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[Ceterum introductionis exspectandum.]

EPISTULA SECUNDA: EPICURI QUAE FERTUR AD PHYTHOCLEM DE METEORIS

EPISTULA TERTIA: EPICURI AD MENOECEUM MORALIS

Letter to Herodotus

34b. Hello Herodotus

Ἐπίκουρος Ἡροδότῳ, χαίρειν!

Epikouros to Herodotus, greetings!

35a. Abridgment

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὧ Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν ἔξακριβοῦν – μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν: ἐπιτομὴν τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας εἰς τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὀλοσχερωτάτων γε δοξῶν τὴν μνήμην ἱκανῶς αὐτοῖς Παρεσκεύασα – ἵνα παρ' ἐκάστου τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς Δύνωνται (καθ' ὅσον ἂν Ἐφάπτωνται τῆς περὶ φύσεως θεωρίας)

for those who are not able, Herodotus, to examine each of the things written by us about nature – nor inspect the larger books of what has been organized: I prepared a summary of the whole work for retaining the memory of the most comprehensive judgements sufficiently for themselves – so that on each occasion, They might be able to provide help for themselves on the most decisive (to the extent that They engage with the observation of nature)

ἡ φύσις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ <i>to write again</i>
ἡ βίβλος αἱ βίβλοι	book	ΒΙΒΛΟΣ <i>papyrus</i>
αἱ μείζονες βίβλοι	larger books	
τὰ συντεταγμένα	things organized	ΣΥΝΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΑ <i>to order together</i>
αἱ μείζονες τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλοι	larger books of the things organized	
ἡ ἐπιτομή	summary	ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗ <i>to cut upon</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	circumstance	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	work	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ <i>issue</i>
ἡ ἐπιτομή τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας	summary of the whole work	
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>

τὸ κυριώτατον τὰ κυριώτατα	most decisive thing	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ <i>most</i> <i>lordly, masterly</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>observing</i>
ἡ περι φύσεως θεωρία	observation of nature nature	

35b. Prioritizing Summaries

καὶ τοὺς προβεβηκότας δὲ ἰκανῶς ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβλέψει, τὸν τύπον τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας τὸν κατεστοιχειωμένον δεῖ μνημονεύειν – τῆς γὰρ ἀθρόας ἐπιβολῆς πυκνὸν δεόμεθα – τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος οὐχ ὁμοίως

and Those who have advanced sufficiently in the observation of the whole [system], must remember the impression of the entire work that has been reduced [to the fundamentals] – for We frequently need [our] attention for the aggregate – but not similarly [attention] toward each part

ὁ προβεβηκώς οἱ προβεβηκότες	he who has advanced	ΠΡΟΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ <i>to have walked forward</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιβλέψις αἱ ἐπιβλέψεις	observation	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΨΙΣ <i>looking upon</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
ὁ τύπος τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας	impression of the entire work	
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἐπιβολή	our attention for each part	
ἀθρόος (α, ον)	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	aggregate	

A summary is more often needed than the details. Fix in your mind on the main points of the whole subject more frequently than you review the specific details.

36a. Focused Memory

Βαδιστέον, μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα συνεχῶς: ἐν δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ τὸ τοσοῦτο ποιητέον – ἀφ' οὗ ἢ τε κυριωτάτη Ἐπιβολή ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἔσται: καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος Ἀκρίβωμα πᾶν ἐξευρήσεται, τῶν ὀλοσχερωτάτων τύπων εὖ περιειλημμένων καὶ μνημονευομένων

additionally, It is necessary to proceed, of course, towards those [observations of the condensed system] constantly: and It is necessary make this much [effort] in memory – from which [your] most decisive Attention will exist for [your] circumstances: and then the entire Accuracy for each part [of our observations] will be discovered, with the most comprehensive impressions well understood and remembered

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
κύριος (α, ον)	decisive	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ <i>critical / valid</i>
ἡ κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολή	most decisive attention	
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	circumstance	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>

τὸ ἀκρίβωμα τὰ ἀκριβώματα	accuracy	ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ <i>(to make precise)</i>
τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκρίβωμα	accuracy for each part	
ὄλοσχερής <i>(ές)</i>	comprehensive	ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΗΣ <i>to hold the whole</i>
οἱ ὄλοσχερώτατοι τύποι	most comprehensive impressions	

We should return continually to the main principles – and memorize them to gain a solid understanding of the facts. We have a greater ability to discover details accurately once the general outlines are well understood.

36b. Elementary Mastery

ἐπεὶ καὶ, τῷ τετελειουργημένῳ, τοῦτο Κυριώτατον τοῦ παντὸς ἀκριβώματος γίνεται: τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὀξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι ἐκάστων πρὸς ἀπλᾶ στοιχειώματα καὶ φωνὰς συναγομένων

since, for the one who is accomplished, this most important Thing is produced by total accuracy: to be able to quickly use [our] attentions with each thing referenced by simple component principles and statements

ὁ τετελειουργημένος	he who has accomplished	ΤΕΤΕΛΕΙΟΥΡΓΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>work completing</i>
τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὀξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι	the ability to quickly use attentions	
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἀπλός <i>(η, ον)</i>	simple	ΑΠΛΟΣ <i>one fold</i>
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component principle	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	basic component	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>to speak</i>
ἀπλᾶ στοιχειώματα καὶ φωναί	simple elementary principle and statements	

Simplicity is a feature of a mature student. Being able to reference elementary facts with simple terms helps us keep a clear view of study mentally accessible, at least in summary form.

36c. A Structured View

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ Πύκνωμα τῆς συνεχοῦς τῶν ὅλων περιοδείας εἰδέναι – μὴ δυνάμενον διὰ βραχεῶν φωνῶν ἅπαν ἐμπεριλαβεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ (τὸ καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἂν ἐξακριβωθέν)

the Concentration of the continuous tour of the whole [system] is not possible to understand – while not encompassing in short statements everything within it (which would also be precise according to each part)

τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
ἡ περιοδεία	tour	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΕΙΑ <i>around the path</i>
ἡ συνεχῆς τῶν ὅλων περιοδεία	continuous tour of the whole	

τὸ πύκνωμα τῆς συνεχοῦς τῶν ὄλων περιοδείας	concentration of the continuous tour of the whole [system]	
βραχύς (εἶα, ὑ)	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ <i>brief</i>
αἱ βραχεῖαι φωναί	short statements	
τὸ ἐξακριβωθέν τὰ ἐξακριβωθέντα	what is precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΩΘΕΝ <i>fully accurate</i>
τὸ ἂν ἐξακριβωθέν	what would be precise	
τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐξακριβωθέν	what is precise according to each part	

We need to be able to remember the basics of all our studies in organized and simple terms – this enables us to understand all the details more accurately.

37a. Purpose of Study

ὄθεν δὴ, πᾶσι χρησίμης οὔσης τοῖς ὠκειωμένοις φυσιολογία τῆς τοιαύτης ὁδοῦ, (παρεγγυῶν τὸ συνεχές ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογία καὶ τοιοῦτω μάλιστα ἐγγαληνίζων τῷ βίῳ) Ἐποίησά σοι καὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐπιτομήν καὶ στοιχείωσιν τῶν ὄλων δοξῶν

therefore, since such a course is useful to all who are familiar with physics, I (while recommending continuous activity in physics and calming myself particularly with such a life) have also made for you such a type of summary and elementary-exposition of all judgements

ὁ ὠκειωμένος	he who is familiar	ΩΙΚΕΙΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>made comfortable dwelling</i>
ἡ φυσιολογία	physics (the study of nature)	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning of producing</i>
ἡ ὁδός	course	ΟΔΟΣ <i>road</i>
ἡ τοιαύτη ὁδός	such a course	ΤΟΙΑΥΤΗ ΟΔΟΣ
τὸ ἐνέργημα τὰ ἐνεργήματα	activity	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ <i>work result within</i>
τὸ συνεχές ἐνέργημα	continuous activity	
ἐγγαληνίζειν	to calm oneself	ΕΓΓΑΛΗΝΙΖΕΙΝ <i>calm within causing</i>
<i>This verb is only used by Epikouros, and only used here – but we can understand the general meaning because it clearly comes from the noun:</i>		
ἡ γαλήνη	calm	ΓΑΛΗΝΗ
τοιοῦτος ὁ βίος	such a life	
ἡ τοιαύτη τις ἐπιτομή	such a type of summary	
ἡ στοιχείωσις τῶν ὄλων δοξῶν	elementary exposition of all judgments	

Recognizing that effort in natural philosophy provides tranquility for himself and for others, Epikouros prepared this concise epitome of natural philosophy. Epikouros advises that we always pursue our studies – but with a sense of tranquility.

37b. Clarity in Language

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὧ Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι: ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν, εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν – καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα Πάντα ἡμῖν «ἴη» – εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν, ἢ κενούς φθόγγους ἔχωμεν

first of all, Herodotus, Understanding **what is assigned to words** is necessary: **in order that**, We may have **what is judged, investigated, or uncertain** to test **by referring** to these [words] – so that Everything does not go **untested by us** – leading **into infinity**, or Us having **empty words**

τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα	what is assigned (subordinated things)	ΥΠΟΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΑ <i>having arranged under</i>
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	word	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>sound</i>
τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις	what is assigned to words	
τὰ δοξαζόμενα	what is judged (our understanding of information)	ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΑ <i>to seem</i>
τὰ ζητούμενα	what is investigated (difficulty with getting information)	ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΑ <i>to search</i>
τὰ ἀπορούμενα	what is uncertain (difficulty with understanding information)	ΑΠΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΑ <i>to be confused</i>

We must understand the meaning of words to test opinions, inquiries, or problems – always ensuring our proofs are meaningful and not endlessly unverified.

38a. Clear Mental Images

ἀνάγκη γὰρ, τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι, καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι – εἴπερ ἔξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ' ὃ ἀνάξομεν

Seeing [for ourselves] **the primary thought** for each word, and in no way needing **proof**, is **necessary** – if We are to have [something] to which we will refer **what is investigated, uncertain, or judged**

τὸ ἐννόημα	thought	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing within</i>
τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα	the primary thought	
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα βλέπειν	seeing the primary thought	
ἢ ἀπόδειξις αἱ ἀποδείξεις	proof	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ <i>from pointing out</i>

We need to be able to mentally visualize exactly what we are talking about. If we ensure that the primary meaning of each term is clear – then we have a solid foundation for evaluating problems, opinions, and inquiries.

38b. Adhering to Sensations

ἔτι τε, ^[1] **τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντως τηρεῖν: καὶ ἀπλῶς ^[1] τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἶτε ^[1a] διανοίας εἶθ' ^[1b] ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ^[1c] τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη – ὅπως ἂν καὶ ^[A] τὸ προσμένον καὶ ^[B] τὸ ἄδηλον** ἔχωμεν οἷς **σημειωσόμεθα**

also, Preserving ^[1] the sensations in every way is necessary: and simply ^[1] our present attentions, whether ^[1a] of [mental] perception or ^[1b] of any of the standards, and likewise ^[1c] of [already] existing experiences – so that We may also have signs by which we will interpret both ^[A] what is pending and ^[B] what is unclear

ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
παρών <i>(παρουσα, παρόν)</i>	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ <i>to be beside</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	conception about	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
αἱ παροῦσαι ἐπιβολαί διανοίας	present attentions of perception	
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard <i>(test of truth)</i>	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
αἱ παροῦσαι ἐπιβολαί ὅτου τῶν κριτηρίων	present attentions of any of the standards	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> ὑπάρχοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>feeling</i>
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη	already existing experiences	
τὸ προσμένον <i>(what is seen but requires more views)</i>	what is pending <i>[confirmation]</i>	ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of toward</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>

Sensations are the basis of understanding. We need to focus on our immediate senses and feelings as our basis of understanding, in order to further understand what is unclear or unseen.

38c. Foundation of Existence

ταῦτα Δεῖ διαλαβόντας συνορᾶν ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων: πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι Οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος: Πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ' ἄν – σπερμάτων γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον

after [we] have grasped these things, It is now necessary to fully [mentally] see what is unclear: first, that Nothing is produced from what does not exist: for Everything would be produced from everything – and would in no way also need seeds

ορᾶν	to [mentally] see	ΟΡΑΝ <i>seeing</i>
συνορᾶν	to fully [mentally] see	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>seeing together</i>
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not seeing</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	the unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>

γίνεσθαι

to be produced

ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ
come into being

First and foremost: nothing can come from something that does not exist. If matter could arise from nonexistence, anything could come from nothing.

39a. Perishability

καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ Ἄφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν: πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ Πράγματα – οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἃ διελύετο

and if what Disappears was also destroyed into what does not exist: all Things would have perished – without [anything] existing into which they could fully dissolve

τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον

what disappears

ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ
result of not appearing

This refers to objects that are completely destroyed to the point that the matter composing them is no longer visible – such as sugar dissolving in water.

Matter cannot disintegrate into nonexistence. If something disappearing were completely destroyed into nonexistence, then everything would ultimately perish

39b. Universal Consistency

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Πᾶν αἰεὶ τοιοῦτον ἦν – οἷον νῦν ἐστὶ – καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσται: Οὐθέν γάρ ἐστιν εἰς ὃ μεταβαλεῖ: παρὰ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν Οὐθέν ἐστὶν (ὃ ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς αὐτὸ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσαιτο)

and indeed, the Universe has always been such – as it is now – and it will always be such: for there is Nothing into which it can transform: because there is Nothing outside of the universe (which could enter into it and make a transformation)

τὸ πᾶν	(individually) everything, (collectively) the universe	ΠΑΝ all
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ throwing in change

The universe is consistent in its ultimate composition because there is nothing outside of everything that could enter everything and cause it to change.

39c. Atomism

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Πᾶν ἐστὶ σώματα καὶ κενόν: σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ Αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ – καθ' ἣν, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ Ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι

but indeed, the Universe exists as bodies and as void: that bodies exist, Sensation itself in all [cases] testifies – using this [sensation], the Unseen must be inferred by reasoning

For what we cannot directly sense, we infer with reasoning from what we can directly sense. Our sensations are the toolkit our reason uses to function.

The universe is fundamentally matter and void. Everything that exists is made up of bodies and space. We know bodies exist because we can see and feel them, and we must use our senses to understand things we cannot directly see, such as the void.

40a. Necessity of Void

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἦν ὁ 'κενόν' καὶ 'χώραν' καὶ 'ἀναφῆ φύσιν' ὀνομάζομεν: οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ Σώματα ὅπου ἦν, οὐδὲ δι' οὗ ἔκινεῖτο – καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα

and if What we call 'void' 'space' and 'intangible nature' did not exist: Bodies would not have anywhere to be, or [anything] through which they move – just as they are seen moving

τὸ κενόν	void	KENON <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ χώρα	space	ΧΩΡΑ <i>empty space</i>
ἀναφῆς (ές)	intangible	ΑΝΑΦΗΣ <i>not touchable</i>
ἡ ἀναφῆς φύσις	intangible nature	

40b. Qualities

παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Οὐθέν οὐδ' ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται (οὔτε περιληπτῶς οὔτε ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς) ὡς καθ' ὅλας φύσεις λαμβανόμενα, καὶ μὴ ὡς τὰ τούτων 'συμπτώματα' ἢ 'συμβεβηκότα' λεγόμενα

beyond these, Nothing at all is able to be conceived (either comprehensibly or analogously to the comprehensible) as being apprehended according to whole natures, and not as what are called the 'symptoms' of these or 'properties'

περιληπτῶς	comprehensibly	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ <i>apprehending around</i>
τὸ περιληπτόν τὰ περιληπτά	what is comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>apprehending around</i>
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ <i>reasoning again</i>
ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς	analogously to the comprehensible	
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαμβάνεσθαι	to be apprehended	
λαμβάνόμενος (η, ον)	apprehended	
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality (characteristic)	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition [from] gathering</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling together</i>
συμβεβηκῶς (υῖα, ὅς)	having endured	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>

ὅλαι φύσεις	Whole Natures	
Everything is either an atom, the void, which have whole natures – or it is an emergent nature (characteristic) of atoms and void.		
αἱ ποιότητες	Qualities (or "Characteristics")	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΤΕΣ <i>category state</i>

Qualities are of two types:

τὰ συμπτώματα	Contingent Qualities:	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ to fall together
ĒVENTA	Symptoms	
<i>Slavery/Freedom, Poverty/Riches, Peace/War</i>		
τὰ συμβεβηκότα	Necessary Qualities:	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΤΑ to have walked together
CONIUNCTA	Properties	
<i>Weight to stone, Heat to fire, Liquidity to water</i>		
This outline is specific to Epikouros. For example, Aristotle uses τὰ συμβεβηκότα, with the sense of τὰ συμπτώματα.		

Beyond atoms and void, nothing is able to be conceived that has a wholly complete nature in-and-of-itself. Everything else is an emergent characteristic that comes to exit from arrangements of atoms and void.

The inseparable qualities (i.e., properties) of the atoms are permanent. The inseparable qualities of a compound exist as long as the compound exists. The separable qualities (i.e., symptoms) of the atoms (e.g., their location) are impermanent. The separable qualities of a compound do not even exist for as long as the compound exists.

40c. Atomic or Aggregate

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις – τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηται

and indeed, Some objects are compounds – but Some [are objects] out of which compounds are made

ἡ κρίσις	judgement	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ separating
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ separating together
τὰ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηται	things from which the compounds are formed	

Some bodies are combinations of atoms – but some bodies are simply the atoms themselves.

41a. Indestructible Units

Ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα: εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει Πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθαρῆσθαι – ἀλλ' ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων, πλήρη τὴν φύσιν ὄντα: οἷα δὴ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπη ἢ ὅπως διαλυθήσεται – ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους Ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις

These [objects] exist as indivisible and non-transformable: if Everything is not going to be destroyed into nonexistence – but to endure, prevailing in the dissolutions of compounds, while existing as full in nature: such that they indeed do not have anywhere or any way they will be fully dissolved – It is therefore necessary that the origins exist as indivisible physical objects

ἄτομος (ον)	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ not cut
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom	
τὰ ἀμετάβλητα	what is non-transformable	ΑΜΕΤΑΒΛΗΤΑ not thrown change
ἰσχύων (ισχύουσα, ἰσχύον)	prevailing	ΙΣΧΥΩΝ strength

πλήρης (ες)	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ quality of <i>full</i>
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>through dissolve</i>
διαλυθήσεσθαι	to be about to be dissolved	
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	origin	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>

There are objects that cannot be divided or changed. This must be true because everything has not been permanently destroyed and turned into nothing. These objects are strong enough to remain when objects break apart – because they are totally solid and cannot be dissolved. So, the basic building blocks of everything are physically indivisible.

41b. Space Is Infinite In Extent

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι: Τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει – τὸ δὲ Ἄκρον παρ' ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται (τὸ δὲ Πᾶν οὐ παρ' ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται) ὥστε, οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον, πέρασ οὐκ ἔχει – πέρασ δὲ οὐκ ἔχον: ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον

but indeed, the Universe is *infinite*: for What is finite has a *boundary* – and a Boundary is observed *relative to something else*, (however the Universe is not observed *relative to anything else*) therefore, not having an *boundary*, it does not have a *limit* – and what does not have a *limit*: would be *infinite* and *not finite*

ἄπειρος (οῦ)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον πᾶν	the infinite universe	
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of having been limited</i>
τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	boundary	ΑΚΡΟΝ <i>highest extremity</i>
τὸ πέρασ τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>piercing through (to the end)</i>

The universe is infinite. Anything finite has an end, and an end is only recognized by comparing it to something else. Since there is nothing else to compare the universe to, it must be boundless and infinite.

41c. Matter Is Infinite In Quantity

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῷ πλήθει τῶν σωμάτων – ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ Πᾶν – καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ κενοῦ

and indeed, in the number of objects – the Universe is *infinite* – and in the size of the void

πλήρης (ες)	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ quality of <i>full</i>
τὸ πλῆθος τὰ πλήθη	number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ <i>fullness</i>
τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων	the number of objects	
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κενοῦ	the size of the void	

εἴ τε γὰρ ἦν τὸ Κενὸν ἄπειρον, τὰ δὲ Σώματα ὠρισμένα: οὐθαμοῦ ἂν ἔμενε τὰ Σώματα, ἀλλ' ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὸ ἄπειρον κενὸν διεσπαρμένα – οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰ ὑπερείδοντα καὶ στέλλοντα κατὰ τὰς ἀνακοπὰς – εἴ τε τὸ Κενὸν ἦν ὠρισμένον: οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ ἄπειρα Σώματα ὅπου ἐνέστη

* for if the Void were infinite, and Objects finite: Objects would stay nowhere, but would be carried through the infinite void while scattered – having nothing that supports and that restrains by their collisions – if the Void were finite: the infinite Objects would not have anywhere to be

τὸ ὑπερείδον τὰ ὑπερείδοντα	what supports	ΥΠΕΡΕΙΔΟΝ <i>looking over</i>
τὸ στέλλον τὰ στέλλοντα	what restrains	ΣΤΕΛΛΟΝΤΑ <i>arrange</i>

If the void were infinite and atoms were finite – the atoms would be scattered throughout the infinite void. On the other hand, if the void were finite and bodies were infinite – there would not be enough space for all the atoms to exist.

42b. Finite Variety of Atomic Shapes

πρὸς τε τούτοις, τὰ ἄτομα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ Μεστά (ἐξ ὧν καὶ αἱ Συγκρίσεις γίνονται καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύονται) ἀπερίληπτά ἐστι ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων: οὐ γὰρ Δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τὰς τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιειλημμένων

besides these [points], the indivisible and full Things in objects (out of which Compounds are produced and into which they fully dissolve) are incomprehensible in the [amount of] differences of their shapes: for It is not possible for so many differences to arise from what is completely apprehended about their [atomic] shapes

μεστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	full	ΜΕΣΤΟΣ <i>filled</i>
τὸ μεστόν τὰ μεστά	what is full	
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τὸ περιληπτόν τὰ περιληπτά	what is comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΑ <i>apprehending around</i>
ἀπερίληπτος <i>(ος, όν)</i>	incomprehensible	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>not apprehending around</i>
τὸ ἀπερίληπτον τὰ ἀπερίληπτά	what is incomprehensible	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
τὰ ἀπερίληπτά ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων	what is incomprehensible in the differences of shapes	
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
τὸ περιειλημμένον τὰ περιειλημμένα	what completely apprehended	ΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of being grasped around</i>
τὰ περιειλημμένα [ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων]	what is apprehended [in the differences of shapes]	

The amount of different atomic shapes is indefinite (incomprehensibly large) – but not infinite. However the amount of each atomic shape is infinite.

42c. Infinite Atoms of Each Shape

καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ σχημάτισιν: ἀπλῶς ἄπειροί εἰσιν αἰΏμοιαι – ταῖς δὲ διαφοραῖς οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄπειροι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀπερίληπτοι

and regarding each shape: the Similar [atoms] are completely infinite – but in their differences they are not completely infinite, but only incomprehensible

There is an infinite number of each shape of atom – but the number of different shapes of atoms is not infinite (though it is incalculably large).

{43a. Atomic Size Limit}

{οὐδὲ γὰρ Φησιν ἐνδοτέρω εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν τομὴν τυγχάνειν, (λέγει) δὲ ἐπειδὴ αἰ Ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται – εἰ μέλλει Τις μὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀπλῶς εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὰς ἐκβάλλειν}

{for [Epikouros] states that division [of atoms] does not happen further ad infinitum, even though (as he says) the Qualities are transformed – unless Someone is also going to extend those [atoms] completely ad infinitum in [terms of] size}

τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom	ATOMA not cut
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	TOMH cut

This scholion notes that, despite the variety that we see in qualities (including the disappearance of qualities), we should not think that objects can continue to be divided forever (although objects can be divided to the point of no longer being visible). The same line of thinking would also have us posit that atoms are infinitely large.

43b. Constant Movement

κινοῦνται τε συνεχῶς αἰΏμοιαι τὸν αἰῶνα {φησὶ δὲ ἐνδοτέρω καὶ ἰσοταχῶς αὐτὰς κινεῖσθαι – τοῦ κενοῦ τὴν εἶξιν ὁμοίαν παρεχομένου καὶ τῇ κουφοτάτῃ καὶ τῇ βαρυτάτῃ}

the Atoms move continuously forever {further he says that they move with equal speed – with the void offering the same yielding both to the lightest [atom] and to the heaviest [atom]}

ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	TOMH cut
ἄτομος (ος, ον)	indivisible	ATOMA not cut
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom	
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	
ἰσοταχῶς	with equal speed	ΙΣΟΤΑΧΩΣ equal fast
ἡ εἶξις	yielding	ΕΙΞΙΣ giving way
κουῖφος (η, ον)	light	κουῖφος nimble
κουφότατος (η, ον)	lightest	
ἡ κουφοτάτη [ἄτομος]	the lightest [atom]	

τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ heavy
βαρύτατος (η, ον)	heaviest	ΒΑΡΥΤΑΤΟΣ heaviest
ἡ βαρυτάτη [ἄτομος]	the heaviest [atom]	

43c. Atomic Interaction

καί, Αἱ μὲν εἰς μακρὰν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διστάμεναι – Αἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν παλμὸν ἴσχουσιν (ὅταν τύχῃσιν τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλειμέναι ἢ στεγαζόμενοι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν)

* also, Some [atoms] stand apart at a distance from each other – while Others retain their vibration (when they happen to have been enclosed by intertangling or are covered by tangled [atoms])

ὁ παλμός οἱ παλμοί	vibration	ΠΑΛΜΟΣ pulse
ἡ περιπλοκή αἱ περιπλοκαί	intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ weave around
κλειῖν	to enclose	ΚΛΕΙΕΙΝ key / hook
κεκλειμένος (η, ον)	having been enclosed	
στεγαζόμενος (η, ον)	covered	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ shelter
πλεκτικός (η, ον)	tangled	ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ weaved
ἡ πλεκτική [ἄτομος]	tangled atom	

Atoms move at the same speed, either freely or vibrating in an aggregate. Some atoms move far apart from each other, while others just oscillate in one place when they get entangled or are enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

44a. Vibration

ἢ τε γὰρ τοῦ κενοῦ Φύσις, ἡ διορίζουσα ἐκάστην αὐτήν, τοῦτο παρασκευάζει (τὴν ὑπέρεισιν οὐχ οἷα τε οὔσα ποιεῖσθαι) – ἢ τε Στερεότης ἡ υπάρχουσα αὐταῖς κατὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν τὸν ἀποπαλμὸν ποιεῖ (ἐφ' ὅποσον ἂν ἡ Περιπλοκή τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως διδῶ). Ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, αἰδίων τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσῶν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ

firstly, the Nature of the void, which separates every single [atom], prepares this [atomic movement] (not being able to make [any] support) – secondly, the Solidity which already exists in [the atoms] creates a rebound upon collision (to the extent that the Intertangling allows reestablishment from the collision). a [beginning] Foundation of these things does not exist, since the atoms and the void are eternal

ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	solidity	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ condition of making stiff
ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ hitting
ἡ σύγκρουσις αἱ συγκρούσεις	collision	ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ hitting together
ἡ ὑπέρεισις αἱ ὑπερείσεις	support (supportive resistance)	ΥΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ go under
ἡ περιπλοκή		ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ weave around
ὁ παλμός	vibration	ΠΑΛΜΟΣ pulse

ὁ ἀποπαλμός	rebound	ΑΠΟΠΑΛΜΟΣ <i>pulsing off</i>
<i>one step in the vibration (ὁ παλμός) process</i>		
ἡ περιπλοκή αἱ περιπλοκαί	intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ <i>weave around</i>
ἡ ἀποκατάστασις αἱ ἀποκαταστάσεις	reestablishment	ΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>placed thoroughly back</i>
<i>another step in the vibration (ὁ παλμός) process</i>		
ἀποπαλμοί καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις	reboundings and reestablishments	
<i>description of the vibration process</i>		

Vibration occurs because there is space between atoms in aggregates – each atom is separated by void, which cannot resist their movement. The solidity of the atom causes it to rebound after a collision (even if only a very short distance), when trapped by a mass of entangling atoms. There is no beginning to this process since both atoms and void exist forever.

44b. {Shape, Size, And Weight}

{Φησὶ δ' ἐνδοτέρω, μηδὲ Ποιότητά τινα περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ βάρους – τὸ δὲ Χρῶμα παρὰ τὴν θέσιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἀλλάττεσθαι, ἐν ταῖς Δώδεκα Στοιχειώσεσιν φησὶ – πᾶν τε Μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι περὶ αὐτάς: οὐδέποτε, γοῦν, Ἄτομος ὡφθη αἰσθήσει}

{He says within [his books], that no Quality at all for the atoms exists except shape, size, and weight – that Color varies with the position of the atoms, he states in the *Twelve Elementary Principles* – and that concerning them every Size does not exist: never, at least, has an Atom ever been perceived by sensation}

ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality <i>(characteristic)</i>	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition [from] gathering</i>
αἱ ποιότητες περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους	qualities of the atoms	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing</i>
ἡ θέσις τῶν ἀτόμων	the position of the atoms	
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ <i>skin color</i>

Atoms have no qualities except shape, size, and weight. Color varies with the arrangement of the atoms.

45a. The Basics

ἡ τοσαύτη δὲ Φωνή, τούτων πάντων μνημονευομένων, τὸν ἱκανὸν τύπον ὑποβάλλει τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπινοίας

such a Statement, along with all these things being remembered, establishes a sufficient impression for complete conceptions about the nature of existing things

ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>to speak</i>
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τὸ μνημονευόμενον τὰ μνημονευόμενα	remembered thing	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of memory</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>to imprint</i>
ὁ ἰκανὸς τύπος	a sufficient impression	
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	conception about	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπινοίαι	conceptions about the nature of things	

45b. Similar & Dissimilar Cosmoi

ἀλλὰ μὴν, καὶ Κόσμοι ἄπειροί εἰσιν: οἳ θ' ὅμοιοι τούτῳ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι – αἷ τε γὰρ Ἄτομοι (ἄπειροι οὕσαι ὡς ἄρτι ἀπεδείχθη) φέρονται καὶ πορρωτάτω

but indeed, there are also infinite Cosmoi: both those similar to this one and dissimilar – for the Atoms (being infinite as has just been thoroughly shown) move even further on

ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἄπειρος (ον)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
οἱ κόσμοι ἄπειροί	infinite cosmoi	
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>same</i>
οἱ ὅμοιοι κόσμοι	similar cosmoi	
ἀνόμοιος (ον)	dissimilar	ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>not the same</i>
οἱ ἀνόμοιοι κόσμοι	dissimilar cosmoi	
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
αἱ ἄπειροι ἄτομοι	infinite atoms	
αἱ ὅμοια ἄτομοι	similar atoms	
αἱ ἀνόμοιοι ἄτομοι	dissimilar atoms	

Since the number of atoms is infinite they continue to spread out into space and form infinite worlds – some worlds are like ours and other worlds are unlike ours.

45c. Infinite Cosmoi

οὐ γὰρ κατανήλωνται αἱ τοιαῦτα Ἄτομοι ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο κόσμος (ἢ ὑφ' ὧν ἂν ποιηθείη) – οὐτ' εἰς ἓνα οὐτ' εἰς πεπερασμένους (οὐθ' ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι οὐθ' ὅσοι διάφοροι τούτοις) – ὥστε οὐδὲν τὸ Ἐμποδοστατήσον ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων

for such Atoms from which a cosmos could come into being (or by which it could be made) would not all been consumed – neither in one [cosmos] nor in a finite amount (whether on those alike or on those different from these) – so that in no way does an Obstacle exist for the infinity of cosmoi

καταναλίσκειν	to consume	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly spent</i>
καταναλωθῆναι	to be consumed	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΩΘΗΝΑΙ <i>pushed into being thoroughly spent</i>
τὸ ἔμποδοστατήσον τὰ ἔμποδοστατήσαντα	obstacle	ΕΜΠΟΔΟΣΤΑΤΗΣΟΝ <i>set up in (way of) foot</i>

46a. Films

καὶ μὴν καὶ, Τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμονες τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἰσὶ – λεπτότησιν ἀπέχοντες μακρὰν τῶν φαινόμενων: οὔτε γὰρ Συστάσεις ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι γίνεσθαι τοιαῦται – οὔτ' Ἐπιτηδειότητες πρὸς κατεργασίας τῶν κοιλωμάτων καὶ λεπτοτήτων γίνεσθαι – οὔτε Ἀπόρροιαὶ τὴν ἐξῆς θέσιν καὶ βάσιν διατηροῦσαι (ἦνπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἶχον): τούτους δὲ τοὺς τύπους 'εἶδωλα' Προσαγορεύομεν

and indeed, Impressions exist in the same shape as solid objects – although they are far different from visible things in [their] fineness: for neither are Compositions such as this unable to be produced in the surrounding [air] – nor [are] Supplies [unable] to be produced for an outflow with hollowness and thinness – nor [are] Effluences [unable to be produced] preserving [their] position in succession and order (as they also had in the solid objects): these are the impressions We call 'films'

Impressions (τύποι, forms, outlines) are emitted by objects. Impressions that maintain the same of the object that emitted them are known as films (εἶδωλα, idols, phantoms).

ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ to imprint
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ holding [a form]
ὁμοιοσχήμων (ον)	same shape	ΟΜΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ same form
ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	solidity	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ condition of making stiff
στερεός (ἄ, ὄν)	solid	
τὸ στερεμνίον τὰ στερεμνία	solid object	
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	thinness	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ condition of being fine/subtle
ἀπέχων (ουσα, ον)	different	ΑΠΕΧΩΝ holding away
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ result of appearing
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ stand together
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ not powerful
ἡ ἐπιτηδειότης αἱ ἐπιτηδειότητες	supply	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΤΗΣ suitable towards
ἡ κατεργασία αἱ κατεργασίαι	outflow	ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ work thoroughly
τὸ κοίλωμα τὰ κοιλώματα	hollowness	ΚΟΙΛΩΜΑΤΑ concave
ἡ ἀπόρροια αἱ ἀπόρροιαί	effluence	ΑΠΟΡΡΟΙΑΙ flow off
ἐξῆς	in succession	ἘΞΗΣ six
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ process of placing
ἡ βάσις αἱ βάσεις	order	ΒΑΣΙΣ process of going
διατηρεῖν	to preserve	ΔΙΑΤΗΡΕΙΝ completely guard

διατηρῶν (οὔσα, ὦν)	preserve	
αἱ διατηροῦσαι ἀπόρροιαί	the preserving effluences	
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΑ <i>appearing</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to call [by the name]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speak toward</i>

Air is a mix of void and atoms. Atoms continually travel through objects and are released from their surfaces into the air. This forms patterns that persist through the air. When these physical patterns encounter our bodies, they produce various sensations. When these physical patterns produce sensations with continuity, we know they correspond to their source-object.

