Lucretius Today Episode 256 - Epicurean Gods: Real, Or Ideal Thought Constructs?

1.1. From the Introduction to "Epicurus and The Epicurean Tradition" edited by Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders":

2.1. We want to know what Epicurus thought and taught so we can understand where he was coming from.

2.2. We want to apply Epicurean philosophy today so we need to have an opinion on whether what Epicurus taught in respect to gods is obsolete.

3.1. Does Knowledge of the Gods Come Solely Through Prolepsis?

1. Are the gods a unique example of a prolepsis with propositional content?
   
2. Is there a prolepsis of pleasure that sheds light on prolepsis of gods?
   

   Page 38 of the Sedley article: There should, at least, be no resistance to the idea that in Epicurean eyes some true attitudes and evaluations are embodied in, and attested by, our innate predispositions. The obvious parallel is the innate leaning towards pleasure as the object to pursue, said by Torquatus, Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman in De finibus, to manifest itself in our behaviour from the moment of birth (Fin. 1.30). In this ‘cradle argument’ our innate predispo sition to treat pleasure as the goal is cited as sufficient evidence that pleasure is indeed the goal. And that is strongly reminiscent of the way our innate predisposition to think of the gods as existing with certain characteristics is cited as proving that the gods do exist and do have those characteristics. We have here, then, some encouragement to persist with the hypothesis that the doctrine of innate belief in god is authentically Epicurean.

   So far the parallelism does not extend to the inclusion of an innate prolêpsis. However, as Torquatus immediately goes on to attest (1.31), some Epicureans did interpret Epicurus’ argument for pleasure’s being the goal as invoking a prolêpsis:

   However, some of our school want to refine this doctrine, and deny that sensation should be left to be the criterion of what is good or what is bad. Instead, they maintain, it can be understood by the mind’s reasoning both that pleasure is to be sought for its own sake and that pain is to be avoided for its own sake. To this end, they say that there is as it were a natural idea implanted in our souls (quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem).

3.2. Does Knowledge Of The Gods Come Through Images?

3.3. Does Knowledge Of The Gods Come Through Deductive Reasoning?

3.4. Do Epicurean Gods Have Physical Realities Independent of Us Thinking About Them, Or Are the Gods Simply Constructions Of Our Minds, As Is The Concept Of "Justice"?

4.1. The Idealist argument is presented by David Sedley in Chapter 3 of Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition in the article "Epicurus' Theological Innatism."

4.2. The Realist argument is presented by David Konstan in Chapter 4 of the same book in the article "Epicurus and The Gods".

5.1. Idealists take Epicurus' idea to have been that gods are our own graphic idealization of the life to which we aspire, and that the simulacra identified with them are simply those on which, by the standard Epicurean process of visualization (more on this below), we choose to focus our minds in order to enjoy the image of such perfection.

5.2. Idealism takes Epicurus to recognize that gods were not needed in his atomic system, and therefore he reduced the gods to projections of human thought. (p.29,par. 2)

5.3. Dr. Sedley gives special emphasis in this article to the "innateness" of religious belief. (p.30, par 1)

5.4. The innateness argument starts with Velleius' references to proplepsis. It is the main purpose of [Dr. Sedley's] paper to argue that Cicero's interpretation (as stated through Velleius) that knowledge of the gods is inborn is correct. (p.31. par 1)

5.5. Note that Dr. Sedley says that "Greek usage of prolepsis does not normally give it a propositional context." (p.32, par.7) However in this instance Dr. Sedley interprets Velleius' argument as giving prolepsis propositional implications (p.33, par. 1)

5.6. Dr. Sedley believes that Cicero's inclusion of the "universal consent" argument by Cicero is defensible.

5.7. Dr. Sedley calls the prolepsis of the gods an "innate predisposition." (p.38, par. 2) Dr. Sedley says that there is an obvious parallel with the innate disposition leaning toward pleasure, and he cites Torquatus in saying that some in our school maintain as to pleasure that there is a "natural idea implanted in our souls" to make us realize that pleasure is to be pursued and pain avoided. (p.38. par. 2)

