By Pleasure We Mean All Feeling Which Is Not Painful

One of the great problems that arises when you first consider the possibility that Pleasure is the goal of life is that most everyone recognizes that it is impossible to constantly experience nothing but stimulating pleasures. We cannot live every moment pursuing the pleasure of sex or partying or mountain-climbing, and if we try to do so we can expect disaster.

But are stimulative activities all that there is to pleasure?

While virtually everyone before him agreed that stimulative activities like this are pleasurable, Epicurus saw there was no reason to limit the definition of pleasure to sensory stimulation alone.

Epicurus held that many important experiences in life so not involve sensory stimulation, but arise from our own mental processes, especially those that give us confidence in our ability to live our lives happily. For example, consider Epicurus' first teo principal doctrines.

Doctrine One explains why we can have confidence that that are no supernatural gods constantly plotting against us to cause us harm or bribe us to follow their rules.

Doctrine Two explains why we can have confidence that the condition of being dead cannot cause us pain and anguish of any kind.

And Doctrine Four gives us confidence that any pain in life that we do encounter will either be manageable or - if it is severe enough - brief. Epicurus also reminds us elsewhere that there is no reason to fear anything truly terrible in life for the person who understands that there is nothing terrible in not living.

We see this emphasis on the pleasures of mental confidence displayed also in the openings of Book One and Two of Luceetius.

In the opening of Book One, Venus as mother nature spurs all living beings on with passion to move life forward and assure the continuation of their kind, giving many examples of what we as humans do to pursue physically many activities and pleasures of life.

In turn, the opening of Book Two tells us how sweet - how pleasurable - it is to posses the confidence that comes from the possession of a true philosophy that keeps us free from the actual and the imagined terrors of those who do not understand how to pursue life wisely.

There is nothing contradictory between these two types of pleasures, and both are essential for the happiest life.

As a crude modern example, most of us get great stimulative pleasure from flying in a jet airplane, looking out the window at the amazing scenery below and enjoying the excitement of flying 30000 feet above the earth. We even regularly enjoy the special rush of takeoffs and landings.

But the only reason that most of us are willing to set foot on the airplane in the first place is that we have confidence in the professionalism of the pilot and crew to keep us safe. This feeling of confidence deserves to be considered a pleasure - and a great one at that - even though it may be a quiet and calm assurance of a happy trip ahead, and even though it might not even come to the front of our minds absent some special reason to do so. This feeling of confidence in our Pilot finds parallels not only in the opening of Book Two of Luceetius, but also in the openings of the other Books where Luceetius reminds us over and over that we can have confidence in the leadership of Epicurus almost to the extent of considering his philosophy to be godlike.

But let's not get ahead of ourselves - let's drop back and think about how Epicurus reached his conclusions.

Epicurus realized that since Nature has given us only two feelings, if we are alive and feeling anything at all we then are feeling one or the other of the two. That means if we are not feeling pain, what we are feeling is in fact pleasure.

As a result of this perspective, we see that "Pleasure" involves much more than the sensory stimulation, and we can overcome the training of priests and virtue-based philosophers to consider the only meaning of the term.

One of many benefits of this perspective is that Pleasure becomes something that is widely available in ways that do not require great pain to experience. Pleasure becomes a workable term to describe the goal of life. We can see continuous pleasure is possible when we realize that even though some pains may come, pleasures can predominate over pain if we conduct our physical and mental lives properly. Even those unlucky people who do encounter extreme hardship can be confident that no pain has the ability required them to remain in its grip permanently.

So today we will talk about this issue in more detail and flesh out the issues more fully.

Cicero says that Epicurus included within the term pleasure things (" … which no one but your sect calls pleasure at all"):

The name of pleasure certainly has no dignity in it, and perhaps we do not exactly understand what is meant by it; for you are constantly saying that we do not understand what you mean by the word pleasure: no doubt it is a very difficult and obscure matter. When you speak of atoms, and spaces between worlds, things which do not exist, and which cannot possibly exist, then we understand you. Cannot we understand what pleasure is, a thing which is known to every sparrow? What will you say if I compel you to confess that I not only do know what pleasure is (for it is a pleasant emotion affecting the senses), but also that I know what you mean by the word? For at one time you mean by the word the very same thing which I have just said (which is a pleasant emotion affecting the senses), and you give it the description of consisting in motion, and of causing some variety. At another time you speak of some other highest pleasure, which is susceptible of no addition whatever, but that it is present when every sort of pain is absent, and you call it then a "state," not a "motion." Let that, then, be pleasure.

