Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time

It should come as no surprise that Epicurus held that life is desirable. How could he reason otherwise, given that life is a necessity for the experience of pleasure, and pleasure is what Nature has given us as the goal to pursue?

Some philosophers and religions counsel otherwise, and Epicurus repudiated this point of view:

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’. [127] For if he says this from conviction why does he not pass away out of life? For it is open to him to do so, if he had firmly made up his mind to this. But if he speaks in jest, his words are idle among men who cannot receive them.

  • Letter to Menoeceus

#+end_quoterg

Epicurus also knew that humanity is not only fearful of death, but that we covet so strongly the possibility of living forever that we are constantly tempted by mystical claims offering us false promises of eternal life.

Epicurus saw that he needed to answer the temptation to yearn for eternal life, and that he needed to deal with the concern that the inevitable death of our friends and ourselves constitutes a stain on life which forever spoils our happiness.

Such a negative view of life was unacceptable to Epicurus, and he pointed out that death in fact does not deprive us of nearly so much as we think it does.

As Diogenes of Oinoanda inscribed on his wall in what we now have in fragment 3, we can experience "full" pleasure in this life, even though it ends in death:

#+begin_quote Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted.

However Epicurus' views on this subject have been controversial since ancient times.

Cicero complained to the Epicurean Torquatus in Book 2, Section 27, that:

It may be rejoined that Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, maintains that long duration can not add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if pleasure were everlasting. In this he is grossly inconsistent. He places the Chief Good in pleasure, and yet he says that no greater pleasure would result from a lifetime of endless duration than from a limited and moderate period. If a person finds the sole Good in Virtue, it is open to him to say that the happy life is consummated by the consummation of virtue; for his position is that the Chief Good is not increased by lapse of time. But if one thinks that happiness is produced by pleasure, how can he consistently deny that pleasure is increased by duration? If it is not, pain is not either. Or if pain is worse the longer it lasts, is not pleasure rendered more desirable by continuance? On what ground then does Epicurus speak of the Deity (for so he always does) as happy and everlasting? Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus; each of them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure.

  • Loeb / Rackham translation.

But is the above synopsis by Cicero a fair summary of Epicurus' position? Professor David Sedley argues that it is not, and that Epicurus did in fact take the position that longer pleasure is preferable to shorter pleasure. We'll discuss that today, including comments from Dr. Sedley's article "Epicurean vs. Cyreniac Happiness," in which Dr. Sedley writes:

Eudaimonia, happiness, is a property of a whole life, not of some portion of it. What can this mean for hedonists? For Epicurus, it is made possible by the mind’s capacity to enjoy one’s whole life from any temporal viewpoint: to relive past pleasures and enjoy future ones in anticipation, importantly including confidence in a serene closure. Enjoying your life is like enjoying a day as a whole, not least its sunset. Although pleasure is increased by greater duration (contrary to a more favoured reading), and premature death therefore better avoided, the finitude of human life as such does not lessen its value, and even a premature death need not prevent a life’s being enjoyed as ‘complete’. In this chapter, the above interpretation is documented, explained, and contextualized in terms of Epicurus’ diametrical opposition to his contemporaries, the Cyrenaics.

2. The Question Of Whether Life Is Desirable, And How Long We Need to Live To Experience the Greatest Pleasure Still Matters Today Because:

  1. Other philosphies and religions will argue that it would be better never to have been born (see next section).
  2. Also, there is confusion in Epicurean discussions as to how long we should seek to live. Is it wrong to seek to live a certain number of years, or should we be satisfied with whatever period we have already lived, and not hope for or desire more?

Also, questions appear in articles such as this by Philip Mitis:

Notoriously, however, the Epicurean strongly denies that death in any way diminishes life's pleasures by cutting them short. To many, this has seemed merely perverse. David Furley, for example, dismisses this feature of Epicurus' theory as "dogma without argument" and denies that any surviving Epicurean text offers a defense for this strongly counter-intuitive claim.4 A related objection is raised by Cicero in De Finibus ii. Cicero complains that nothing, in fact, could be more at odds with Epicurus' own hedonism than the claim that death involves no loss or deprivation of hedonic goods (ii 87-88; cf. Plutarch, Non posse 1106bff.). If pleasurable states are what make us happy, Cicero insists, surely we will be happier if we can remain in these states longer. Thus, he wonders, how can death fail to be an evil for Epicureans, if it prevents them from being happy for a longer period of time?