5.8. Dr. Sedley says that we should not let the apparent conflict with Diogenes Laertius's description of prolepsis as coming from outsideconcern us, (p.40, par.3-4) We can resolve this problem by noting that to be dispositionally innate does not mean that the concept arises all at once, only that there is a disposition to develop it over time in response to outside stimulus. Also, we can point to Philodemus, who says that the gods are not sensible but they are intelligible. (p.42) Dr. Sedley sees atoms as anothe example of something Epicurus held to be intelligible but not sensible. Dr. Sedley says "The gods may in this regard be unique, the only intelligible objects of a prolepsis." (p.43, par.1) (Here he cites a reconstruction of a passage of Philodemus by Dirk Obbink)

5.9. Dr. Sedley finds support for prolepsis of gods being formed (despite no exposure to them) in Lucretius 5:1169, recounting of the history of early mankind and men having dreams of the gods. (p 44)

5.10. Dr. Sedley asks how did this predisposition (to process dreams this way) arise? "All animals have an innate desire to maximize their own pleasure, and for human beings that maximization is identifiable with a life of blessed tranquility untainted by fear of death." The gods are an ideal model of just such a life. Each of us has an innate propensity to imagine - and in particular to dream of - the being we would ideally like to become." (p.49, par 1)

5.11. Dr. Sedley says:

5.12. Dr. Sedley rejects the contention that Epicurus' loyal followers with full access to his works could not possibly have misunderstood him. He thinks this happens all the time in religion, including as to Plato's Timaeus.

5.13. Dr. Sedley thinks that Epicurus is primarily telling people how to think about gods, not that they have a physical existence. And he thinks that Epicurus would not mind if his later readers misunderstood him.

6.1. In this chapter, I defend (once again) the view that the Epicurean gods are real, in the sense that they exist as atomic compounds and possess the properties that pertain to the concept, or prolˆepsis, that people have of them. (p.53, par 1)

6.2. Epicurus flatly declares in the letter to Menoeceus that "there are gods," and this position is echoed by all subsequent Epicureans who have pronounced on the matter. (p.53, par 1) (He cites Philodemus, Lucretius, Demetrius Laco)

6.3. The only reason anyone can plausibly argue that gods are "thought constructs" is:

1. (1) the idea of an incorruptible god would seem to contradict Epicurean physics, and
   
   1. (contradicts the idea that nothing but atoms is indestructible)
      
2. (2) it is not clear how even if we get images from the gods that we know that gods are blessed and immortal. (p.54, par 1-2)
   
   1. (no matter how long we observed images of the gods we can't be sure that they are immortal (we die first).
      

6.4. As to gods being incorruptible:

1. Lucretius says that some animals maintain their bodies for long periods of time in equilibrium, so the Epicureans likely saw no reason that this could not be extended indefinitely. (p.55, par 1) Lucretius says at 819: "If by chance the preferred supposition is that the soul is to be considered immortal because it is fortified and protected by the forces of life, or because things fatal to its existence never approach it, or because those that do approach it are repulsed by some means before they can inflict any injury upon us . . ." "Wigodsky argues that the gods maintain their corporeal integrity by means of their superior psychic control, and may be conceived of as ‘a species which is as far in advance of us in bodily self-control as we are of the animals in emotional self-control’." (p.57)
   
2. As for damage from outside, blows, Konstan says "The answer, I think, is that the gods are composed of such fine material that streams of ordinary atoms simply pass through them, without inflicting any damage." (p.57)
   
3. As to the intermundia," what reason is there to locate them at a distance from our own cosmos, or in those spaces that Epicurus (Ep. Pyth. 89) identifies as XXXXX or ‘the space between cosmoi’, and which Cicero (Fin. 2.75, ND 1.18) labels intermundia?" (p.58, par 4) "Perhaps, however, these lines refer not to a different location in space – Lucretius, after all, does not speak of intermundia – but simply to a different kind of habitation, one that could be conceived of as intersecting with our own, in the same way that the ultra-fine simulacra of the gods pass through our world like neutrinos, unaffected by contact (though they must make an impression at least on the finest particles that constitute the human mind, or else they would not be knowable by us at all)." (p.59. par 3) "Philodemus’ own view, as I understand the text (9,42–10,2), is that the gods would not be in peril even if they did mingle with things subject to generation and destruction. If they do dwell in more remote locations, it may be simply because they choose to do so. More than this it is impossible to conclude, I think, given the state of the papyrus." (p.60 par. 2)
   