47a. Thinness of Films

εἶθ' ὅτι τὰ εἶδωλα ταῖς λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις κέχρηται. Οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῶν φαινομένων – ὅθεν καὶ τάχη ἀνυπερβλήτα ἔχει (πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα πρὸς τῷ ἀπείρῳ αὐτῶν) μηθὲν ἀντικόπτειν (ἢ ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν: **πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ἀπείροις, εὐθύς ἀντικόπτειν τι**)

accordingly, Nothing among visible things contradicts that Films are endowed with unsurpassable thinness – from which [Films] also have unsurpassable speeds (having every proportionate passageway in relation to [their] infinite nature) colliding against nothing (or colliding against a few things: for among many and infinite [atoms], [films] are immediately colliding against something)

ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	thinness	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being fine/subtle</i>
ἀνυπερβλήτος (ον)	unsurpassable	ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ <i>not thrown over</i>
ἡ λεπτότης ἀνυπερβλήτος	unsurpassable thinness	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contradict	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
τὸ τάχος ἀνυπερβλήτον	unsurpassable speed	
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
σύμμετρος (ον)	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
πᾶς πόρος σύμμετρος	every proportionate passage	
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>

The extreme thinness of the films is not contradicted by any observed facts. Because they are so thin, they can move very quickly and easily through void spaces. Their constant flow faces little to no resistance – unlike larger groupings of atoms that encounter much more resistance to their movement.

[47b ^{*1} Apparent Instantaneity of Films]

οὐ μὴν, οὐδ' ἅμα κατὰ τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους αὐτὸ τὸ φερόμενον Σῶμα ἐπὶ τοὺς πλείους τόπους ἀφικνεῖται (ἀδιανόητον γάρ) – καὶ τοῦτο συναφικνούμενον ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ ὅθεν δήποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου, οὐκ ἐξ οὗ ἂν Περιλάβωμεν τὴν φοράν τόπου ἔσται ἀφιστάμενον: Ἀντικοπή γὰρ ὁμοιον ἔσται, κἂν μέχρι τοσοῦτου τὸ τάχος τῆς φοράς μὴ ἀντικόπτων καταλίτωμεν – χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κατασχεῖν τὸ στοιχεῖον

however, during times observable through reasoning, the very Body being carried does not arrive at many locations simultaneously (for this is [mentally] imperceptible) – although This [body] indeed arrives as a whole in sensible time from somewhere in the infinite [void], it will not be different from the location from which We would completely apprehend its transmission: because it will be similar to a collision, even if up to this point We leave remaining the speed of its transmission that is not colliding – indeed, it is useful also to hold [in mind] this component fact

however, [even] during [minute] times observable through reasoning, the very Body being carried does not arrive at many locations simultaneously (for this is [mentally] imperceptible) – although This [body] indeed arrives as a whole in sensible time from somewhere in the infinite [void], it will not [really] be different from the location from which We would completely apprehend [its] transmission *{even if a body it moves so fast that it visually appears to arrive at multiple places at once, it is mentally perceivable that a body does not arrive at multiple places at once}*.

because it *{arriving at many locations simultaneously}* will be similar to a collision, even if up to this point We leave alone the speed of [its] transmission that is not colliding – indeed, it is useful also to hold [in mind] this component fact

[Hicks] Not that if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable) – although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if [this motion] changed its direction – that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance (even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight). This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind.

θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
πλείων <i>(ον)</i>	many	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more</i>
ό τόπος οι τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>spot</i>
άφικνεΐσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>towards arriving</i>
τό νόημα τά νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing</i>
ή διάνοια αί δianoiai	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοεΐσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
άπερινόητος <i>(ον)</i>	inconceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
άδιανόητος	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing through</i>
διανόητος	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>seeing through</i>
συναφικνούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	to arrive as a whole	ΣΥΝΑΦΙΚΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>towards arriving together</i>
ή αΐσθησις αί αισθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τό αισθητήριον τά αισθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>instrument of perceiving</i>
αΐσθητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ <i>perceiving</i>
άπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>

ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἀφιστάμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	different	ΑΦΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>standing away</i>
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
ἀντικοπεῖν	to collide [against]	
ἀντικόπτων <i>(οὔσα, ον)</i>	colliding [against]	
ἡ οὐκἀντικοπή αἱ οὐκἀντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>not beating against</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>same</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
χρήσιμος <i>(ον)</i>	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ <i>use</i>
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component principle	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row</i> <i>(in a series)</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component fact	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row</i> <i>(in a series)</i>

Past a certain rate, speeds appear to be similarly instantaneous. A moving body does not reach more than one place at the same time – which is impossible (and impossible to imagine). However, in time perceptible to our senses, a quickly moving body can appear to arrive at different places at the same time.

A moving body cannot occupy multiple places at once when we think about time rationally. However, when considering perceptible time (observable motion), the body moves continuously from some point in the infinite and remains connected to the place from which we can understand its motion. The key point is the continuity and connectedness of the moving body with the space it moves through, making its motion comprehensible. Consider a torch that is brought into a room and fills it with light – the light seems to fill the room instantly, although really it had to fill the room in a physical sequence – nevertheless the source remains the same.

48a. Films Move Quickly

πρός τε τούτοις, ὅτι ἡ Γένεσις τῶν εἰδώλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει

in addition to these things, the Creation of films occurs simultaneously with conception

ἡ γένεσις αἱ γένεσις	creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ <i>action of being born</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοῖαι	conception about	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>

48b. Films Stream Off Aggregates

καὶ γὰρ ῥεῦσις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχῆς (οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ μείωσει, διὰ τὴν ἀνταναπλήρωσιν) σώζουσα τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεμνίου θέσιν καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον (εἰ καὶ ἐνίοτε συγχεομένη ὑπάρχει)

for the Flowing [of atoms] from the surface of objects is continuous (not noticeable by shrinking, due to [its] replenishment) preserving the position and arrangement of atoms in the solid [object] for a long time (although indeed sometimes it exists as mixed)

ἡ ῥεῦσις αἱ ῥεῦσεις	flowing	ῬΕΥΣΙΣ <i>action of flowing</i>
ἡ ἐπιπολή αἱ ἐπιπολαί	surface	ΕΠΙΠΟΛΗ <i>being [πέλ] upon</i>
συνεχής (ές)	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
ἡ συνεχῆς ῥεῦσις	continuous flowing	
ἐπίδηλος (ον)	noticeable	ΕΠΙΔΗΛΟΣ <i>shine upon</i>
ἡ μείωσις αἱ μείωσεις	shrinking	ΜΕΙΩΣΙΣ <i>action of reducing</i>
ἡ ἀνταναπλήρωσις αἱ ἀνταναπλήρωσεις	replenishment	ΑΝΤΑΝΑΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΣ <i>action of filling again in place of</i>
σώζων (σώζουσα, σώζον)	preserving	ΣΩΙΖΩΝ <i>safe</i>
ἡ σώζουσα ῥεῦσις	preservative flowing	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing</i>
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ <i>ordered</i>
ἡ θέσις καὶ τάξις	position and arrangement	
συγχεόμενος (μένη, μενον)	mixed	ΣΥΓΧΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>together mixed</i>
ἡ συγχεομένη ῥεῦσις	mixed flowing	

Particles constantly stream off from the surface of objects, but we do not see those objects get smaller because other particles take their place. These particles mostly retain the same position and arrangement as when they were part of the solid body, although sometimes they are altered while traveling.

48c. Formation of Films

καὶ Συστάσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὀξεῖαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δεῖν κατὰ βάθος τὸ συμπλήρωμα γίνεσθαι (καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ Τρόποι τινὲς γεννητικοὶ τῶν τοιούτων φύσεων εἰσίν)

and swift Compositions [of films] are produced in the surrounding space because there is no need for deeply filling all up (and there are also some other Ways that are generative of such natures)

ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>stand together</i>
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding space	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ <i>hold around</i>
ὀξύς (ὀξεῖ, ὀξύ)	quick	ΟΞΥΣ <i>sharp</i>
τὸ συμπλήρωμα τὰ συμπληρώματα	filling all up	ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ <i>filling together</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΙ <i>method</i>

Films form very quickly in the air because they are created by streaming or reflecting off the surface of objects. Additionally, films can also be formed passing through the entire object.

48d. Film Correspondence

Οὐθὲν γὰρ τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: ἂν βλέπη τίς τινα τρόπον τὰς ἐναργείας (ἵνα καὶ τὰς συμπαθείας ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξωθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς) ἀνοίσει

None of these things is contradicted by the sensations: if Someone sees the certain way [sensation] will bring up visible realities (and so also the correspondences from external sources towards us)

ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contradict	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρόμενος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contradicted	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
ἐναργής <i>(ές)</i>	visible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	visible thing	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ
ἡ ἐναργεία αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	visible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ <i>experience together</i>
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding space	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ <i>hold around</i>
τὸ ἔξωθεν τὰ ἔξωθεν	external source	ἘΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
ἀνοίσειν	to bring up <i>(in the future)</i>	ΑΝΟΙΣΕΙΝ <i>[will carry] up</i>

Films preserve a general correspondence between objects and the observer – and it is through a continuity of films that we develop confidence in their accurate correspondence with their source-object.

49a. Basis Of Sight & Thought

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν – ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν – τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι

It is also necessary to think that – by something entering [us] from external sources – We see and [mentally] perceive [their] shapes

νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see	ὍΡΑΝ <i>perceiving</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>

We are able to see and think about objects and their qualities when films streaming off of external objects contact and enter our bodies.

49b. Shared Contact

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο τὰ ἔξω τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τοῦ τε χρώματος καὶ τῆς μορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ μεταξύ ἡμῶν τε κάκεινων – οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων, ἢ ὠνδήποτε ῥευμάτων ἀφ' ἡμῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα παραγινομένων – οὕτως ὡς τύπων τινῶν ἐπεισιόντων ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὁμοχρόων τε καὶ ὁμοιομόρφων κατὰ τὸ ἐναρμόττον μέγεθος εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡκέως ταῖς φοραῖς χρωμένων

for external Objects would not imprint inside [us] **their own nature of both color and shape** through the air that is between us and them – or through rays, or through flows of any kind **originating from us to them** – but rather, with certain impressions entering into us from the circumstances, of the same color and of the same shape according to the size that fits into [our] vision or [mental] perception, **swiftly using their transmissions**

ἐναποσφραγίζειν	to imprint inside	ΕΝΑΠΟΣΦΡΑΓΙΖΕΙΝ <i>seal away within</i>
τὸ ἔξωθεν τὰ ἔξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
τὰ ἔξω	external objects	ΕΞΩ <i>outside</i>
ἡ ἀκτίς αἱ ἀκτῖνες	ray	ΑΚΤΙΣ <i>beam</i>
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ <i>skin color</i>
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>air</i>
ἡ ῥεῦσις αἱ ῥεῦσεις	flowing	ῬΕΥΣΙΣ <i>action of flowing</i>
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>
παραγινόμενος <i>(α, ον)</i>	originating from	ΠΑΡΑΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>come into being alongside</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>to imprint</i>
ἐπεισιών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	entering into	ΕΠΕΙΣΙΩΝ <i>come upon</i>
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	work	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ <i>issue</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	circumstance	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>
ὁμόχρους <i>(ον)</i>	same color	ὍΜΟΧΡΟΣ <i>same color</i>
ὁμοίομορφος <i>(ον)</i>	same shape	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ <i>similar form</i>
ἐναρμόττων <i>(οὔσα, ον)</i>	fitting into	ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ <i>join into</i>
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις	vision	ΟΨΙΣ <i>eye</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ δianoiai	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ὠκέως	swiftly	ΩΚΕΩΣ <i>quick</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>

External things cannot stamp an impression of their color and shape on us through the air between them merely through rays or flows. Instead, we see and think when actual films from the objects themselves, which match the color and shape of the source-object, enter our senses.

50a. Proportional Impact

εἶτα, διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποδιδόντων – **καὶ τὴν συμπάθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σωζόντων** – **κατὰ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν σύμμετρον ἐπερειασμόν, ἐκ τῆς κατὰ βάθος ἐν τῷ στερεμνίῳ τῶν ἀτόμων πάλλσεως**

accordingly, because of this, because [Transmissions] are demonstrating the image of a single continuous thing – they are also preserving the correspondence [of qualities] from the original source – according to the proportionate impingement [of the transmissions on us] from that location, [coming] out of the vibration of the atoms deep in that solid object

ἡ αἰτία αἰ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ blame
ἡ φαντασία αἰ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ state of appearing
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination [an act of imagining]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ process of appearing
ἀποδιδούς (οὔσα, ὄν) ἀποδιδόντες	demonstrating	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΥΣ giving away
ἡ συμπάθεια αἰ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ experience together
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ result of situated under
ἐκεῖθεν	from that location (thence)	ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ from over there
σύμμετρος (ον)	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ measure together
ὁ ἐπερισμός	impingement	ΕΠΕΡΙΣΜΟΣ stay/prop against
ὁ σύμμετρος ἐπερισμός	proportionate impingement	
ὁ παλμός οἱ παλμοί	vibration	ΠΑΛΜΟΣ pulse

Films create a continuous image because they maintain a connection with their original object. Films move faster than the speed of sight: because these films move very fast, they look like a single continuous object and stay connected to their original object. This happens in part because the atoms inside solid object are constantly vibrating.

50b. Film Accuracy

καὶ ἦν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις (εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων) – Μορφή ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ στερεομένου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου

and that image We receive cast over to [our mental] perception or to [our] sense-organs (whether of form or of properties) – is itself the Form of the solid object, coming about from concentration [of the film] in succession or [mere] residue of the film

ἡ φαντασία αἰ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ state of appearing
ἐπιβλητικῶς	[by being] cast over	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ thrown upon
ἡ διάνοια αἰ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ seeing through
ἡ αἴσθησις αἰ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ perceiving process
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ instrument of perceiving
ἡ μορφή αἰ μορφαί	form	ΜΟΡΦΗ form
ἡ μορφῆς φαντασία	the image of form	

τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
ἡ συμβεβηκότης φαντασία	image of properties	
ἑξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωμα τοῦ εἰδώλου	concentration of the film in succession	
τὸ ἐγκατάλειμμα τὰ ἐγκαταλείμματα	[mere] residue	ΕΓΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΜΜΑ <i>the result of fully thoroughly leaving behind</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΑ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου	the residue of the film	
στερεός (ἄ, ὄν)	solid	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>making stiff</i>
τὸ στερεμνίον τὰ στερεμνία	solid object	
ἡ τοῦ στερεμνίου μορφή	the form of the solid [object]	

We accurately perceive the impressions of films. This is true both for concentrations of films and mere residues of films.

50c. Non-Affirmation & Contradiction

τὸ δὲ **Ψεῦδος** καὶ τὸ **Διημαρτημένον** ἐν τῷ **προσδοξαζομένῳ** αἰεὶ ἐστὶν **ἐπὶ τοῦ προσμένοντος** ^[E] **ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι** ἢ ^[V] **μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι** – εἴτ' ^[3] **οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρομένου** **ἢ** ^[A] **ἀντιμαρτυρομένου**

Falsity and Misinterpretation always exist in the addition of judgment **«regarding what is expected»** ^[E] **to be affirmed** or ^[V] **not to be contradicted** – and subsequently is ^[3] **not affirmed** **or** ^[A] **is contradicted**

τὸ ψεῦδος τὰ ψεύδη	falsity	ΨΕΥΔΟΣ <i>falsehood / lie</i>
τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	misinterpretation	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of fully not being testimony</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον	the addition of judgement	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition to seeming</i>
προσμένων (ουσα, ον)	expected	ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ <i>addition to</i>
τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα	what is expected	ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition to</i>
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to affirm	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying upon</i>
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα	what is affirmed	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of testifying upon</i>
ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι	to be affirmed (in the future)	
«τὸ προσμένον» ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι	^[E] what is expected to be affirmed	

τὸ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον	[3] what is not affirmed	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contradict	ANTIMARTYPEIN <i>testify against</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρηθήσεται	to be contradicted <i>(in the future)</i>	
τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενα	[A] what is contradicted	
«τὸ προσμένον» μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθήσεται	[V] what is expected not to be contradicted	

Errors and miscalculations do not come from sensation, but from judgment. When we affirm facts that need to be checked – and then these facts are later proven wrong or contradicted.

51a. Image Similarity

ἢ τε γὰρ Ὀμοιότης τῶν φαντασμῶν (οἶονεὶ ἐν εἰκόνι λαμβανομένων ἢ καθ' ὕπνου γινομένων ἢ κατ' ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων) οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς 'οὔσι' τε καὶ 'ἀληθεῖσι' προσαγορευομένοις – εἰ μὴ ἦν τινα καὶ τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἃ παραβάλλομεν

in fact, the Similarity of [our] imagination (whether apprehended in a representation or occurring through dreams or through certain other attentions of [mental] perception or [attentions] of the rest of the standards) would never at anytime occur with the things that are publicly called 'existing' and 'true' – unless those very [films] to which We compare also existed

ἡ ὁμοιότης	similarity	ΟΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination <i>[an act of imagining]</i>	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαμβάνεσθαι	to be apprehended	
λαμβάνόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	apprehended	
ἡ εἰκὼν αἱ εἰκόνες	representation	ΕΙΚΩΝ <i>portraying</i>
ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	dream	ΥΠΝΟΣ
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
τινες ἐπιβολαί τῆς διανοίας	some attentions to perception	<i>"some focus of the mind"</i>
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
τινες ἐπιβολαί τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων	some attentions of the other standards	
ἀληθής <i>(ές)</i>	true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>
προσαγορευόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	publicly called	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>towards the [public] assembly</i>
παραβάλλειν	to compare	ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in across</i>

We know things exist because we sense them. Our thoughts and dreams come from the impressions of images of existing objects. The images that we see (or dream or imagine) would never look like real and true things unless we had contact with actual objects. The similarity of mental images to real and existing things would never arise at any time unless we had those real things for direct comparison.

51b. Logical Additions

τὸ δὲ Διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν εἰ μὴ Ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς – συνημμένην μὲν τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ – διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν {καθ' ἣν τὸ Ψεῦδος γίνεται}

Misinterpretation would never had occurred if We did not also apprehended a certain other movement in us ourselves – connected to our image-based attention – but having a distinction {through which Error is produced}

τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	misinterpretation	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ result of <i>fully not being</i> <i>testimony</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τις κίνησις ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς	some movement within us ourselves	
συνημμένος (α, ον)	connected	ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>joined together</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination [an act of imagining]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i>
φανταστικός (ή, όν)	image-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>appearance</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ	our image-based attention	
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	distinction	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping separation</i>

Mental images are necessary for thinking. Mistakes happen because we feel another kind of movement inside us (thinking) that is linked to, but different from, the impressions we receive.

51c. Affirmation & Non-Contradiction

κατὰ δὲ ταύτην, ἐὰν μὲν ^[3] μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ^[A] ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ψεῦδος γίνεται – ἐὰν δὲ ^[E] ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ^[V] μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ἀληθές

and regarding this [movement of thought in us], if ^[3] is not affirmed or ^[A] is contradicted, Falsity is produced – if it ^[E] is confirmed or ^[V] is not contradicted, Truth [is produced]

ΤΟ ΨΕΥΔΟΣ	An Opinion Is False:	ΨΕΥΔΟΣ <i>falsehood / lie</i>
ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ	^[3] if it is not affirmed	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying upon</i>
τὸ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον	what is not affirmed	
ἐὰν ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ	^[A] if it is refuted	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον	what is refuted	
ΤΟ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ	An Opinion Is True:	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>
ἐὰν ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ	^[E] if it is affirmed	

«τὸ προσμένον» ἐπιμαρτυρηθήσεται	what is expected to be affirmed
ἐὰν μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ	if it is not refuted
«τὸ προσμένον» μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθήσεται	what is expected not to be refuted

Opinions about perceptions can be false, but the perceptions themselves are not false – they must be real because they physically affect us. However, we must think about and judge these "honest" reports of our sensations to figure out the extent that they do, in fact, accurately correspond to external objects and circumstances.

A true opinion is established by the full correspondence of that opinion to external objects and their circumstances. If our opinion is not affirmed or is refuted, it is false; but if our opinion is affirmed or not refuted, it is true.

An example of something not expected to be refuted (and therefore true is the existence of extraterrestrial life – which is rightfully considered to exist, despite not being affirmed by direct evidence.

52a. Basis In Reality

καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν δόξαν κατέχειν – ἵνα μήτε τὰ κριτήρια ἀναιρῆται τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐναργείας – μήτε τὸ διημαρτημένον, ὁμοίως βεβαιούμενον, πάντα συνταράττει

firmly Maintaining **this judgment** is indeed very necessary – otherwise the Standards according to visible reality are taken away – and also the Misinterpretation, **being similarly affirmed**, would confuse **everything**

σφόδρα	very	ΣΦΟΔΡΑ <i>vehement</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly maintain	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly hold</i>
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasp back</i>
ἀναιρεῖσθαι	to be taken away	
ἡ ἐναργεία αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	visible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ
τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	misinterpretation	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of fully not being testimony</i>
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>the same</i>
βεβαιούμενος (η, ον)	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>firm standing</i>
συνταράττειν	to confuse	ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>agitate together</i>

Ideas not based on sensation have no basis in reality. We must avoid rejecting the clear evidence of our senses and we must reject thoughts not based in our sense – otherwise we will confuse reality with our own ideas.

52b. Origin of Sound

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὸ ἄκουεῖν γίνεται ῥεύματος φερομένου ἀπὸ τοῦ φωνοῦντος ἢ ἠχοῦντος ἢ ψοφοῦντος ἢ ὅπωςδήποτε ἀκουστικὸν πάθος παρασκευάζοντος

but indeed, Hearing is produced because a flow is carried off of what is speaking or echoing or making noise or in any way producing an auditory experience

ἀκούειν	to hear	ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ <i>listening</i>
τὸ ἀκούειν	hearing	
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
φωνῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	speaking	ΦΩΝΩΝ <i>to speak</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>to speak</i>
ἠχῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	echoing	ΗΧΩΝ <i>sound</i>
ψοφῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	making noise	ΨΟΦΩΝ <i>noise</i>
ὅπωςδήποτε	in any way	ὍΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ <i>indefinite</i> <i>in what way</i>
ἀκουστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	auditory	ΑΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>hearing</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>feeling</i>

Sound is a current perpetuated through air. Hearing happens when a flow of sound travels from an object to us.

52c. Sound Waves

τὸ δὲ Ῥεῦμα τοῦτο εἰς ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους διασπείρεται, ἅμα ^[1] τινὰ διασώζοντας συμπάθειαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ^[2] ἐνότητα ιδιότροπον, διατείνουσιν πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαι καὶ τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ποιοῦσαν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἔνδηλον παρασκευάζουσιν

this Flow is dispersed into homogeneous particles, which simultaneously preserve ^[1] a certain correspondence among themselves and ^[2] a particular type of unity, which extends [back] towards the object that sent [the flow of sound] and [this particular unity] usually makes the heightened sensation [of specific sounds] in that [recipient of the flow], otherwise, it only makes [the presence of] the external source fully clear

τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>
ὁμοιομερής <i>(ές)</i>	homogeneous	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>similar parts</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
διασπείρειν	to disperse	ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>scatter</i>
διασπείρεσθαι	to be dispersed	
διασώζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	preserving	ΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΩΝ <i>fully save</i>
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ <i>experience together</i>
ἡ ἐνότης αἱ ἐνότητες	unity	ΕΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of oneness</i>
ιδιότροπος <i>(ον)</i>	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>
διατείνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	extending	ΔΙΑΤΕΙΝΩΝ <i>stretching across</i>
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>send away</i>
ἀποστεῖλας <i>(α, αν)</i>	having sent away	

τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν τὰ ἀποστείλαντα	the object that sent	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΙΛΑΝ result of sending away
ἡ ἐπαίσθησις αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις	heightened sensation	ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ upon sensation
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ perceiving process
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ instrument of perceiving
ποιῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	making	ΠΟΙΩΝ doing
τὸ ἕξωθεν τὰ ἕξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ outside origin
ἔνδηλος (ον)	fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ clear within
παρασκευάζων (ουσα, ον)	makes	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΩΝ preparing alongside

Sound waves are composed of particles. Currents of sound break into tiny particles that have a direct connection with the object that produced the sound. This connection allows us to understand the source of the sound or at least allows us to understand that there is something, external to us, that is making a sound.

53a. Direct Correspondence

ἄνευ γὰρ ἀναφερομένης τινὸς ἐκεῖθεν συμπαθείας οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἡ τοιαύτη Ἐπαίσθησις

for, without some correspondence being carried back from that location [that made the sound], a heightened Sensation such as this would not occur

ἀναφερόμενος (η, ον)	being carried back	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ carry back
ἐκεῖθεν	from that location (thence)	ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ from over there
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ experience together
ἡ ἐπαίσθησις αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις	heightened sensation	ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ upon sensation

Hearing is based on material transmission from object to observer. Without the transmission of a certain connection between the parts from the object, we could not have the sensation of hearing.

53b. Mechanics of Sound

οὐκ αὐτὸν οὔν Δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν Ἄερα ὑπὸ τῆς προιεμένης φωνῆς ἢ καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν σχηματίζεσθαι – πολλὴν γὰρ ἔνδειαν ἔξει τοῦτο πάσχωσιν ὑπ' ἐκείνης – ἀλλ' εὐθύς, τὴν γινομένην πληγὴν ἐν ἡμῖν (ὅταν φωνὴν Ἀφίωμεν) τοιαύτην ἔκθλιψιν ὄγκων τινῶν ρεύματος πνευματώδους ἀποτελεστικῶν ποιεῖσθαι (Ἡ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἀκουστικὸν ἡμῖν παρασκευάζει)

therefore, it is not necessary to think that the air itself is shaped by an emitted statement and [sounds] of the same kind – for this [air] will have a great lack of being affected by that [sound] – but simply, [it is necessary to consider that] the strike produced inside us (when We emit a statement) makes such a pressure of certain particles producing an airy flow (Which produces an auditory experience in us)

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN custom
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ὁ ἀήρ (τοῦ ἀέρος)	air	ΑΗΡ air
προϊέμενος (η, ον)	emitted	ΠΡΟΙΕΜΕΝΟΣ throw before
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ to speak
ὁ ὁμογενής οἱ ὁμογενεῖς	the same kind	ὍΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ same born
ὁμογενής (ές)	of the same kind	
σχηματίζειν	to assume a shape	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ forming
σχηματίζεσθαι	to be shaped	
ἡ ἔνδεια αἱ ἔνδεια	lack	ΕΝΔΕΙΑ deficiency
πάσχω (ουσα, ον)	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩ suffering
εὐθύς (εἴτα, ὕ)	simply	ΕΥΘΥΣ direct
γινόμενος (η, ον)	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ become
ἡ πληγή αἱ πληγαί	strike	ΠΛΗΓΗ to hit
ἀφιέναι	to emit	ΑΦΙΕΝΑΙ send away
ἡ ἔκθλιψις αἱ ἔκθλιψεις	pressure	ΕΚΘΛΙΨΙΣ press out
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ bulk
τὸ ρεῦμα τὰ ρεύματα	flow	ῚΡΕΥΜΑ result of flowing
πνευματώδης (ες)	airy	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ air
ἀποτελεστικός (ή, όν)	producing	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ completing out
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ experience
ἀκουστικός (ή, όν)	auditory	ΑΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΣ hearing

The void can never affect anything and the void cannot be affected by anything in any way. Air, which is a mixture of atoms and void, can affect and be affected. Nevertheless, we should not think that the air itself is shaped by the voice or sound. Instead, when we make a sound, we make a movement of particles that flow in current. This current producing the sensation of hearing when it contacts an organ that can hear.

53c. Smell

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὴν ὀσμὴν Νομιστέον, ὡσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε οὐθὲν πάθος ἐργάσασθαι, εἰ μὴ Ὅγκοι τινὲς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀποφερόμενοι, σύμμετροι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν: οἱ μὲν Τοῖοι τεταραγμένως καὶ ἀλλοτριῶς – οἱ δὲ Τοῖοι ἀταράχως καὶ οἰκείως ἔχοντες

and indeed, It is not necessary to think that **smell**, like **sound**, would ever produce any experience unless certain Particles existed that are carried away from the circumstances [that smell or make noise], that are proportionate for moving that sense-organ: Some [particles] turbulently and strangely [move the sense organ due to their proportions] – while Others do so calmly and comfortably

ἡ ὀσμή αἱ ὀσμαί	smell	ΟΣΜΗ odor
ἡ ἀκοή αἱ ἀκοαί	sound	ΑΚΟΗ hearing

τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>experience</i>
ἐργάζεσθαι	to be working	ΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>work</i>
ἐργάσασθαι	to accomplish	
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	circumstance	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>
ἀποφερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried away	ΑΠΟΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>carry out</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
σύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>instrument of perceiving</i>
τεταραγμένως	turbulently	ΤΕΤΑΡΑΓΜΕΝΩΣ <i>disturbed</i>
ἄλλοτρίως	strangely	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ <i>foreign</i>
ἄταράχως	calmly	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΩΣ <i>calmness</i>
οἰκείως	comfortably	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ <i>appropriately</i>

Smell like sound, would not produce any sensation for us, if particles from their source-objects did not reach our nose or ears. Some particles feel strange or disruptive (when they contact a part of our body that can sense the contact), while other particles feel calming and comforting (when they contact).

54a. Shape, Size, And Weight

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὰς Ἄτομους Νομιστέον μηδεμίαν ποιότητα τῶν φαινομένων προσφέρεσθαι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ βάρους καὶ μεγέθους (καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος συμφυῆ ἔστι)

and indeed, It is not necessary to think that the Atoms also carry no qualities of visible things except shape, weight, size (and However many [qualities] that are are necessarily inherent to shape)

ἄτομος <i>(ον)</i>	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom	
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality <i>(characteristic)</i>	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition [from] gathering</i>
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
προσφέρεσθαι	to also carry <i>[for themselves]</i>	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>carrying as well</i>
πλὴν	besides	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>necessity</i>

συμφυής (ές)	inherent	ΣΥΜΦΥΗΣ growing together
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Atoms do not have any of the qualities we can see in objects except shape, weight, and size, and the properties that come with shape.

54b. Dissolutions of Compounds

Ποιότης γὰρ πᾶσα μεταβάλλει – αἱ δὲ ἄτομοι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλουσιν: ἐπειδήπερ, δεῖ Τι ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων στερεὸν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον (Ἔως τὰς μεταβολὰς – οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ποιήσεται οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος – ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις ἐν πολλοῖς, τινῶν δὲ καὶ προσόδους καὶ ἀφόδους)

for every Quality transforms – but the Atoms do not transform at all: since indeed, Something must remain solid and indissoluble in the dissolutions of the compounds (Which will make transformations – not into what does not exist or from what does not exist – but mostly through transpositions, and also through additions and removals [of the atoms])

ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality (characteristic)	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ condition [from] gathering
τὰ ἀμετάβλητα	what is non-transformable	ΑΜΕΤΑΒΛΗΤΑ not thrown change
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ throwing in change
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ not cut
ὑπομένειν	to remain	ἽΠΟΜΕΝΕΙΝ stay under
ἡ διάλυσις αἱ διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ fully loose
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ separating together
ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	solidity	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ condition of making stiff
στερεός (ά, όν)	solid	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ making stiff
ἀδιάλυτος (ον)	indissoluble	ΑΔΙΑΛΥΤΟΣ not fully loose
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ stepping change
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ threw in a change
ἡ μετάθεσις αἱ μεταθέσεις	transposition	ΜΕΤΑΘΕΣΙΣ placing change
ἡ πρόσοδος αἱ προσόδοι	addition	ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ course toward
ἡ ἀφοδος αἱ ἀφόδοι	removal	ΑΦΟΔΟΣ course away

All compositions and their qualities are fully changeable, but atoms and their qualities are not changeable. When composite bodies break apart, there must be something solid and unbreakable left behind, which allows for subsequent changes of compositions and qualities. The atoms themselves cannot transform, add or subtract anything from their form.

54c. Permanence of Atoms

ὅθεν, Ἀναγκαῖον τὰ Μετατιθέμενα ἄφθαρτα εἶναι – καὶ τὴν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντα – ὄγκους δὲ καὶ σχηματισμούς ἰδίους (Ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν)

therefore, It is necessary that the rearranged Things exist as indestructible – and do not have the nature of what transforms – but [exist as] particles and configurations of their own (for It is necessary that these remain)

ἀναγκαῖος (α, ον)	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ <i>necessity</i>
μετατιθέμενος (η, ον)	rearranged	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ <i>placing change</i>
τὸ μετατιθέμενον τὰ μετατιθέμενα	what is rearranged	
ἄφθαρτος (ον)	indestructible	ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ <i>not decaying</i>
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
μεταβάλλων (ουσα, ον)	transforming	
τὸ μεταβάλλον τὰ μεταβάλλοντα	what transforms	
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of forming</i>
ὑπομένειν	to remain	ὙΠΟΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>stay under</i>

Changes in the emergent qualities of matter do not come from or go into nothingness, but occur through rearranging, adding or removing atoms. These atoms are indestructible and unchangeable, each with its own permanent size and shape.

55a. Permanent Properties

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μετασχηματιζομένοις κατὰ τὴν περιαίρεσιν, τὸ Σχῆμα ἐνυπάρχον λαμβάνεται – αἱ δὲ Ποιότητες οὐκ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι (ὥσπερ ἐκείνο καταλείπεται) ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλύμεναι – ἱκανὰ οὖν τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα Ταῦτα τὰς τῶν συγκρίσεων διαφορὰς ποιεῖν: ἐπειδήπερ ὑπολείπεσθαι γέ Τίνα Ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μὴ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθειρεσθαι

for even in things transfigured in our presence by the stripping away [of their material], a Shape is [still] apprehended as integral – while (in comparison to the way that [shape] is left behind) the Qualities [are apprehended] as not integral in what transforms but are dissolved away from the entire body – therefore These remaining [atoms] are sufficient to make the differences [of qualities] in [subsequent] compounds: since indeed, It is necessary for certain Things to remain and not to be destroyed into nonexistence

[Bailey] For even in things perceptible to us which change their shape by the withdrawal of matter it is seen that shape remains to them, whereas the qualities do not remain in the changing object, in the way in which shape is left behind, but are lost from the entire body. Now these particles which are left behind are sufficient to cause the differences in compound bodies, since it is essential that some things should be left behind and not be destroyed into the non-existent.

for even in things transfigured in our presence by the stripping away [of their material], a Shape is [still] apprehended **as integral** – while the Qualities [are apprehended] **as not integral** in what transforms (in the way that [some shape] is left behind) but [the qualities] are dissolved away from the entire body – therefore These remaining [atoms] are **sufficient** to make the **differences in the compounds**: since indeed, It is necessary for **certain Things to remain** and **not to be destroyed** into nonexistence

ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of forming</i>
τὸ μετασχηματιζόμενον τὰ μετασχηματιζόμενα	what is transfigured	ΜΕΤΑΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>change form</i>
μετασχηματιζόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	transfiguring	
ἡ περιαιρέσεις αἱ περιαιρέσεις	stripping away	ΠΕΡΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ <i>taking around</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἐνυπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> ἐνυπάρχοντα	integral	ΕΝΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>existing in</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαμβάνεσθαι	to be apprehended	
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality <i>(characteristic)</i>	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition [from]</i> <i>gathering</i>
μεταβάλλων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
τὸ μεταβάλλον τὰ μεταβάλλοντα	what transforms	
καταλείπειν	to leave behind	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
καταλείπεσθαι	be be left behind	
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>fully dissolve</i>
ἀπόλλυται	to dissolve away	ΑΠΟΛΛΥΝΑΙ <i>dissolve away</i>
ἀπόλλυσθαι	to be dissolved away	
ὑπολειπόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	remaining	ὙΠΟΛΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>leave under</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ὑπολείπειν	to leave remaining	ὙΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>leave under</i>
ὑπολείπεσθαι	to be remaining	
φθείρειν	to destroy	ΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>damaging</i>
φθειρέσθαι	to be destroyed	

The ^[1] inseparable qualities (i.e., properties) of the atoms are indeed permanent, nevertheless the ^[2] inseparable qualities of a compound exist only as long as the compound exists and the ^[3] separable qualities (i.e., symptoms) of a compound do not exist for as long as the compound exists – and finally, the ^[4] separable qualities of the atoms (e.g., their location) are impermanent.