Say, in any assembly you please, that you do everything with a view to avoid suffering pain. If you do not think that this language is sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently honorable, say that you will do everything during your year of office, and during your whole life, for the sake of your own advantage; that you will do nothing except what is profitable to yourself, nothing which is not prompted by a view to your own interest. What an uproar such a declaration would excite in the assembly, and what hope do you think you would have of the consulship? Can you follow principles, which when you are alone or with your closest friends you do not dare to profess and avow openly?

But instead, you have those maxims constantly in your mouth which the Peripatetics and Stoics profess! In the courts of justice and in the senate you speak of duty, equity, dignity, good faith, uprightness, honorable actions, conduct worthy of power, worthy of the Roman people; you talk of encountering every imaginable danger in the cause of the republic — of dying for one's country. When you speak in this manner we are all amazed, like a pack of blockheads. And you are laughing in your sleeve: for, among all those high-sounding and admirable expressions, pleasure has no place, not only that pleasure which you say consists in motion, and which all men, whether living in cities or in the country, all men, in short, who speak Latin, call pleasure, but even that stationary pleasure, which no one but your sect calls pleasure at all.

• Cicero, On Ends 2:23

Here we see Cicero saying that Epicurus has a concept of pleasure "which no one but your sect calls pleasure at all."

We need to get to the bottom of that, so let's follow Cicero just a little further to see what this dispute is all about, because what we are going to find is that Epicurus held that all experiences in life - all experiences in life - fall within one of two feelings, either pleasure or pain, and Cicero refuses to accept that division.

Cicero told his Epicurean friend Torquatus that Epicurus' application of the term pleasure in this way

… does violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued. For who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; and thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain….

• Cicero, On Ends 2:16

Here we have the crux of the issue, not only between Cicero and Torquatus, but between Epicurus and the rest of the philosophic world. Cicero is saying that there are states which do not constitute pleasure or pain, and Epicurus is saying that that is not true - that there are only pleasure and pain. Epicurus is saying that if you are alive, and feeling anything at all, you are feeling one or the other - pleasure or pain.

And what I have just said there is almost an exact quote from Torquatus. In Section 38 of On Ends Book One, Torquatus said to Cicero,

"Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition is necessarily either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain.

• Torquatus - Cicero, On Ends 1:38

Epicurus holds that death is nothing to us, which means there is no life after death, and that means that all the happiness we are ever going to experience must occur in this single life that we have. Most all of the supposed great thinkers of the world, like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, were dedicated to some form of supernatural creation of the universe, which implies that humans are special beings with eternal souls which can continue to exist in some form after death. From Epicurus' perspective, this life is our most valuable possession and something to be enjoyed, so it makes perfect sense that we should consider every experience of life which is not painful to be pleasurable. You can decide for yourself whether you agree with Epicurus' terminology, but from this perspective it makes perfect sense to divide everything in life between that which is desirable, and call it pleasure, and that which is undesirable, and call it pain. Between those two there is no middle ground, and those who reject this division are saying more about themselves, and their own inferior view of life, than they are saying about Epicurus.

As a result of this perspective, when we look at Venus as a representation of Pleasure and Nature, as Lucretius did at the opening of his poem, we are not looking only at stimulative pleasure - the sex drugs and rock and roll of life. We are also looking at Venus as the representation of every desirable aspect of human life, mental and physical, from philosophy to sports to art to literature to music to history, from passionate love and affection to simple contemplation, and to every mental and physical activity of life in between that is not painful.

Cicero and other opponents of Epicurus strongly reject this expansion in the use of the word pleasure. In Section 7 of Book One of On Ends, Cicero tried to make an end-run around Epicurus by arguing that Epicurus never made the claim that Pleasure includes all of the mental and physical activities that I just listed. Cicero argued,

What actual pleasure do you, Torquatus, or does Triarius here, derive from literature, from history and learning, from turning the pages of the poets and committing vast quantities of verse to memory? Do not tell me that these pursuits are in themselves a pleasure to you, and that so were the deeds I mentioned of the Torquati. That line of defense was never taken by Epicurus or Metrodorus, nor by any one of them if he possessed any intelligence or had mastered the doctrines of your school.