6.5. As to how a concept of blessed and imperishable gods arose in the human mind:

1. First, pathe are infallible: It follows, I believe, that the pathe are infallible, in the same way, and for the same reason, that ‘all sensations are true’ for Epicurus. One can no more be in error about whether one feels pain or pleasure than one can be mistaken about hearing a sound or seeing a colour. The information provided by the senses is on a par with that provided by receptors of pleasure and pain, however they may be presumed to function. (p 61, par 2)
   
2. Konstan argues that prolepsis, like pathe, is infallible, and not "true" or "false." Epicurus is in this same passage said to assert that ‘preconceptions are always clear (+)’: as far as I can judge, the Epicureans reserved the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ for what they called ) and )D, which we may render as ‘belief’ and ‘supposition’, two psychic processes that surely involve the rational part of the soul. According to Diogenes (ibid.), Epicurus further specifies that what is believable (, )) ‘depends upon a previous thing that is clear, to which we refer it when we say, “How do we know whether this is a human being?”’ The thing that is clear must, I think, be a prolˆepsis. The upshot is that beliefs, which may be true or false, depend on prolˆepseis, which are clear; and prolˆepseis, in turn, result from the memory of repeated sensations, which are infallible. We can add a further detail: while a prolˆepsis depends on sense impressions, it is usually triggered by a word or name: when we hear a word, then, in accord with a prolˆepsis, we conceive of an imprint (") of a thing, and in this process ‘the senses lead’.
   
3. Konstan describes how false opinion arises from prolepsis on page 62-63, for example: "It is true that, according to Diogenes (10.33), Epicurus speaks of recognizing ‘the shape (0!) of a horse or a cow by way of prolˆepsis’. In terms of distinguishing a cow from a horse, that may well be sufficient, although it would hardly be enough to specify what a horse is. In any case, the repeated sense impressions that result in a prolˆepsis of a human being must include evidence of rational behaviour, not just of the human form. Since no such sequence of sensations occurs in the case of horses, the belief that a horse is rational represents an erroneous addition to whatever prolˆepsis we have of that creature; we must, accordingly, return to the prolˆepsis and eliminate the false belief, just as we should do if we falsely ascribe immortality to human beings or corruptibility and the absence of blessedness to the gods."
   
4. Konstan argues "there is no need to posit an innate disposition to perceive gods as immortal and happy as the basis for the prolepsis that we form from simulacra that impinge on the mind." (p.66. par 1)
   
5. Konstan argues that "innate" does not mean "inborn" but rather "grown upon" or "developed." The basic meaning of innatus, an adjective derived from the past participle of innascor, is not so much ‘innate’ or ‘inborn’ as ‘grown upon’ or ‘developed’. Thus, a character in Terence’s Hecyra (l. 543) describes the vice of associating with hetaerae as one developed (innatum) in adolescence: not ‘innate’, but naturally occurring at a certain age. So too, Pyrgopolyneices, the braggart soldier in Plautus’ Miles gloriosus, declares (l. 1063): ‘avarice has never developed in me (non mihi avaritia umquam innatast), for I have riches enough’. He does not mean that he was born without the trait, but rather that, thanks to the wealth he acquired as a mercenary, it has had no occasion to emerge.45 Turning to Cicero himself, in Top. 69 he explains that one type of comparison of worth involves the case in which things desirable in themselves are preferred to those desired for the sake of something else, in the same way that things that are ‘grafted and grown upon’ another are preferred to those that are added on and accidental (ut innata atque insita assumptis atque adventiciis), pure things to those that are mixed, necessary to unnecesary, and the like. Note here that the order of innata and insita is the reverse of that in the passage in ND, which suggests that there is no significant difference in emphasis between the two terms; the contrast is between traits or parts that pertain to a thing essentially and merely accidental accretions." (p.67)
   
6. Konstan says "Both terms are compatible with the idea that knowledge of the gods is something people acquire over time, as they mature; there is no suggestion, I think, of innateness in the sense of a concept or even a disposition that is present in the mind from the very moment of birth." (p.68)
   
7. Konstan says: "To sum up: the images of the gods that early people perceived, whether awake or asleep, were clear enough, but were already overlaid by interpretation and hence were vulnerable to error. The prolˆepsis of the gods’ indestructibility is formed, rather, in tandem with that of their perfect tranquillity or blessedness, directly on the evidence of (mental) perception." (p.69)
   