With the destruction of an object, most qualities may all disappear, but the qualities of shape, weight, and form will always remain with the matter that composed that destroyed object.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, οὐδὲ Δεῖ νομίζειν πᾶν Μέγεθος ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις ὑπάρχειν (ἵνα μὴ τὰ Φαινόμενα ἀντιμαρτυρή) Παραλλαγὰς δὲ τινὰς μεγεθῶν Νομιστέον εἶναι: βέλτιον γὰρ καὶ τούτου προσόντος τὰ κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις Γινόμενα ἀποδοθήσεται

however, It is not necessary to think that every Size exists among the atoms (otherwise visible Things would contradict) instead, It is necessary to think that certain Differences of sizes do exist: for the Things that happen according to experiences and sensations will be demonstrated in a better way with this [size variation] being present

[Bailey] Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations.

ὑπάρχειν	to exist [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of</i> <i>appearing</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contradict	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρόμενος (α, ον)	contradicted	
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	difference	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
βελτίων (ον)	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ <i>better</i>
βέλτιον	in a better way	
προσών (οὔσα, ὄν)	[being] present	ΠΡΟΣΩΝ <i>existing towards</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>feeling</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	Αἰσθησις <i>perceiving process</i>
γινόμενος (η, ον)	happening	ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ
γινόμενοι (αι, α)		<i>birthing</i>
τὸ γινόμενον τὰ γινόμενα	what happens	
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΥΣ <i>fully giving</i>
ἀποδιδούς (οὔσα, ὄν)	demonstrating	
ἀποδιδόντες		
ἀποδοθήσεσθαι	to about to be demonstrated	ΑΠΟΔΟΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ <i>will be fully given</i>

We should not think that atoms come in every possible size, as this would be contradicted by experience – but we must admit that atoms do have many different sizes.

56a. Limits in Atomic Size

πᾶν δὲ Μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν οὔτε χρήσιμόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ποιότητων διαφοράς – ἀφίχθαι τε ἅμ’ ἔδει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁρατὰς Ἄτομους (“Ὁ οὐ θεωρεῖται γινόμενον) οὔθ’ ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο ὁρατὴ Ἄτομος” Ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι

but every Size [of atom] existing is also not **useful** for [producing] the differences of qualities – and It would also therefore have been necessary for **visible Atoms to arrive among us** (Which are not observed to be produced) nor is It possible to conceive **how a visible Atom would be produced**

[Bailey] But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.

τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist [already]	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
χρήσιμος <i>(ov)</i>	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ <i>use</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality <i>(characteristic)</i>	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition [from]</i> <i>gathering</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>come towards</i>
ἀφῖχθαί	to have arrived	
ὄρατός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	visible	ΌΡΑΤΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be observed	
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>observing</i>
γινόμενος <i>(η, ov)</i>	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to conceive [about]	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἐπινοῆσαι	to think about [already]	

Thinking that atoms exist in every and all sizes is not necessary to explain the differences in qualities of things. If atoms existed in every and all sizes, some atoms would be big enough to see – which is contrary to evidence and also inconceivable.

56b. Impossibility of Infinite Divisibility

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οὐ Δεῖ νομίζειν ἐν τῷ ὠρισμένῳ σώματι ἀπείρους Ὅγκους εἶναι – οὐδ’ ὀπηλίκοις οὖν: ὥστε, οὐ μόνον ^[1] **τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον Τομήν ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον Ἀναιρετέον** (ἵνα μὴ **πάντα ἀσθενῆ Ποιῶμεν, κὰν ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρόων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀναγκαζώμεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν**), ἀλλὰ καὶ ^[2] **τὴν μετάβασιν μὴ Νομιστέον γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ὠρισμένοις εἰς ἄπειρον μὴδ’ ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον**

also regarding these [topics], It is not necessary to think that **infinite Particles exist in a finite body** – nor [particles] of any size whatsoever: therefore, not only ^[1] is It necessary to take away **the Division ad infinitum into something smaller** (in order that We do not make **everything weak**, and in [our] **comprehensions of the aggregates**, be forced to totally expend **what exists** by pinching [the atoms] into non-existence), but also ^[2] It is not necessary to think that **an extension is produced within the finite [atoms] ad infinitum**, not into something [ever] smaller

[Bailey] Besides this we must not suppose that in a limited body there can be infinite parts or parts of every degree of smallness. Therefore, we must not only do away with division into smaller and smaller parts to infinity, in order that we may not make all things weak, and so in the composition of aggregate bodies be compelled to crush and squander the things that exist into the non-existent, but we must not either suppose that in limited bodies there is a possibility of continuing to infinity in passing even to smaller and smaller parts.

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
ὠρισμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	finite	ΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ <i>limit</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
ὀπηλίκος <i>(η, ον)</i>	of any size	ὈΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>which</i> <i>magnitude</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
εἰς ἄπειρον	ad infinitum	
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ <i>cut</i>
τοῦλαττον τοῦλάττα	something smaller	ΤΟ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ <i>light weight</i>
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasp back</i>
ἀσθενής <i>(ές)</i>	weak	ΑΣΘΕΝΗΣ <i>not strength</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ περίληψις αἱ περιλήψεις	comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ κατάληψις αἱ καταλήψεις	<i>understanding</i> <i>(complete reception)</i>	ΚΑΤΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping</i> <i>thoroughly</i>
ἡ λῆψις αἱ λήψεις	<i>[conception]</i> <i>(reception)</i>	ΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ πρόληψις ἡ προλήψεις	preconception <i>(anticipation)</i>	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping before</i>
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	distinction	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping</i> <i>separation</i>
ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις	supposition	ΥΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping under</i>
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ <i>in groups</i>
ἄθροος <i>(α, ον)</i>	aggregated	
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ <i>necessary</i>
ἀναγκάζεσθαι	to be forced	
θλίβειν	to pinch	ΘΛΙΒΩΝ <i>squeezing</i>
θλίβων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> θλίβοντες	pinching	
καταναλίσκειν	to totally expend	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly spent</i>
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ <i>stepping change</i>

ἡ μετάβασις εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον	extension ad infinitum into what is smaller	
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ <i>threw in a change</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>

Infinite parts cannot exist in a finite object. We should not think that a finite body can have an infinite number of parts, no matter how small the parts. This means we must reject the idea of dividing things into smaller and smaller parts forever, as it would make everything too weak and destroy atoms, turning them into nothing. We also cannot believe that atoms can transform into nothingness.

57a. Paradox of Infinite Parts

οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως (ἐπειδὴν ἅπασι τις εἶπη ὅτι ἄπειροι ὄγκοι ἔν τινι ὑπάρχουσιν, ἢ ὀπηλίκοι οὖν) ἔστι νοῆσαι ὅπως ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο πεπερασμένον εἴη τὸ Μέγεθος: πηλίκοι γὰρ τινες δῆλον ὡς οἱ ἄπειροί εἰσιν ὄγκοι – καὶ οὗτοι ὀπηλίκοι ἂν ποτε ᾧσιν – ἄπειρον ἂν ᾗν καὶ τὸ Μέγεθος

for in no way (whenever Someone says that infinite Particles exist in something, or [particles] of any size whatsoever) is it possible to conceive in what way this [thing's] Size might still be finite: For clearly these infinite Particles must be some size – and any size they may be – the Size [of something composed of them] would also be infinite

[Bailey] For if once one says that there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of smallness, it is not possible to conceive how this should be, and indeed how could the body any longer be limited in size? (For it is obvious that these infinite particles must be of some size or other; and however small they may be, the size of the body too would be infinite.)

ἄπειρος <i>(ov)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist [already]	ὑΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ὀπηλίκος <i>(η, ov)</i>	of any size	ὀΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>which magnitude</i>
πηλίκος <i>(η, ov)</i>	of some size	ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>magnitude</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to conceive about	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	conception about	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of having been limited</i>
πεπερασμένος <i>(η, ov)</i>	finite	
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ov)</i>	clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>

δῆλον	clearly	
ἔνδηλος (ov)	fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear within</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἄπειρος (ov)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>

A finite object cannot have infinite parts. If we say that there are an infinite number of tiny particles in anything, we cannot imagine how it could still be limited in size. An infinite amount of particles, no matter how small they are, would form an aggregate that would be infinitely large.

57b. Infinite Boundaries

ἄκρον τε ἔχοντος τοῦ πεπερασμένου διαληπτόν (εἰ μὴ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρητόν) οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐξῆς τούτου τοιοῦτον Νοεῖν καὶ οὕτω – κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν βαδίζοντα εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον ὑπάρχειν – καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ

because what is finite has a boundary that is apprehensible (even if it is not intrinsically observable) it is impossible not to also Conceive that what is in succession to it [is] of the same kind [i.e., another boundary] and therefore – because [our conception of a boundary] proceeds to exist according what is in succession towards what is ahead ad infinitum – such a [correct view of the infinite] also arrives by internal conception

[Hicks] And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

[Bailey] And again, since the limited body has an extreme point, which is distinguishable, even though not perceptible by itself, you cannot conceive that the succeeding point to it is not similar in character, or that if you go on in this way from one point to another, it should be possible for you to proceed to infinity marking such points in your mind.

τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	boundary	ΑΚΡΟΝ <i>highest extremity</i>
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of having been limited</i>
πεπερασμένος (η, ον)	finite	
τὸ περιληπτόν τὰ περιληπτὰ	what is comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>apprehending around</i>
διαληπτός (ή, όν)	apprehensible	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>apprehending through</i>
τὸ διαληπτόν τὰ διαληπτὰ	what is apprehensible	
θεωρητός (ή, όν)	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
ἐξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
τὸ ἐξῆς τὰ ἐξῆς	what is in succession	
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
τοῦμπροσθεν τᾶμπροσθεν	what is ahead	ΤΟ ΕΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ <i>before in</i>

βαδίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	proceeding	ΒΑΔΙΖΩΝ
βαδίζοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>		
εἰς ἄπειρον	ad infinitum	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
υὔπαρχειν	to [already] exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>arrive from</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοῖαι	conception about	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing in</i>

Because all finite objects have a discernible boundary, it is impossible not to conceive that whatever bounds the last object must be of a similar nature (being surrounded, in turn, by something else). Proceeding in this manner (with the mind progressing from one boundary to the next, endlessly) brings the concept of infinity to our minds.

58a. Unique Quality Of Visual Limits

τό τε ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει δεῖ Κατανοεῖν: ὅτι οὔτε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἔχον, οὔτε πάντη πάντως ἀνόμοιον – ἀλλ' ἔχον μὲν τινα κοινότητα τῶν μεταβατῶν, διάληψιν δὲ μερῶν οὐκ ἔχον

it is necessary to fully Conceive the minimum in sensation: it is neither just like that which [we see] has extensions, nor all-in-all dissimilar – because, although it has some commonality with what extends, it does not have distinction into parts

[Bailey] We must notice also that the least thing in sensation is neither exactly like that which admits of progression from one part to another, nor again is it in every respect wholly unlike it, but it has a certain affinity with such bodies, yet cannot be divided into parts.

τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
ἡ αἰσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
ἡ κατάληψις αἱ καταλήψεις	understanding <i>(full reception)</i>	ΚΑΤΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping thoroughly</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to conceive about	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ <i>stepping change</i>
τὸ μεταβᾶν τὰ μεταβάντα	what extends	
ἀνόμοιος <i>(ον)</i>	dissimilar	ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>not the same</i>
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	commonality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>common</i>

ή μεταβολή αί μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ <i>threw in a change</i>
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
ή διάληψις αί διαλήψεις	distinction	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping separation</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>

In one way, that smallest thing you can see is like everything else you can see – it has extension (dimension) – but in another way that smallest thing you can see is unlike everything else that you can see because only one single part is visible in the smallest thing – and everything else we can see does have other parts.

58b. Absolute Visual Limits

ἀλλ' ὅταν, διὰ τὴν τῆς κοινότητος προσεμφέρειαν, Οἰθῶμεν διαλήψεσθαί τι αὐτοῦ – Τὸ μὲν ἐπιτάδε, Τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα – Τὸ ἴσον ἡμῖν δεῖ προσπίπτειν

but, due to this resemblance of the commonality, whenever We suspected we were going to distinguish something in it – This here, That there – It must be that What is equal strikes us

but, due to this resemblance of the commonality [of extension between regular objects and visible minima], whenever We suspected we were going to distinguish some [other part] in it [that was considered to be the smallest visible unit] – This [part] here, That [part] there – It must be that What is equal [to what was considered to be the visible minima] strikes us

[Bailey] But when on the analogy of this resemblance we think to divide off parts of it, one on the one side and another on the other, it must needs be that another point like the first meets our view.

ή κοινότης αί κοινότητες	commonality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>common</i>
ή προσεμφέρεια αί προσεμφέρειαί	resemblance	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΕΙΑ <i>carrying in toward</i>
οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
οἰήσασθαι	to have suspected	
διαλήψεσθαί	going to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping separation</i>
ή διάληψις αί διάληψεις	distinction	
ἐπιτάδε	here	ΕΠΙΤΑΔΕ <i>upon these</i>
ἐπέκεινα	there	ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ <i>upon those</i>
ἴσος (η, ον)	equal	ΙΣΟΣ <i>equal</i>
προσπίπτειν	to strike	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling toward</i>

If you are trying to look at the smallest object you can see – and then you see another "part" of that thing – then that part (which will be half of the original object-of-focus) is now the smallest thing you can see. Ultimately, you will see something that has the common resemblance to other objects: extension (dimension) – but cannot be further divided while also staying within your vision!

58c. Minimum of Measurement

ἔξης τε θεωροῦμεν ταῦτα, ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καταρχόμενοι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ – οὐδὲ μέρει μερῶν ἀπτόμενα – ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν τῇ ιδιότητι τῇ ἑαυτῶν τὰ μεγέθη καταμετροῦντα – τὰ πλείω πλείον καὶ τὰ ἐλάττω ἔλαττον

and We observe **these in succession**, beginning indeed with the first, and not in the same [space] – nor **intertwining parts with [any other] part** – but **fully measuring size according to [their own] particularity** – a greater [amount measuring a] greater [size] and a lesser [amount measuring a] lesser [size]

and We observe **these [visible minima] in succession** beginning indeed with the first [visible minima], and [we do] not [observe them] in the same [space as another] – nor [do we observe them] **intertwining [any] parts with [any other] part** – but [we observe visible minima] **fully measuring size according to [their own] particularity [of being visibly indivisible]** – a greater [amount of visible minima measuring a] greater [size object] and a lesser [amount of visible minima measuring a] lesser [size object]

[Hicks] In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

[Yonge] In this way, we examine them successively, from the first to the last, not by themselves, more as composed of parts in juxtaposition, but only in their extent; in other words, we consider, the magnitudes by themselves, and in an abstract manner, inasmuch as they measure, the greater a greater extent, and the smaller a smaller extent

[Bailey] And we look at these points in succession starting from the first, not within the limits of the same point nor in contact part with part, but yet by means of their own proper characteristics measuring the size of bodies, more in a greater body and fewer in a smaller.

ἔξης	successive	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα	the first	ΠΡΩΤΟΝ <i>first</i>
καταρχεῖν	to begin	καταρχεῖν
καταρχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	beginning	
καταρχόμενοι <i>(αι, α)</i>		
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἄπτειν	to intertwine	ἈΠΤΕΙΝ <i>touching</i>
ἀπτόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	intertwining	
ἀπτόμενοι <i>(αι, α)</i>		
ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>
ιδιότροπος <i>(ον)</i>	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly measure</i>
καταμετρῶν <i>(οῦσα, οῦν)</i>	fully measuring	
καταμετροῦντες <i>(οῦσαι, οὔντα)</i>		
τὸ πλεόν τὰ πλέω	the greater	ΠΛΕΟΝ <i>more</i>

τὸ ἐλάττων
τὰ ἐλάττω

the lesser

ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ
less

Visual limits are only visible in sequence – we see these tiny points one after another, starting from the first, not in the same space or intermixing with each other. Instead, we use their unique quality of indivisible (yet visible) extension as a basis of minute size measurements.

59a. Analogy for Atomic Limits

ταύτη τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ Νομιστέον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον κεχρησθαι – μικρότητι γὰρ Ἐκεῖνο δῆλον ὡς διαφέρει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρουμένου – ἀναλογία δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κέχρηται: ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἡ ἀτομος, κατὰ τὴν ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίαν Κατηγορήσαμεν – μικρόν τι, μόνον μακρὰν ἐκβαλόντες

It is necessary to think that the minimum in the atom also follows this analogy – although clearly in minuteness It differs from what is observed by sensation – but it follows the same same analogy: since We have also fully indicated that the atom has size, according to the analogy from the immediate surroundings – by extending a small thing, only by a long way

[Bailey] Now we must suppose that the least part in the atom too bears the same relation to the whole; for though in smallness it is obvious that it exceeds that which is seen by sensation, yet it has the same relations. For indeed we have already declared on the ground of its relation to sensible bodies that the atom has size, only we placed it far below them in smallness.

ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ reasoning again
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ custom
ἡ ἀτομος αἱ ἀτομοί	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ not cut
τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum (the smallest thing)	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ small
ἡ μικρότης αἱ μικρότητες	minuteness	ΜΙΚΡΟΤΗΣ little
δῆλος (η, ον)	clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ clear
δῆλον	clearly	
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ carry through
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ perceiving process
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ observing
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	observed	
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ largeness
ἐνταῦθα	from immediate surroundings	ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ in this
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ thoroughly speak
κατηγορήσαι	to fully indicate [already]	
μικρόν (ά, όν)	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΝ little
μόνος (η, ον)	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ only
μόνον	only	
μακρὰν	by a long way	ΜΑΚΡΑΝ long

μικρόν τι, μόνος μακράν	a small thing, only by a long way	
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
ἐκβάλλειν	to extend	ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing out</i>
ἐκβαλῶν <i>(οὔσα, ὄν)</i>	extending	
ἐκβαλόντες <i>(οὔσαι, ὄντα)</i>		

The smallest part of an atom follows the same pattern as the the smallest visible units – and supplies a base unit of atomic measurement.

59b. Units of Atomic Measurement

ἔτι τε, τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ πέρατα Δεῖ νομίζειν τῶν μηκῶν – τὸ καταμέτρημα ἐξ αὐτῶν πρώτων τοῖς μείζουσι καὶ ἐλάττωσι παρασκευάζοντα – τῆ, διὰ λόγου, θεωρία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀοράτων

also, It is necessary to think of [atomic] minima also as pure limits of length – providing out of themselves as primary [units] the full measurement for the larger and for the smaller [atoms] – by [our] observation, through reasoning, of what is unseen

[Bailey] Further, we must consider these least indivisible points as boundary-marks, providing in themselves as primary units the measure of size for the atoms, both for the smaller and the greater, in our contemplation of these unseen bodies by means of thought.

τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
ἀμιγῆς <i>(ές)</i>	pure	ΑΜΙΓΗΣ <i>not mixed</i>
τὸ πέρασ τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>piercing through (to the end)</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>
τὸ καταμέτρημα τὰ καταμετρήματα	full measurement	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΜΑ <i>thoroughly measure</i>
πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
μείζων <i>(ον)</i>	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
ἐλάττων <i>(ον)</i>	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
παρασκευάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	providing	
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ <i>reasoning again</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>observing</i>
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not seeing</i>

τὸ ἄδηλον
τὰ ἄδηλα

the unclear

ΑΔΗΛΟΝ
not clear

The smallest and simplest parts of an atom serve as the fundamental units for measuring atomic lengths and sizes.

59c. Unchangeable Parts of Atoms

ἡ γὰρ Κοινότης ἢ ὑπάρχουσα αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ ἀμετάβολα ἰκανὴ τὸ μέχρι τούτου συντελέσαι – συμφόρησιν δὲ ἐκ τούτων κίνησιν ἐχόντων οὐχ οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι

for the Commonality [of extension] that exists in those [visible minima] with the untransformables [i.e., atomic minima] is sufficient to mutually fulfill this [comparison of measurement by minima] up to this point – but that [atomic minima] are produced by [their] accumulation from them having [any] movement is not possible

[Bailey] For the affinity which the least parts of the atom have to the homogeneous parts of sensible things is sufficient to justify our conclusion to this extent but that they should ever come together as bodies with motion is quite impossible.

ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	commonality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ common
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ stepping change
ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον) ὑπάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	existing [already]	ἽΠΑΡΧΩΝ beginning under (before)
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ threw in a change
τὸ ἀμετάβολον τὰ ἀμετάβολα	the untransformable	
ἰκανός (ή, όν)	sufficient	ἼΚΑΝΟΣ fitting / proper
ἀποτελεστικός (ή, όν)	producing	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ from completing
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ completing together
ἡ συμφόρησις αἱ συμφόρησεις	accumulation	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΗΣΙΣ carrying together
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ moving action
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being

The parts of the atoms are unchanging and motionless. Unlike the atoms themselves, the parts of atoms (including their minima) do not have motion and cannot form by accumulation.

60a. Relative Direction

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τοῦ ἀπείρου ὡς μὲν ἀνωτάτω καὶ κατώτατω οὐ δεῖ κατηγορεῖν τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω: ἴσμεν, μέντοι, τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς (ὄθεν ἂν στῶμεν) εἰς ἄπειρον ἄγειν – ὃν μηδέποτε φανεῖσθαι τοῦτο ἡμῖν (ἢ τὸ ὑποκάτω τοῦ νοηθέντος εἰς ἄπειρον) ἅμα ἄνω τε εἶναι καὶ κάτω πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο γὰρ ἄδύνατον διανοηθῆναι

and indeed, It is not necessary to thoroughly indicate **what is above** or **below in the infinite as highest** or **lowest**: We know, nevertheless, that **What is overhead** (from wherever we may stand) **leads ad infinitum** – and **It** (just like **What is below in thought ad infinitum**) **will never be seen by us as existing both above** and **below** in relation to that same [spot we are standing], for [this] is impossible to perceive

[Bailey] Furthermore, **in the infinite** we must not speak of 'up' or 'down' as though with reference to an absolute highest or lowest — and indeed we must say that, though it is possible to proceed to infinity in the direction above our heads from wherever we take our stand, the absolute highest point will never appear to us — **nor yet can that which passes beneath the point thought of to infinity be at the same time both up and down in reference to the same thing for it is impossible to think this.**

[Hicks] Further, we must not assert 'up' or 'down' of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time 'up' and 'down' with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable.

[Yonge] Moreover, we must not say (while speaking of the infinite), that such or such a point is the highest point of it, or the lowest. For height and lowness must not be predicated of the infinite. We know, in reality, that if, wishing to determine the infinite, we conceive a point above our head, this point, whatever it may be, will never appear to us to have the character in question otherwise, that which would be situated above the point so conceived as the limit of the infinite, would be at the same moment, and by virtue of its relation to the same point, both high and low; and this is impossible to imagine.

[Bailey] Furthermore, in the infinite we must not speak of 'up' or 'down' as though with reference to an absolute highest or lowest — and indeed we must say that, though it is possible to proceed to infinity in the direction above our heads from wherever we take our stand, the absolute highest point will never appear to us — nor yet can that which passes beneath the point thought of to infinity be at the same time both up and down in reference to the same thing for it is impossible to think this.

ἄπειρος (ον)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἄνωτάτος (η, ον)	highest	ΑΝΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>the most above</i>
ἄνωτάτω	highest	
κάτω	below	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
τὸ κάτω τὰ κάτω	what is below	
κατώτατος (η, ον)	lowest	ΚΑΤΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>the most below</i>
κατώτατω	lowest	
τὸ κατώτατω τὰ κατώτατω	what is lowest	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speak</i>
ἄνω	above	ΑΝΩ <i>above</i>
τὸ ἄνω τὰ ἄνω	what is above	
εἰδέναι	to know	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>looking at</i>
ἴσμεν	we know	ΙΣΜΕΝ <i>knowing</i>
ἡ κεφαλή αἱ κεφαλαί	head	ΚΕΦΑΛΗ <i>head</i>

τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τὰ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς	what is overhead	
ἴστασθαι	to be stood up	ἸΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>setting</i>
στήναι	to stand [already]	ΣΤΗΝΑΙ <i>set</i>
φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appear</i>
φανεῖσθαι	to be seen [in the future]	
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
ὑποκάτω	down below	
τὸ ὑποκάτω τὰ ὑποκάτω	what is [down] below	ὙΠΟΚΑΤΩ <i>under below</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
νοηθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i> νοηθέντες <i>(εἶσαι, ἐντα)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing</i>
τὸ ἐννόημα	thought	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing within</i>
ἀδύνατος <i>(ον)</i>	unable	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>not powerful</i>
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>saw through</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>

There is no ultimate direction because the universe has no center. We should not describe the infinite as having an ultimate "up" or "down" because these terms do not apply to something without limits. Nevertheless, relative direction does still exist in infinite space.

60b. Only Relative Direction Exists

ὥστε, Ἔστι μίαν λαβεῖν φοράν τὴν ἄνω, νοουμένην εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ μίαν τὴν κάτω – ἂν καὶ μυριάκις πρὸς τοὺς πόδας τῶν ἐπάνω τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν Φερόμενον εἰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν τόπους ἀφικνῆται – ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν κάτω Φερόμενον: ἢ γὰρ ὅλη Φορὰ (οὐθὲν ἦττον Ἐκατέρα ἑκατέρα ἀντικειμένη) ἐπ' ἄπειρον νοεῖται

so, It is possible to apprehend **one transmission that is above** and **one that is below**, **[both] conceived ad infinitum** – even if What is brought **from us** towards the feet of those above arrives innumerable times **at the locations** above our heads – and [the same for] What is being carried downward **from us** towards the head of those below: for the whole Motion (Each [direction] **no less opposed to the other**) is conceived **ad infinitum**

[Bailey] So that it is possible to consider as one single motion that which is thought of as the upward motion to infinity and as another the downward motion, even though that which passes from us into the regions above our heads arrives countless times at the feet of beings above and that which passes downwards from us at the head of beings below; for none the less the whole motions are thought of as opposed, the one to the other, to infinity.

εἷς (μία, ἓν)	one	ἜΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἘΝ
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαβεῖν	to apprehend [already]	ΛΑΒΕΙΝ <i>seized</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τὸ ἄνω τὰ ἄνω	what is above	ΑΝΩ <i>above</i>
νοούμενος (η, ον)	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
εἰς ἄπειρον	ad infinitum	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
τὸ κάτω τὰ κάτω	what is below	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
μυρίος (α, ον)	innumerable	ΜΥΡΙΟΣ <i>ants</i>
μυριάκις	innumerable times	
ὁ πούς οἱ πόδες	foot	ΠΟΥΣ <i>foot</i>
ὁ ἐπάνω οἱ ἐπάνω	someone above	ΕΠΑΝΩ <i>above upon</i>
φερόμενος (η, ον)	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>spot</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>towards arriving</i>
τὸ ὑποκάτω τὰ ὑποκάτω	what is [down] below	ὙΠΟΚΑΤΩ <i>under below</i>
ὁ ὑποκάτω οἱ ὑποκάτω	someone [down] below	
ἀντικείμενος (η, ον)	opposed	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>lie against</i>
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing</i>

We can think of two arrows, one going up and one going down, moving in opposite directions forever – despite whatever other relative interactions occur – one arrow can be correctly said to be moving "up" (relative to us), and the other arrow can be correctly said to be moving "down" (relative to us).

61a. Size Variation

καὶ μὴν καὶ, **ἰσοταχεῖς Ἀναγκαῖον τὰς Ἀτόμους εἶναι** – ὅταν διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ **εἰσφέρωνται μηθενὸς ἀντικόπτοντος**: οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα **θᾶπτον** οἰσθήσεται τῶν **μικρῶν** καὶ **κούφων**, (ὅταν γε δὴ Μηδὲν ἀπαντᾷ αὐτοῖς) οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ τῶν **μεγάλων** – Πάντα **πόρον σύμμετρον** ἔχοντα (ὅταν Μηθὲν μηδὲ **ἐκείνους** ἀντικόπτῃ)

and indeed, It is necessary for **the atoms to be equally fast** – whenever they **are carried** through the void **with nothing colliding against**: for in no way will the heavy [Atoms] be carried **swifter than the small** and **light [atoms]**, (certainly whenever Nothing encounters **them**) nor [will] the small [Atoms be swifter] **than the large ones** – All having **a proportionate passageway** (whenever Nothing also collides against **them**)

[Bailey] Moreover, the atoms must move with equal speed, when they are borne onwards through the void, nothing colliding with them. For neither will the heavy move more quickly than the small and light, when, that is, nothing meets them nor again the small more quickly than the great, having their whole course uniform, when nothing collides with them either.

ἰσοταχής (ής, ές)	equally fast	ΙΣΟΤΑΧΗΣ <i>equally swift</i>
ἀναγκαῖος (α, ον)	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ <i>compulsion</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
εἰσφέρειν	to carry in	ΕΙΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>carry into</i>
εἰσοίσειν	to carry in [in the future]	ΕΙΣΟΙΣΕΙΝ <i>will carry into</i>
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>carry through</i>
ἀντικόπτων (οὔσα, ον) ἀντικόπτοντες (οὔσαι, οντα)	colliding against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΟΝΤΟΣ <i>strike against</i>
τὸ βαρύ τὰ βαρέα	heavy thing	ΒΑΡΥ <i>heavy</i>
θάπτον	more swiftly	ΘΑΤΤΟΝ <i>swift</i>
θάπτων (ουσα, ον)	more swift	
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>carry</i>
οἴσειν	to carry [in the future]	ΟΙΣΕΙΝ <i>will carry</i>
οἴσθησθαι	to be carried [in the future]	
τὸ μικρόν τὰ μικρά	small thing	ΜΙΚΡΟΝ <i>little</i>
τὸ κοῦφον τὰ κούφα	light things	ΚΟΥΦΟΝ
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ
τὸ μέγα τὰ μεγάλα	large thing	ΜΕΓΑ <i>large</i>
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
σύμμετρος (ον)	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>

When atoms move through empty space without any obstacles, they all travel at the same speed – regardless of their size and weight.

61b. Direction Variation

οὔθ' ἡ ἄνω οὔθ' ἡ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων Φορά, οὔθ' ἡ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίων βαρῶν: ἐφ' ὅποσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχη Ἐκάτερον – ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φοράν σχήσει – ἕως ἄν τι ἀντικόψη ἢ ἐξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν

neither the **upward** nor the **sideways** Transmission from impacts [is swifter], nor is the **downward** [transmission swifter] through those particular weights [of the atoms]: as far as Each [transmission] fully maintains itself – for that long it will maintain **its transmission** as quick as **conception** – until Something collides against [it], either **from an external source** or **from its particular [counter] weight** against the force of an impact

[Bailey] Nor is the motion upwards or sideways owing to blows quicker, nor again that downwards owing to their own weight. For as long as either of the two motions prevails, so long will it have a course as quick as thought, until something checks it either from outside or from its own weight counteracting the force of that which dealt the blow.

πλάγιος (ον)	sideways	ΠΛΑΓΙΟΣ <i>oblique</i>
εἰς τὸ πλάγιον	sideways	
ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ <i>strike</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
κάτω	below	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ιδιότροπος (ον)	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
ὅποσος (η, ον)	as much as	ὍΠΟΣΟΣ <i>how many which</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly hold</i>
κατασχέειν	to have firmly held	ΣΧΕΙΝ <i>will hold</i>
τοσοῦτος (τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο)	so long	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this so much</i>
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο	for that long	
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	conception about	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
σχεῖν	to hold [in the future]	ΣΧΕΙΝ <i>will hold</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>
τὸ ἔξωθεν τὰ ἔξωθεν	external source	ἘΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
ἔξωθεν	externally	
τό πλήξαν τό πλήξαν	impact	ΠΛΗΞΑΝ <i>strike</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>

Atoms move at the same rate regardless of their direction. When contact occurs, the natural weight of the atoms plays a role in how they respond to collisions, offsetting the force and influencing their motion.

* 46b. Consistent Speed of Atoms

καὶ μὴν καὶ, ἡ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Φορὰ (κατὰ μηδεμίαν ἀπάντησιν τῶν ἀντικοψόντων γινομένη) πᾶν μῆκος περιληπτὸν ἐν ἀπερινοήτῳ χρόνῳ συντελεῖ: βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους Ἀντικοπή καὶ Οὐκαντικοπή ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει

and indeed, the Transmission [of something] through the void (while happening without any clash of something colliding against) completes every comprehensible length in an inconceivable time: for [it is] Collision and Non-collision [that] take on an appearance of slowness and speed

[Bailey] Moreover, their passage through the void – when it takes place without meeting any bodies which might collide – accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time: for it is collision and its absence which take the outward appearance of slowness and quickness.

τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ ἀπάντησις αἱ ἀπαντήσεις	clash	ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΙΣ <i>action against all</i>
τὸ ἀντικοψόν τὰ ἀντικοψά	what collides against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΨΟΝ <i>beat against</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τό μήκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>length</i>
περιληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>apprehending around</i>
τὸ περιληπτόν τὰ περιληπτά	what is comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>apprehending around</i>
ἀπερινόητος <i>(ον)</i>	inconceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	conception about	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
ἡ βραδύς αἱ βραδεῖς	slowness	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ <i>slow</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	
ἡ οὐκἀντικοπή αἱ οὐκἀντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>not beating against</i>
τό ὁμοίωμα τὰ ὁμοιώματα	appearance	ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑ <i>result of [being] similar</i>

Without any resistance, movement through the void can cover massive distances in an instant.