3. What Arguments Are Made By Others That Life Is Not Desirable, Or That We Need To Live Forever?

Note: This section was generated by Chatgpt so the quotes need to be checked.

3.1. 1. Ancient Greek Philosophy

3.1.1. Sophocles (c. 496–406 BCE)

  • In Oedipus at Colonus, the chorus states:

    "Not to be born is best of all, when all is reckoned in."

  • This reflects a pessimistic view of existence, suggesting that life is filled with suffering, and nonexistence is preferable.

3.1.2. Theognis of Megara (6th century BCE)

  • In his elegies, Theognis expresses a similar sentiment:

    "Best of all for mortal beings is never to have been born at all, nor ever to have seen the light of the sun."

3.2. 2. Buddhism

3.2.1. The First Noble Truth (Dukkha)

  • Buddhism teaches that life is characterized by suffering (dukkha). While Buddhism does not explicitly promote anti-natalism, some interpretations suggest that nonexistence may be preferable to the cycle of suffering and rebirth (samsara).

3.2.2. The Parable of the Mustard Seed (Pali Canon)

  • The Buddha reportedly stated that if one fully understood the suffering inherent in existence, they would not wish to be reborn.

3.3. 3. Christianity (Ecclesiastes and the New Testament)

3.3.1. Ecclesiastes 4:2-3 (Old Testament, attributed to Solomon)

"And I declared that the dead, who had already died, are happier than the living, who are still alive. But better than both is the one who has never been born, who has not seen the evil that is done under the sun."

  • This passage reflects a deep existential pessimism, suggesting that witnessing human suffering makes life burdensome.

3.3.2. Jesus on Judas (Matthew 26:24)

"It would have been better for that man if he had not been born."

  • Though this is spoken in reference to Judas Iscariot, it implies that some fates are worse than nonexistence.

3.4. 4. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860, German Pessimism)

  • Schopenhauer believed that existence is characterized by suffering and that life is fundamentally an error.

  • In The World as Will and Representation, he states:

    "Human existence must be some kind of mistake."

  • He praised Buddhism and ascetic traditions for their rejection of worldly attachment and suffering.

3.5. 5. Emil Cioran (1911–1995, Existential Pessimism)

  • Cioran, a Romanian-French philosopher, took Schopenhauer's pessimism even further.

  • In The Trouble with Being Born, he writes:

    "Not to be born is undoubtedly the best plan of all. Unfortunately, it is within no one’s reach."

  • He viewed life as absurd and saw birth as an imposition.

3.6. 6. David Benatar (Contemporary Anti-Natalism)

  • In Better Never to Have Been (2006), Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm due to the inevitability of suffering.
  • His asymmetry argument states that:
    • The presence of suffering is bad.
    • The absence of suffering is good (even if no one experiences it).
    • The presence of pleasure is good.
    • The absence of pleasure is not bad (if there is no one to miss it).
  • This leads him to conclude that it is always better never to have been born.

3.7. Conclusion

Many traditions—philosophical, religious, and literary—have entertained the notion that nonexistence might be preferable to life, often due to the inevitability of suffering. While some, like Schopenhauer and Cioran, embrace this view fully, others, such as Buddhism and Christianity, use it to highlight the need for transcendence, salvation, or enlightenment rather than outright anti-natalism.

4. What Arguments Are Made By Epicureans That Life Is Desirable, But That We Do Not Need To Live Forever In Order To Experience The Greatest Pleasure?

4.1. Life is Desirable

"And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well."

  • Letter to Menoeceus 126

4.2. "The Highest Degree Of Pleasure Is Defined By The Removal Of All Pain" Which Is A Reference to "The Limit of Pleasure"

This is explained by Torquatus in Book One of Cicero's On Ends:

Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“

  • On Ends Book One, 38

And in turn this definition is based on the statement found in Principal Doctrine Three:

PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.