• Cicero, On Ends 1:7

Of all the arguments made by Cicero against Epicurus, this is one of the most patently absurd. Are we to believe that there is no pleasure to be found in literature, history, poetry, and other learning? Cicero could hardly believe that Torquatus would accept this claim, and indeed Torquatus rejects it implicitly over and over again when given the chance.

No, this claim by Cicero is absurd, and there's an important lesson to be learned when an experienced trial lawyer like Cicero is willing to risk his own credibility by going over the top with an argument that no one with any knowledge of Epicurus would believe. What Cicero is doing is making an argument that is patently false, and instead of accepting Epicurus' view of pleasure and disagreeing on the merits, Cicero tries to ridicule Epicurus, throughout his book, by calling Epicurus's position effeminate and cowardly and disreputable. Rather than dealing honestly with ideas, Cicero is deflecting our attention and asking us to consider whether any normal, proud, strong, and vigorous man or woman would possibly accept "absence of pain" as the goal of their lives.

The answer to that, is of course they would not, given Cicero's definition of pleasure as limited to sensual stimulation. But that's not the definition of pleasure that Epicurus stated, or the Epicureans were working with. And that's something that Cicero, and people who think like Cicero, refuse to acknowledge.

This is an important question that demands a response, but Cicero controlled the terms of the debate in On Ends, and he never gave Torquatus the opportunity to address it in detail. Cicero was counting on the fact that - just like today - many people do in fact jump to the conclusion that "pleasure" means "sensual stimulation" only, because they have not heard the full Epicurean explanation of Pleasure. Just as Epicurus complained to Menoeceus, it is very easy for Epicurus' enemies to deceive and say that when Epicurus speaks of pleasure all he means is bodily stimulation.

Why would Cicero take such a risk in making an argument that can be easily refuted, and which the information in Cicero's own book refutes? Because Epicurus's enemies, from the Stoics, to Cicero, to Plutarch, and on to the Jews and the Christians who came afterward, totally reject Epicurus's view that there are no supernatural gods. Epicurus's enemies promote piety to the gods or Virtue or Reason as the organizing principles of life, and they know that what Epicurus taught meant the total rejection of their own principles of life.

In educating people to what Pleasure really means, and showing them how a life of pleasure can in fact be achieved, Epicurus was leading a philosophical and moral revolution. Cicero rightly saw that the continued spread of Epicurean philosophy would have spelled the end of supernatural-based ethis in the educated world.

Norman DeWitt, the Canadian Professor who authored the book Epicurus And His Philosophy, expressed what Epicurus was doing in this way:

“The extension of the name of pleasure to the normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

• Norman DeWitt - Epicurus and His Philosophy, p. 240

Today, the term "Absence of Pleasure" is often misinterpreted as Epicurus abandoning the normal active and stimulating mental and bodily pleasures in favor of a Buddhist-like or Stoic-like indifference, or aloofness, or asceticism. This could not be further from the truth. As we have already discussed, Epicurus held that there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain. When there are only two options of anything, then the absence of one equals the presence of the other.

One way to think of this is as a Pie chart divided by a line into two parts, with one side representing pleasure and the other representing pain. No matter how you draw the dividing line, everything on one side of the line is pleasure, and the other is pain. The part of the chart that is not pain - where pain is absent - is therefore pleasure, and vice versa. In this paradigm, the term "absence of pain" means nothing more, or less, than "Pleasure."

In this way we see what Cicero refused to admit: that the term "absence of pain" does not indicate a special or higher type of pleasure, but pleasure itself, in any of the many active or stable forms in which it can exist. Dividing all of experience into the two categories of pleasure and pain in this way does not tell us what type of pleasure or pain is involved in a particular life at a particular moment, but it does tell us that in general, we want as much of our experience to be pleasurable, and as little of our experience to be painful, as possible.

Epicurus' enemies, and even many who profess to be his friend but who are or more of Stoic or Ascetic bent, have turned this perspective on its head, and ended up making it look like the primary goal of Epicurean philosophy is to run like a coward from every moment of pain no matter how slight. Again, nothing could be further from the truth. Epicurus clearly tells us that we will regularly choose activities that are painful, when those activities increase our total pleasure, and that in fact the cowardly and shameful person is he who always chooses pleasure even when he or she should see that that choice will lead ultimately to disaster.