62a. Consistent Atomic Speed

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, κατὰ τὰς συγκρίσεις, θάπτων Ἐτέρα ἑτέρας φορηθήσεται – τῶν ἀτόμων ἰσοταχῶν οὐσῶν, τῷ ἐφ' ἓνα τόπον φέρεσθαι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀθροίσμασιν Ἀτόμους κατὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον συνεχῆ χρόνον – εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐφ' ἓνα, κατὰ τοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς χρόνους, ἀλλὰ πυκνὸν Ἀντικόπτουσιν – ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸ Συνεχὲς τῆς φορᾶς γίνηται

but indeed, regarding compounds, One will be transmitted more swiftly than another – while the atoms are equal in speed, as [a result] of the Atoms in the aggregates being brought to one location in the minimum continuous time – even if, in the times observable by reasoning, [they are] not [transmitted] to one [single location], but They collide frequently against [each other] – until a Continuity of [their] motion comes to exist within [the realm of] sensation

[Bailey] Moreover, it will be said that in compound bodies too one atom is faster than another, though as a matter of fact all are equal in speed this will be said because even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move towards one place, even though in moments of time perceptible only by thought they do not move towards one place but are constantly jostling one against another, until the continuity of their movement comes under the ken of sensation.

ή σύγκρισις αί συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
θάπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	more swift	ΘΑΠΤΩΝ <i>swift</i>
ή φορά αί φόραι	transmission	
φορεῖν	to transmit	ΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying</i>
φορηθήσεται	to be transmitted [in the future]	ΦΟΡΗΘΗΣΕΘΑΙ <i>will be carried</i>
φέρειν	to bring	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>spot</i>
φέρεσθαι	to be brought	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>carrying</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of [being] in groups</i>
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ <i>in groups</i>
ή ἄτομος αί ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
συνεχῆς <i>(ές)</i>	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῆ	continuity	
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i>
θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
πυκνόν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ <i>compacting</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>
ή αἴσθησις αί αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>

Atoms move at the same rate if they are moving alone in one direction or if they are vibrating in a compound. In contrast, compounds, as we can see, can move faster than other compounds (or appear still). This happens because the atoms in the compound collide and change direction so quickly that we can only sense their group movement (or lack of movement).

62b. Speed Disparity

τὸ γὰρ Προσδοξαζόμενον περὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου – ὡς ἄρα καὶ οἱ διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ
Χρόνοι τὸ συνεχές τῆς φορᾶς ἔξουσιν – οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων: ἐπεὶ
τό γε θεωρούμενον Πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐστὶ

for the Addition of judgment concerning the unseen – that the [minute] Times observable through reasoning will indeed also have continuity of transmission [for compounds and their atoms] – is not true in such cases: since Everything observed [by the senses] or apprehended through our attention to [mental] perception is true

[Bailey] For the addition of opinion with regard to the unseen, that the moments perceptible only by thought will also contain continuity of motion, is not true in such cases; for we must remember that it is what we observe with the senses or grasp with the mind by an apprehension that is true.

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
προσμένων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	expected	ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ <i>addition to</i>
τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα	what is expected	ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition to</i>
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον	the addition of judgement	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition to seeming</i>
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not seeing</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	the unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i>
θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
συνεχής <i>(ές)</i>	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχή	continuity	
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding</i>
ἔξειν	to have [in the future]	ἘΞΕΙΝ <i>will hold</i>
ἀληθής <i>(ές)</i>	true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>
θεωρούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	observed	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>observing</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
λαμβάνόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	apprehended	ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἀληθής <i>(ές)</i>	true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>

Only what we can directly observe with our senses or mind is always true. The motions of a compound take place in observable time, and the motions of the atoms take place in mentally perceptible time.

Viewing a compound as as only an aggregate of atoms is too reductionist. It is contrary to sensation to say that the motion of a compound body is only the sum of the motions of its component atoms – just as it is inconceivable that only the atomic motions in an object alone are real and the motion of the compound object itself is delusion.

The motion (or lack of motion) of compound objects is a reality – even though the compound object itself is determined by the collisions of its component atoms.

[47b ^{*2} Inconsistent Compound Speed]

οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἅμα, κατὰ τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους, καὶ τὸ φερόμενον Σῶμα ἐπὶ τοὺς πλείους τόπους ἀφικνεῖται (ἀδιανόητον γάρ – καὶ, Τοῦτο συναφικνούμενον ἐν αἰσθητῶ χρόνῳ ὅθεν δήποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου, οὐκ ἐξ οὗ ἂν Περιλάβωμεν τὴν φοράν τόπου Ἔσται ἀφιστάμενον) ἀντικοπῆ γὰρ ὁμοιον Ἔσται, κἂν μέχρι τοσούτου τὸ τάχος τῆς φορᾶς μὴ ἀντικόπτον Καταλίπωμεν – χρήσιμον δὴ καὶ τοῦτο Κατασχεῖν τὸ στοιχεῖον

nor also, during times observable through reasoning, does the very Body being carried arrive simultaneously at many locations (for this is [mentally] imperceptible – although This [body] arrives as a whole in sensible time from anywhere in the infinite, It will not be be different from the location from which We would completely apprehend its transmission) because This will be similar to a collision, even if up to that point We leave undisputed the speed of transmission that is not colliding – indeed, Holding [in mind] this component fact is now also useful

nor also [is the addition of opinion true that] [even] during [minute] times observable through reasoning, does the very Body being carried arrive simultaneously at many locations [to which its component atoms move, which are also observable through reasoning] (for this is [mentally] imperceptible – although This [body] arrives as a whole in sensible time from anywhere in the infinite [void], It will not be be different from the location from which We would completely apprehend its transmission)^{the compound really does arrive from where we saw it arrive} because This [whole body moving in the direction of its atoms] will be similar to a collision, even if up to the point [of perceptible time] We leave undisputed [the perception of] the speed of transmission as non-colliding [for the body as a whole] ^{if a body as a whole moves in all the directions of its atoms, it will have a changing transmission, even though nothing impedes its course} _

indeed, Holding [in mind] this component fact is now also useful

[Bailey] Nor must it either be supposed that, in moments perceptible only by thought, the moving body too passes to the several places to which its component atoms move (for this too is unthinkable and in that case, when it arrives all together, in a sensible period of time, from any point that may be in the infinite [void], it would not be taking its departure from the place from which we apprehend its motion). For the motion of the whole body will be the outward expression of its internal collisions, even though up to the limits of perception we suppose the speed of its motion not to be retarded by collision. It is of advantage to grasp this first principle as well.

The compound is more than just an aggregate – it is an new entity per se. Similarly its motion of the compound is not just the sum of its atomic motions, but a new realty per se.

The motion of the whole body is the sum of the motions of its component atoms – but because these motions are an infinite series of tiny transmissions in all directions, it might then be supposed that the whole body preforms this entire series of motions, and arrives at the end of its journey after having followed varied course in all directions.

This conclusion is inconceivable and also contradicts sensation (because, in this case, whole body will have come from any of the directions from which one of its atoms started and not from the direction from which we saw the entire body come).

Compounds themselves are real objects and their motion is a reality. The motion, or lack of motion, of a compound is the sensible sum of the motions of its atoms – even though those atoms themselves are moving in many directions at total speed. The atoms are at the same time moving their own direction and also moving as a group with the the object they compose.

θεωρητός
(ἦ, ὄν)

observable

ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ
observing

φέρóμενος (η, ον)	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
πλείων (ον)	many	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more</i>
ó τόπος οί τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>spot</i>
άφικνεΐσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>towards arriving</i>
τό νόημα τά νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing</i>
ή διάνοια αί δiάνοιαι	[mentally] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοεΐσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
άπερινόητος (ον)	inconceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
άδιανόητος	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing through</i>
διανόητος	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>seeing through</i>
συναφικνούμενος (η, ον)	to arrive as a whole	ΣΥΝΑΦΙΚΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>towards arriving together</i>
ή αΐσθησις αί αισθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τό αισθητήριον τά αισθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>instrument of perceiving</i>
αισθητός (ή, όν)	sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ <i>perceiving</i>
άπειρος (ον)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
ή φορά αί φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
άφιστάμενος (η, ον)	different	ΑΦΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>standing away</i>
ή άντικοπή αί άντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
άντικοπτεΐν	to collide [against]	
άνतिकόπτων (οὔσα, ον)	colliding [against]	
ή ούκάντικοπή αί ούκάντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>not beating against</i>
όμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>same</i>
τό τάχος τά τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
χρήσιμος (ον)	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ <i>use</i>
τό στοιχείωμα τά στοιχειώματα	component principle	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row (in a series)</i>
τό στοιχεΐον τά στοιχεΐα	component fact	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Δεῖ συνορᾶν (ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη – οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιοτάτη Πίστις ἔσται) ὅτι ἡ Ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς, παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι: καὶ, πῆ μὲν, τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῆ δὲ, τούτῳ

after these things, It is necessary to fully [mentally] see (while referring to the sensations and experiences – for in this way the most affirmed Belief will exist) that the Soul is a subtle body, spread out across the whole aggregation, most closely resembling [cool] wind {i.e., pneumatic} that has a certain mixture of heat {i.e., thermal}: indeed, in one way, it is closely resembling to the one, and in another way, [it is closely resembling] to the other

[Bailey] Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings, for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief, you must consider that the soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure, and most resembling wind with a certain admixture of heat, and in some respects like to one of these and in some to the other.

ορᾶν	to [mentally] see	ΟΡΑΝ <i>seeing</i>
συνορᾶν	to fully [mentally] see	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>seeing together</i>
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not seeing</i>
ἀναφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry back</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>feeling</i>
βεβαιοτάτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	most affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most certain</i>
ἡ πίστις αἱ πίστεις	belief	ΠΙΣΤΙΣ <i>trust</i>
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
λεπτομερὲς <i>(ή, όν)</i>	subtle	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>fine part</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of [being] in groups</i>
παρεσπαρμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ <i>scatter beside</i>
τὸ προσεμφερέστατον τὰ προσεμφερέστατα	what most closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΕΣΤΑΤΟΝ <i>most toward bearing resemblance</i>
προσεμφερέστατος <i>(η, ον)</i>	most closely resembling	
προσεμφερὲς	closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΗΣ <i>toward bearing resemblance</i>
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ <i>breath result</i>
θερμός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	hot	ΘΕΡΜΟΣ <i>warm</i>
ἡ κρᾶσις αἱ κρᾶσεις	mixture	ΚΡΑΣΙΣ <i>weaving</i>
πῆ μὲν... πῆ δὲ	in one way... in another way	ΠΗΙ <i>by which way</i>

From a reductionist angle, life is a circumstantial characteristic of certain aggregates. We can use our senses and feelings to understand that the soul is a physical thing made of tiny particles spread throughout the body. The soul has thermal (hot & fast), pneumatic (cold & slow), and aerial (moderate) characteristics.

[1] Thermal Element	● τό Θερμόν	Calor, Vapor
[2] Pneumatic Element	● τό Πνευματικόν	Ventus, Aura
[1 & 2] Aerial Mix	● τό Ἀερώδες	Aer
[3] Nameless Element	τό Ἄκατονόμαστον	Nominis Expers

63b. Finest Part of the Soul

ἔστι δὲ τὸ τρίτον Μέρος, **πολλήν παραλλαγὴν** εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων – **συμπαθὲς** δὲ τούτῳ **μᾶλλον** καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἄθροισματι: **τοῦτο** δὲ **πᾶν** αἰ Δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς δηλοῦσι, καὶ τὰ Πάθη, καὶ αἰ Εὐκινήσιαι, καὶ αἰ Διανοήσεις – καὶ ὧν **στερόμενοι**, Θνήσκομεν

and the third Part exists, having acquired **the most difference** in subtlety than even than those [thermal and pneumatic elements] themselves – and because of this [reason, the third part is] **more harmonious** also with the remaining aggregation: and the Forces of the soul make **all this** clear, as well as our Experiences, Agilities, and [mental] Perceptions – and when we are deprived of **these**, We die

[Hicks] But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death.

τρίτος (η, ον)	third	ΤΡΙΤΟΣ <i>third</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἡ παραλλαγή αἰ παραλλαγαί	difference	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend [to take]	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
εἰληφώς (υῖα, ός)	having acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ <i>took</i>
λεπτομερής (ή, όν)	subtle	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>fine part</i>
ἡ λεπτομερής αἰ λεπτομερεῖς	subtlety	
συμπαθής (ές)	harmonious	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΗΣ <i>together experiencing</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>feeling</i>
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of [being] in groups</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἰ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>
ἡ ψυχή αἰ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	the unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>
ἔνδηλος (ον)	fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear within</i>
δηλοῦν	to make clear	ΔΗΛΟΥΝ

ἡ εὐκίνησια αἱ εὐκίνησiai	agility	ΕΥΚΙΝΗΣΙΑ <i>good movement</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
στερούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	deprived	ΣΤΕΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>deprived</i>
θνήσκειν	to die	ΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ <i>dying</i>

The finest part of the soul is highly sensitive and closely connected to the body. This is shown by our mental abilities, feelings, quick thoughts – all everything else that we lose when we die.

63c. Cause of Sensation

καὶ μὴν, ὅτι ἔχει ἡ Ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν Δεῖ κατέχειν

And indeed, It is necessary to firmly maintain that the Soul is the greatest cause of sensation

[Bailey] Further, you must grasp that the soul possesses the chief cause of sensation.

ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαι	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	Αἰσθησις <i>perceiving process</i>
πλεῖστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	the greatest [the most]	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	Αἰτία <i>blame</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly maintain	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly hold</i>

64a. Interrelationship of Body & Soul

οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν ταύτην, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἄθροισματος ἐστεγάζεται πως: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα, παρασκευάσαν ἐκείνη τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην, μετείληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτου συμπτώματος παρ' ἐκείνης – οὐ, μέντοι, πάντων ὧν ἐκείνη κέκτηται

nevertheless [the Soul] would not have acquired [sensation], unless it was in some way covered by the remaining aggregation: while the remaining Aggregation, having provided that cause [of protection] to that [soul], also itself partook of this same symptom with that [soul] – not, however, of all [symptoms] which that [soul] possesses

[Bailey] yet it could not have acquired sensation, unless it were in some way enclosed by the rest of the structure. And this in its turn having afforded the soul this cause of sensation acquires itself too a share in this contingent capacity from the soul. Yet it does not acquire all the capacities which the soul possesses.

λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
εἰληφέναι	to have acquired	εἰληφέναι
εἰληφώς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	having acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ <i>took</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregation	Ἀθροισμα <i>result of [being] in groups</i>
στεγάζειν	to cover	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ <i>covering</i>

παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
παρασκευάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	providing	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
μετέχειν	to partake	ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold among</i>
μετεκληθέναι	to have partaken	ΜΕΤΕΚΛΗΘΕΝΑΙ <i>taken among</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>

The soul can exist and operate only because it is enclosed within the body. The body also gets the ability to exist and operate from the soul.

Sensation is a "symptomatic quality" (i.e., contingent characteristic) of the atoms. Sensation arises from particular circumstances and arrangements of the atoms (specifically when they form a body). This arrangement, and subsequent dissolution of the arrangement, from the reductionist viewpoint of the atoms, are both temporary "events" that do not affect their own properties.

Nevertheless, for humans, the soul is a necessary quality ("property") of life.

64b. No Life Without Body

διὸ, ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς Ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν: οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν – ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἅμα συγγεγεννημένον αὐτῷ παρεσκευάζεν – "Ὁ, διὰ τῆς συντελεσθείσης περὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως, κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν, σύμπτωμα αἰσθητικὸν εὐθύς ἀποτελοῦν ἑαυτῷ – ἀπεδίδου κατὰ τὴν ὁμοῦρησιν καὶ συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καθάπερ Εἶπον

therefore, when the Soul has already been removed away [from the body], it does not have sensation: for that [soul] had not possessed this force intrinsically – but provides something else inherent together with [the body] – Which [existence of the two together], through the force within itself which has come to completion together [with the body], in accordance with its movement, directly brought to fulfillment for itself a perceptible symptom – and fully gives [that symptom] to the [body] in accordance with [its] adjacency and correspondence [of movement], just as I said

[Bailey] and therefore when the soul is released from the body, the body no longer has sensation. For it never possessed this power in itself, but used to afford opportunity for it to another existence, brought into being at the same time with itself and this existence, owing to the power now consummated within itself as a result of motion, used spontaneously to produce for itself the capacity of sensation and then to communicate it to the capacity to the body as well, in virtue of its contact and correspondence of movement, as I have already said.

ἀπαλλάσσειν	to remove away	ΑΠΑΛΛΑΣΣΕΙΝ <i>other away</i>
ἀπαλλάξαι	to remove away <i>[already]</i>	
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτηῆσθαι	to have possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΘΗΣΘΑΙ <i>acquired</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>

συγγεγονέναι	to have been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΟΝΕΝΑΙ <i>having been born together</i>
συγγεγενημένος (η, ον)	having been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having been born together</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
συντελεσθείσης	having come to completion together	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΘΕΙΣΗΣ <i>completing together</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
αἰσθητικός (ή, όν)	perceptible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>pertaining to perceiving</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
ἀποτελοῦν	to bring to fulfillment	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΟΥΝ <i>completing away</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to fully give	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΥΣ <i>fully giving</i>
ἀποδιδούς (οὔσα, όν) ἀποδιδόντες	demonstrating	
ἡ ὁμούρησις αἱ ὁμούρησις	adjacency	ὍΜΟΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>state of being together with</i>
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ <i>experience together</i>

The soul must mix with the body to produce life and sensation. When the soul leaves the body, the body and the soul both lose the ability to feel – because they never had this power on their own.

65a. Soul Requires Body

διό, δὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἡ Ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀναισθητεῖ – ἀλλ’ Ἄ ἂν καὶ ταύτης ξυναπόληται τοῦ στεγάζοντος λυθέντος (εἴθ’ ὅλου εἶτε καὶ μέρους τινός) – ἐάν περ διαμένη, ἔξει τὴν αἴσθησιν

therefore, while also existing **within [the body]**, the Soul never becomes **insensible even when some other part has been removed [along with that part of the body]** – but Whatever [portions] of this [soul] might also perish **when its [bodily] covering is loosened** (whether in whole or also in part) – if [the soul] persists [in the body], it will have **sensation**

[Bailey] Therefore, so long as the soul remains in the body, even though some other part of the body be lost, it will never lose sensation; nay more, whatever portions of the soul may perish too, when that which enclosed it is removed either in whole or in part, if the soul continues to exist at all, it will retain sensation.

[Hicks] Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience.

ένυπάρχων (ουσα, ον)	existing within	ΕΝΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>existing in</i>
ένυπάρχοντα		
ή ψυχή αί ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἀπηλλαγμένος (η, ον)	having been removed	ΑΠΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ <i>removing away from</i>
άναισθητεῖν	to become insensible	ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙΝ <i>not sensing</i>
ξυναπολέσθαι	to perish together	ΞΥΝΑΠΟΛΕΣΘΑΙ <i>being destroyed together</i>
τὸ στεγάζον τὰ στεγάζοντα	what covers	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΝ <i>covering</i>
λυθείς (εἶσα, ἐν)	loosened	ΛΥΘΕΙΣ <i>sever</i>
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>remaining through</i>

Life can persist if a part of the body is injured (i.e., loosened in part) or suffers amputation (i.e., loosened in whole).

65b. Body Requires Soul

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα – διαμένον καὶ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος – οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐκείνου ἀπηλλαγμένου (ὅσον ποτέ ἐστι) τὸ συντεῖνον τῶν ἀτόμων πλῆθος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν

but the remaining Aggregation – although persisting as a whole or in part – does not possess sensation, once it has lost (however much it is) the number of atoms contributing together into the nature of the soul

[Bailey] On the other hand the rest of the structure, though it continues to exist either as a whole or in part, does not retain sensation, if it has once lost that sum of atoms, however small it be, which together goes to produce the nature of the soul.

λοιπὸς (ἡ, ὄν)	remaining	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>remaining</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of [being] in groups</i>
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>remaining through</i>
διαμένων	persisting	
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἀπηλλαγμένος (η, ον)	having been removed	ΑΠΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ <i>removing away from</i>
συντείνειν	to contribute together	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extending together</i>
συντείνων	contributing together	
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ πλῆθος τὰ πλῆθη	multitude (large amount)	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ <i>fullness</i>

ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ producing
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The rest of the body, even if it remains whole or in part, loses all feeling once the atoms that make up the soul are gone.

65c. Death

καὶ μὴν καὶ, **λυομένου τοῦ ὅλου ἄθροίσματος**, ἡ Ψυχὴ διασπείρεται καὶ οὐκέτι ἔχει **τὰς αὐτὰς δυνάμεις**, οὐδὲ κινεῖται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' **αἴσθησιν** κέκτηται

and indeed, **when the entire aggregation is dissolved**, the Soul is dispersed and no longer possesses **the same forces**, and no longer moves – therefore it no longer possesses **sensation**

[Bailey] Moreover, if the whole structure is dissolved, the soul is dispersed and no longer has the same powers nor performs its movements, so that it does not possess sensation either.

διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ fully dissolve
λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ dissolve
λυόμενος (η, ον)	being dissolved	
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ result of [being] in groups
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ blowing
διασπείρειν	to disperse	ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ scatter
διασπείρεσθαι	to be dispersed	
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ power
κινεῖν	to move	ΚΙΝΕΙΝ moving
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ perceiving process
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ acquire
κεκτῆσθαι	to have possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΣΘΑΙ acquired

When the entire body is broken up, the soul is scattered and loses its powers and movements, so it cannot feel anymore.

66a. No Sensation Without Body

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε Νοεῖν **αὐτὸ αἰσθανόμενον**, μὴ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συστήματι καὶ ταῖς κινήσεσι ταύταις **χρῶμενον** – ὅταν τὰ στεγάζοντα καὶ Περιέχοντα **μὴ τοιαῦτα ᾗ** (**ἐν οἷς νῦν οὔσα ἔχει ταύτας τὰς κινήσεις**)

for it is not possible to Conceive of **that same [soul]** as sensing, while not in **that structure** and **[not]** making use of **those movements** – whenever the Coverings and Surroundings are **not the same** (**in which it now** exists while having **these movements**)

[Hicks] For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.

[Bailey] For it is impossible to imagine it with sensation, if it is not in this organism and cannot effect these movements, when what encloses and surrounds it is no longer the same as the surroundings in which it now exists and performs these movements.

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἰ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i>
αἰσθανόμενος	sensing	
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing</i> <i>together</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἰ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving</i> <i>action</i>
χρῶμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>using</i>
στεγάζειν	to cover	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ <i>covering</i>
στεγάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> στεγάζοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>	covering	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΩΝ <i>covering</i>
στεγαζόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	covered	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>shelter</i>
περιέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ <i>holding</i> <i>around</i>
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding space	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ <i>hold</i> <i>around</i>

A soul cannot feel or sense anything if it is not in the same body it grew up with.

{66b. Irrational & Rational Parts}

{Λέγει, ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων Αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων – πολλῶ τινι διαφορουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός: καὶ τὸ μὲν Τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι – τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς}

{He says, in other [locations], that the [Soul] is compounded from the smoothest and roundest atoms – by a large measure in some respect differing from those of fire: and that a Part of it is unreasoning, which is spread out through the remaining body – but the reasoning [part is] in the chest, as is clear both from fears and from delight}

[Hicks] [He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms – far superior in both respects to those of fire: that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame – while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our joy

τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>set</i> <i>together</i>
λεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	smooth	ΛΕΙΟΣ <i>smooth</i>
λειότατοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	smoothest	ΛΕΙΟΤΑΤΟΙ <i>most</i> <i>smooth</i>
στρογγύλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	round	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΟΣ <i>droplet</i>
στρογγυλωτάτοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	roundest	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΩΤΑΤΟΙ <i>most</i> <i>like</i> <i>a droplet</i>

διαφέρων (ουσα, ον)	differing	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry through</i>
ἀναφέρων (ουσα, ον)	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry back</i>
τὸ πῦρ τὰ πυρά	fire	ΠΥΡ <i>fire</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i>
ἄλογος (ον)	unreasoning	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
παρεσπάρθαι	to be spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΘΑΙ <i>scatter beside</i>
παρεσπαρμένος (η, ον)	spread out	
τό σῶμα τά σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
λογικός (ή, όν)	reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>reasoning</i>
ὁ θώραξ οἱ θώρακες	chest	ΘΩΡΑΞ <i>breastplate</i>
δῆλος (η, ον)	clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
ἡ χαρά αἱ χαραί	delight	ΧΑΡΑ <i>cheer</i>

Life is part irrational (feeling) and part rational (thinking). The soul is made of the smoothest and roundest atoms. The irrational part of the soul is spread throughout the body, while the rational part is in the chest, shown by emotions like fear and joy. Sleep happens when the scattered parts of the soul either gather together or escape through the body's pores.

{66c. Sleep}

{“Υπνον τε γίνεσθαι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (τῶν παρ’ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν παρεσπαρμένων, ἐγκατεχομένων ἢ διαφορουμένων) – εἶτα συμπιπτόντων τοῖς ἐπεραιομοῖς: τό τε Σπέρμα ἀφ’ ὅλων τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι}

{[Ephikouros also says that] Sleep is produced when the parts of the soul (which are spread out throughout the entire compound, [either] compacted or disseminated) – accordingly fall into each other from their mutual pressing: for Seeds [of the soul] emanate from the entirety of [our] bodies}

[Hicks] that sleep occurs when the parts of the soul (which have been scattered all over the composite organism) are held fast in it or dispersed, and afterwards collide with one another by their impacts. The semen is derived from the whole of the body.]

[Yonge]... for particles emanate from all bodies

ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	sleep	ΎΠΝΟΣ <i>sleep</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
παρεσπαρμένος (η, ον)	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ <i>scatter beside</i>

ἐγκατεχόμενος	compacted	ΕΓΚΑΤΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>holding fully in</i>
διαφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	disseminated	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry through</i>
συμπίπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	to fall into each other	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ <i>falling together</i>
ὁ ἐπερισμός οἱ ἐπερισμοί	mutual pressing	ΕΠΕΡΙΣΜΟΣ <i>pressing upon</i>
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ <i>seed</i>

Sleep occurs when the parts of the soul, which are spread throughout the body (either gathering together or staying dispersed) eventually fall together.

67a. Incorporeal Existence

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, Τόδε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν: ὅ τι "τὸ ἀσώματον" λέγομεν κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος – ἂν καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον, πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ

but indeed, This too must be fully conceived: *that which* We we call "the *incorporeal*" in the most common usage of the word [is] applied to what is conceived as intrinsic – while is not possible to conceive the *incorporeal* as intrinsic, except as void

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must clearly comprehend as well, that the incorporeal in the general acceptance of the term is applied to that which could be thought of as such as an independent existence. Now it is impossible to conceive the incorporeal as a separate existence, except the void.

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
προσκατανοεῖν	to also fully conceive	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>addition to seeing thoroughly</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>
πλείστος <i>(ἡ, ον)</i>	the greatest [the most]	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most</i>
ἡ ὁμιλία αἱ ὁμιλῖαι	common usage	ὁμιλία <i>association</i>
τὸ ὄνομα τὰ ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
νοηθεῖς <i>(εἷσα, ἐν)</i> νοηθέντες <i>(εἷσαι, ἐντα)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ <i>seeing</i>
νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>

It is generally agreed that the "incorporeal," although it does not have a physical existence, is something that "exists" independent from objects. However – empty space is the only thing we can think of as truly incorporeal.

67b. Soul is Material

τὸ δὲ Κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχειται – ὥστε Οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν Ψυχὴν ματαιίζουσιν – οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη: νῦν δ' ἐναργῶς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα διαλαμβάνεται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ Συμπτώματα.

But the Void neither produces nor experiences [anything], but only yields movement through itself to bodies – therefore, Those who claim that the Soul is incorporeal speak vainly – for it would be able to neither produce nor experience [anything] if it were of that sort: but now both these Symptoms concerning the soul are thoroughly apprehended visibly

[Bailey] and the void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity of motion through itself to bodies. So that those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking idly. For it would not be able to act or be acted on in any respect, if it were of this nature. But as it is, both these occurrences are clearly distinguished in respect of the soul.

τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
ἢ κίνησις αἰ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τό σῶμα τά σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly hold</i>
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold beside</i>
τό ἀσώματον τά ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>
ἀσώματος (ον)	incorporeal	
ἢ ψυχὴ αἰ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ματαιίζειν	to speak vainly	ΜΑΤΑΙΖΕΙΝ <i>vain</i>
τὸ πάθος τά πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>feeling</i>
πάσχειν	to experience	ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ <i>feeling</i>
ἐναργῆς (ές)	visible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τά ἐναργήματα	visible thing	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ
ἢ ἐναργεία αἰ ἐναργεῖαι	visible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ
ἐναργῶς	visibly	ΕΝΑΡΓΩΣ
ἀμφότερος	both	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>both</i> <i>on both sides</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
διαλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly apprehend	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping through</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τά συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>

The void can never affect anything and cannot be affected by anything in any way – it just allows objects to move through it. The soul is corporeal: because the soul can both act and be acted upon, which is impossible for empty space.

Acting and being acted upon are "symptoms" (i.e., separable qualities) of the soul, because – although the soul can act and be acted upon – such activities are not necessarily a quality of the soul at any given time.

ταῦτα οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλογίσματα τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάγων Τίς ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, μνημονεύων τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ ῥηθέντων: ἰκανῶς κατόψεται, τοῖς τύποις, ἐμπεριελημμένα – εἰς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀπὸ τούτων, ἐξακριβοῦσθαι βεβαίως

Therefore, Someone referring all these thorough reasonings about the soul back to [the standards of] the experiences and the sensations, while remembering what was said originally: [He] will, using these impressions, sufficiently [be able to] mentally inspect [those reasonings that are] completely apprehended within – [in order] to be affirmatively examined precisely from these [impressions] according to [the details of] each part

[Bailey] Now if one refers all these reasonings about the soul to the standards of feeling and sensation and remembers what was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in these general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the system as well.

λογικός (ή, όν)	reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ reasoning
τό διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ result of reasoning through action
ή ψυχή αί ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ blowing
ἀνάγων (ουσα, ον)	referring back	ΑΝΑΓΩΝ leading back
τό πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ feeling
ή αἴσθησις αί αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ perceiving process
ή μνήμη αί μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ thinking
μνημονεύειν	to remember	
μνημονεύων (ουσα, ον)	remembering	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΩΝ thinking
ή ἀρχή αί ἀρχαί	origin	ΑΡΧΗ first order
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ saying
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῚΡΗΘΗΝΑΙ said
ῥηθείς (εἶσα, ἐν) ῥηθέντες (εἶσαι, ἐντα)	said	ῚΡΗΘΕΙΣ said
ορᾶν	to [mentally] see	ΟΡΑΝ seeing
καθορᾶν	to [mentally] inspect	ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ thoroughly seeing
κατόψεσθαι	to be inspected [in the future]	ΚΑΤΟΨΕΣΘΑΙ thoroughly will see
ό τύπος οί τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ to imprint
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping around
τό περιελημμένον τὰ περιελημμένα	what completely apprehended	ΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ result of being grasped around
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping around in

ἐμπεριειλημμένος (η, ον)	completely apprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>being grasped around in</i>
ἐξακριβοῦν	to examine precisely	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ <i>fully accurate</i>
ἐξακριβοῦσθαι	to be examined precisely	
βεβαιοτάτος (η, ον)	most affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most certain</i>
βεβαιούμενος (η, ον)	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>firm standing</i>
βεβαίως	affirmatively	

By linking all reasoning to experiences and sensations – while recalling the foundational points about the atoms – one can examine and confirm details accurately.

68b. Dependent Existence of Qualities

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὰ Σχήματα καὶ τὰ Χρώματα καὶ τὰ Μεγέθη καὶ τὰ Βάρη καὶ Ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται σώματος (ὡσανεὶ **συμβεβηκότα** ἢ **πᾶσιν**, ἢ **τοῖς ὄρατοῖς**, καὶ **κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν γνωστά**) οὔθ' ὡς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον: οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἐπινοῆσαι **τοῦτο**

but indeed, Shapes and Colors and Sizes and Weights and Whatever else are attributed to body (as though [those things are] permanent properties either to all [bodies], or [just] to visible [bodies], and are recognized according to sensation itself) cannot be judged as intrinsically existing natures: for it is not possible to conceive this

[Bailey] Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, as though they were concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that)

τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ <i>skin color</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
κατηγορεῖν	to attribute	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly publicly declare</i>
κατηγορεῖσθαι	to be attributed	
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
ὄρατός (ή, όν)	visible	ὍΡΑΤΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ ὄρατόν τὰ ὄρατά	visible thing	
αἰσθητός (ή, όν)	sensible	Αἰσθητός <i>perceiving</i>

ἡ αἴσθησις αἰ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i>
γινώσκειν	to recognize	
γνωστός (ή, όν)	recognized	γνωστός
ἡ δόξα αἰ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
δοξαστός (ή, όν)	able to be judged	ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΣ <i>judged</i>
δυνατός (ή, όν)	able	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>power</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to conceive about	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>

Shapes, colors, sizes, weights (and other qualities that are known through our senses) do not exist independently apart from their object of origin. However they do exist – even though their physical existence is dependent.

69a. Physical Existence of Qualities

οὔτε ὅλως ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν – οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερ' ἄττα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα – οὔθ' ὡς μόρια τούτου: ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ ὅλον Σῶμα καθόλου ἐκ τούτων πάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδίων

nor [can it be judged] that those [qualities] entirely do not exist – nor as if [they they could be] Some other incorporeal [quality] inherent to that [body] – nor as portions of that [body]: but as the whole Body generally possessing its nature in a way that lasts from all these things

[Hicks] nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them,

[Bailey] Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, as though they were concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that) nor that they absolutely do not exist. (as when, for instance, a larger structure is put together out of the parts which compose it, whether the first units of size or other parts smaller than itself, whatever it is), but only, as I say, that it owes its own permanent existence to all of them.

ἄττα	some	ΑΤΤΑ <i>is an alternative</i>
τινά	certain	<i>form of</i> ΤΙΝΑ
ἕτερ' ἄττα	certain other things	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον)	existing	ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
ὑπάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	[already]	
προσυπάρχων (ουσα, ον)	preexisting	ΠΡΟΣΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>addition to /</i>
προσυπάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	[already] ? inherent?	<i>toward beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
τό ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>

τὸ μόριον τὰ μόρια	portion	ΜΟΡΙΟΝ <i>dividing</i>
τό σῶμα τά σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
καθόλου	generally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ <i>universally</i>
αἰδῖος <i>(αἰδία, αἰδίων)</i>	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked</i> <i>together</i>

Qualities are physical manifestations of bodies. The whole body gets its enduring nature from its enduring qualities – such as a stone from weight, fire from heat, and water from liquidity. Although these qualities do not have an independent existence separate from atoms and void – they nevertheless do have an existence.