  • On Ends Book One, 56

Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”

  • On Ends Book Two, 9

Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Clearly the same, he says, and indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be.” (Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. Cic. Fin. 2.11)

  • On Ends, Book Two, 11

“This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”

  • On Ends Book Two, 16

Aulus Gellius' explains Epicurus' phrasing this way:

9 But concerning inlaudatus it seems possible to give two answers. One is of this kind: There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari). And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb: Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose. 10 But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as freedom from all reproach makes one inculpatus (blameless). Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. 11 It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example: “And not unwillingly they charged,” and again:15 “Not then would you divine Atrides see Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight.” 12 Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words:16 “The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains.” 13 Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool “unlovely.”14 For just as he expressed abhorrence of the “unpraised” man by the denial of praise, 15 so he abhorred the “unlovable” by the denial of love. 16 Another defence of inlaudatus is this: laudare in early Latin means “to name” and “cite.” Thus in civil actions they use laudare of an authority, when he is cited. 17 Conversely, the inlaudatus is the same as p141 the inlaudabilis, namely, one who is worthy neither of mention nor remembrance, and is never to be named; 18 as, for example, in days gone by the common council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention the name of the man who had burned the temple of Diana at Ephesus.18

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights

4.3. Beyond the Limit, Pleasure is Not "Greater" Except In Terms of More Variety

Epicurus explains to us that his philosophy allows us to see that no matter how long we live, unlimited time can contain no "greater" pleasure than limited time. This is because time (duration) is only one aspect of pleasure. It makes no more sense for us to seek the longest time of life as the greatest pleasure as it would for us to measure the largest quantity of food at a banquet as being the best way to eat. While time is a relevant dimension, time is not at all the complete picture of pleasure, because pleasure involves not just time but intensity, and the part of the our experience that is affected; and in the end the "best" pleasure is a subjective assessment. Epicurus tells us we can see this by considering the person at a banquet, as already mentioned. Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus that the wise man at a banquet will choose not the most food, but the best food, and held that our desire should not be for the longest life, but the most pleasant life.

PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

4.4. Variety Too Is Desirable, But Variety Is Not Necessarily Pleasurable, Nor Does Variety Constitute Greater Pleasure, Nor Is Variety Alone Enough To Justify Living Longer When Pain Outweighs Pleasure

  • Variety Is Desirable. Some people find variety to be desirable ("variety is the spice of life") but others do not. Variety is therefore not necessarily pleasurable.
  • Variety cannot increase the size of the vessel so as to allow a greater total amount of pleasure to be experienced.
  • Variety cannot itself justify living longer when pain outweighs pleasure.

The basic point is that there is nothing wrong with variety, and indeed variety is itself desirable. However variety alone cannot outweigh pain that exceeds pleasure so it makes sense to reconcile oneself to a limited life span when (due to age or unfortunate and irreversible circumstance) pain becomes too severe.)

  • Potential citations:
    • Torquatus' reference to leaving the theatre when the play ceases to please us.
    • Epicureans who ended their lives when they became intolerable (Atticus, Cassius, Demotimus sp?)
    • Epicurus himself not wishing to live further (apparently / maybe)

4.5. If We View Our Lives From The Perspective of Nature, We Can And Should Be Satisfied When We Are Full

Lucretius makes the argument this way near the end of Book Three:

[931] Again, suppose that the nature of things should of a sudden lift up her voice, and thus in these words herself rebuke some one of us: ‘Why is death so great a thing to thee, mortal, that thou dost give way overmuch to sickly lamentation? why groan and weep at death? For if the life that is past and gone has been pleasant to thee, nor have all its blessings, as though heaped in a vessel full of holes, run through and perished unenjoyed, why dost thou not retire like a guest sated with the banquet of life, and with calm mind embrace, thou fool, a rest that knows no care? But if all thou hast reaped hath been wasted and lost, and life is a stumbling-block, why seek to add more, all to be lost again foolishly and pass away unenjoyed; why not rather make an end of life and trouble? For there is naught more, which I can devise or discover to please thee: all things are ever as they were. If thy body is not yet wasted with years, nor thy limbs worn and decayed, yet all things remain as they were, even if thou shouldst live on to overpass all generations, nay rather, if thou shouldst never die.’ What answer can we make, but that nature brings a just charge against us, and sets out in her pleading a true plaint?