Nothing could be more clear than Torquatus' explanation of this:

… [[W]e denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided.

But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pain.

• Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends Book 1:10

By now in my talk it is clear that even though Cicero was a strong critic of Epicurus, we have much to thank Cicero for, because Cicero preserved for much detail about Epicurean arguments that would otherwise be lost. And those who read the letter to Menoeceus over and over again without the illustrations that Torquatus provides are doing themselves a major disservice.

Possibly the most important illustration that Cicero preserved through Torquatus is a story about an argument made against Epicurus by the famous Stoic philosopher Chrysippus.

The argument strikes many of us as strange the first time we hear it, but if you'll stay with me I think you'll see something very important. Here's the story Torquatus told in Section 11 of Book One of On Ends, and it involves Chrysippus holding out his hand, and making a short logical argument to an unknown person who apparently does not understand Epicurus.

"At Athens, so my father used to tell me when he wanted to air his wit at the expense of the Stoics, in the Ceramicus there is a statue of Chrysippus seated and holding out one hand, the gesture being intended to indicate the delight which Chrysippus used to take in the following little syllogism:

“Does your hand want anything, while it is in its present condition?”

“No, nothing.”

“But if pleasure were a good, it would want pleasure.”

“Yes, I suppose it would.”

“Therefore pleasure is not a good.”

This is an argument, my father declared, which not even a statue would employ, if a statue could speak; because though it is cogent enough as an objection to the Cyrenaics, it does not touch Epicurus. For if the only kind of pleasure were that which so to speak tickles the senses, an influence permeating them with a feeling of delight, neither the hand, nor any other part of the body, could be satisfied with the absence of pain unaccompanied by an agreeable and active sensation of pleasure.

Whereas if, as Epicurus holds, the highest pleasure be to feel no pain, Chrysippus's interlocutor, though justified in making his first admission (that his hand in that condition wanted nothing) was not justified in his second admission (that if pleasure were a good, his hand would have wanted it).

And the reason why it would not have wanted pleasure is that to be without pain is to be in a state of pleasure.

• Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends 1:11

What does this mean? Again, this can be confusing, as the Stoics like to be. We don't normally think about our hands in their normal condition wanting or lacking pleasure or anything else. But thinking about that is the key to understanding the analogy and why Chrysippus's point is false. Chrysippus was presuming that we would agree with him, and in fact we do, that if a thing is the highest good for a living thing, then any living thing that lacks that thing will want it, and be dissatisfied, or even in pain, from the lack of it.

Just like Cicero is doing, Chryssipus is trying to get us to accept that the only type of pleasure is sensual stimulation, and in fact Torquatus points out for us that that is exactly what Aristippus, and the Cyreniacs, did in fact believe. In other words if the only kind of pleasure that exists for our hand is that of being massaged, or being immersed in a warm bath, then if the goal of life is pleasure then our hands would be satisfied unless they were constantly being massaged or warmed. Cicero and the Stoics are both saying that if Pleasure is the goal of life, and Pleasure consists only in stimulation, no living being, whether a hand or a full person, could ever be satisfied, and thus it would be in pain, unless it had sensual stimulation.

And of course the enemies of Epicurus also want you to focus on the fact - with which Epicurus agrees - that sensual stimulation is not something you can expect to be constant and uninterrupted for your whole life. So therefore they want you to conclude that considering Pleasure to be the goal of life and the highest good is not only disreputable but a fool's errand that is doomed to failure.

The Epicurean response to this is very clear, and Torquatus gives it:

Under Epicurus' sweeping view of pleasure, the default position of simply being alive in a healthy state is pleasurable. Whether we are talking about our hand or any other living thing, if we are not experiencing pain and we are in a normal and healthy state then what we are experiencing is pleasure. And even when we may be experiencing physical pain, Torquatus makes clear that physical pain can be outweighed by mental pleasure. Torquatus says this:

This therefore clearly appears, that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration. But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: and this fact serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.

• Torquatus - Cicero, On Ends Book 1:18

As we will mention later, the story of Epicurus being happy even while in great physical pain on the last day of his life makes this same point. So far is Epicurus from valuing only bodily pleasures, that he emphasized using his own example that mental pleasures are frequently of much greater importance to us than are bodily ones.