69b. Formation of Properties

οὐχ οἷον δὲ εἶναι συμπεφορημένον – ὡσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὀγκῶν μεῖζον ἄθροισμα συστῆ (ἦτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδέ τινος ἐλαττόνων) – ἀλλὰ μονον, ὡς λέγω, ἐκ τούτων ἀπάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδῖον

nor is it **such a thing** that has been put together – in the same way as when a larger Aggregation is set together from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] **of this whole particular [aggregation]**) – but only, as I say, having **its lasting nature** from all of these

nor [can a quality be judged as if] it is **such a thing** that has [come about by having] been put together *{i.e., as though "little parts of a quality" could "come together to form a full quality"}* – in the same way as when a larger Aggregation is set together from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] *{i.e., atoms}* or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] **in that particular whole [aggregation]**) – but only, as I say, having **its lasting nature** from all of these [particles that have come together]

nor [can a quality be judged as if] it is **such a thing** that has [come about by having] been put together *{i.e., as though "little parts of a quality" could "come together to form a full quality"}* – in the same way as when a larger Aggregation is set together from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] *{i.e., atoms}* or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] **of this whole particular [aggregation]**) – but only, as I say, having **its enduring nature** from all of these

[Bailey] nor that they are some other kind of incorporeal existence accompanying body, nor that they are material parts of body, rather we should suppose that the whole body in its totality owes its own permanent existence to all these, yet not in the sense that it is composed of properties brought together to form it.

[Hicks] nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them. Though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature.

φορεῖν	to transmit	ΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying</i>
συμφορεῖν	to put together	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying together</i>
συμπεφορημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been put together	ΣΥΜΠΕΦΟΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>carried together</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>

μείζων (ον)	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of [being] in groups</i>
τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα	the first	ΠΡΩΤΟΝ <i>first</i>
συνιστάναι	to set together	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
συνστήσαι	to set together [already]	ΣΥΝΣΤΗΣΑΙ <i>stood together</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
μικρός (ά, όν)	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
ἐλάσσων	smaller	ΕΛΑΣΣΩΝ <i>littler</i>
αἰδιος (αἰδία, αἰδιον)	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>

A compound's enduring nature comes from its inseparable qualities (qualities that are permanent to that body because they are a necessary quality of that body – such as weight to stone, heat to fire, liquidity to water).

However, these qualities are not formed by simply assembling them from "smaller pieces of other qualities." (e.g., "particles of heat" do not form fire, "particles of liquidity" do not form water). These inseparable qualities are not separate entities, or even parts of the compound – but these inseparable qualities come about when the compound is formed (e.g., when a compound of water is formed, it has the inseparable quality of liquidity).

69c. Perception of Properties

καὶ ἐπιβολὰς μὲν ἔχοντα ἰδίας πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι καὶ διαλήψεις:
συμπαρακολουθοῦντος δὲ τοῦ ἁθροῦ καὶ οὐθαμῆ ἀποσχιζομένου – ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὴν ἁθροῦν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σώματος κατηγορίαν εἰληφότος

and all these [inseparable qualities] indeed have [their] own particular attention {i.e., mode of being perceived} and distinction: as long as the Aggregate follows along together [with the qualities] and is nowhere detached – but rather having acquired an attribution of [that] body according to [our] aggregated internal conception

[Hicks] They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

[Bailey] All these properties have their own peculiar means of being perceived and distinguished, provided always that the aggregate body goes along with them and is never wrested from them, but in virtue of its comprehension as an aggregate of qualities acquires the predicate of body.

τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	distinction	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping separation</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
συμπαρακολουθῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ <i>following alongside together</i>

ἄθροος (α, ον)	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>
τὸ ἄθροον τὰ ἄθροα	aggregate	
οὐθαμῆ = οὐδαμοῦ	nowhere	οὐθαμῆ <i>not in any place</i>
ἀποσχίζειν	to detach	ΑΠΟΣΧΙΖΕΙΝ <i>split away</i>
ἀποσχιζόμενος (η, ον)	being detached	
ἄθροος (α, ον)	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ <i>in groups</i>
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing in</i>
τό σῶμα τά σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
κατηγορεῖν	to attribute	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly publicly declare</i>
ἡ κατηγορία αἱ κατηγορίαι	attribution	
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
εἰληφώς (υῖα, ός)	having acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ <i>took</i>

Different qualities are perceived separately and through different senses. These qualities can only be perceived and identified along with the whole object they belong to, never separately. The complete idea of the object comes from the combination of all these perceptions.

70a. Formation of Symptoms

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τοῖς σώμασι συμπίπτει πολλάκις – καὶ οὐκ αἰδίων παρακολουθεῖν... οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις καὶ οὔτε ἀσώματα

and indeed, [there are also separable qualities] that are often symptomatic to **bodies** – although not [always] also following along [with bodies] as **lasting**... either in the unseen {i.e., *the atoms*} or in the incorporeal {i.e., *the void*}

[Bailey] Furthermore, there often happen to bodies and yet do not permanently accompany them accidents: of which we must suppose neither that they ⁽¹⁾do not exist at all, nor that they ⁽²⁾have the nature of a whole body, nor that ⁽³⁾they can be classed among unseen things, nor as ⁽⁴⁾incorporeal.

[Hicks] Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal.

[Yonge] Bodies often possess other attributes which are not eternally inherent in them, but which nevertheless, cannot be ranged among the incorporeal and invisible things.

τό σῶμα τά σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling together</i>
συμπίπτων (ουσα, ον)	to fall into each other	
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ <i>many times</i>

αίδιος <i>(αἰδία, αἰδιον)</i>	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
συμπαρακολουθῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ <i>following alongside together</i>
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not seeing</i>
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>

Objects often have temporary qualities that are not permanent parts of them. These characteristics do exist, but they are not like whole bodies, invisible things, or incorporeal entities.

70b. Perception of Symptoms

ὥστε δὴ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φορὰν τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμενοι φανερὰ ποιούμεν τὰ συμπτώματα: οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ἔχειν (ὃ συλλαβόντες κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα, Προσαγορεύομεν) – οὔτε τὴν τῶν αἰδίων παρακολουθούτων (ᾧν ἄνευ Σῶμα οὐ δυνατόν νοεῖσθαι) – κατ' ἐπιβολὰς, δ' ἂν τινὰς παρακολουθοῦντος τοῦ ἀθρόου ἕκαστα προσαγορευθεῖν

Therefore, by using this word in accordance with the most extensive transmission {i.e., by using "symptoms" with its most common meaning}, We make the symptoms evident: they do not have ^[1] the nature of the whole (which [is what] We call it because those [symptoms] are apprehended together according to the aggregated body) – nor [do symptoms have] ^[2] the lasting [nature] of those [properties] that follow along together {always with that type of body} (without which a Body is not able to be conceived) – but according to our attentions, certain things could be called by this name [of "symptoms"], as long as the aggregate is following along [with that symptom]

[Hicks] Hence, using the term 'accidents' in the commonest sense, we say plainly that 'accidents' have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of. And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident.

[Bailey] So that when according to the most general usage we employ this name, we make it clear that accidents have neither ^[1] the nature of the whole, which we comprehend in its aggregate and call body, nor ^[2] that of the qualities which permanently accompany it, without which a given body cannot be conceived. But as the result of certain acts of apprehension, provided the aggregate body goes along with them, they might each be given this name

πλείστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	the greatest <i>[the most]</i>	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
τὸ ὄνομα τὰ ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
χρώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>using</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>the state of appearing</i>
φανερὸς <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>

ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality (characteristic)	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ condition [from] gathering
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	[temporary for its compound] symptom (separable quality)	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ to fall together
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ to have walked together
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping
συλλαμβάνειν	to apprehend together	ΣΥΛΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping together
συλλαβεῖν	to apprehend together [already]	ΣΥΛΛΑΒΕΙΝ grasped together
συλλαβῶν (οὔσα, ὄν)	apprehended together	
ἄθροος (α, ον)	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ in groups
προσαγορεύειν	to call [by the name]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ speak toward
προσαγορευθῆναι	to be called [by the name] [already]	
αἰδιός (αἰδία, αἰδιον)	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ always
συμπακολουθῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ following alongside together
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
παρακολουθῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	following along	
δυνατός (ή, ὄν)	able	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ power
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ seeing
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ throwing upon

Symptoms (separable qualities) are not permanent constituents an object – these temporary qualities do not have the nature of the whole body or its properties (inseparable qualities).

71a. Properties vs. Symptoms

ἀλλ' ὅτε δήποτε ἕκαστα συμβαίνοντα θεωρεῖται – οὐκ αἰδιον τῶν Συμπτωμάτων παρακολουθούτων: καὶ οὐκ ἔξελατέον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ταύτην τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν (ᾧ συμβαίνει – ὃ δὴ καὶ "σῶμα" Προσαγορεύομεν) οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν αἰδιον παρακολουθούτων

but [only] whenever Each of those [symptoms] is observed enduring [with its compound] – because Symptoms do not follow along in a way that lasts: [but] It is not necessary to expel this visible reality from what exists, [just] because [the symptom] does not have ^[1] the nature of the whole (with which [the symptom] endures – which indeed We call "a body") nor ^[1] [does the symptom have] that [nature] of those [properties] that follow along [with the body] in a way that lasts

[Hicks] But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole--by us called body--to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole.

[Bailey], but only on occasions when each one of them is seen to occur, since accidents are not permanent accompaniments. And we must not banish this clear vision from the realm of existence because it does not possess the nature of the whole to which it is joined nor that of the permanent accompaniments,

τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
συβαίνων (ουσα, ον)	enduring [with its compound]	
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be observed	
αἰδῖος (αἰδία, αἰδίων)	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>ever</i>
αἰδῖον	in a way that lasts	
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	[temporary for its compound] symptom (separable quality)	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
παρακολουθῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	following along	
ἐξελαύνειν	to expel	ΕΞΕΛΑΥΝΕΙΝ <i>driving out of</i>
ἐναργής (ές)	visible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	visible thing	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ
ἡ ἐναργεία αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	visible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to call [by the name]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speak toward</i>

Symptoms (separable qualities) are not essential constituents of body – they are temporary characteristics that are only occasionally part of the body. Nevertheless, these qualities are real – as they are physically based in a body. Even though they are not permanent parts of that body or among its essential properties.

71b. Neither Intrinsic nor Extrinsic

οὐδ', αὖ, καθ' αὐτὰ νομιστέον – οὐδὲ γὰρ Τοῦτο διανοητόν: οὐτ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰδῖον συμβεβηκόντων – ἀλλ' ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται, Συμπτώματα πάντα «κατὰ» τὰ σώματα νομιστέον, καὶ οὐκ αἰδῖον παρακολουθοῦντα, οὐδ' αὖ φύσεως καθ' ἑαυτὰ τάγμα ἔχοντα: ἀλλ' ὄν τρόπον αὐτὴ ἡ Αἴσθησις τὴν ιδιότητα ποιεῖ θεωρεῖται

nor, again, is it necessary to think that [Qualities exist] intrinsically – for this is **not mentally perceptible**: neither for these [symptoms] nor for the properties [existing] **in a way that lasts [with the compound]** – but just as they appear, all Symptoms must be thought of according to the bodies, and not following along [with the body] **in a way that lasts [as permanent accompaniments]**, nor having **an intrinsic arrangement of nature {i.e., having of independent existence}**: but [those Qualities] are observed [to exist] **[exactly] in the way that Sensation itself gathers [each's] particularity**

[Bailey] nor must we suppose that such contingencies exist independently (for this is inconceivable both with regard to them and to the permanent properties), but, just as it appears in sensation, we must think of them all as accidents occurring to bodies, and that not as permanent accompaniments, or again as having in themselves a place in the ranks of material existence; rather they are seen to be just what our actual sensation shows their proper character to be.

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>saw through</i>
ἡ δianoia αἱ δianoiai	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοητός (ἡ, ὄν)	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>saw through</i>
αἰδιος (αἰδία, αἰδιον)	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>
αἰδιον	in a way that lasts	
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
συμβαίνων (ουσα, ον)	enduring [with its compound]	
συμβεβηκώς (υῖα, ὄς)	having endured	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appear</i>
φανείσθαι	to be seen [in the future]	
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>to make appear</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	[temporary for its compound] symptom (separable quality)	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
παρακολουθῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	following along	
τὸ τάγμα τὰ τάγματα	arrangement	ΤΑΓΜΑ <i>ordering</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΙ <i>method</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality (characteristic)	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition [from] gathering</i>
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>

Qualities do not have an independent existence – they do not exist independently apart from their object of origin. Separable qualities are temporary characteristics of bodies (and may not last as long as their source-object).

Separable qualities (symptoms) are not part of the body's essential nature – in contrast to inseparable qualities (properties) which last as long as the source-object lasts.

We can understand qualities as they appear through our senses, recognizing their role as attributes of bodies. Qualities are neither intrinsic (they do not exist in-and-of-themselves) nor extrinsic (they cannot be separated from their source-object and still exist).

72a. Investigating Time

καὶ μὴν καὶ, **τόδε γε Δεῖ** προσκατανοῆσαι σφοδρῶς: τὸν γὰρ δὴ Χρόνον οὐ ζητητέον ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ (**ὅσα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ** Ζητοῦμεν, ἀνάγοντες ἐπὶ τὰς βλεπομένας παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς προλήψεις): ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ Ἐνάργημα (καθ' ὃ τὸν πολὺν ἢ ὀλίγον χρόνον **Ἀναφωνοῦμεν**) **συγγενικῶς τοῦτο περιφέροντες ἀναλογιστέον**

and indeed, It is necessary to also fully conceive **this very thing** attentively: Time should not to be investigated **in the same way as the other** [qualities] (**which** We investigate in [their] original source, while referring **them** back to the preconceptions seen by us): but the visible Fact itself (according to which We declare **time as long** or **short**) ought to be analogized by us **inherently linking this** [attribute of duration with time]

[Bailey] Moreover, you must firmly grasp this point as well: we must not look for time, as we do for all other things which we look for in an object (by referring them to the general conceptions which we perceive in our own minds) – **but we must take the direct intuition**, in accordance with which we speak of 'a long time' or 'a short time' **and examine it**, applying our intuition to time as we do to other things.

[Hicks] There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds; **but we must take into account the plain fact itself**, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, **linking to it in intimate connection this attribute of duration**. {{linking this attribute of duration to [time] in intimate connection}}

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
προσκατανοεῖν	to also fully conceive	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>addition to seeing thoroughly</i>
σφοδρός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	attentive	ΣΦΟΔΡΟΣ <i>intense</i>
σφοδρῶς	attentively	ΣΦΟΔΡΩΣ <i>intensely</i>
ζητεῖν	to investigate	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seeking</i>
ζητητός <i>(ἦ, ὄν)</i>	investigated	ΖΗΤΗΤΟΣ <i>sought</i>
ζητητέος <i>(α, ὄν)</i>	ought to be investigated	ΖΗΤΗΤΕΟΣ <i>should be sought</i>
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of situated under</i>
ἀνάγων <i>(ουσα, ὄν)</i>	referring back	ΑΝΑΓΩΝ <i>leading back</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
βλεπόμενος	seen	ΒΛΕΠΟΜΕΝΗ <i>looking</i>
ἡ πρόληψις ἡ προλήψις	preconception <i>(anticipation)</i>	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping before</i>

ἐναργής (ές)	visible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
ἡ ἐναργεία αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	visible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	visible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ
πολύς (ή, ύ)	long	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>many</i>
ὀλίγος (η, ον)	short	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ <i>little</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
ἡ ἀναφωνήσις αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις	declaration	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ <i>voice up</i>
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	
συγγεγονέναι	to have been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΟΝΕΝΑΙ <i>having been born together</i>
συγγεγεννημένος (η, ον)	having been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having been born together</i>
συγγενής (ές)	inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ <i>born with</i>
συγγενικῶς	inherently	
διαφέρων (ουσα, ον)	differing	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry through</i>
ἀναφέρων (ουσα, ον)	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry back</i>
περιφέρων (ουσα, ον)	linking making known	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry around</i>
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning again</i>
ἀναλόγως	analogously	
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	
ἀναλογικός (ή, όν)	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>reasoned again</i>
ἀναλογιστέος (α, ον)	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be reasoned action again</i>

Time is a characteristic of movement. We cannot investigate time by perceiving it directly – therefore we cannot investigate time in the same way we investigate other qualities, which we seek in their source-object (i.e., we look for red in an object that has the quality of red), but we must investigate time as a quality of movement itself.

We must realize that time is not something we can investigate in the same way we investigate other qualities that we can experience as characteristics of objects (and which we can refer to what we already know). Rather, we should pay attention to how we actually sense time in everyday life and reference these direct observations of motion as an analogy for the nature of time for use applications in scientific considerations.

72b. Indicating Time

καὶ οὐτε διαλέκτους ὡς βελτίους Μεταληπτέον, ἀλλ' αὐταῖς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις κατ' αὐτοῦ Χρηστέον – οὐτε ἄλλο τι κατ' αὐτοῦ Κατηγορητέον (ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος τῷ ἰδιώματι τούτῳ, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιοῦσί Τινες) – ἀλλὰ μόνον ᾧ Συμπλέκομεν τὸ ἴδιον τοῦτο καὶ Παραμετροῦμεν μάλιστα Ἐπιλογιστέον

and It is also not necessary to substitute **expressions** as [though they are] **better**, but It is necessary to use **the existing [expressions]** about [time] – nor is It necessary to fully indicate **anything else** about [time] (as though [anything else] has the same existence as this idiom {i.e., the word "time"}, for Some people indeed do **this**) – but It is most necessary to consider only [the phenomena] with which We entangle the particular feature [of time duration] and comparatively measure it

[Hicks] We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it – nor need we predicate anything else of time (as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word 'time,' for this also is done by some) – We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it.

[Bailey] Neither must we search for expressions as likely to be better, but employ just those which are in common use about it. Nor again must we predicate of time anything else as having the same essential nature as this special perception, as some people do, but we must turn our thoughts particularly to that only with which we associate this peculiar perception and by which we measure it.

ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	expression	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ <i>speaking across</i>
ἀγαθός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ <i>great</i>
βελτίων <i>(ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ <i>strong</i>
περιληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>apprehending around</i>
διαληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	apprehensible	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>apprehending through</i>
μεταληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	substitutable	ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>apprehending change</i>
μεταληπτέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be substituted	ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΕΟΝ <i>out to be apprehending change</i>
μεταληπτέον	it is necessary to substitute	
ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> ὑπάρχοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>	existing [already]	ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
χρη̑σθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>using</i>
χρηστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	useful	
χρηστέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be used	
χρηστέον	it is necessary to use	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speak</i>
κατηγορητέον	it is necessary to fully indicate	
ἡ οὐσία αἱ οὐσίαι	existence	ΟΥΣΙΑ <i>being</i>
ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>
τὸ ἰδίωμα τὰ ἰδιώματα	idiom	ΙΔΙΩΜΑ <i>particular</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>

πλεκτικός (η, ον)	tangled	ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ <i>weaved</i>
συμπλέκειν	to entangle	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ <i>weaved together</i>
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly measure</i>
παραμετρεῖν	to comparatively measure	ΠΑΡΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>measuring alongside</i>
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i>
τό διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of reasoning through action</i>
ἀναλογιστέος (α, ον)	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be reasoned action again</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός	consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action upon reasoning</i>
ἐπιλογιστέος (α, ον)	out to be considered	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be action upon reasoning</i>
ἐπιλογιστέον	it is necessary to consider	

We should use the common expressions for time and not invent new ones. This is because we must not attribute other qualities to time that it does not have – but focus on understanding and measuring it as it is commonly perceived. It is important to focus on the specific way we inherently understand and describe time, rather than trying to add anything else to its meaning.

73a. Considering Time

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδέεται, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες – καθ' ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ*}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We internalize, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] – according to which We use the word "Time" {He says this in both the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

[Bailey] For indeed this requires no demonstration, but only reflection, to show that it is with days and nights and their divisions that we associate it and likewise also with internal feelings or absence of feeling, and with movements and states of rest; in connection with these last again we think of this very perception as a peculiar kind of accident, and in virtue of this we call it time.

ἢ ἀπόδειξις αἰ ἀποδείξεις	proof	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ <i>from pointing out</i>
δεῖ	it is necessary	ΔΕΙ <i>needing</i>
δεῖσθαι	to need	
προσδεῖσθαι	to also need	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>needing in addition to</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός	consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action upon reasoning</i>

ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ day
ἡ νύξ αἱ νύκτες	night	ΝΥΞ night
συμπλέκειν	to entangle	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ weaved together
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ part
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ experiencing
ἡ ἀπάθεια αἱ ἀπάθειαι	absence of experience	ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ not experiencing
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ moving action
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ standing
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ particular
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ to fall together
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ seeing
ἐπινοεῖν	to conceive about	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ seeing upon
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ seeing through
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	ΕΝΝΟΕΙΝ seeing within
ἐννοῶν (ἐννοοῦσα, ἐννοοῦν) ἐννοοῦντες (ἐννοοῦσαι, ἐννοοῦντα)	internalizing	ΕΝΝΟΩΝ
προσαγορεύειν	to call [by the name]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ speak toward
τὸ ὄνομα τὰ ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ name
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ name

Only observation and reflection are needed to understand time. We recognize time by associating it with our experiences of the day progressing and by movement.

73b. Cosmoi

ἐπί τε τοῖς προειρημένοις τοὺς κόσμους Δεῖ (καὶ πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην τὸ ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς θεωρούμενοις πυκνῶς ἔχουσαν) νομίζειν γεγονέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου: πάντων τούτων ἐκ συστροφῶν ἰδίων ἀποκεκριμένων (καὶ μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων) – καὶ, πάλιν, διαλύεσθαι Πάντα (τὰ μὲν θάπτον, τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον – καὶ, τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε) τοῦτο πάσχοντα

moreover, in addition to the things already mentioned, It is necessary that the Cosmoi (as well as every [other] finite compound [which] has a form similar to frequently observed [objects around us]) be considered to have come into being from the infinite: because all of these (both larger and smaller) had been distinguished [out of the infinite] by particular conglomerations [of atoms] – and, in turn, [It is necessary for] all [these compound] Things to be dissolved (some more swiftly, others more slowly – indeed, some things by some specific [causes], and other things by other specific [causes]) [because they are all] affected by this [dissolution]

[Bailey] And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another.

λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
εἰρη̄σθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>spoke</i>
εἰρημένος	having been said [already]	
προεἰρημένος	having been previously said [already]	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>spoke before</i>
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of having been limited</i>
πεπερασμένος (η, ον)	finite	
προσεμφερής	closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΗΣ <i>toward bearing resemblance</i>
ἀνόμοιος (ον)	dissimilar	ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>not the same</i>
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>same</i>
ὁμοιομερής (ές)	homogeneous	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>same parts</i>
ὁμοειδής (ές)	similarly formed	ὍΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>same looking</i>
τὸ ὁμοειδές	similar form	
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	observed	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>observing</i>
πυκνὸν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ <i>compacting</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἡ σύστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	conglomeration	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ <i>twisting together</i>
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἀποκεκριμένος (η, ον)	had been distinguished	ΑΠΟΚΕΚΡΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>separated away from</i>
μείζων (ον)	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
ἐλάττων (ον)	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>

διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>through dissolve</i>
διαλύεσθαι	to be dissolved	
ταχύς <i>(εἶα, ύ)</i>	swift	ΤΑΧΥΣ <i>swift</i>
θάπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	swifter	ΘΑΤΤΩΝ <i>swifter</i>
θάπτων	more swiftly	
βραδύς <i>(εἶα, ύ)</i>	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ <i>slow</i>
βραδύτερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ <i>slower</i>
βραδύτερον	more slowly	
πάσχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ <i>suffering</i>

Worlds (as well as every other compound) emerge out of the indistinct infinite void and infinite amount of atoms as distinct and finite aggregates. They are formed from groups of atoms and will eventually break apart due to various different causes – some quickly and some very slowly.

73c. {Perishability of Cosmoi}

{**δῆλον, οὖν, ὡς καὶ φθαρτοὺς Φησι τοὺς Κόσμους – μεταβαλλόντων τῶν μερῶν: καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τὴν Γῆν τῷ ἀέρι ἐποχεῖσθαι**}

{clearly, therefore, He states that the Cosmoi [are] also perishable – because [their] parts are transforming: and in other [places in his books he says that] the Earth is carried along by the air}

δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
δῆλον	clearly	
φθαρτός	perishable	ΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ <i>being destroyed</i>
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
μεταβάλλων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	Γῆ <i>earth</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	Αἴρ <i>air</i>
ὁ ὄχος οἱ ὄχοι	carriage, cart, chariot	ΟΧΟΣ <i>riding</i>
ὄχεῖν	to carry	
ἐποχεύειν	to carry upon	ΕΠΟΧΕΥΕΙΝ <i>riding upon</i>
ἐποχεῖσθαι	to be carried along	

Worlds are perishable because their parts can change. Epikouros also mentions that our cosmos is carried through space by the air. The air in space is filled with "oceans" of atoms (and the waves and wakes that originate when objects pass through such atomic "oceans"). Our earth (as well as all the planets in our cosmos) is supported by, and carried along in, this atomic ocean.

74a. Shapes of Cosmoi

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης Δεῖ νομίζειν ἓνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας – ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφόρους αὐτοὺς {ἐν τῇ ιβ΄ *Περὶ Φύσεως* Αὐτὸς φησιν: οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ὠοειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἀλλοιοσχήμονας ἑτέρους – οὐ, μέντοι, πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν – οὐδὲ ζῶα εἶναι ἀποκριθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου}

yet also, It should not necessarily be thought that the *Cosmoi* have [just] one configuration – but indeed they are different {in the 12th book *On Nature*, He himself says: some are spherical, others egg-shaped, and others differently shaped – they do not, however, have every shape – nor are [the *Cosmoi*] living beings that are distinguished from the infinite}

[Bailey] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape.

ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>necessity</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
εἷς <i>(μία, ἓν)</i>	one	Εἶς ΜΙΑ Ἐν
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of forming</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
διάφορος <i>(ον)</i>	different	
δώδεκα	twelve	ΔΩΔΕΚΑ <i>two (and) ten</i>
ιβ΄	12	ΙΒ΄ <i>ten (and) two</i>
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
ὁμοειδής <i>(ές)</i>	similarly formed	ὍΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>same looking</i>
σφαιροειδής <i>(ές)</i>	spherical	ΣΦΑΙΡΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>sphere looking</i>
ὠοειδής <i>(ές)</i>	oval	ΩΙΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>egg looking</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἀλλοιοσχήμων <i>(ον)</i>	differently shaped	ΑΛΛΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ <i>holding other [form]</i>
τὸ ζῶον τὰ ζῶα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ <i>life</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἀποκεκριμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	had been distinguished	ΑΠΟΚΕΚΡΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>separated away from</i>
ἀποκριθείς <i>(εἶσα, ἓν)</i>	distinguished [already]	ΑΠΟΚΡΙΘΕΙΣ
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>

Cosmoi are spherical, oval, and very many other shapes – nevertheless they are not formed in every possible shape.

[...] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἀποδείξειεν Οὐδείς ὡς <έν> μὲν τῷ τοιούτῳ (καὶ οὐκ ἂν Ἐμπεριελήφθη) τὰ τοιαῦτα Σπέρματα ἐξ ὧν ζῳά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα <τὰ> θεωρούμενα συνίσταται – ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνήθη {ὡσαύτως, δὲ καὶ ἐντραφῆναι τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς Νομιστέον}

[furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and all the other things that we see produced in this world] for Nobody could fully prove (nor could it be completely apprehended within) that in one particular [world there are] the particular Seeds from which living beings, plants, and all other observed things are put together – whereas in another similar [world], [similar seeds] could not possibly be [put together] {likewise, It is necessary to consider [those similar living beings, plants, and all other observed things] being nourished in the same manner as on earth}

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

δείκνυται	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
ἀποδείκνυται	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>fully showing</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to fully give	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΥΣ <i>fully giving</i>
οὐδείς <i>(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)</i>	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ <i>not someone</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
τὸ περιελημμένον τὰ περιελημμένα	what completely apprehended	ΠΕΡΙΕΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of being grasped around</i>
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around in</i>
ἐμπεριλαβεῖν	to completely apprehend within [already]	
ἐμπεριληφθῆναι	to be completely apprehended within [already]	ἐμπεριληφθῆναι <i>grasped around in</i>
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ <i>seed</i>
τὸ φυτόν τὰ φυτὰ	plant	ΦΥΤΟΝ <i>growing</i>
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	observed	
συνστήσαι	to put together [already]	ΣΥΝΣΤΗΣΑΙ <i>stood together</i>
συνιστάναι	to put together	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
συνίστασθαι	to be put together	
δύνασθαι	to be able	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>having power</i>
δυνηθῆναι	to be able [already]	

τρέφειν	to nurture	ΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ <i>raising</i>
έντρέφεισθαι	to be nurtured in	ΕΝΤΡΕΦΕΣΘΑΙ <i>raising in</i>
έντραφῆναι	to be nurtured in [already]	ΕΝΤΡΑΦΗΝΑΙ <i>raised in</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΙ <i>method</i>
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	Γῆ <i>earth</i>

Some worlds have a composition like ours, other worlds have a composition unlike ours. In worlds similar to ours, there are similar living creatures, plants, and everything else that exists in our world. The seeds needed for those living beings and plants to form and grow are not only found in just one world, but in all others similar to it. Those living beings and plants are nourished in the same way as they are on Earth.

75a. Adaptive Learning

ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὕποληπτόν καὶ τὴν Φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι – τὸν δὲ Λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μὲν τισὶ θάττον, ἐν δὲ τισὶ βραδύτερον – καὶ ἐν μὲν τισὶ περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις μείζους λαμβάνειν ἐπιδόσεις, ἐν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ἐλάττους

but indeed, It is also necessary to fundamentally apprehend that [human] Nature is taught numerous and diverse things by the circumstances themselves and that it is also forced [to do many things] – and that [human] Reasoning afterward further examines and elaborates the things already recommended by these [circumstances], in some cases more swiftly, in others more slowly – and in some periods and times [human reasoning] apprehends larger advancements, but also smaller [advancements] in other [periods]

[Bailey] Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times making great advances, and lesser again at others.

λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
διαλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly apprehend	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping through</i>
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	to completely apprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around in</i>
ὑπολαμβάνειν	to fundamentally apprehend	ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping under</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	circumstance	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>teaching</i>
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ <i>necessary</i>
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i>
τὸ διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of reasoning through action</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός	consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action upon reasoning</i>

ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action reasoning</i>
παραγγέλλειν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΑΓΓΥΑΝ <i>transmitted a message across</i>
παρεγγυηθείς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	recommended [already]	ΠΑΡΕΓΓΥΗΘΕΙΣ <i>transmitted a message across</i>
ὕστερον	afterward	ΎΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>next</i>
ἐξακριβοῦν	to examine precisely	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ <i>fully accurate</i>
ἐπακριβοῦν	to examine further	ΕΠΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ <i>accurate</i>
εὐρίσκειν	to discover	ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ
προσεξευρίσκειν	to elaborate	ΠΡΟΣΕΞΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>finding in addition from</i>
ταχύς <i>(εἶα, ὑ)</i>	swift	ΤΑΧΥΣ <i>swift</i>
θάπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	swifter	ΘΑΠΤΩΝ <i>swifter</i>
θάπτον	more swiftly	
βραδύς <i>(εἶα, ὑ)</i>	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ <i>slow</i>
βραδύτερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ <i>slower</i>
βραδύτερον	more slowly	
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	period [of time]	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ <i>path around</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
μείζων <i>(ον)</i>	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ ἐπίδοσις αἱ ἐπιδόσεις	advancements	ΕΠΙΔΟΣΙΣ <i>giving in addition</i>
ἐλάττων <i>(ον)</i>	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>

Human nature is shaped by events and circumstances – afterwards, reasoning fine-tunes this nature. Humans learn and adapt through experiences, with reason developing and expanding on these lessons. The speed of this progress varies over time.

75b. Natural Word Formation

ὄθεν καὶ τὰ Ὄνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι – ἀλλ’ αὐτὰς τὰς Φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πάσχουσας πάθη – καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως – τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ’ ἐκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων (ὡς ἂν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν Διαφορὰ ἦ)

and so [It is necessary to fundamentally apprehend that] Words were also not produced from [their] origin by [purposeful] implementation – but rather the very Natures of humans according to each ethnicity were affected by particular experiences – and particularly apprehending particular mental images – [human nature] emitted the air brought up by each of the experiences and mental images (as there may also be a Difference depending on the locations of the ethnicities)

[Bailey] And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men's natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well.

τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	origin	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the origin	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	implementation	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	human	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man looking</i>
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
πάσχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ <i>suffering</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	experience	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>feeling</i>
λαμβάνειν	to apprehend	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαμβάνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	apprehending	
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination <small>[an act of imagining]</small>	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i>
τὸ φάντασμα τὰ φαντάσματα	mental image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ <i>result of appearing</i>
ιδίως	particularly	ΙΔΙΩΣ <i>particular</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>air</i>
ἐκπέμπειν	to emit	ΕΚΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ <i>sending out</i>
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>equipping [for being] away</i>
στέλλειν	to send	ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>equipping</i>
στελλόμενον	being sent	ΣΤΕΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of equipping</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>spot</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ὑστερον	afterward	ΎΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>next</i>
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	commonality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>common</i>
κοινῶς	commonly	

Words and names for things were not created on purpose or by agreement but arose by natural human impulse. Primitive people made sounds based on their feelings and experiences, and these sounds varied depending on the region and culture they lived in.

76a. Purposeful Word Formation

ὕστερον, δὲ κοινῶς καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι – πρὸς τὸ τὰς Δηλώσεις ἦττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας: τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνωρώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς Συνειδότας, παρεγγυῆσαι τινὰς φθόγγους – ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐλομένους – κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἐρμηνεῦσαι

next, [It is necessary to fundamentally apprehend that] particular Things were commonly established according to each ethnicity – so that [their] Clarifications might become less ambiguous to one another and more concisely clear: and Those who knew well [how to clarify with words] also introduced certain circumstances that [were] not fully mentally seen, while recommending certain words [for the circumstances they introduced] – they were [sometimes] compelled to declare [certain words] but [other times] they chose [words] by reasoning – interpreting [circumstances] in that way according to [their] greatest cause [i.e., according to their primary purpose of communicating clearly]

[Bailey] And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.