6.6. As to the contention that the images that are responsible for this prolepsis necessarily derive from actually existing deities, as opposed to arising in some other way, theree are at least four such alternative explanations:

1. (1) The first is Sextus Empiricus’ statement (Adv. math. 9.45) that our idea of the gods’ eternity and blessedness is nothing but an extrapolation from images of long-lived and happy human beings, like the notion we have of Cyclopes – an explanation that Sextus himself challenges (9.47) on the grounds of circularity, since in order to recognize perfect happiness in human beings we need first to have formed a concept of it on the basis of our knowledge of the gods." (p.69)
   
2. (2) The second alternative is that our belief in the gods arises from a conflation or ‘coalescence’, in Obbink’s expression, of images from different sources, like the idea we have of centaurs and other hybrid creatures. (p.69)
   
3. (3) Conceivably, the gods exist simply as simulacra, effluences that drift through the universe and produce a prolepsis when they impinge on human minds. We may imagine certain loci in the universe where free-floating atoms are configured in the appropriate way, without there being an abiding entity that generates them. Think of the images produced by a warped lens, for example; some such cosmic prism might theoretically be a source of simulacra that could yield a conception of beings wholly imperturbable and immune to pain, and so appearing to be immortal. (p.70)
   
4. (4) Finally, there is the view that the gods are second-order abstractions: real enough, in their way, but what Epicurus would describe as XXXXX or an accident of atomic combinations, rather than a concretely existing thing. Thus, Dirk Obbink states: ‘Knowledge of the gods, like that of virtues, mathematics, qualities, etc. constitutes a reality that supervenes on corporeal physical existence. It is true, of course, that Epicurus posited a prolˆepsis of justice, for example, to which there corresponds no physical object. But surely the analogous case would be a concept of divinity or the divine, not of gods; yet, the prolˆepsis we have, according to Epicurus, is of the gods as blessed and indestructible animals or creatures. This can only derive from the repeated impact of simulacra from gods. (p.70)
   

6.7. Konstan concludes: We are left, then, with these simulacra as the source of the prolepsis we have of the gods. A continuous stream of them impinges on our minds, sufficiently rich in content to convey the gods’ blessedness and incorruptibility. When we say the word ‘god’ in response to a given (presumably mental) stimulus, it activates the relevant impression or xxxx, and if we refer this impression to the right prolepsis, we can correctly judge by this criterion the nature of the object that produced it. (p.71)

7.1. What Epicurus Had To Say

7.2. What Lucretius Had To Say

7.3. What Cicero Preserved Through Velleius

7.4. What Philodemus Had To Say

1. Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, fragment VI (Usener152 )
   

   "He will be frank with the one who has erred and even with him who responds with bitterness. Therefore, Epíkouros too, when Leonteús, because of Pythoklês, did not admit belief in gods, reproached Pythoklês in moderation, and wrote to him {i.e., Leonteús} the so-called 'famous letter' taking his point of departure from Pythoklês…"

7.5. What Diogenes of Oinoanda Had To Say

7.6. What Diogenes Laertius Had To Say

7.7. What Sextus Empiricus Had To Say

1. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat Page 96
   

   Page 13 of the PDF: Finally, we must turn to the difference between the preconception of natural species, like animal, horse, and cow and the more specific preconception of the gods. It is clear that the prolepsis of the gods is a special case, but to what extent and how does this affect the Epicurean conception of the prolepsis? A passage from Sextus Empiricus seems to be quite illuminating. The passage belongs to the chapter “on the gods” of Sextus’ Against the Physicists and describes how, according to Epicurus, “the gods were conceived” (ἐνοήθησαν οἱ θεοί) and men formed “a thought of the gods” (νόησις θεῶν). 48 Sextus does not mention the prolepsis, but there is no doubt that Epicurus admitted a prolepsis of the gods, since he mentions such a prolepsis in Ep. Men., 123-124, so that Cicero is clearly not mistaken. 49 And yet, one may wonder whether everything that Sextus describes as a thought of the gods is a prolepsis.

7.8. Oxyrhynchos Paypus 215

7.9. Demetrius Lacon

7.10. Plato - Phaedrus

8.1. Norman DeWitt

8.2. David Glidden

8.3. Jean-Baptist Guirinat

8.4. Voula Tsouna