This view of pleasure does in fact reject the terminology that Cicero and the rest of the philosophers insist on using. However as Norman Dewitt said, this change in paradigm is fully justified, and humanity would be far better off by recognizing and reasoning that Epicurus's approach to pleasure is correct.

And what could be more true than to observe that when the total experience of the hand, or a person as a whole, is without any pain, than that the total experience is the highest amount of pleasure possible? Such an experience is pure pleasure with no mixture of pain, and fully justifies the label of "the highest pleasure," even if we are not specifying whether the person is sitting calmly at rest or rocketing himself to Mars to experience the exhilaration of exploration. Both of these examples, or any example in which it is stated that no pain is present, are rightly considered to be "the highest pleasure." Cicero in fact provides later in the same work just such an example, which left Cicero astounded, that the Epicureans could consider both the host at a banquet who is without pain but pouring wine for a guest, as experiencing the same amount of pleasure as the thirsty guest who is relieving his thirst and is also otherwise without pain.

The point of that story as well, is that if it is stated that you are without pain, then you are without pain, and at the theoretical peak of pleasure.

We frequently hear the objection "How can absence of pain be the "peak" of Pleasure?" Here we can look back to both the words and the life of Epicurus for guidance on how much pleasure a person should seek.

In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus tells us repeatedly that the goal of life is pleasure, and that we should the most pleasant life, but Epicurus does notseek to substitute his judgment for ours as to what each person will be find to be most pleasant life for them.

Just as with food the wise man does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy to the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

…

Independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it. …

• Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus

Epicurus tells Menoeceus that "every pleasure because of its natural kinship to us is good," but that some pleasures are not to be chosen because in the end they do bring more pain than pleasure. Epicurus tells everyone in Principal Doctrine 10 that:

If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires and of pains, we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

• Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 10

All of those point in the same direction, that Epicurus is not going to tell us what is the most pleasurable life for us. He's going to let Nature tell us that, directly, given the circumstances of our own lives. Epicurus is a philosopher, not a life coach, and as you would expect from a philosopher who rejects the idea of a central supernatural plan for the universe as a whole, Epicurus generally writes in broad philosophic terms that are appropriate for someone who realizes that our specific personal circumstances will generally control what we find to be most pleasant and most painful for us. Epicurus always tracks his underlying premises about the nature of the universe, and therefore when each of us reaches the end of our lives, whenever that may be, it is only we ourselves - and no supernatural god or anyone else - whose opinion counts as to whether we have made the best use of our lives.

In Epicurus' own case, we have the biography of Diogenes Laertius as evidence that Epicurus was far from choosing a life of minimalism or asceticism for himself. Few men who choose a life of asceticism have any need to write a will disposing of extensive personal property, but Epicurus' will shows us that at the time of his death Epicurus held not only the "garden" that is associated with his name, Epicurus held also a house in Milete, which appears to have generated income sufficient for a number of purposes, including caring for the son of Metrodorus, for the son of Polyaenus, and for the daughter of Metrodorus. Epicurus also appears to have held at least four slaves, whom he freed at his death, and possibly a larger number that he did not. To the example of Epicurus we can also point to Diogenes of Oinoanda, who was well off enough at the end of his life to endow a large public monument dedicated to Epicurus. We can also look to other Epicureans such as Cicero's friend Atticus or Philodemus' patron Piso, all of whom were very wealthy. These are not the markings of men who believed that Epicurean philosophy pointed them toward any form of asceticism or minimalism.

Epicurus regularly challenges us to think outside the box by using phrases such as "death is nothing to us," or "the size of the sun is as it appears to be." The use of terminology that equates Pleasure with "Absence of Pain" is not only challenging but it is also maddening to those people like Cicero who refuse to accept any other way of thinking than their own. But in the end, stating proudly that the goal of life is "Absence of Pain" is just as aggressive - just as confrontational - and just as correct - as stating that the goal of life is Pleasure.

Cicero tried to argue Torquatus down from this position, but Torquatus stood his ground without hesitation.

At Section 9 of Book 2 of On Ends, Cicero argued:

“…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'”

Torquatus replied:

“Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for the fact that freedom from pain means pleasure is as true as any proposition can be.”

• Cicero On Ends 2:9

Some who resist Epicurus' view of pleasure will say that he is playing a word game, and that on most occasions our immediate experience is a combination of pleasures and pains. But Epicurus himself provides the example that in proves the rule of what he was asserting.