ὕστερον	afterward	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>next</i>
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	commonality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>common</i>
κοινῶς	commonly	
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
ἡ δήλωσις αἱ δηλώσεις	clarification	ΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ <i>action of making clear</i>
ἀμφίβολος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	ambiguous	ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΟΣ <i>throwing around both sides</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
συντομός	concise	ΣΥΝΤΟΜΟΣ <i>cut together</i>
συντομωτέρως	more concisely	
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
δηλούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	clarified	
συνωρᾶν	to fully [mentally] see	ΣΥΝΩΡΑΝ <i>seeing together</i>
συνωρώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	fully [mentally] seen	ΣΥΝΩΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seen together</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	circumstance	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>

ἀναφερόμενος (ἦ, ον)	being carried back	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>carry back</i>
εἰσφέρων (ουσα, ον)	introducing	ΕΙΣΦΕΡΩΝ <i>carry into</i>
εἰδέναι	to know	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>looking at</i>
συνειδώς (υῖα, ός)	knowing well	ΣΥΝΕΙΔΩΣ <i>looking at [it all] together</i>
ὁ συνειδώς οἱ συνειδότες	he who knew well	
παρεγγυᾶν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΕΓΓΥΑΝ <i>entrust besides</i>
παρεγγυῆσαι	to recommend [already]	
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	word	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>sound</i>
ἀναγκάζειν	to compel	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ <i>necessary again</i>
ἀναγκάσαι	to compel [already]	
ἀναγκασθεῖς (εῖσα, έν)	compelled	
ἡ ἀναφωνήσις αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις	declaration	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ <i>voice up</i>
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	
ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action reasoning</i>
αἰρεῖν	to choose	Αἶρειν <i>taking</i>
ἐλόμενος (ἦ, ον)	chosen [already]	Ἐλομενος <i>took</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	Αἰτία <i>blame</i>
ἐρμηνεύειν	to interpret	Ἐρμηνεύειν <i>Hermes nod interpreter sign</i>
ἐρμηνεῦσαι	to interpret [already]	

Although many words arose naturally, some were invented for precision, and others for newly discerned mental concepts.

Different races automatically created their specific words to make communication clearer and more concise among themselves. Afterward, educated people introduced – either instinctively or logically – new terms for things that were not previously understood.

76b. Autonomous Motion

καὶ μὴν «καὶ, τὴν» ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις **φορὰν** καὶ **τροπήν** καὶ **ἔκλειψιν** καὶ **ἀνατολήν** καὶ **δύσιν** καὶ **τὰ σύστοιχα** τούτοις – **μήτε** λειτουργοῦντός τινος **νομίζειν** **Δεῖ γενέσθαι** καὶ **διατάπτοντος**, ἢ **διατάζοντος** – καὶ **ἅμα τὴν πάσαν μακαριότητα** ἔχοντος **μετ' ἀφθαρσίας**

and indeed [regarding] the transmission in astronomical phenomena, and turning, and disappearance, and rising, and setting, and components related to these – It is necessary to think that they are produced neither by anyone who is administrating and [currently] arranging, or who will be arranging [those components of astronomical phenomena] – [all] while they are also simultaneously possessing all blissfulness in accordance with [their] indestructibility

[Bailey] Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality.

[Hicks] Nay more, we are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality.

[Yonge] As to the heavenly phenomena, such as the motion and course of the stars, the eclipses, their rising and setting, and all other appearances of the same kind, we must beware of thinking that they are produced by any particular being which has regulated, or whose business it is to regulate, for the future, the order of the world, a being immortal and perfectly happy.

[Bailey] Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality.

ὁ μετέωρος οἱ μετέωροι	astronomical phenomena	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΣ <i>rising beyond</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ τροπή αἱ τροπαί	turning	ΤΡΟΠΗ <i>diverting</i>
ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	eclipse [disappearance]	ΕΚΚΛΙΨΙΣ <i>leaving out</i>
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component principle	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component fact	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ σύστοιχον τὰ σύστοιχα	related component	ΣΥΣΤΟΙΧΟΝ <i>together in a row</i>
λειτουργεῖν	to administrate [to serve the state]	ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΕΙΝ <i>council-room worker</i>
λειτουργῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	administrating	
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>came into being</i>
διατάπτειν	to arrange	ΔΙΑΤΑΣΣΕΙΝ <i>ordering across</i>
διατάπτων (ουσα, ον)	arranging	
διατάξων (ουσα, ον)	will be arranging	ΔΙΑΤΑΞΩΝ <i>will order across</i>
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blissfulness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [greatness]</i>
ἡ ἀφθαρσία αἱ ἀφθαρσίαι	indestructibility	ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑ <i>not destroyed</i>

Matter and events are not created by a controlling entity. We must believe that celestial events like star movements, solstices, and eclipses happen naturally, without the control or command of any immortal and perfectly happy being.

οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὄργαι καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητα, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεταί, μήτε αὖ πυρὸς ἀνάμματα συνεστραμμένου τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν

* And immortality, for activities, cares, anger, and gratitude are not consistent with blessedness. Rather, these arise from weakness, fear, and dependence on others. Nor should one believe that these movements occur by the will of a fire-god possessing blessedness, for such entanglements are inconsistent with true blessedness.

[Hicks] For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one's neighbours. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will.

[Yonge] for the cares and anxieties, the benevolence and the anger, far from being compatible with felicity, are, on the contrary, the consequence of weakness, of fear, and of the want which a thing has of something else. We must not fancy either that these globes of fire, which roll on in space, enjoy a perfect happiness, and give themselves, with reflection and wisdom, the motions which they possess.

[Bailey] (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors). Nor again must we believe that they, which are but fire agglomerated in a mass, possess blessedness, and voluntarily take upon themselves these movements.

x	vvv	x

Emotions like concern, anxiety, anger, and kindness are signs of weakness, fear, and dependence – all such feelings do not fit with a state of bliss. We should not believe that celestial bodies, which are just masses of fire, experience happiness or move by their own will.

77b. Maintaining Reverence

Ἄλλὰ πᾶν τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν, κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας, ἵνα μηδ' ὑπεναντία ἐξ αὐτῶν ᾗ γένωνται τῷ σεμνώματι δόξαι εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῆ ἢ ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει.

* But one must maintain all reverence, applying it to such notions in every respect, so that no judgements contrary to reverence may arise. Otherwise, the very opposition will cause the greatest disturbance in the souls.

[Hicks] Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds.

[Yonge] But we must respect the established notions on this subject, provided, nevertheless, that they do not all contradict the respect due to truth; for nothing is more calculated to trouble the soul than this strife of contradictory notions and principles.

[Bailey] But we must preserve their full majestic significance in all expressions which we apply to such conceptions, in order that there may not arise out of them opinions contrary to this notion of majesty. Otherwise this very contradiction will cause the greatest disturbance in men's souls.

x	vvv	x

Maintain reverence for all that is dignified. We must maintain the full majestic meaning of terms like bliss and immortality to avoid creating conflicting opinions that can disturb our minds. Contradictory notions and principles can greatly trouble the soul.

77c. Autonomous Planetary Mechanics

Ὅθεν δὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναπολήψεις τῶν συστροφῶν τούτων ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει δεῖ δοξάζειν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ περίοδον συντελεῖσθαι.

* Therefore, one must believe that from the original formations of these clusters in the creation of the world, both this necessity and the cyclical nature are fulfilled.

[Hicks] Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.

[Yonge] We must therefore admit that from the first movement impressed on the heavenly bodies since the organization of the world there is derived a sort of necessity which regulates their course to this day.

[Bailey] Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about.

x	vvv	x

Planets move according to their constitution and interrelationships. The consistent recurrence of natural phenomena is due to the original clustering of atoms when the world was formed. This initial organization set the patterns that continue to regulate their courses today.

78a. Singular Universal Causes

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι καὶ ἐν τῷ τίνες φύσεις αἰ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτί, καὶ ὅσα συντείνει πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοῦτο ἀκρίβειαν.

* And indeed, one must believe that it is the work of physics to ascertain the cause of the most important things, and that blessedness lies in understanding which natures are observed in the heavens, and whatever contributes to this precision.

[Hicks] Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science, and that happiness depends on this (viz. on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.

[Yonge] Let us be well assured that it is to physiology that it belongs to determine the causes of the most elevated phenomena, and that happiness consists, above all things, in the science of the heavenly things and their nature, and in the knowledge of analogous phenomena which may aid us in the comprehension of ethics.

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must believe that to discover accurately the cause of the most essential facts is the function of the science of nature, and that blessedness for us in the knowledge of celestial phenomena lies in this and in the understanding of the nature of the existences seen in these celestial phenomena, and of all else that is akin to the exact knowledge requisite for our happiness.

x	vvv	x

The role of natural philosophy should be to thoroughly investigate the chief causes. We must believe that understanding the causes of important natural phenomena is the job of natural science, and our happiness depends on this knowledge. Knowing what heavenly bodies truly are and related facts helps us achieve accurate understanding and happiness.

78b. Phenomenal Equivalence

Ἔτι τε οὐ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μηθέν καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς εἶναι.

* Furthermore, it is not that there can be multiple possibilities in such matters, nor that they can be otherwise, but simply that there is no place for those who cause division or disturbance in an immortal and blessed nature. And to understand this with the mind is simply to be.

[Hicks] Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this.

[Yonge] These heavenly phenomena admit of several explanations; they have no reason of a necessary character, and one may explain them in different manners. In a word, they have no relation - a moment's consideration will prove this by itself - with those imperishable and happy natures which admit of no division and of no confusion.

[Bailey] in knowing too that what occurs in several ways or is capable of being otherwise has no place here but that nothing which suggests doubt or alarm can be included at all in that which is naturally immortal and blessed. Now this we can ascertain by our mind is absolutely the case.

x	vvv	x

Phenomena can exhibit identical qualities through various methods. We must understand that heavenly phenomena can have multiple explanations and are not necessarily fixed. These phenomena do not relate to immortal and blessed natures, which are free from doubt and confusion, and our mind can grasp this absolute truth.

79a. Various Particular Causes

Τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκός, τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ὅσα συγγενῆ τούτοις μηθέν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τὰς γνώσεις συντείνειν

* What is recorded in history, such as the setting, rising, revolution, and eclipse, and all things related to these, no longer contributes at all to the knowledge of blessedness.

[Hicks] But when we come to subjects for special inquiry, there is nothing in the knowledge of risings and settings and solstices and eclipses and all kindred subjects that contributes to our happiness.

[Yonge] As for the theoretical knowledge of the rising and setting of the stars, of the movement of the sun between the tropics, of the eclipses, and all other similar phenomena, that is utterly useless, as far as any influence upon happiness that it can have.

[Bailey] But what falls within the investigation of risings and settings and turnings and eclipses, and all that is akin to this, is no longer of any value for the happiness which knowledge brings.

x	vvv	x

Studying the historical movement of specific aggregates does not lead to happiness. Understanding the technical details of star risings, settings, solstices, and eclipses does not contribute to our happiness. This theoretical knowledge is useless in influencing our well-being.

79b. Distress Over Particular Causes

Ἄλλ' ὁμοίως τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν τοὺς ταῦτα κατειδότες, τίνες δ' αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοοῦντας καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι, καὶ εἰ μὴ προσήδεισαν ταῦτα τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους, ὅταν τὸ θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προσκατανοήσεως μὴ δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν.

* But likewise, those who are familiar with these things have fears, as well as those who are ignorant of the natures and the primary causes, and if they had not known these things, perhaps even more so, when awe from their observation cannot provide a solution and understanding of the primary matters.

[Hicks] but those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such special information--nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.

[Yonge] Moreover, those who, though possessed of this knowledge, are ignorant of nature, and of the most probable causes of the phenomena, are no more protected from fear than if they were in the most complete ignorance; they even experience the most lively fears, for the trouble, with which the knowledge of which they are possessed inspires them, can find no issue, and is not dissipated by a clear perception of the reasons of these phenomena.

[Yonge] but persons who have perceived all this, but yet do not know what are the natures of these things and what are the essential causes, are still in fear, just as if they did not know these things at all indeed, their fear may be even greater, since the wonder which arises out of the observation of these things cannot discover any solution or realize the regulation of the essentials.

x	vvv	x

Misunderstanding of natural principles causes similar fears in the informed and ignorant. People who know about risings, settings, and other celestial events but do not understand the true nature or main causes of these phenomena feel as much fear as those who are completely ignorant. Their fear might even be greater because their curiosity is not satisfied, and they cannot comprehend the underlying reasons.

79c. Imprecision of Particular Causes

Διὸ δὴ κἂν πλείους αἰτίας εὐρίσκωμεν τροπῶν καὶ δύσεων καὶ ἀνατολῶν καὶ ἐκλείψεων καὶ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος γινομένοις ἦν

* Therefore, even if we find multiple causes for revolutions, settings, risings, eclipses, and similar phenomena, just as there are for events occurring in particular cases,

[Hicks] Hence, if we discover more than one cause that may account for solstices, settings and risings, eclipses and the like, as we did also in particular matters of detail...

[Yonge] As to us, we find many explanations of the motions of the sun, of the rising and setting of the stars, of the eclipse and similar phenomena, just as well as of the more particular phenomena.

[Bailey] And for this very reason, even if we discover several causes for turnings and settings and risings and eclipses and the like, as has been the case already in our investigation of detail.

x	vvv	x

Multiple explanations for phenomena exist. If we find multiple explanations for solstices, risings, settings, eclipses, and similar phenomena, just as we have for specific details, it helps us understand these events better.

80a. Precision of Universal Causes

Οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων χρεῖαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ἀπειληφέναι, ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνει.

* we must not believe that the need for exactness in these matters has not been met, as much as it contributes to our tranquility and blessedness.

[Hicks] we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity and happiness.

[Yonge] And one must not think that this method of explanation is not sufficient to procure happiness and tranquillity.

[Bailey] we must not suppose that our inquiry into these things has not reached sufficient accuracy to contribute to our peace of mind and happiness.

x	vvv	x

Precision in the fundamental matters is necessary as it contributes to our tranquility and happiness. We should not think that our explanations are inaccurate if they help ensure our peace of mind and happiness. This method of understanding is sufficient to achieve tranquillity.

80b. General vs. Particular

Ὡστε παραθεωροῦντας ποσαχῶς παρ’ ἡμῖν τὸ ὅμοιον γίνεται, αἰτιολογητέον ὑπὲρ τε τῶν μετεώρων καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ἀδήλου, καταφρονοῦντας τῶν οὔτε τὸ μοναχῶς ἔχον ἢ γινόμενον γνωριζόντων οὔτε τὸ πλεοναχῶς συμβαῖνον, τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀποστημάτων φαντασίαν παριδόντων, ἔτι τε ἀγνοούντων καὶ ἐν ποίοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀταρακτῆσαι καὶ ἐν ποίοις ὁμοίως ἀταρακτῆσαι.

* Therefore, by observing how often similar things occur among us, we must provide explanations for the celestial phenomena and all that is unknown, disregarding those who neither recognize the unique or common occurrences nor understand the impressions from observations, and still do not know in which matters it is possible to achieve tranquility and in which it is equally impossible.

[Hicks] When, therefore, we investigate the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, as of all that is unknown, we must take into account the variety of ways in which analogous occurrences happen within our experience while as for those who do not recognize the difference between what is or comes about from a single cause and that which may be the effect of any one of several causes, overlooking the fact that the objects are only seen at a distance, and are moreover ignorant of the conditions that render, or do not render, peace of mind impossible --all such persons we must treat with contempt.

[Yonge] Let us content ourselves with examining how it is that similar phenomena are brought about under our own eyes, and let us apply these observations to the heavenly objects and to everything which known only indirectly. Let us despise those people who are unable to distinguish facts susceptible of different explanations from others which can only exist and be explained in one single way. Let us disdain those men who do not know, by means of the different images which result from distance, how to give an account of the different appearances of things; who, in a word, are ignorant about what are the objects which can excite any trouble in us.

[Bailey] So we must carefully consider in how many ways a similar phenomenon is produced on earth, when we reason about the causes of celestial phenomena and all that is imperceptible to the senses; and we must despise those persons who do not recognize either what exists or comes into being in one way only, or that which may occur in several ways in the case of things which can only be seen by us from a distance, and further are not aware under what conditions it is impossible to have peace of mind.

We can understand ambiguous phenomena by observing similar occurrences. We must differentiate between general causes and particular causes. When investigating the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, we should consider how similar events happen on Earth. We should disregard those who cannot distinguish between events with multiple possible causes and those with only one cause, especially if they are unaware of what prevents peace of mind.

80c. Accepting Imprecision of Particular Causes

Ἄν οὖν οἴωμεθα καὶ ὡδί πως ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι, αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς γίνεται γνωρίζοντες, ὥσπερ κἂν ὅτι ὡδί πως γίνεται εἶδωμεν, ἀταρακτῆσομεν.

* If we thus believe that it is possible for it to happen in various ways, knowing that it occurs in multiple ways, just as we would if we knew it happens in one particular way, we will achieve tranquility.

[Hicks] If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

[Yonge] If, then, we know that such a phenomenon can be brought about in the same manner as another given phenomenon of the same character which does not inspire us with any apprehension; and if, on the other hand, we know that it can take place in many different manners, we shall not be more troubled at sight of it than if we know the real cause of it.

[Bailey] If, therefore, we think that a phenomenon probably occurs in some such particular way, and that in circumstances under which it is equally possible for us to be at peace, when we realize that it may occur in several ways, we shall be just as little disturbed as if we know that it occurs in some particular way.

x	VVV	x

Accepting varied possibilities of phenomena promotes serenity. If we understand that a phenomenon can happen in multiple ways, and that any of these ways do not cause us fear, we will be just as calm as if we knew the exact cause.

81a. The Gods

Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ὅλως ἅπασιν ἐκεῖνο δεῖ κατανοεῖν, ὅτι τάραχος ὁ κυριώτατος ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς γίνεται ἐν τῷ ταῦτά τε μακάρια δοξάζειν «εἶναι» καὶ ἄφθαρτα, καὶ ὑπεναντίας ἔχειν τούτῳ βουλήσεις ἅμα καὶ πράξεις καὶ αἰτίας.

* In addition to all this, it must be understood that the greatest disturbance in human souls arises from believing that these blessed and immortal beings have contrary intentions, actions, and causes.

[Hicks] There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief

[Yonge] We must also recollect that which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of men is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings imperishable and perfectly happy, and that then one's thoughts and actions are in contradiction to the will of these superior beings

[Bailey] And besides all these matters in general we must grasp this point, that the principal disturbance in the minds of men arises because they think that these celestial bodies are blessed and immortal, and yet have wills and actions and motives inconsistent with these attributes.

x	vvv	x

Anxiety results from not understanding the nature of the gods. A major source of anxiety for people is the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible – while these people also have thoughts and actions that contradict this belief.

81b. Limiting Fears

Καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν αἰεὶ προσδοκᾶν ἢ ὑποπτεῦειν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους εἴ τε καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὴν ἐν τῷ τεθάναι φοβουμένους ὥσπερ οὖσαν κατ' αὐτούς, καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ δόξαις ταῦτα πάσχειν ἀλλ' ἀλόγῳ γέ τιμι παραστάσει, ὅθεν μὴ ὀρίζοντας τὸ δεινὸν τὴν ἴσην ἢ καὶ ἐπιτεταμένην ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν τῷ εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι ταῦτα.

* And from always expecting or suspecting some eternal danger according to myths, and from fearing the insensibility in death as if it were according to them, and in not judging these things, but with some irrational impression, they do not define the danger, thus experiencing equal or even greater disturbance than those who randomly believe these things.

[Hicks] and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague.

[Yonge] They also being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of evils, and they fear the insensibility of death, as if that could affect them. What do I say? It is not even belief, but inconsiderateness and blindness which govern them in every thing, to such a degree that, not calculating these fears, they are just as much troubled as if they really had faith in these vain phantoms.

[Bailey] and because they are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends, or even fear the loss of feeling in death as though it would concern them themselves; and, again, because they are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational presentiment, and therefore, as they do not know the limits of pain, they suffer a disturbance equally great or even more extensive than if they had reached this belief by opinion.

x	vvv	x

Both the fear of an eternal existence and the fear of nonexistence lead to anxiety. People often feel intense anxiety because they fear eternal suffering from myths or the insensibility of death, thinking it affects them. This fear arises from irrational beliefs rather than reasoned understanding, causing as much or even more distress than vague beliefs.

82a. Principled Tranquility

Ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων.

* Tranquility is being free from all these things and having a constant remembrance of the entire and most important principles.

[Hicks] But mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

[Yonge] And the real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things, and in preserving the recollection of all the principles which we have established, especially of the most essential of them.

[Bailey] But peace of mind is being delivered from all this, and having a constant memory of the general and most essential principles.

x	VVV	x

Mental tranquillity comes from being free from these fears and constantly remembering the most important truths and principles of nature's operation.

82b. Emotional Awareness

Ὅθεν τοῖς πάθεσι προσεκτέον τοῖς παροῦσι, κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς κοιναῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ταῖς ἰδίαις, καὶ πάση τῇ παρουσίᾳ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν κριτηρίων ἐναργείᾳ. ἂν γὰρ τούτοις προσέχωμεν, τὸ ὅθεν ὁ ταραχος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐγένετο ἐξατιολογήσομεν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀπολύσομεν, ὑπὲρ τε μετεώρων αἰτιολογοῦντες καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀεὶ παρεμπιπτόντων, ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐσχάτως.

* Therefore, we must attend to the present feelings, to the common ones in a common way, and to the individual ones in an individual way, and to the clear evidence present in each of the criteria. For if we pay attention to these, we will rightly explain and dispel the cause of disturbance and fear, by providing explanations for celestial phenomena and other occurrences that continuously arise and frighten most people greatly.

[Hicks] Hence we must attend to present feelings and sense perceptions, whether those of mankind in general or those peculiar to the individual, and also attend to all the clear evidence available, as given by each of the standards of truth. For by studying them we shall rightly trace to its cause and banish the source of disturbance and dread, accounting for celestial phenomena and for all other things which from time to time befall us and cause the utmost alarm to the rest of mankind.

[Yonge] Accordingly, it is well to pay a scrupulous attention to existing phenomena and to the sensations, to the general sensations for general things, and to the particular sensations for particular things. In a word, we must take note of this, the immediate evidence with which each of these judicial faculties furnishes us; for, if we attend to these points, namely, whence confusion and fear arise, we shall divine the causes correctly, and we shall deliver ourselves from those feelings, tracing back the heavenly phenomena to their causes, and also all the other which present themselves at every step, and inspire the common people with extreme terror.

[Bailey] Wherefore we must pay attention to internal feelings and to external sensations in general and in particular, according as the subject is general or particular, and to every immediate intuition in accordance with each of the standards of judgment. For if we pay attention to these, we shall rightly trace the causes whence arose our mental disturbance and fear, and, by learning the true causes of celestial phenomena and all other occurrences that come to pass from time to time, we shall free ourselves from all which produces the utmost fear in other men.

x	VVV	x

Paying attention to our current emotions assists in untangling and soothing anxiety. We must pay close attention to our feelings and sense perceptions, both general and individual, and consider all clear evidence from our standards of truth. By doing this, we can correctly identify and eliminate the causes of disturbance and fear, understand celestial phenomena, and free ourselves from the fears that trouble most people.

Ταῦτά σοι, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἔστι κεφαλαιωδέστατα ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως ἐπιτετημένα.

* These, Herodotus, are the most essential points summarized concerning the nature of the whole.

[Hicks] Here then, Herodotus, you have the chief doctrines of Physics in the form of a summary.

[Yonge] This, Herodotus, is a kind of summary and abridgment of the whole question of natural philosophy.

x	vvv	x

83a. Clear View

Ὡστ' ἐὰν γένηται δυνατὸς ὁ λόγος οὗτος κατασχεθεὶς μετ' ἀκριβείας, οἶμαι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα βαδίσῃ τις τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβωμάτων, ἀσύμβλητον αὐτὸν πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀδρότητα λήψεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ καθαρὰ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιήσει πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐξακριβουμένων κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πραγματείαν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐν μνήμῃ τιθέμενα συνεχῶς βοηθήσει.

* Therefore, if this discourse can be thoroughly mastered with precision, I believe, even if one does not proceed to every particular detail, it will render one incomparable in general understanding to other people. For it will clarify many particulars of our comprehensive treatise by itself, and keeping these points in constant memory will be helpful.

[Hicks] So that, if this statement be accurately retained and take effect, a man will, I make no doubt, be incomparably better equipped than his fellows, even if he should never go into all the exact details. For he will clear up for himself many of the points which I have worked out in detail in my complete exposition; and the summary itself, if borne in mind, will be of constant service to him.

[Yonge] So that, if this reasoning be allowed to be valid, and be preserved carefully in the memory, the man who allows himself to be influenced by it, even though he may not descend to a profound study of its details, will have a great superiority of character over other men. He will personally discover a great number of truths which I have myself set forth in my entire work; and these truths being stored in his memory, will be a constant assistance to him.

[Bailey] Here, Herodotus, is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy. I think that, even if one were unable to proceed to all the detailed particulars of the system, he would from this obtain an unrivaled strength compared with other men. For indeed he will clear up for himself many of the detailed points by reference to our general system, and these very principles, if he stores them in his mind, will constantly aid him.

x	vvv	x

Becoming proficient in this reasoned approach enables a clear view of nature. If this reasoning is accurately remembered and applied, a person will be much better equipped than others, even without knowing all the exact details. Students will be able to clarify many points from these general principles – and these principles will be a constant help if kept in mind.

83b. Comprehensive Insight

Τοιαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἤδη ἐξακριβοῦντας ἰκανῶς ἢ καὶ τελείως, εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀναλύοντας ἐπιβολάς, τὰς πλείστας τῶν περιοδειῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ποιεῖσθαι ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἰσίν, ἐκ τούτων καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄνευ φθόγγων τρόπον τὴν ἅμα νοήματι περίοδον τῶν κυριωτάτων πρὸς γαληνισμὸν ποιοῦνται.

* For such is their nature that even those who already investigate the particulars sufficiently or completely, by applying these concepts, conduct most of their inquiries into the whole nature. And those who do not fully understand everything can use these principles, and by means of silent contemplation, conduct their inquiry into the most important matters for their tranquility.

[Hicks] It is of such a sort that those who are already tolerably, or even perfectly, well acquainted with the details can, by analysis of what they know into such elementary perceptions as these, best prosecute their researches in physical science as a whole; while those, on the other hand, who are not altogether entitled to rank as mature students can in silent fashion and as quick as thought run over the doctrines most important for their peace of mind.

[Yonge] By means of these principles, those who have descended into the details, and have studied the question sufficiently, will be able, in bringing all their particular knowledge to bear on the general subject, to run over without difficulty almost the entire circle of the natural philosophy; those, on the other hand, who are not yet arrived at perfection, and who have not been able to hear me lecture on these subjects, will be able in their minds to run over the main of the essential notions, and to derive assistance from them for the tranquility and happiness of life.

[Bailey] For such is their character that even those who are at present engaged in working out the details to a considerable degree, or even completely, will be able to carry out the greater part of their investigations into the nature of the whole by conducting their analysis in reference to such a survey as this. And as for all who are not fully among those on the way to being perfected, some of them can from this summary obtain a hasty view of the most important matters without oral instruction so as to secure peace of mind.

x	vvv	x

Our tranquility is supported by our reflection of fundamental truths. These principles are useful for everyone: those well-versed in details can use them to deepen their understanding of physical science, while those less experienced can quickly grasp the main ideas to achieve peace of mind and happiness.

Decisive Judgments

Κύρια Δόξα

ΚΔ 1. Contentment & Autonomy

τὸ Μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει – οὔτε ἄλλω παρέχει:
ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται, ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον

* the Satisfied and Indestructible neither itself holds onto **affairs** – nor pours [affairs] **onto another**: therefore it is not wrapped up in **angers** or **favors**, because every thing **like that** is in [a state of] **weakness**

Whatever fits our conception of a perfect being must have the nature of something that cannot add any improvement to its fully content and totally independent nature. A happy and immortal being has no problems and does not cause problems for others – it is not affected by anger or gratitude because those feelings come from weakness. Any being that feels anger or obligation is not fit to be labeled a god.

Seneca, Apocolocyntosis Divi Claudii, 8

Ἐπικούρειος Θεὸς non potest esse: οὔτε αὐτὸς πράγμα ἔχει τι – οὔτε ἄλλοις παρέχει.

An **Epicurean** God he cannot be: for he himself neither has **any issues** nor pours [issues] **onto others**.

*Seneca partially preserves an alternative version of this **Κύρια Δόξα**, while speaking mockingly of Claudius.*

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.48

ómnis énim per sē dívum Nātúra necessest

indeed, it must be **by its own ability** that the entire Nature of the gods

immortál' áenō súmmā cum páce fruátur

enjoys **unending time** with the greatest peace,

sēmót^a ab nóstris rébus seíúntaque lóngē;

removed from **our issues** and far separated

nam, prívata dolór^e ómnī, prívata perícilīs,

for, deprived from **all pain**, deprived from **risks**,

ípsa súis póllēns ópibus, níhil índiga nóstrī,

itself powerful in **its own resources**, wanting **nothing from us**,

nec béne prómérītis cápitur nec tángitur írā

it is neither agreeably captured **by good deeds**, nor touched **by anger**

* *Philodemus, On The Gods, Book 3, P.Herc. 26, fr. 87*

* **...ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῶν ἀσθενῶν καὶ προσδεομένων πρὸς τὰ χρειώδη τῆς φιλίας...**

...but certainly indeed **for us, who have weakness** and have further need also **for the necessary things of friendship...**

*Regarding imperfection, Philodemus directly connects human weakness with our need for friendship. While discussing the importance of mutual friendship (ἡ **συμφυλία**) he says that generosity is necessary.*

ΚΔ 2. The Limit of Life

ὁ Θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς – τὸ γὰρ Διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ – τὸ δ' Ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς

* Death is **nothing** to us – because the Dissolved is insensible – and the Insensible is **nothing** to us

Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* 3.830

nīl ἰγίτuρ Mors est ad nos **néque** pértinet ἥλuμ

therefore Death is **nothing** to us and it does not pertain to us **at all**

Cicero, *De Finibus* 2.100

Mortem nihil ad nos pertinere: Quod enim dissolutum sit – Id esse sine sensu. Quod, autem, sine sensu sit – Id nihil ad nos pertinere omnino

Death in **no way** concerns us: What has been dissolved – That is **without** sensation. What, however, is **without** sensation – That pertains to us in **no way** at all

ΚΔ 3. The Limit of Pleasure

ὄρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος Ὑπεξάιρεσις: ὅπου δ' ἂν τὸ ἠδόμενον ἐνῆ – καθ' ὃν ἂν χρόνον ἦ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ Ἀλγοῦν ἢ Λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ Συναμφότερον

* **the limit of the amount of pleasures** is the Removal of all pain: **wherever** the Pleasing is present – **during that time** it exists, there is neither the Painful or the Distressing or Both together.

Epikouros is, in part, responding to the teachings of the Cyrenaics, who viewed the removal of pain as a state of calm to which pleasure could then be added. Epikouros is also responding to Plato who argued for the existence of mixed pleasures (μικταὶ ἡδοναί) – which Plato imagined contained an aspect of pain. However, in reality, pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive at any particular point in the body.

It is common for people to consider the elimination of pain as the onset of pleasure. In fact, the absence of pain, and the resulting state of painlessness, is precisely what constitutes pleasure. Full physical contentment is often and naturally achieved through our body's internal processes when we have the necessary provisions of food and shelter. Similarly, full mental contentment can be attained just as naturally and frequently by recognizing the ease with which physical contentment can be obtained and by cultivating gratitude for this success.

Mētródoros, quoted by Plutarch, *Non Posse* 1091 A

Τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι: τὸ Φυγεῖν τὸ κακόν – ἐνθα γὰρ τεθήσεται τάγαθόν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅταν Μηθὲν ἔτι ὑπεξίη μήτε ἀλγεινὸν μήτε λυπηρόν

This very thing is **the good**: Escaping **the bad** – because it is not possible for **the good** to be placed **anywhere**, **when** Nothing **further** painful or **distressing** is withdrawing.

ΚΔ 4. The Limit of Pain

οὐ χρονίζει τὸ Ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί – ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἠδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει, αἱ δὲ Πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωσιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἠδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκί ἥπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν

* the Painful does not last **continuously** in the **body** – but that which is **extreme** lasts **for the shortest time**, and that which **merely exceeds pleasure** in the **body** does not occur **for many days**, and the Chronic symptoms of illnesses have **the pleasing** in the **body** **exceeding over the painful**

The significance of pain in life is often overestimated. Our body's sensory areas generally experience natural pleasure when free from disturbance. While of course not mutually exclusive within the entire body – pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive at any specific point in the body. While some parts of the body may experience pain, other parts may simultaneously experience pleasure.

ΚΔ 5. Practical Virtues

οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως Ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως: ὅτω δὲ Τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐχ ἔστι Τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν

* Living **pleasantly** is not possible without living **sensibly** and **honorably** and **balanced**, nor **sensibly** and **honorably** and **balanced** without living **pleasantly**: when This is not happening **for someone**, it is not possible that **He is living pleasantly**

*The manuscripts have the second instance of **φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως** moved towards the end of the sentence. Most editors keep this as a third instance of **φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως** and also add it back to its original position in brackets.*

ΚΔ 6 Self-Defense

ἔνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων: Ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ὧν ἂν ποτε τοῦθ' Οἷός τ' ἦ παρασκευάζεσθαι

* for the sake of **security from men**: [Anything] is [able to be] **according to nature** a **good** by which **at any time** Anyone may be able to arrange for themselves **this [security]**

Any means of obtaining protection is a natural good.

ΚΔ 7. Respect & Popularity

ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί Τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι – τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι, ὥστε, εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλῆς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων Βίος: ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν – εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλῆς: οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἔνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον, ὠρέχθησαν

* Some wanted to become **respected** and **popular** – thinking to preserve for themselves **safety from men in this way**, so that, if the Life of such people is **safe**: they receive **the good of nature** – but if it is **not safe**: they do not possess [that] **for the sake of which they craved from the start**, according to what is naturally comfortable

Wealth benefits only as much as it can be used to provide natural and necessary resources. Having wealth harms mental and bodily health to the extent that gaining or having wealth causes one to be exposed to stress and dangers. Similarly, power benefits only as much as it can be used to provide security. Having power harms mental and personal health to the extent that gaining or having power causes one to be exposed to stress and dangers.

ΚΔ 8. Practical Consequences

οὐδεμία Ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν – ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν Ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς οχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν

* no Pleasure **in itself** is **bad** – but the Sources **of some pleasures** bring **many more troubles than pleasures**

ΚΔ 9. Variance of Pleasures

εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα Ἡδονὴ καὶ χρόνω καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν (ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως) – οὐκ ἂν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ Ἡδοναί

* If every Pleasure was fully condensed both in time and existed in the whole organism (or in the most important parts of its nature) – then Pleasures would never differ from one another

Another argument using negative assumptions, showing that the opposite is true. This statement is in part a response to the view of the Cyrenaics, following Aristippus of Cyrene, who thought that (1) pleasures do not differ from one another, (2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and (3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged. This incorrect understanding leads to indiscriminate in choosing pleasures.

In reality, even though pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, pleasures are variable in duration (from momentary to continuous) and location (affecting different parts of the body, including the mind) and have different qualities. Therefore, discrimination is required in choosing pleasures.