[952] But if now some older man, smitten in years, should make lament, and pitifully bewail his decease more than is just, would she not rightly raise her voice and chide him in sharp tones? ‘Away with tears henceforth, thou rogue, set a bridle on thy laments. Thou hast enjoyed all the prizes of life and now dost waste away. But because thou yearnest ever for what is not with thee, and despisest the gifts at hand, uncompleted and unenjoyed thy life has slipped from thee, and, ere thou didst think it, death is standing by thy head, before thou hast the heart to depart filled and sated with good things. Yet now give up all these things so ill-fitted for thy years, and with calm mind, come, yield them to thy sons: for so thou must.’

She would be right, I trow, in her plea, right in her charge and chiding. For the old ever gives place thrust out by new things, and one thing must be restored at the expense of others: nor is any one sent down to the pit and to black Tartarus. There must needs be substance that the generations to come may grow; yet all of them too will follow thee, when they have had their fill of life; yea, just as thyself, these generations have passed away before, and will pass away again. So one thing shall never cease to rise up out of another, and life is granted to none for freehold, to all on lease.

Look back again to see how the past ages of everlasting time, before we are born, have been as naught to us. These then nature holds up to us as a mirror of the time that is to come, when we are dead and gone. Is there aught that looks terrible in this, aught that seems gloomy? Is it not a calmer rest than any sleep?

…

[1003] Then to feed for ever the ungrateful nature of the mind, to fill it full with good things, yet never satisfy it, as the seasons of the year do for us, when they come round again, and bring their fruits and their diverse delights, though we are never filled full with the joys of life, this, I trow, is the story of the maidens in the flower of youth, who pile the water into the vessel full of holes, which yet can in no way be filled full.

…

[1076] Again, what evil craving for life is this which constrains, us with such force to live so restlessly in doubt and danger? Verily, a sure end of life is ordained for mortals, nor can we avoid death, but we must meet it. Moreover, we move ever, we spend our time amid the same things, nor by length of life is any new pleasure hammered out. But so long as we have not what we crave, it seems to surpass all else; afterward, when that is ours, we crave something else, and the same thirst for life besets us ever, open-mouthed. It is uncertain too what fortune time to come may carry to us, or what chance may bring us, or what issue is at hand. Nor in truth by prolonging life do we take away a jot from the time of death, nor can we subtract anything whereby we may be perchance less long dead. Therefore you may live on to close as many generations as you will: yet no whit the less that everlasting death will await you, nor will he for a less long time be no more, who has made an end of life with today’s light, than he who perished many months or years ago.

4.6. A Mental Process Is Required To Understand That Unlimited Time Does Not Provide "Greater" Pleasure

The insights being discussed here are not self-evident, but require a process of reasoning to understand them. Epicurus highlights this in several ways:

PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.

PD21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

Lucretius emphasizes that what is required is not simple observation, but an understanding of the laws of nature:

Bailey: [146] This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature; whose first rule shall take its start for us from this, that nothing is ever begotten of nothing by divine will.

5. Final Comments

When you remember the Epicurean worldview that there is no supernatural god, no absolute virtue or right and wrong to which we must conform, we can see that the decision as to what is the best life - the most complete life for us - is a matter for us to decide, and that time is neither the most important factor nor the determiner of our decision. Epicurus teaches us to compare our lives to a banquet, or to a jar that we are filling with water. What we should want to do is not to eat the most food, or continue pouring water into the jar after it is full, but to see that the "fullness of pleasure" and the completeness of life is something that we can retain despite our limited lifespans. No jar can be filled more full than full, and no life can be made more complete than complete: once we see that our target is a "complete" life, then "variation" - or the continuous adding-on of new pleasurable experiences – does not make the experience any more pleasant. And since it is pleasure that Nature gives us as our goal, Epicurean philosophy gives us a fighting chance - if we work to understand it and apply it properly - to consider our lives to be complete and in no need of unlimited time.

This harks back to the argument from Philebus about the "limit" of pleasure. "Limit" has multiple meanings and so does any variation of "greater." Unless you add something extra such as "in every respect" then it's going to be a very fair reading to acknowledge that what you're saying is "greater" is not greater "in every respect." What Epicurus is talking about is the limit of Pleasure, but pleasure has many aspects, of which one is time, and not all pleasures are equal in time or in many other respects.