As Diogenes Laertius records:

When he was on the point of death Epicurus wrote the following letter to Idomeneus: ‘On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you. Do, as I might expect from your devotion from boyhood to me and to philosophy, take good care of the children of Metrodorus.

• Diogenes Laertius 10:22

So on the last day of his life, Epicurus was experiencing both severe bodily pain and mental pleasure at the thought of his philosophical achievements and the company of his friends. Nevertheless, Epicurus wrote that this last day of his life was also among his happiest.

Epicurus knew that because we are humans must expect a combination of pleasures and pains. As Torquatus explains for us Epicurean philosophy gives us the key to understanding that it is within our power to live a life in which pleasure predominates.

As Torquatus explained in Section 62 of Book One of On Ends:

For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.

• Torquatus - Cicero, On Ends 1:62

If this analysis of "Absence of Pain" is correct, it would be nice to find some ancient authority making the same point outside of Cicero's work. We can cite at least one instance of this in the previously-mentioned work of Aulus Gellius. In addition to defending Epicurus' non-standard use of logical phrasing as to death, Gellius provides us no less an example than Homer himself as someone who emphasized the height of something by referring to it as the extreme point of its opposite. Here is the text, again from "Attic Nights," where Gellius gives examples of this device and says that Epicurus was using it himself as to "absence of pain."

There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari). And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb:

Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose.

But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as "freedom from all reproach" makes one inculpatus (blameless).

Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness. It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example:

“And not unwillingly they charged,”

and again:

“Not then would you divine Atrides see Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight.”

Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words: “The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains.”

Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool “unlovely.” For just as he expressed abhorrence of the “unpraised” man by the denial of praise, so he abhorred the “unlovable” by the denial of love.

• Attic Nights 2:6

So in this example we can see that we need not consider "absence of pain" to be a new paradigm at all. If Homer can "usually bestow high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults, then Epicurus is perfectly within his rights to use "absence of pain" as the "height of pleasure." Using Gellius' phrasing and applying it to pleasure and pain, we can begin to make this phrasing more familiar to us be seeing that just as "absence of pain" is the synonym for perfect pleasure, therefore conversely "absence of pleasure" represents the limit of extreme pain.

For those who have not thought about this wording beforehand, it might not be advisable to surprise your romantic partner by telling him or her that they represent "absence of pain" to you. But figuring problems like this out is exactly what Epicurean philosophy requires of us, and indeed Epicurus is noted by Norman DeWitt to have said just that:

To substantiate this drift of reasoning it is not impossible to quote a text:

The stable condition of well-being in the flesh and the confident hope of its continuance means the most exquisite and infallible of joys for those who are capable of figuring the problem out.

DeWitt page 233, citing Usener 68.

1. All Sensations Are True In The Sense of Honestly Reported Without Their Own Opinions
2. Truth and Error Are In Opinion, Not In the Canonical Faculties
3. The argument that the senses are unreliable is nonsense, and should be given no credence, as there is no authority more reliable than the senses.

There is a great deal of modern discussion alleging that Epicurus valued "Katestematic" over "Kinetic" pleasure. The interpretation offered here is that while a distinction between the two types of pleasure does exist, it is clear that Epicurus valued both types of pleasure, and there is no clear indication that one is favored as a higher priority over the other. There is much dispute over what "katastematic" pleasure even means, especially as to how such pleasure is experienced, given that "motion" (the focus of the term "kinetic") is inherent in every change change in experience, and even the operation of the mind involves change.

Most discussions at EpicureanFriends follow the approach taken in Emily Austin's book "Living For Pleasure," (see discussion below) where this issue is treated as an advanced topic which is not necessary for non-specialists to consider, and which indeed generally results in distraction and even harmful error if a position is taken before detailed study and evaluation of the competing positions.

While Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus did mention the distinction, Laertius is also clear that Epicurus embraced both categories of pleasure, with no indication that Epicurus favored one over the other. Most of the controversy around this topic arises from Cicero's employment of the distinction to attempt to show that Epicurus was being inconsistent, but as with the rest of Cicero's criticisms, there are ready responses which do not involve accepting Cicero's view that a conflict exists.

For those who are interested in pursuing this further, the foillowing references will be of Assistnance

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