ΚΔ 10. Practical Benefits

εἰ τὰ Ποιητικά τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας – τοὺς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων – ἔτι τε τὸ πέρασ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων ἐδίδασκεν: οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἶχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν – καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν

* if the Sources of pleasures among degenerates released the fears of the mind – those about the heavens and death and pains – further if they taught the limit of desires and of pains: then we would never have had anything we would hold against them, filling themselves from all places with pleasures – and they would not have what pains or what saddens from any place, the very thing which is the bad

τὰ ποιητικά τῶν ἡδονῶν	the sources that produce pleasure
τὸ πέρασ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν	the limit of desires
τὸ πέρασ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων	the limit of pains

ΚΔ 11. The Reason for Study

εἰ μὴθὲν ἡμᾶς αἰ τῶν μετεώρων Ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν – καὶ αἰ περὶ θανάτου (μήποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἦ τι) – ἔτι τε τὸ Μὴ Κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν: οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας

* if in no way Suspicions of heavenly occurrences disturbed us – and those regarding death (although it would never be anything to us) – and Not Understanding the limits of pains and of desires: then we would not be in need of physics

ΚΔ 12. The Benefit of Study

οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον Λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἢ τοῦ σύμπαντος Φύσις – ἀλλ’ ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους: ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίουσ τὰς ἡδονὰς Ἀπολαμβάνειν

* Dispelling what causes fear about the most important issues was not possible while not understanding what the Nature of the universe is – but suspecting some of those things according to the myths: therefore, Receiving undiluted pleasures is not possible without physics

[Saint-Andre] It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural.

[Bailey] A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

ΚΔ 13. Mental Security

οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν Παρασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων – καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς – καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

* Preparing for oneself **safety** from people was **in no way beneficial** while the things above us are **feared** – and the things under the earth – and **in general, the things in the infinite**

[Bailey] There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above, and things beneath the earth, and indeed all in the boundless universe, remain matters of suspicion.

We get nothing by getting protection from others if we still fear the general operations of the universe. The things above (τὰ ἄνωθεν) and things under the earth (τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς) are all things things in our cosmos (κόσμος) that are difficult for us to closely observe and study, whereas the things in the infinite (τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ) are the things in other cosmoi (κόσμοι) and in the spaces between (οἱ κόσμοι).

ΚΔ 14. Personal Security

τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξεριστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ – εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν Ἀσφάλεια

* **although security** from other people **to some extent comes from agency, resistance, and skill** – the **most pure** is the Security that comes out of tranquility and withdrawal from the many

[Bailey] The most unalloyed source of protection from men, which is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life, and retirement from the world.

ἡ Δύναμις	Ability, agency; power
ἡ Ἐξεριστικὴ	Resistance
ἡ Εὐπορία	Ease, facility; wealth

ἡ Ἡσυχία	Tranquility, stillness, quiet; a quiet place
ἡ Ἐκχώρησις τῶν πολλῶν	Removal from the crowd, withdrawal from the public, a going away

ΚΔ 15. The Limit of Needs

ὁ τῆς φύσεως Πλοῦτος καὶ ὠρισταὶ καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν – ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει

* the Wealth of nature is **limited** and **easy to acquire** – but that of empty judgments falls ad infinitum

[Bailey] The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity.

To achieve complete and full satisfaction, our nature only requires a finite and specific set of accommodations. The needs of our bodies and minds are limited and easily attainable, but the requirements to satisfy desires not grounded in nature have no inherent limits.

Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος	The wealth of nature
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ΚΔ 16. The Limit of Chance

βραχέα σοφῷ Τύχη παρεμπίπτει: τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ Λογισμὸς διώκηκε – καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει.

* Chance falls upon the wise man briefly: for Reasoning has managed the greatest and most critical things – and for the whole time of life manages and will manage

[Bailey] In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

ΚΔ 17. Social & Personal Wellbeing

ὁ Δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος – ὁ δ' Ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γήμων

* the Equitable person is the most undisturbed – but the Inequitable is filled with the greatest disruption

ΚΔ 18. Practical Satisfaction

οὐκ ἀπαύξει ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ Ἡδονὴ ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ' ἔνδειαν Ἄλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῆ – ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται: τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρασ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἢ τε (τούτων αὐτῶν) Ἐκλόγισις καὶ (τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις) ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκευάζε τῇ διανοίᾳ

* Pleasure is not increased in the body as soon as what Hurts due to deficiency is removed – but only varies: and the mind's limit in regards to pleasure is fully produced by an Examination (of these issues and of things similar to them which used to arrange the greatest fears for the mind)

Wealth can only vary the means by which we can achieve the very same natural pleasure that a non-wealthy life achieves. It a common misconception to think that wealth and luxury increase pleasure. Wealth does not increase pleasure. The point where the amount of pleasure is at its maximum in the body is the painless state reached by removing the pains of natural and necessary needs. Attempts to increase pleasure beyond this maximum point will always fail, and will often involve the introduction of unnecessary pain and troubles.

ἢ τούτων αὐτῶν
ἐκλόγισις

the rational examination
of these things

The study of the pains arising from the limited natural needs of our body and the corresponding complete pleasures after these needs are met

ΚΔ 19. Fulfillment of Time

ὁ ἄπειρος Χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος – ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ

* infinite Time has the same pleasure as finite – if One measures its limits by reasoning

Because no pleasure is greater than the absence of bodily and mental pain, complete pleasure is attained by our natural state when not in pain. More time cannot produce a greater pleasure than this complete pleasure.

ΚΔ 20. The Experience of Time

ἡ μὲν Σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν Χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν – ἡ δὲ Διάνοια, τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσσασα: τὸν παντελεῖ βίον παρεσκεύασε, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη – ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐδ’ (ἠνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν) ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεψεν

* the Body takes the limit of pleasure as infinite, and the Time as infinite that arranges for it – but the Mind, grasping the full reasoning of the body's fulfillment and limit, and dispelling the fears about eternity: arranges for the complete life, and in no way do we still have further need of infinite time – yet it does not flee pleasure, nor (when circumstances begin to produce the departure from life) does it come to its end as though it were missing something of the best life

The complete pleasure of being pain free has been frequently achieved throughout our lives, and having a longer life does not allow us to increase the complete pleasure that we have already experienced. Understanding this, we are pleased to continue living our full and complete life. But because our life is full and complete, we understand that continuing to live cannot improve our lives.

ΚΔ 21. Competition

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου Κατειδῶς οἶδεν ὡς: εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν Ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελεῖ Καθιστάν – ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων

* the Observer of the limits of life knows: what Removes pain due to need and Makes [our] whole life complete is easy to get – so that he has no further need of things that produce conflicts

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου Κατειδῶς	He who knows life's limits well
τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἐνδειαν Ἐξαιροῦν	What removes pain due to need

As long as we are not in an environment hostile to human life, we do not need to engage in competitive struggles against other men in order gain all our natural needs.

ΚΔ 22. Managing Evidence

τὸ ὑφεισθηκὸς δεῖ τέλος Ἐπιλογίζεσθαι – καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν (ἐφ’ ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν) – εἰ δὲ μὴ, Πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστὰ

* Reasoning fully about the fundamental goal is necessary – and about all evidence (to which we refer the things that judged) – otherwise, Everything will be full of bad judgment and disruption

τὸ ὑφεισθηκὸς τέλος Ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	To rationally consider the fundamental goal
πᾶσα ἡ Ἐνάργεια (ἐφ’ ἣν τὰ Δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν)	All that is clear (to which we refer the things that are believed)

Epikouros transitions from ethics to epistemology in this κύρια δόξα. Unless our conclusions (τὰ δοξαζόμενα) are tested in reference to external sensations (αἰσθήσεις) and internal sensations (τὰ πάθη) we will go about our lives with added opinions (προσδοξαζόμενα) that do not correspond to reality.

ΚΔ 23. Doubting All Sensations

εἰ Μαχῆ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: οὐχ’ ἔξεις οὐδ’ (ἅς ἂν Φῆς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι) πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀγωγὴν Κρίνης

* if You contend **against all sensations**: You will have **nothing** (which You could say **fully disprove themselves**) while bringing up **a reference to something** You could judge xxx

* if You contend **against all sensations**: You will have **nothing** which You could judge while bringing up **a reference to something** (which you could say **fully disprove themselves**)

[Saint-Andre] If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you declare to be false.

[Bailey] If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.

To address the extreme position of some skeptics that all sensations are untrustworthy, Epikouros argues that if one rejects all sensations, there is no other standard of judgment to rely on. He contends that any skeptic who claims to use logic as a standard for judgment fails to recognize that the relationship between their logic and reality is inherently based on their own observations.

ΚΔ 24. Judging Sensations

εἰ τιν' Ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἴσθησιν (καὶ μὴ Διαιρήσεις^[A] τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ^[B] τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ^[1] τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ^[2] τὰ πάθη καὶ^[3] πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας) συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῆ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν' Ἐκβαλεῖς

* if You will **simply reject any one sensation** (and You will not separate^[A] a **theory** about what is still pending versus^[B] **what is actually present** according to^[1] **sensation**,^[2] **feelings**, and the^[3] **whole visual focus of the mind**) then you will also disturb **the remaining sensations** with empty thought, so that You will throw out **all the criteria**

εἰ δὲ Βεβαιώσεις καὶ^[A] τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ^[B] τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν: οὐκ ἔκλειψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον – ὡς τετηρηκῶς Ἔση πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς

also, if You accept^[A] **all that which is still pending** in concepts to be judged along with^[B] **that which is not [still pending] full confirmation**: You will not avoid **error** – since You will have guarded **all doubt** regarding all separation of what is true or not true

[Bailey] If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

τὸ Δοξαζόμενον κατὰ	that which is theoretical in regards to, a speculation regarding
τὸ Προσμένον	that which is still pending [confirmation], what what awaits [a proof]
τὸ Προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς Ἐννοίαις	all that which is still pending in theoretical concepts

τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ:	what is actually present according to:
ἡ αἴσθησις	sensation
αἱ αἰσθήσεις	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τὸ πάθος	experience
τὰ πάθη	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>experiencing</i>

ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[our] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ throwing upon
ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας	our mental attention	
πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας	our whole visual attention of the mind	
τὸ μὴ προσμένον ἅπαν τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν	all that which is not still pending full confirmation	

ἡ πᾶσα φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας	our complete visual attention of the mind
<p><i>Because all thought is based upon images, the use of 'graphic' (φανταστική) here is only further explaining the process of mental focus; the whole phrase is therefore equivalent to 'the focus of the mind' (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας) alone, which Lucretius translates (2.740) as 'a casting of mental energy' or 'a throwing out of the attention' (animī iniectus). The paraphrases animī iniectus and ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας therefore are equivalent to our modern use of 'attention.'</i></p>	

We need to distinguish between sensations and ideas. If you do not distinguish between your ideas and your sensations and you reject even one sensation as false, you are rejecting the criteria you have to understand the world because you are confusing your senses with your ideas. Sensations are true per se, but ideas are only true if they accurately reflect our repeated sensations. If we accept any idea as true per se, without demanding any evidence, we have undermined our sensations which are the only foundation we have to accurately understand our environment.

The fact that the tower appears to have rounded edges when viewed from various distances is accurately demonstrated by the senses. The sensation of a round tower is a real sensation. However, after seeing the tower more closely and from other angles, the issue of its shape changes from what is pending confirmation (τὸ προσμένον τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν) to what is not pending confirmation (τὸ μὴ προσμένον τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν).

ΚΔ 25. Remember the Goal

εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν Ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως – ἀλλὰ Προκαταστρέψεις (εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος) εἰς ἄλλο τι: οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ Πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι

* if You will not on every occasion refer each of the things you are doing to the goal of your nature – but instead You stop short (when choosing an avoidance or pursuit) at something else: [your] Actions will not be consistent with your understanding

[Bailey] If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.

If you stop short and turn to some other goal (τέλος) before considering the goal of nature (τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως). In such a case, the natural goal of bodily comfort and mental calmness is forgotten and is replaced by some other goal that is either natural but not necessary (φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι) or neither natural or necessary (οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖαι).

ΚΔ 26. Unnecessary Desires

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν Ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ' ἀλοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρῶσιν: οὐκ εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλ' εὐδιάχουτον τὴν ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν (ὅταν δυσπορίστων ἢ βλάβης ἀπεργαστικαὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι)

* However many of the desires that do not lead back to pain if they are not fulfilled: they do not exist as **necessary**, instead they have a **craving** that is **easy to dismiss** (whenever they will be judged to be **unattainable** or **cause harm**)

[Bailey] Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

ΚΔ 27. Benefit of Friendship

ὧν ἡ Σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας Κτήσις

* of the things that **Wisdom** arranges for the satisfaction of one's whole life, **by far the greatest** is the Possession of friendship

[Bailey] Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.

ἡ Μακαριότης	contentedness, the state of not needing anything, bliss, happiness; independence
ἡ τῆς φιλίας Κτήσις	the possession of friendship

ΚΔ 28. Security of Friendship

ἡ αὐτὴ Γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὠρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμένην

* the same Understanding that made [us] **confident** regarding nothing terrible being **eternal** or even **long-lasting**, also sees that **security** regarding those same limited things is **mostly attained by friendships**

[Bailey] The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts for ever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life.

[White] The same insight that made us confident that nothing terrible is either everlasting or long-lasting also noticed security within these boundaries resulting especially in friendship.

Our spirit does not survive death and while alive we only require nature's finite list of necessary desires. The ability to maintain access to what satisfies this finite list is more secure while maintaining positive social relationships.

ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὠρισμένοις "those limited things themselves"—referring to what is terrible (**τὸ δεινὸν**) which is limited by being neither eternal (**αἰώνιον**) nor even long-lasting (**πολυχρόνιον**) and therefore meaning "in the midst of life's limited evils." In contrast, Cicero understood it as a reference to life in general (which is limited by death).

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 1.68

"eadem" inquit "Scientia confirmavit **animum ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum**, quae perspexit **in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum.**"

"it is the same Knowledge" [Epikouros] says "that strengthened **the mind so that it did not fear eternal or prolonged evil**, which understood that within this very span of life, the support of friendship is the strongest."

ΚΔ 29. Desire Classification

τῶν Ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι – αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι – αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.

* of the Desires, some are **natural and necessary** – some are **natural and not necessary** – and some are **neither natural nor necessary** but created from empty judgement

[Saint-Andre] Among desires, some are **natural and necessary** – some are natural and unnecessary, and some are **unnatural and unnecessary**, arising instead from groundless opinion.

Φυσικαὶ καὶ Ἀναγκαῖαι	Natural and Necessary
Φυσικαὶ καὶ Οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι	Natural and Not necessary
Οὔτε φυσικαί, Οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι	Neither natural, Nor necessary

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.149

φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαῖας ἡγεῖται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἀπολυούσας (ὡς ποτὸν ἐπὶ δίψου) – φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖας δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ ὑπεξαίρουμένης δὲ τὸ ἄλγημα (ὡς πολυτελεῖ σιτία) – οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖας (ὡς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις)

Epikouros pointed out that **natural and necessary** [are] those [desires] which liberate from pain (such as **drink for thirst**) – **natural but not necessary** [are] those which merely diversify pleasure without removing pain (such as **very expensive foods**) – but **neither natural nor necessary** (such as **crowns** and the **dedication of statues**)

ΚΔ 30. Natural & Unnecessary Desires

ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν μὴ ἐπ' ἄλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν ὑπάρχει ἡ Σπουδὴ σύντονος – παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὐταὶ γίνονται – καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν

* when intense Pursuit arises in those **natural desires** not leading back to **pain if not fulfilled** – these [desires] arise from empty judgement – and not because of their own nature do they fail to be dispelled, but because of man's empty judgment

[Saint-Andre] Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind.

[Bailey] Wherever, in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination; and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man.

Οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν "not due to their own nature" – when we develop intense desires for that which is unnecessary (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι) and also not easy to get (οὐκ εὐπόριστος), we have a problem that arises completely from our thoughts and not from any actual need.

In ΚΔ 26, Epikouros pointed out that all desires that do not bring pain when unfulfilled, are unnecessary, and in ΚΔ 29, he distinguished between desires that are natural and unnecessary (φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι) versus those that are neither natural nor necessary (οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖαι). Now he reminds us that it is foolish to pursue even natural desires if they are unnecessary and also difficult to attain.

**ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
Κενοδοξία**

The groundless-notions of man

ΚΔ 31. Natural Justice

τὸ τῆς φύσεως Δικαίον ἐστὶ σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι

* the Justice of nature is a mutual agreement of mutual benefit in not harming each other or being harmed

[Bailey] The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

ΚΔ 32. Nonaggression Agreements

ὅσα τῶν Ζῶων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι: πρὸς ταῦτα, οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι

* all of the Beings not able to compose agreements regarding not harming each other and not being harmed: for them, in no way [is anything able] to be just or unjust – in this same situation also are all of those Races who were not able or did not want to form agreements regarding not harming and not being harmed

[Saint-Andre] With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.

[Bailey] For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, or unwilling, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

Justice does not exist among animals because they make no mutual agreements. Similarly, justice does not exist among humans who do not establish agreements regarding their interactions. Justice does not exist between tribes that do not maintain a mutual agreement to not harm or be harmed.

ΚΔ 33. Practical Justice

οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ Δικαιοσύνη – ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ' ὀηλικούς: δήποτε αἰεὶ τόπους Συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι

* Justice does not exist as anything by itself – but instead in the associations with each other: in whatever place there is ever continually some Agreement regarding not harming and not being harmed

[Saint-Andre] Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place.

[Bailey] Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.

Justice does not exist per se and is not metaphysical or universal. Rather, it exists only among those who are both able and willing to establish and uphold agreements that serve mutual interests.

ΚΔ 34. Practical Injustice

ἡ Ἄδικία οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν – ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ εἰ μὴ Λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς.

* Injustice is not by itself bad – but in the fear from anxiety that One will not evade those appointed as punishers regarding such things

Injustice is not inherently bad; but it is bad due to the fear and anxiety of being caught and punished by those appointed to enforce justice. The true harm of injustice lies in the constant worry about facing retribution.

οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρη τι ποιοῦντα (ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι) πιστεύειν ὅτι Λήσει – κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος Λαθάνη – μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἀδηλον εἰ καὶ Λήσει

* It is not possible that he who secretly does something (among those things agreed with each other for not harming and not being harmed) to believe that He will evade [notice] – even if He evades thousands of times up to now – for until his death it is unclear if He will evade notice

[Saint-Andre] It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.

[Bailey] It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

It is impossible for someone who secretly breaks an agreement not to harm or be harmed to be confident they will avoid detection. Even if they have escaped detection many times, they can never be sure they will not be caught.

This state of anxiety persists until death, so the moral and psychological consequences of breaking such a compact are significant.

The underlying message is that the fear of potential exposure serves as a deterrent to engaging in harmful actions, underscoring the importance of trust and accountability in social agreements.

ΚΔ 36. General Uniformity of Justice

κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν, πᾶσι τὸ Δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό: συμφέρον γάρ Τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ – κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δήποτε αἰτίων – οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ Δίκαιον εἶναι

* in a general sense, Justice is the same for everyone: because Something is mutually beneficial in the association with each other – but due to the peculiarity of a region or of whatsoever reasons – Justice happens not to be the same thing for all

[Bailey] In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

Justice, in general, is the same for everyone because it is based on what is mutually beneficial in our interactions. However, due to specific regional characteristics and various other reasons, what is considered just may differ from one place to another.

Consequently, while the general principle of justice aims for mutual benefit and fairness – the actual application of justice varies – in order to accommodate the unique circumstances and needs of different communities.

ΚΔ 37. Pragmatic Justice

τὸ μὲν Ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει (ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων) ἔχει τοῦ δικαίου χαρακτήρα – ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό

* what is Confirmed to be mutually beneficial (among those things considered to be just for the requirements of mutual interaction) has the character of justice – whether it is the same for all or not the same

[Bailey] Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not.

ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνει δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας: οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει

then if Someone establishes a law, but it does not result in a mutual benefit of interaction with each other: it no longer has the nature of justice

But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice.

κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον Συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἑναρμόττει: οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοῦς συνταράττουσιν – ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν

if the mutual Benefit in regards to justice declines, yet for some time conforms within the general impression: nevertheless for that time it was just to those not confusing themselves with empty words – but aware of the circumstances

And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἑναρμόττειν	to conform within the general impression, to fit into the mental image
εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἀρμόττειν	to conform with the general impression, to fit to the mental image

Laws are just when they are beneficial and they are unjust when they are not beneficial. The same law may be beneficial and just in one place and time, yet not beneficial in another place and time. No ordinance or decree makes a law just, but only the fact that it results in a practical benefit.

If a law or action brings mutual benefit, it is just, regardless of uniformity – if it does not bring mutual benefit, it loses its justice. Even if mutual benefit changes over time, as long as it aligns with the general understanding of justice for that period, it remains just to those who focus on practical outcomes.

ΚΔ 38. Contextual Justice

ἔνθα, μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περισσῶτων πραγμάτων, ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἀρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων: οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια

* whenever, without surrounding things becoming new, those [laws] considered just in the actions themselves are shown not to fit with the general impression: it is not possible that they are just

ἔνθα δέ, καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων – οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα – ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια (ὅτε σενέφερον εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων), ὕστερον δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια (ὅτε μὴ συνέφερον)

but whenever, with things becoming new – when the same [laws] established as just were no longer be mutually beneficial – in that case then they were just (when it was mutually beneficial for the interaction of fellow-citizens with each other), while afterwards it is not possible that they were still just (when it was not mutually beneficial)

[Bailey] Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

μη ἀρμόπτοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν	not corresponding with the general idea, not fitting with the basic grasp
ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων	in the actions themselves, in actual practice, in reality

If circumstances have not changed and actions once thought just no longer fit the basic idea of justice – they are not truly just. If nothing changes and actions no longer seem fair they are not fair.

When circumstances do change – actions that were once beneficial and just can become unjust if they no longer provide mutual benefit. When things change, actions that were once fair can become unfair if they stop helping people.

ΚΔ 39. Relationship Management

Ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος: Οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο – τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ, οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά – γε ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμεικτος ἐγένετο (καὶ ἐξηρείσατο ὅσα τοῦτ’ ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν)

* He who best manages the lack of confidence regarding the outside world: is He who fully arranges what he can as familiar – but what he cannot, not as foreign – and [for] however many he was not even able to do this, he makes himself estranged (and expels however many it was beneficial to accomplish this)

[Saint-Andre] The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that is not advantageous.

[Bailey] The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.

τὰ Ὅμοφυλα	things that are similar to us, elements that align with our nature
οἱ Ὅμοφύλοι	people like ourselves, our friends with whom we interact for mutual benefit
οἱ Οὐκ ἀλλόφυλοι	things that are not alien, elements we engage with for our own benefit
οἱ Οὐκ ἀλλόφύλοι	people who are not alien, the general public with whom we interact for our own benefit
τὰ Ἀνεπίμεικτα	things that are estranged, elements that may cause harm and with which we refuse to engage
οἱ Ἀνεπίμεικτοι	people who are estranged, people who may cause us harm and with whom we refuse to interact

He who best handles uncertainty in the outside world is he who strives to make as much of his environment familiar and manageable as possible. For aspects that cannot be controlled, he does not see them as entirely foreign or threatening but accepts them. When there are elements or individuals that he cannot manage at all, he distances himself from them and removes those that are beneficial to expel. This approach helps him maintain a sense of control and security by maximizing familiarity and minimizing the impact of unmanageable external threats.

ΚΔ 40. The Complete Life

Ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορρούντων παρασκευάσασθαι (οὕτω καὶ ἐβίωσαν μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἡδιστα) τὸ βεβαιοτάτον πίστωμα ἔχοντες – καὶ πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες – οὐκ ὠδύραντο, ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον, τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφήν

* all Those possessing the power of arranging the greatest security from those around (and so also live most pleasantly among other) have the most consistent assurance – and because they receive the fullest familiarity – they do not mourn, as though with pity, the prior demise of a deceased friend

[Saint-Andre] All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away.

[Bailey] As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.

Those who are able to create and maintain secure and pleasant relationships with others live more contentedly. They find reassurance and comfort in the familiarity and reliability of their bonds. As a result, they do not experience deep mourning or regret when a friend passes away, because the strength and joy of their relationship provide lasting fulfillment that outweighs the sorrow of loss.

Testimonials Concerning the Books of Epíkouros

Diogénēs Laértios, Lives, 10.26

Diogénēs Laértios (fl. probably around 230 AD) was the compiler of the "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" and a poet.

Γέγονε δὲ πολυγραφώτατος ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, πάντας ὑπερβαλλόμενος πλήθει βιβλίων: κύλινδροι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους εἰσὶ. γέγραπται δὲ μαρτύριον ἔξωθεν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐδέν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ εἰσὶν Ἐπικούρου φωναί. ἐζήλου δὲ αὐτὸν Χρύσιππος ἐν πολυγραφίᾳ, καθά φησι καὶ Καρνεάδης παράσιτον αὐτὸν τῶν βιβλίων ἀποκαλῶν: εἰ γὰρ τι γράψαι ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, φιλονεικεῖ τοσοῦτον γράψαι ὁ Χρύσιππος.

Epíkouros became the most prolific writer, surpassing all in the number of books; for there are indeed about three hundred scrolls. And there is no external testimony written in them, but they are the very words of Epíkouros. Chrysippus envied him in prolific writing, as Carneades also says, calling him a bookish parasite: for if Epíkouros wrote something, Chrysippus contested to write just as much.

Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πολλάκις ταῦτὰ γέγραφε καὶ τὸ ἐπελθόν, καὶ ἀδιόρθωτα εἶακε τῷ ἐπείγεσθαι: καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὡς ἐκείνων μόνων γέμειν τὰ βιβλία, καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Ζήνωνι ἔστιν εὐρεῖν καὶ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει. καὶ τὰ συγγράμματα μὲν Ἐπικούρω τοσαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα, ὧν τὰ βέλτιστά ἐστι τάδε:

And for this reason, he often wrote the same things again and left them uncorrected in his haste: and the testimonies are so numerous that the books seem to be filled with them alone, as can be found with Zénōn and Aristotle. And the writings of Epíkouros are so many and of such a kind, of which these are considered the best:

- **Περὶ Φύσεως, ΛΖ** On Nature, in thirty-seven books
- **Περὶ Ἀτόμων Καὶ Κενοῦ** On the Atoms and the Void
- **Περὶ Ἔρωτος** On Love
- **Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς** Summary of Objections to the Physicists
- **Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς** Against the Megarians
- **Διαπορίαι** Problems
- **Κύρια Δόξαι** Principal Doctrines
- **Περὶ Αἰρέσεων Καὶ Φυγῶν** On Choices and Avoidances
- **Περὶ Τέλους** On the End Goal
- **Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανῶν** On the Criterion, or The Canon
- **Χαιρέδημος** Chairédēmos

- **Περὶ Θεῶν** On the Gods
- **Περὶ Ὁσιότητος** On Holiness
- **Ἠγησιάναξ** Hēgēsíanax
- **Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα** On Lifecourses, in four books
- **Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας** On Fair Dealing
- **Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίстан** Neoklēs, Dedicated to Themísta
- **Συμπόσιον** Symposium
- **Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον** Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros
- **Περὶ τοῦ Ὁραῖν** On Vision
- **Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας** On the Angle of the Atom
- **Περὶ Ἀφῆς** On the Sensation of Touch
- **Περὶ Εἴμαρμένης** On Destiny
- **Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι Πρὸς Τιμοκράτην** On Theories about Feelings
- **Προγνωστικόν** Prognostication
- **Προτρεπτικός** Exhortation to Study Philosophy
- **Περὶ Εἰδώλων** On Films
- **Περὶ Φαντασίας** On Sensory Presentation
- **Ἀριστόβουλος** Aristóbuolos
- **Περὶ Μουσικῆς** On Music
- **Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν** On Justice and Other Virtues
- **Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος** On Gifts and Gratitude
- **Πολυμήδης** Polymédēs
- **Τιμοκράτης γ'** Timokratēs, in three books
- **Μητρόδωρος ε'** Mētródōros, in five books
- **Ἀντίδωρος β'** Antídōros, in two books
- **Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην** Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs
- **Καλλιστόλας** Kallistólas
- **Περὶ Βασιλείας** On Kingship
- **Ἄναξιμένης** Anaximénēs
- **Ἐπιστολαί** Letters

Πολλά δὲ Ζήνων, πλείω Ξενοφάνης, πλείω Δημόκριτος, πλείω Ἀριστοτέλης, πλείω Ἐπίκουρος, πλείω Χρυσίππος.

Many books were written by Zēnōn, even more by Xenophanes, even more by Democritus, even more by Aristotle, even more by Epíkouros, and even more by Chrysippus.

Diogénēs Laértios 7.181 (Chrysippus)

Καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τῇ Συναγωγῇ τῶν δογμάτων, βουλόμενος παριστάνειν ὅτι τὰ Ἐπικούρου οἰκεία δυνάμει γεγραμμένα καὶ ἀπαράθετα ὄντα μυρίω πλείω ἐστὶ τῶν Χρυσίππου βιβλίων, φησὶν οὕτως αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει "εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφέλοι τῶν Χρυσίππου βιβλίων ὅσ' ἀλλότρια παρατέθειται, κενὸς αὐτῷ ὁ χάρτης καταλείψεται."

Apollodorus of Athens, in his "Collection of Philosophical Doctrines" wanting to show that the works of Epíkouros (written by his own efforts rather than propped up with citations) were infinitely more numerous than those of Chrysippus, said in the precise terms "Indeed if one were to remove from Chrysippus' books all the citations taken from elsewhere, nothing but a blank page would remain."

Souda (epsilon 2404)

The Souda is a large encyclopedia, probably written in the 900's AD.

Συγγράμματα δ' αὐτοῦ πλεῖστα

His writings are the **most numerous**

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 1.20.19

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 AD) is known for his historical works, particularly those on Alexander the Great. He was also a devoted student of the Epictetus.

Τί δὲ καὶ λύχνον ἄπτεις (Ἐπίκουρε) καὶ πονεῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ τηλικαῦτα βιβλία γράφεις; idem

Why, Epíkouros, do you even light a lamp and labor for our sake, and write so many books?

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.9

Ἄνθρωπε, τί ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν φροντίζεις; τί δι' ἡμᾶς ἀγρυπνεῖς; τί λύχνον ἄπτεις; τί ἐπανίστασαι; τί τηλικαῦτα βιβλία συγγράφεις; μὴ τις ἡμῶν ἐξαπατηθῆ περιθεῶν ὡς ἐπιμελουμένων ἀνθρώπων ἢ μὴ τις ἄλλην οὐσίαν ὑπολάβῃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδονῆν; εἰ γὰρ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχει, βαλὼν κάθειυδε κτλ.

Dear fellow, why do you bother yourself about us? Why do you keep up a vigil on our account, for which you light a lamp? Why do you get up? Why do you write so many big books? Is it to keep one or another of us from being tricked into believing that the gods care for men, or is it to keep one or another of us from supposing that the nature of good is other than pleasure? If this is indeed so, then back to your bed and go to sleep!

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 46.1

Lucius Seneca the Younger (fl. 35 AD) was a Roman statesman, Stoic philosopher, playwright, and advisor to Emperor Nero. He quotes Epíkouros frequently in his "Moral Letters to Lucilius."

Librum tuum quem mihi promiseras accepi qui quam disertus fuerit, ex hoc intellegas licet: leuis mihi uisus est, cum esset nec mei nec tui corporis sed qui primo aspectu aut Titi Liui aut Epicuri posset uideri. tanta autem dulcedine me tenuit et traxit ut illum sine ulla dilatione perlegerim.

I received your book that you had promised me... how well I find it written, you can know this much: it strikes me as light and elegant, though bulkier than we are accustomed to, so that at first glance it seems to resemble Livy or Epíkouros. However, it caught and charmed me so much that I read it from beginning to end in one sitting.

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? 3.1129A

Lucius Plutarchus (fl. 85 AD) was a Greek historian, Platonist philosopher, and biographer known for his work "Parallel Lives." He lived in Chaeronea (Boeotia), where he was also involved in local political and priestly duties.

Μηδὲ διάπεμπε βίβλους πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν σοφίαν... τί δὲ αἰτοσάται μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον, ἐπὶ Ἀριστόβουλον, ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον γραφόμεναι καὶ συνταπτόμεναι φιλοπόνως; ἵνα μηδ' ἀποθανόντες λάθωσιν; (ἢ) ἴν' ἀμνησίαν νομοθετῆς ἀρετῆ καὶ ἀπραξίαν τέχνη καὶ σιωπὴν φιλοσοφία καὶ λήθην εὐπραγία;

(Rhetorically addressing Epíkouros) Don't send books everywhere to advertise your wisdom to every man and woman... What sense is there in so many tens of thousands of lines honoring Mētródōros, Aristóboulos, and Chairédēmos, and published with so much industry that they cannot remain unknown even after they're dead? Who are you to call for the obliteration of virtue, the uselessness of skills, silence to philosophy, and forgetfulness of good deeds?

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.3,8

Marcus Cicero (fl. 65 BC) was a Roman statesman who often mentions Epíkouros.

Platonem reliquosque Socraticos et deinceps eos qui ab his profecti sunt legunt omnes, etiam qui illa aut non adprobant aut non studiosissime consecantur, Epicurum autem et Metrodorum non fere praeter suos quisquam in manus sumit.

Everyone reads **Plato** and **the rest of the Socratic school** even those who do not accept their teaching or are not enthusiastic disciples, and after them their followers, while scarcely anyone beyond their own adherents takes up the works of Epíkouros and Mētródōros.

On the Language & Style of Epíkouros

Diogénēs Laértios 10.13

Κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρία κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἦν ὅτι ιδιωτάτη ἐστίν, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς αἰτιᾶται. σαφῆς δ' ἦν οὕτως, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν.

He uses plain language in his works throughout, which is unusual, and Aristophanes, the grammarian, reproaches him for it. He was so intent on clarity that even in his treatise On Rhetoric, he didn't bother demanding anything else but clarity.

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.5.14

(Torquatus ad M. Ciceronem) sed existimo te sicut nostrum Triarium minus ab eo (Epicuro) delectari, quod ista Platonis Aristoteli Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud quidem adduci uix possum, ut ea quae senserit ille tibi non uera uideantur. Vide quantum, inquam, fallare, Torquate. oratio me istius philosophi non offendit: nam et complectitur uerbis quod uolt et dicit plane quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner; si non habeat, non admodum flagitem. re mihi non aequae satis facit, et quidem locis pluribus.

(Torquatus to Cicero) "I think that you, like our friend Triarius, are displeased

with Epíkouros because he neglected the rhetorical embellishments of Plato, Aristotle, and Theóphrastos. I find it hard indeed to figure out why you think his opinions untrue." (Cicero to Torquatus): "You will see, Torquatus" said I, "how mistaken you are. I am not annoyed by this philosopher's style. He is straightforward, expressing simple and plain concepts in a way that is easy to understand; though I do not despise eloquence in a philosopher either – but if he doesn't have it, I do not insist on it. It's in the contents where he does not satisfy me, and in many places."

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 2.9.1

Aulus Gellius (fl. 165 AD) was a Roman politician and the compiler of the "Attic Nights" which has many quotes from lost works.