And that's where you come back to what Epicurus said to Menoeceus that just as the wise man does not choose the most food, but the most pleasant food, the wise man does not choose the longest life, but the most pleasant.

That right there is a clear illustration. The food the wise man chooses is better to him, but not more in quantity, and the time the wise man chooses more pleasant for him, but not longer in time.

But the difference in quantity of food and length of time is not physically abolished by the choice of the wise man. The wise man is simply intentionally choosing to ignore the quantity difference and the time difference. because he has mentally chosen to recognize that the pleasantness is more important to him than the extra time or the extra quantity.

So that's why I think Long and Sedley are clearly correct: Epicurus would recognize that length of time is something that can definitely be desirable, but it is not the overriding factor. The overriding factor is what you choose to feel and recognize as the most pleasant for you. The mind can influence what it finds pleasurable even more than can the body.

So it is perfectly proper to say "infinite time contains no greater time than finite time" on the grounds that the "greater" you are talking about is what you deem to be "the most pleasant." What is "most pleasant" for you is something that you can choose to recognize as something that doesn't necessarily get better with significantly more time.

One example is standing on the tip of the mountaintop - the more time you spend there the less you're likely to want to stay.

So I would say too that this is why Epicurus is saying several times that you get to this recognition through "reason" and through "the mind." The body itself is not able to figure this out, nor is someone who doesn't have the benefit of Epicurean philosophy and who thinks that unlimited time will necessarily allow him to reach greater heights of pleasure.

This view of duration totally gets rid of fear, and that's very important. But not everyone is as subject to "fear" as are others, and it is perfectly legitimate and in fact natural when you are young to take the position - "I am not afraid of death or anything else – I simply want to understand how to spend my life."

And Epicurus has the answer that "time" or "duration" is not at all the overriding factor in making your choices. You can in fact live like "a god among men" not only because you not afraid of death, but because you are confident that you are able to obtain whatever is the greatest pleasure for you in the time that you have.

5.1. DeWitt's Views

DeWitt has the following to say in Chapter 13, the New Hedonism, from Epicurus and His Philosophy.

5.1.1. Pleasure Is Not Increased by Immortality

At the same time that the denial of immortality resulted in placing body and soul upon a parity and required the formulation of a dualistic good, it demanded a doctrinal counterpoise for the surrender of belief in immortality. That this surrender was recognized in the reasoning of Epicurus as a further delimitation of the scope of pleasure is indicated by the position of the Authorized Doctrine in which the remedial doctrine is stated; it is No. 19 and follows that on the ceilings of pleasure: "Infinite time and finite time are characterized by equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason." This is both paradoxical and subtle. It is shocking to Christian feeling and was hardly less so to the pagan of antiquity. To the multitude, as Lucretius observed, it was a gloomy and repulsive thought. To Platonists, with their stately, elaborate, and mystical eschatology, it must have seemed like nihilism.

Its subtlety is equally manifest. As will presently be shown, Epicurus maintained that pleasure is not altered in kind by the fact of duration or extension; here he declares that it is not increased in quantity. All pleasures have fixed ceilings and fixed magnitudes. When in the words of the Doctrine he speaks of "measuring the limits of pleasure by reason," he means recognition of the fact that for the body health and the expectation of its continuance is the limit of pleasure, and that for the mind the limit is the emancipation from all fear of the gods or death. The attainment to this state, he now declares, is a condition of one dimension. He seems to think of it as an Alpinist would regard the ascent of an arduous mountain peak. The pleasure would not be increased by remaining on the peak.

5.1.2. The Fullness of Pleasure

It is possible, however, to arrive at a higher degree of precision, always a chief objective in the reasoning of Epicurus. This higher precision depends upon discerning the subsidiary doctrine of the fullness of pleasure. For this there is a double logical basis: the first basis is the infinity of time, from which it is deduced that there can be nothing new. As the Epicurean Ecclesiastes expresses it, 1:9: "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun." Lucretius reminds us in similar vein "that all things are always the same" and "no new pleasure can be devised." From this it follows that the exhaustion of pleasures is feasible and the fullness of pleasure is attainable.

The second basis of this subsidiary doctrine is the existence of natural ceilings of pleasure, which, being thus limited, could be enjoyed to the full. Out of this was begotten the familiar metaphor of the aged sage as taking leave of life like a satisfied banqueter. This theme was chosen by Lucretius for the ringing finale of his third book; he personifies Nature and represents her as rebuking the complainer because he cannot depart "as a guest who has had his fill of life" or "as one who is full and has had his fill of experience." The wise man, on the contrary, can say bene vixi, "I have lived the good life." This is the cry of triumph uttered by old Diogenes of Oenoanda; to quote his own words: "Facing the sunset of life because of my age and on the verge of taking my leave of life with a paean of victory because of the enjoyment of the fullness of all pleasures."

If still further precision on this topic be sought, it may be observed that this doctrine of the fullness of pleasure is supplementary to the doctrine that death is anesthesia. The latter may help to reconcile men to the state of being dead but it fails to compensate for the surrender of immortality. Only the possibility of having enjoyed all pleasures to the full in this life can counterbalance the relinquishment of the hope of enjoying eternal pleasures in the afterlife. This is the "true understanding" of which Epicurus speaks: "Hence the true understanding of the fact that death is nothing to us renders enjoyable the mortality of existence, not by adding infinite time but by taking away the yearning for immortality." What cancels the yearning for immortality is the conviction that the fullness of pleasure is possible in this mortal life. The ingenuity of this argument is undeniable; it means the victory over death, and we have proof of its wide acceptance in the vigor with which St. Paul in his ardent plea to the Corinthians champions the resurrection of the dead as a new means of victory over death.

Incidentally, without close scrutiny it is difficult to discern by what sort of logic this doctrine could be reconciled with the perfect blissfulness of the gods. If pleasure is not increased by the length of its duration, how could the lot of the gods seem more desirable than that of the mortal sage? With this problem Epicurus did not fail to deal. The topic must await detailed treatment in the ensuing chapter on the True Piety. Here it will suffice to say that the superiority of the happiness of the gods is represented as consisting in the perfect assurance of its continuance. Involved with this judgment is a startling paradox: what renders the happiness of the gods eternal is this perfect assurance of its continuance; its eternity is a result, not a factor of causation. It is a quality of life.

The paradox that ranks major to this, that happiness is not increased in magnitude by immortality, has found its way into Western thought through the literature of consolation. Obviously, if happiness is not increased by immortality, neither can it be increased by length of mortal life. The philosopher Seneca expatiates upon this inferred aspect of the doctrine, though without mentioning its source, and comforts his correspondent by dwelling feelingly upon the wisdom of measuring a human life by its achievement rather than its length. In the course of this homily he compares the long and merely vegetative life to that of a tree and this detail survives for us in the poem of Ben Jonson which begins,

It is not growing like a tree, in bulk, Doth make man better be.

But the last lines of the poem hark back definitely to Epicurus:

In small proportions we just beauty see And in small measure life may perfect be.

The sentiment recurs in Christian hymnology:

He liveth long who liveth well.

Such is often the fate of Epicurus, to be quoted anonymously if approved, by name if condemned.

5.2. Notes as to Epicureans WERE arguing against fear of premature death:

  • From the Mitsis article, footnote 8:

In her response, Striker argues that Epicurean arguments are meant to allay only the fear of mortality, not the fear of premature death. As she notes, however, it is puzzling to find the former and not the latter fear described as a constant source of disturbance in our lives. Moreover, I would argue that Lucretius' opening vignette at iii 894ff clearly describes a case of premature death. In this passage, death interrupts the domestic joys of someone in the prime of life. The references to small children and being a praesidium (cf. ii 643) for one's family clearly indicate that Lucretius is thinking of a sudden, premature death. This is reinforced by the strong Homeric echoes in this passage which conjure up images of Hector (cf. Iliad vi 450-465). Similarly, at iii 1085, Lucretius argues that the length of our lives is at the mercy of fortune. Again, he recognizes the possibility of premature death, without, however, suggesting that it offers any grounds for fear (cf. Ad Men. 126ff., DRN iii 1078). Striker is no doubt right that Epicureans are concerned with alleviating our fear of mortality. But these passages show that they also are engaged in the more difficult project of eliminating the fear of premature death.

Mitsis page 317

There are several things to notice about this objection. First, the Epicurean can argue that even if happiness and desire require this kind of active, forward-looking engagement,31 there is still no justification for having any special concern with future non-existence. If death robs us of time in which we could be busily engaging in various projects, prenatal non-existence does so as well. For instance, if I had been born in 1952 instead of in 1953, 1 would have had an extra year in which I could have been actively engaged with the world, planning long-term projects. The direction of time and causality is not necessarily called into question by Lucretius' symmetry argument.32 What is called into question is our lack of concern about these earlier lost possibilities for action. Nor can we justify any asymmetry in our attitudes by claiming that death can interrupt activites that we value, while prenatal non-existence cannot. Prenatal nonexistence can affect our future possibilities for acting no less than death can; and it is not clear why our attitudes in such cases should be any different from our attitudes about having our projects interrupted by death.

Long and Sedley's position, as stated by Mitsis:

In closing, I want to return briefly to Epicurus' claim about the unimportance of duration in rational assessments of the overall pleasantness of our lives (KD 19-21 ). Cicero takes Epicurus to be clearly (though wrongly) denying that pleasure is increased by duration (voluptatem crescere longinquitate) or rendered more valuable by its continuance (De Fin. ii 83). Recently, several scholars have resisted Cicero's interpretation because they take Epicurus to be claiming something much less bewildering about the role of duration in our evaluation of pleasures. Long and Sedley, for instance, argue that Epicurus does not mean to assert that time has no bearing at all in assessing quantities of pleasure. Rather, in their view, he is claiming that we can experience the same level of pleasure in a finite or infinite time.36 Pleasure is something with clear natural limits and we can reach these limits as soon as we understand them sufficiently. Epicurus is thus merely observing that we do not need an infinite amount of time to come to such an understanding; nor could any particular complete experience of pleasure reach more intense levels, even if we repeated it an infinite number of times.

On this interpretation, Epicurus must still admit that death can cut short and hence harm the happiness of mortals enjoying even these most complete levels of pleasure. He might therefore readily acknowledge that a long, happy life is preferable to a short, happy one. Long's and Sedley's reading has obvious attractions inasmuch as it leaves Epicurus with a much less paradoxical claim to defend. It also, however, leaves him without a leg to stand on in claiming that death in no way diminishes the complete happiness of mortals (cf. KD 20: w5 ÈÀÀ£ÍTCouoá n Tou apuyroi) (3iov xaTeaTpecpev). Moreover, if Epicurus believes, as they contend, that a long, happy life is better than a short, happy one,37 he would need to ascribe some value to the repetition of particular pleasures. Although pleasures cannot be intensified when repeated, the Epicurean still must acknowledge, on their view, that the overall pleasantness of one's life can be increased by such repetitions and by the ongoing satisfaction of desires. Lucretius, however, takes great pains to refute just such a view of pleasure and desire (iii 944-45; cf. iii 1003ff., 1081ff.). Once our desires are satisfied and we reach a state of katastematic equilibrium, nothing of value can be added to our pleasure. Nor would we gain anything by prolonging such a state. The completeness of life and pleasure is independent of duration.38

6. Takeaway Conclusions

  1. Life is desirable, and in general terms for the wise man who is able to find more reason for joy than for vexation, it is desirable to continue to live.
  2. The limit of pleasure is reached when our entire experience is filled with pleasure with no mixture of pain. This is a description which includes the person as a whole, but which does not describe the duration, intensity, or parts of the body affected by the pleasures which the individual person is experiencing.
  3. The limit of pleasure is analogous to a vessel which is filled to the brim - new pleasures can be poured into the vessel and the contents of the vessel are therefore varied, but the total amount of pleasure held by the vessel is not increased.
  4. This understanding that an unlimited time is not required in order to experience the greatest pleasure comes through proper mental training in philosophy, and - just as the body has no understanding of its own apart from the mind - the body cannot appreciate this insight apart from the mind.

7. Notes:

8. EpicureanFriends.com

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