Quod idem Plutarchus evidenti calumnia verbum ab Epicuro dictum insectatus sit: In eodem libro idem Plutarchus eundem Epicurum reprehendit, quod verbo usus sit parum proprio et alienae significationis. Ita enim scripsit Epíkouros 'Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις.' Non inquit 'παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος' sed 'παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ' dicere oportuit – detractio enim significandi est doloris, non, inquit, dolentis. Nimis minute ac prope etiam subfrigide Plutarchus in Epicuro accusando λεξιθηρεῖ – has enim curas vocum verborumque elegantias non modo non sectatur Epíkouros, sed etiam insectatur.

How the same Plutarch, with obvious captiousness, criticized the use of a word by Epíkouros: In the same book [of Homer], Plutarch also finds fault a second time with Epíkouros for using an inappropriate word and giving it an incorrect meaning. Now Epíkouros wrote as follows: "The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of everything that pains." [Plutarch] declares that [Epíkouros] ought not to have said "of everything that pains (ἀλγοῦντος)" but "of everything that is painful (ἀλγεινοῦ)" – for it is the removal of pain (*doloris*), he explains, that should be indicated, not of that which causes pain (*dolentis*). Plutarch, in his accusation against Epíkouros, is overly meticulous and rather cold, practicing text-hunting (λεξιθηρεῖ) – for these concerns of eloquence in words and phrases Epíkouros not only does not seek out (*sectatur*) but actually attacks (*insectatur*).

ἢ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις	detractio dolentis	<i>centers on the individual who is experiencing pain</i>
ἢ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὑπεξαίρεσις	detractio doloris	<i>centers on the experience of pain itself (Plutarch prefers this)</i>

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.4.12

Itaque hoc frequenter dici solet a uobis non intellegere nos quam dicat Epíkouros uoluptatem...

You Epicureans frequently say to us that we do not correctly understand what pleasure might be which Epíkouros refers to...

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.5.15

Et tamen uide ne si ego non intellegam quid Epíkouros loquatur... sit aliqua culpa eius qui ita loquatur ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias ut Heraclitus... aut cum rerum obscuritas, non uerborum facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in *Timæo* Platonis. Epíkouros autem, ut opinor, nec non uolt, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici – sed **de illustri et facili et iam in uolgiu peruagata loquitur.**

Nevertheless, supposing that I don't understand Epíkouros' intended meaning... then he himself might possibly be at fault, for speaking in such a way that defies understanding. Obscurity may be excused for two reasons: it might be intentional, like with Heraclitus... or it may reflect the difficulty of the material, rather than the rhetoric, as, for example, in Plato's *Timaeus*. But Epíkouros, as far as I can tell, neither refuses to speak in a simple and explicit manner whenever he can, nor does he speak here about an obscure subject, such as physics, or an artificial and technical subject, like mathematics – but he speaks of something evident, easy, and already widespread among the commoners.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.(31).85

In hac ita exposita sententia, sunt qui existiment quod ille incitia plane loquendi fecerat – fecisse consulto: de homine, minime uafro, male existimant.

(Cotta speaking about Epíkouros' first Principal Doctrine) In this statement presented, there are those who believe that what he wrote from ignorance in clearly speaking – he said deliberately: They regard the man, who is not at all clever, unfavorably.

Now there are people who think that the wording of this maxim was intentional: though really it was due to the author's inability to express himself clearly: their suspicion does an injustice to the most guileless of mankind.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.6.18

Dum dialecticam contemnit Epíkouros: quae una continet omnem et perspicendi, quid in quaque re sit, scientiam et iudicandi, quale sit quidque, et ratione ac uia disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem uidetur, nec ea quae docere uolt ulla arte distinguit.

Epíkouros, by despising the dialectic: which encompasses the whole science of discovering the nature of things, judging their qualities, and how to do it with methodic rationality, stumbles, I say. He fails to even half-way distinguish what he desires to convey.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.9.27

Contemnit enim disserendi elegantiam, confuse loquitur.

For he despises the elegance of discourse, he speaks in disorder.

Cicero, On Divination, 2.50.18

Epicurum, quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici

Epíkouros, whom the Stoics usually describe as stupid and crude.

Aelius Theon, Preliminary Exercises, 2.168,169

Aelius Theon (fl. probably around 75 AD) wrote "Preliminary Exercises" (Progymnasmata), a training manual for orators.

Ἐπιμελητέον δὲ καὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων, πάντα διδάσκοντα ἐξ ὧν διαφεύζονται τὸ κακῶς συντιθέναι, καὶ μάλιστα δὲ τὴν ἔμμετρον καὶ ἔνρυθμον λέξιν, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Ἠγησίου τοῦ ῥήτορος, καὶ τῶν Ἀσιανῶν καλουμένων ῥητόρων, καὶ τινὰ τῶν Ἐπικούρου, οἷά που καὶ πρὸς Ἰδομενέα γράφει 'ὧ πάντα τάμὰ κινήματα τερπνὰ νομίσας ἐκ νέου' καὶ τῶν περιφερομένων δ' ὡς ἐκείνου (ἡμεῖς δ' οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν αὐτὰ εὐρίσκομεν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν αὐτοῦ) 'λέγε δὴ μοι Πολύαινε συναπέριμεν μεγάλην χαρὰ γένηται.' τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἐπίμεμπα καὶ πρόδηλον ἔχει τὴν κακίαν τῆς συνθέσεως, συγγνώμης δ' ἄξιον, ὅταν εἰς ἐκεῖνά τις ἐμπέσῃ ποτὲ τὰ μέτρα, ἅπερ ἔχει ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ πεζόν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἱαμβικόν·

Attention must also be given to the composition of words, teaching everything from which one will escape **bad construction**, and especially the metrical and rhythmic expression, as is mostly the case with the works of Hegesias the rhetorician, and those called Asian rhetoricians, and some of Epíkouros, such as he writes to Idomeneús "O you, who perceived all my doings delightful from youth" and of those circulating as his (we have not yet even now found these in his writings) "tell me, Polýainos, if great joy would result from waiting together." Such things therefore **must be completely condemned**, and **evidently possess the badness of composition**, yet are pardonable when one occasionally falls into those measures which have a similarity to prose, such as the iambic.

Writers preferring the older Attic style (which they viewed as more concise and pure) often labeled other writers using a later style as being too ornate, elaborate, effeminate and Eastern (the East was generally associated with wealth and easy living). Note that Theon admits he does not have a citation for what he quotes.

Athēnaïos, The Learned Banqueters, 5.187C

Athēnaïos of Naucratis (fl. around 190 AD), wrote *Deipnosophistai* "The Dinner Experts" or "The Learned Banqueters" a long comedic dialogue filled with many literary references.

Πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ ζητεῖ περὶ δυσπεψίας ὥστ' οἰωνίσασθαι, εἴθ' ἐξῆς περὶ πυρετῶν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρέχουσιν τῇ λέξει ἀρρυθμίαν τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;

Epíkouros poses questions in his Symposium about indigestion as a means of obtaining omens, and then immediately after this discusses fevers. Why should I even mention **the rhythmlessness** that permeates his style?

Cleomedes, Lectures on Astronomy, 2.1

Cleomedes (fl. perhaps around 200 AD) was a Stoic philosopher and astronomer who wrote *Kyklikē Theōria Meteōrōn* "The Cyclical Theory of Meteors," which is also known as "Lectures on Astronomy" or "The Heavens."

Οὕτω καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὡς δὴ τις ὦν ἀλαζονεύεται, ἑαυτὸν γε ἐν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καταριθμεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν – καὶ οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φέρεσθαι διαβεβαιούμενος καὶ ταύτη γε καὶ τοῦ Θερσίτου θρασύτερον ἑαυτὸν ἀποφαίνων. Ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ μόνον ὡς ἀριστεύς καὶ ἴσος τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἀλαζονεύεται, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα ἀπονέμει ἑαυτῷ, οὗτος δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῆς τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης μόνος ἀνευρηκέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν διαβεβαιοῦται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φέρεσθαι ἀξιῶ.

So Epíkouros boasts as if he were someone significant, trying to count himself among the philosophers – and not only that, but he insists on taking the lead, showing himself to be even bolder than Thersites. For the latter boasted only of being the best and equal to kings, not claiming the foremost place for himself, but this man, under the pretense of great wisdom and knowledge, asserts that he alone has discovered the truth and therefore deserves the leading position.

Ὅστε πολὺ ἂν τις δικαιότερόν μοι ἐδόκει πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν "Θερσίτ' ἀκριτόμυθε, λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής," Ἰσχεο!" (Homer, Iliad 2.246-247) Οὐδὲ γὰρ "λιγὺν" ἔγωγε τοῦτον ἂν τὸν Θερσίτην (*Epicurum*) καθάπερ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐκεῖνον, εἴποιμι. ἐπεὶ γε πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν αὐτῷ διεφθορότα ἐστί, σαρκὸς εὐσταθῆ καταστήματα λέγοντι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτης πιστὰ ἐλπίσματα, καὶ λίπασμα ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ δάκρυον ὀνομάζοντι καὶ ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα καὶ γαργαλισμούς σώματος καὶ ληκῆματα καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας κακὰς ἄτας. ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐκ χαμαιτυπείων ἂν τις εἶναι φήσειε, τὰ δὲ ὅμοια τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐν τοῖς Δημητρίοις ὑπὸ τῶν **θεςμοφοριαζουσῶν γυναικῶν, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέσης τῆς προσευχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐπ' αὐταῖς προσαιτούντων Ἰουδαϊκὰ τινὰ καὶ παρακεχαραγμένα καὶ κατὰ πολὺ τῶν ἑρπετῶν ταπεινότερα.**

That is why I would believe it to be quite wrong for someone to say to *him*: "Babbling Thersites, clear orator though you are, be silent!" For I would not also call *this Thersites (Epikouros)* "clear" as Odysseus does the Homeric one, when on top of everything else his mode of expression is also elaborately corrupt. He speaks of "tranquil conditions of flesh" and "the confident expectations regarding it" and describes a tear as a "glistening of the eyes" and speaks of "sacred ululations" and "titillations of the body" and "debaucheries" and other such dreadful horrors. Some of these expressions might be said to be from the brothels, others similar to the things being said at the Demetria **by the Thesmophoria-observing women**, still others, from the middle of the prayers and from those begging in them, are both distinctly something Jewish and much lower than the reptiles.

All the criticized phrases include a "-ματα" superlative (and a "-ματος") whose usage rose in later Greek. This feature that is present in the quotes might be, in part, what Cleomedes critiques.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 1.1-5

Sextus Empiricus, (fl. probably around 170 AD), was a Pyrrhonist philosopher, who accordingly wrote about many other philosophers with skepticism.

Τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀντίρρησιν κοινότερον μὲν διατεθεῖσθαι δοκοῦσιν οἷ τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πύρρωνος – οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δέ διαθέσεως: ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ὡς τῶν μαθημάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν – ἢ, ὡς τινες εἰκάζουσι, τοῦτο προκάλυμμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀταιδευσίας εἶναι νομίζοντες (ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθῆς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καθαρεύων). τάχα δέ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν πολυμαθεῖς γεγονότας· οὐκ ἀπέοικε δέ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ναυσιφάνην τὸν Πύρρωνος ἀκουστὴν ἔχθραν· πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν νέων συνείχε καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως ἐπεμελεῖτο, μάλιστα δέ ῥητορικῆς·

The case against the Mathematici (or Professors of Arts and Sciences) has been set forth in a general way, it would seem, both by Epikouros and by the School of Pyrrho – although the standpoints they adopt are different. **Those around Epikouros** [think] that the subjects taught are of no help in perfecting wisdom – or, as some conjecture, they thought this merely as pretext for their own ignorance (for in many matters Epikouros stands convicted of ignorance, and even in ordinary converse his speech was not correct). Another reason may have been his hostility towards Plato and Aristotle and their like who were men of wide learning. It is not unlikely, too, that he was moved by his enmity against Nausiphánēs, the disciple of Pyrrho, who kept his hold on many of the young men and devoted himself earnestly to the Arts and Sciences, especially Rhetoric.

[Sextus Empiricus] **Γενόμενος οὖν τούτου μαθητῆς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδίδακτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυῆς φιλόσοφος ἠρνεῖτο ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, τὴν τε περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐξαλείφειν ἔσπευδε, πολὺς τε ἐγένετο τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος, ἐν οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐσεμνύετο. φησὶ γοῦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ 'οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε τοὺς Βαρυστόνους καὶ μαθητὴν με δόξειν τοῦ Πλεύμονος εἶναι, μετὰ μαιρακίων τινῶν κραιπαλώντων ἀκούσαντα ' νῦν πλεύμονα καλῶν τὸν Ναυσιφάνην ὡς ἀναίσθητον· καὶ πάλιν προβάς πολλά τε κατειπῶν τάνδρὸς ὑπεμφαίνει τὴν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν αὐτοῦ προκοπὴν λέγων 'καὶ γὰρ πονηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἦν καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκῶς τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ δυνατόν εἰς σοφίαν ἐλθεῖν,' αἰνισσόμενος τὰ μαθήματα. πλὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος, ὡς ἂν τις εἰκοβολῶν εἴποι, ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν πολεμεῖν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἤξιον**

Επίκουρος, then, though he had been one of this man's disciples, did his best to deny the fact in order that he might be thought to be a self-taught and original philosopher, and tried hard to blot out the reputation of Nausiphánēs, and became a violent opponent of the Arts and Sciences wherein Nausiphánēs prided himself. Thus, in his Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilenê, Επίκουρος says, "I quite suppose that 'the bellowers' will fancy that I am even a disciple of 'the Oyster' having sat under him in the company of some intoxicated young men" where he calls Nausiphánēs a "Stockfish" as being without sense. And again, after proceeding further and abusing the man at length, he hints at his proficiency in Arts and Sciences when he says "In fact he was a sorry fellow and exercised himself on matters which cannot possibly lead to wisdom" alluding thereby to Arts and Sciences. Such, in fact, as we may conjecture were the sort of motives which Επίκουρος decided to make war on the Arts and Science.

"I suspect the loudmouths might think I've been a student of the Oyster, simply because I was around him along with some drunken youths."

ὁ βαρύστονος	the deep-voiced one	ΒΑΡΥΣΤΟΝΟΣ <i>heavy tone</i>
ὁ πλευμῶν	lungs	ΠΛΕΥΜΩΝ <i>sides</i>
τὸ μαιράκιον	lad	ΜΕΙΡΑΚΙΟΝ <i>little young man</i>
κραιπαλῶν (ῶσα)	drunk	ΚΡΑΙΠΑΛΩΝ <i>achieve struggle</i>

Plato, Philebus 21c

(Σωκράτης) καὶ μὴν, ὡσαύτως, μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δήπου μὴδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνήσθαι – τῆς τ' ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μὴδ' ἦντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν! **δόξαν** δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον **ἀληθῆ** μὴ δοξάζειν χαιρῖν χαιρόντα. λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μὴδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαιρήσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι – ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλὰ τινος πλευμόνος ἢ τῶν ὄσα θαλάττια μετ' ὄστρεῖνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων.

(Socrates) And surely, in the same way, not possessing memory, you could not even recall that at some point you were glad – with no **memory** whatever of pleasure occurring in the moment remaining! If you did not have a **true opinion** you could not think you were in enjoyment while in enjoyment. If you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future – your life would not be that of a man, but of some mollusk or some other shell-fish like the oyster.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2.17.46

Hic quam volet Επίκουρος iocetur, homo non aptissimus ad iocandum – minimeque resipiens patriam.

(Balbus) Επίκουρος may make a joke of this if he likes, although humor was never his strong point – an Athenian without the "Attic salt!"

Here Επίκουρος may joke as much as he likes, a man not very apt at jesting – and seeming least like a Greek.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.44.123

(Cotta) **At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate? Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. quae enim potest esse sanctitas si dii humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans?**

(Cotta) There is even a book by Επίκουρος On Holiness? We are played by a man not so much witty as free with the license to write. How can holiness exist if the gods do not care for humans? What is a living nature that cares about nothing?

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On the Composition of Words, 24.188

Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χορόν, οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει τούτων, παραιτούμεθα. τὸ γὰρ ἐπίπονον τοῦ γράφειν ὄντως ὡς αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος λέγει τῶν μὴ στοχαζομένων τοῦ πικνὰ μεταπίπτοντος κριτηρίου πολλῆς ἀργίας ἦν καὶ σκαϊότητος ἀλεξιφάρμακον.

The chorus of Epicureans, for whom these things are of no concern, we reject. "The laboriousness of writing exists in fact" as Epíkouros himself says "for those not considering the frequently shifting criterion" was a remedy of [his] much idleness and awkwardness.

(alternative) τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίπονον τοῦ γράφειν ὄντος τῶν μὴ στοχαζομένων τοῦ πικνὰ μεταπίπτοντος κριτηρίου

(alternative) "The laboriousness of writing does *not* exist for those not considering the frequently shifting criterion"

Cicero, Brutus, 1.44.123

(T. Albius) fuit Athenis adulescens, perfectus Epicureus euaserat: minime aptum ad dicendum genus.

Titus Albius grew up in Athens and left there a perfect Epicurean: typically lacking the capacity for eloquence.

Titus Albius (fl. around 100 BC) was a Roman orator and Praetor who was educated in Athens. He faced multiple legal challenges in Rome, ultimately being convicted of extortion (Repetundae Pecuniae). Following his conviction, he went into exile and settled in Athens.

Catalogue of Fragments

Fragments from Known Works

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| 2. | Ἀναξιμένης | Anaximénēs | "Kingly Power" |
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| 4. | Ἀντίδωρος, Α Β | Antídōros, in 2 Books | "Given in return" |
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| 8. | Περὶ Ἄφῆς | On the Sensation of Touch | |
| 9. | Περὶ Βασιλείας | On Kingship | |
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| 11. | Πρὸς Δημόκριτον | Against Democritus | "Chosen by the People" |
| 12. | Διαπορίαι | Problems | |
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| 15. | Περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος | On Gifts and Gratitude | |
| 16. | Περὶ Εἰδώλων | On Films | |
| 17. | Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης | On Destiny | |
| 18. | Μεγάλη Ἐπιτομή | The Big Summary | |
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	πρὸς Μητρόδωρον	for Mētródōros	
22.	Περὶ Εὐσεβείας	On Piety	
23.	Ἠγησιάναξ	Hēgēsíanax	<i>"Leader of Kings"</i>
24.	Περὶ Ἡδονῆς	On Pleasure	
25.	Θεμίστα	Themísta	<i>"Order-keeper"</i>
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27.	Περὶ Θεῶν	On the Gods	
28.	Καλλιστόλας	Kallistólas	<i>"Beautiful Armament"</i>
29.	Περὶ Κριτηρίου ἢ Κανῶν	On the Criterion or The Canon	
30.	Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικούς	Against the Megarians	
31.	Μητρόδωρος, Ε	Mētródōros, in 5 Books	<i>"Mother's Gift"</i>
32.	Περὶ Μουσικῆς	On Music	
33.	Νεοκλῆς πρὸς Θεμίσταν	Neoklēs, for Themísta	<i>"New Glory"</i>
34.	Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην	Theories about Diseases, for Míthrēs	
35.	Περὶ τοῦ Ὁραῖν	On Vision	
36.	Περὶ Ὁσιότητος	On Holiness	
37.	Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην	On Theories about Feelings, against Timokrátēs	
38.	Περὶ Πλούτου	On Wealth	
39.	Πολυμήδης	Polymédēs	<i>"Abundant in Thought"</i>
40.	Προγνωστικόν	Prognostication	
41.	Προτρεπτικός	Exhortation	
42.	Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς	On Rhetoric	
43.	Στοιχειώσεις Δώδεκα	Twelve Elementary Principles	
44.	Συμπόσιον	Symposium	
45.	Περὶ Τέλους	On the End Goal	
46.	Τιμοκράτης, Γ	Timokrátēs, in 3 Books	<i>"Honorable Authority"</i>
47.	Περὶ Φαντασίας	On Sensory Presentation	
48.	Περὶ Φύσεως, ΛΖ	On Nature, in 37 Books	
49.	Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς	Summary of Objections to the Physicists	
50.	Χαιρέδημος	Chairédēmos	<i>"People's Joy"</i>

Fragments from Letters

1.	Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγάλους	To Important Persons
2.	Epistulae Spuriae	Spurious Letters
3.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Φίλους	To Friends Living In Egypt
4.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Φίλους	To Friends Living In Asia
5.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ Φίλους	To Friends Living In Lampsacus
6.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους	To The Philosophers Of Mytilene
7.	Πρὸς Ἀθηναίον	To Athēnaïos <i>"Of Athena"</i>
8.	Πρὸς Ἀναξάρχον	To Anaxárkhos <i>"Ruler of Kings"</i>
9.	Πρὸς Ἀπελλῆν	To Apellês
10.	Πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην	To Apollōnídēs <i>"Son of Apollo"</i>
11.	Πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον	To Aristóboulos <i>"Best Counsel"</i>
12.	Πρὸς Δωσίθεον	To Dōsítheos <i>"God's Gift"</i>
13.	Πρὸς Ἑρμάρχον	To Hermárchos <i>"Leader guided by Hermes"</i>
14.	[Πρὸς Ἐταίρας]	[To A Companion]
15.	Πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον	To Eurýlochos <i>"Far-Reaching Defender"</i>
16.	Πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον	To Hēródotos <i>"Given by Hera"</i>
17.	Πρὸς Θεμιστᾶν	To Themísta <i>"Order-keeper" "Of Themis"</i>
18.	Πρὸς Ἴδομενέα	To Idomeneús <i>"Strength of Ida"</i>
19.	Πρὸς Κράτερον	To Kráteros <i>"Powerful"</i>
20.	Πρὸς Κωλώτην	To Kōlótēs
21.	Πρὸς Λεόντιον	To Leóntion <i>"Little Lion"</i>
22.	Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον	To Mētródōros <i>"Mother's Gift"</i>
23.	Πρὸς Μίθρην	To Míthrēs
24.	Πρὸς Μῦν	To Mÿs <i>"Mouse"</i>
25.	Πρὸς Πολύαινον	To Polýainos <i>"Much Praised"</i>
26.	Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα	To Pythoklês <i>"Glory of Apollo"</i>
27.	Πρὸς Τιμοκράτη	To Timokratēs <i>"Power of Honor"</i>
28.	Πρὸς Θυρσῶνα	To Thyrsōn <i>"Thyrus Bearer"</i>
29.	Πρὸς Χαρμίδην	To Charmídēs <i>"Grace"</i>
30.	Περὶ Ἐπιτηδευμάτων	On Vocations
31.	De Stilpone	On Stilpo
32.	Ad Puerum aut Puellam Epistula	Letter To A Young Boy Or Girl
33.	Epistula Supremorum Dierum	Letter From His Last Days

Fragments From Uncertain Letters

1. Epíkouros' remarks on private problems
2. Regarding Epíkouros' Disciples
3. Regarding the Stoics
4. Sayings

Last Will

1. On Choices & Avoidances

Περὶ Αἰρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν

[U1]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...Κύρια Δόξα. Περὶ Αἰρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν. Περὶ Τέλους...

...Principal Doctrines. On Choices and Avoidances. On the End Goal...

Static & Kinetic Pleasure

Diogénēs Laértios 10.136

Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναίους περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει: ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ.

He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure [that] which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. He admits both: [pleasure] of mind and of body, as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End*, and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene.

[U2]

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω "...νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς." ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Αἰρέσεων οὕτω λέγει "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαὶ εἰσιν ἡδοναί – ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεῖα βλέπονται."

*So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his *Epilecta*, and Mētródōros in his *Timokrátēs*, whose actual words are "...with pleasure considered both according to motion and as static." The words of Epíkouros in his work *On Choice* are "the lack of disturbance and the lack of pain are static pleasures – joy and delight are made apparent according to motion through activity."

ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονή	pleasure according to motion, pleasure in movement, kinetic pleasure
<i>for example joy (ἡ χαρὰ) and delight (ἡ εὐφροσύνη)</i>	
ἡ καταστηματικὴ ἡδονή	static pleasure, pleasure of condition
<i>for example lack of disturbance (ἡ ἀταραξία) and lack of pain (ἡ ἀπονία)</i>	

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.16

Sin autem voluptatem putat adiungendam eam quae sit "in motu" — sic enim appellat hanc dulcem: "in motu" illam nihil dolentis "in stabilitate" — quid tendit?

Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure – for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it "in motion" in contrast with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is pleasure "in stability" – what is he really aiming at?

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.31

Quam multa vitiosa! summum enim bonum et malum vagiens puer utra voluptate diiudicabit? 'stante' an 'movente'? (quoniam, si dis placet, ab Epicuro loqui discimus.)

What a mass of fallacies! Indeed, how will a crying newborn judge the highest good and evil? 'static' or 'in movement'? (Inasmuch as, heaven help us, we learn our language from Epíkouros.)

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.75

Tum enim eam ipsam vis, quam modo ego dixi, et nomen inponis "in motu" ut sit et faciat aliquam varietatem – tum aliam quandam summam voluptatem, quo addi nihil possit, eam tum adesse, cum dolor **omnis absit: eam 'stabilem' appellas.**

For at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I have just defined, and this you entitle "in motion" as it produces a definite change of feeling – but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, to which nothing can be added, when **all** pain is gone: this you call 'stable' pleasure.

Aristotle, Eudêmeian Ethics, 8.1249a

Καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει – διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων καὶ ἡδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιούσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ὄρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μὴ – καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλεον, οὐκέτι: οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ **τινα εἶναι ὄρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ **τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυγῆς**.**

We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure and the manner in which it is a good, and have said that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that things good absolutely are also pleasant. Pleasure does not occur **except in action** – on this account the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not without reason that people think this. But since a doctor has a certain standard by referring to which he judges the body healthy or not – and in relation to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be wholesome, so in regard to actions and choices of things good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man ought to have **a certain standard** both of character and **of choice and avoidance**.

2. Anaximénēs **Ἄναξιμένης**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ βασιλείας. Ἄναξιμένης. Ἐπιστολαί...

...On Kingship. Anaximénēs. Letters...

Usener: Perhaps the title was 'Anaximénēs On Kingship.' You might believe that the book was thus titled Anaximénēs' 'Changes of Kings.' Plentiful and favorable subject matter was provided for debating the miserable life of kings.

Athēnaïos, The Learned Banqueters, 12.531D

Ἄναξιμένης δ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Βασιλέων Μεταλλαγαὶ περὶ τοῦ Στράτωνος τὰ αὐτὰ ἱστορήσας διημιλλῆσθαι φησιν αὐτὸν Νικοκλεῖ τῷ τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Σαλαμῖνος βασιλεύσαντι ἐσπουδακότι περὶ τρυφήν καὶ ἀσέλγειαν, ἀποθανεῖν τ' ἀμφοτέρους βιαίως.

'And Anaximénēs, in his book entitled the Reverses of Kings, giving the same account of Strátonos, says that he was always endeavouring to rival Nicocles, who was the king of Salamis in Cyprus, and who was exceedingly devoted to luxury and debauchery, and that they both came to a violent end.'

Both Strátonos and Nicocles probably died during the revolt of satraps around 361 BC, twenty years before Epíkouros was born. The author of this book Reverses of Kings would be Anaximénēs of Lampsacus (fl. 340 BC, about 40 years before Epíkouros). Anaximénēs studied under Diogenes the Cynic, joined Alexander's Persian campaigns, and wrote about Homer, history, and rhetoric.

Pausanias, Description of Greece, 6.18.3,4

Pausanias (fl. 150 AD) was a Greek geographer archaeologist. He wrote that Anaximénēs stopped Alexander from attacking Lampsacus.

Λαμψακηνῶν τὰ βασιλέως τοῦ Περσῶν φρονησάντων ἢ καὶ αἰτίαν φρονῆσαι λαβόντων, ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἄτε ὑπερζέων ἐς αὐτούς τῆ ὀργῆ κακῶν ἠπειλεῖ τὰ μέγιστα ἐργάσασθαι: οἱ δὲ ἄτε θέοντες περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν καὶ αὐτῆς πατρίδος ἀποστέλλουσιν Ἀναξιμένην ἰκετεύειν, Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τε αὐτῷ καὶ ἔτι Φιλίππῳ πρότερον γεγονότα ἐν γνώσει.

The people of Lampsacus favored the cause of the Persian king, or were suspected of doing so, and Alexander, boiling over with rage against them, threatened to treat them with utmost rigor. As their wives, their children, and their country itself were in great danger, they sent Anaximénēs to intercede for them, because he was known to Alexander himself and had been known to Philip before him.

[Pausanias] **Προσῆει τε ὁ Ἀναξιμένης, καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, πεπυσμένον καθ' ἦντινα αἰτίαν ἦκοι, κατομόσασθαί φασιν ἐπονομάζοντα θεοὺς τοὺς Ἑλλήνων ἢ μὴν αὐτοῦ ταῖς δεήσεσιν ὅποσα ἐστὶν ἐναντία ἐργάσασθαι. ἔνθα δὴ εἶπεν Ἀναξιμένης 'χαρίσασθαι μοι τήνδε ὦ βασιλεῦ τὴν χάριν, ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι μὲν γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνα Λαμψακηνῶν, καταβαλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐς ἔδαφος τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν, τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ τῶν θεῶν σφισιν ἐμπρῆσαι'. ὁ μὲν ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ σόφισμα ἀντιμηχανήσασθαί τι εὐρίσκων καὶ ἐνεχόμενος τῆ ἀνάγκῃ τοῦ ὄρκου συγγνώμην ἔνεμεν οὐκ ἐθέλων Λαμψακηνοῖς.**

Anaximénēs approached, and when Alexander learned for what cause he had come, they say that he swore by the gods of Greece, whom he named, that he would verily do the opposite of what Anaximénēs asked. Thereupon Anaximénēs said, "Grant me, O king, this favour. Enslave the women and children of the people of Lampsacus, raze the whole city even to the ground, and burn the sanctuaries of their gods." Such were his words; and Alexander, finding no way to counter the trick, and bound by the compulsion of his oath, unwillingly pardoned the people of Lampsacus.

Darius III was defeated by Alexander the same year Mētródōros of Lampsacus was born (when Epíkouros was 15). So this event would have occurred a little earlier – before the birth of Mētródōros, when Polýainos of Lampsacus was a child.

Perhaps instead Epíkouros' work was a polemic against Anaximénēs of Miletus and his monism. Anaximénēs of Miletus, flourished 545 BCE, about 250 years before Epíkouros, believed that air (ἀήρ) can change into water, earth, and fire – and everything else – by getting thicker or thinner.

Diogénēs Laértios 2.3

Ἀναξιμένης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος ἤκουσεν Ἀναξιμάνδρου. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ Παρμενίδου φασὶν ἀκοῦσαι αὐτόν. οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἀέρα εἶπε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ἄστρα οὐχ ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀλλὰ περὶ γῆν. κέχρηται τε λέξει ἰάδι ἀπλῆ καὶ ἀπερίττω. Καὶ γεγένηται μὲν, καθά φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος, περὶ τὴν Σάρδεων ἄλυσιν, ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τῆ ἐξηκοστῆ τρίτῃ Ὀλυμπιάδι. Γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι δύο Λαμψακηνοί, ῥήτωρ καὶ ἱστορικός, ὃς ἀδελφῆς υἱὸς ἦν τοῦ ῥήτορος τοῦ τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις γεγραφότος.

Anaximénēs, the son of Eurystratus, a native of Miletus, was a pupil of Anaximander. According to some, he was also a pupil of Parmenides. He took for his **first principle air** or **that which is unlimited**. He held that the stars move round the earth but do not go under it. He writes simply and unaffectedly in the Ionic dialect. According to Apollodorus he was contemporary with the taking of Sardis and died in the 63rd Olympiad. There have been two other men named Anaximénēs, both of Lampsacus, the one a rhetorician who wrote on the achievements of Alexander, the other, the nephew of the rhetorician, who was a historian.

[U3]

3. Declarations Αἱ Ἀναφωνήσεις

<p>ἡ ἀναφωνήσις αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις</p>	<p>declaration</p>	<p>ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ voice up</p>
<p>The Latin verb “Declamare” was probably invented as a translation</p>		

Anger & Moderation

Philódēmos, On Anger, P.Herc. 182, col. 44 fin. – col. 45

Philódēmos of Gádara (fl. 70 BC) was a student of Zénōn of Sidon.

“Ο τε ἐπιθυμῶν τῆς κολάσεως οὔτω[ι] παρίσταθ' ὡς πρὸς αἰρετὸν δι' αὐτὸ τὴν τιμωρίαν – εἴ γε καὶ συνκαταδύνειν προαιρεῖται, σοφὸν δὲ μανία καὶ διανοεῖσθαι παριστάμενον ὡς πρὸς τοιοῦτο τὴν κόλασιν... ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς Καθηγεμόσιν οὐ τὸ κατ[ὰ] τὴν πρόληψιν [τ]αύτην θυμωθήσεσθαι τὸν σο[φ]όν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοι[ν]οτέραν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἐπίκου[ρ]ος ἐν ταῖς Ἀναφωνήσεσιν [δ]ιασαφεῖ [τό] τε θυμωθήσεσθαι καὶ [τὸ] μετρίως· καὶ ὁ Μητροδώ[ρ]ος, εἰ κυρ[ί]ως λέγει, τὸ [τοῦ] σοφοῦ θυμὸς συνεμφα[ίνε]ι τὸ λίαν βραχέως.

* He who desires **punishment** is inclined **towards vengeance** chosen for its **own sake** – if indeed he also chooses **to completely sink down together** [along with the object of his vengeance], but it is **madness** to even consider **a wise man being inclined towards such a punishment...** and it is acceptable **to our Founders** not that the wise man gets angry **according to this preconception** [of rage], but (that he gets angry) **according to the more general** [preconception of anger]. For Epikouros, in the *Declarations* clarifies both getting angry and moderation. And Metrodorus, if he speaks with authority, also shows the anger of the wise man to be very brief.

[McOsker] And the person who desires punishment is thus inclined toward vengeance, as if toward a thing choice-worthy in itself, even if he is choosing to drown himself together with (his victim), but it is insanity even to imagine a sage being inclined to punishment as if it were such a thing... But also the Founders accept the idea that the wise man will be enraged not according to that preconception, but according to the more general one. In fact, Epikouros makes clear in his *First Appellations* both that the sage "will experience rage" and (will experience it) "in moderation" and Metrodorus, if he says "the rage of the wise man" in its proper sense, shows also that he feels it "very briefly."

[McOsker] "*Philódēmos means that the Founders understood thymos not in the sense in which Philódēmos' opponents use it, 'rage,' but in a more general one, as a synonym for 'anger' generally. The Anaphōnéseis is mentioned only here, and this is its only fragment. Sedley argued that these Anaphōnéseis should be identified with the 'natural' and primal meanings of words*"

Epikouros, Book 28 on Nature P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 col. 4

...Φύσις, ἐνταῦθα, κατὰ γε τὴν δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτου οἰομένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τοῦτο νοεῖται ἐν ἐκίναϊς ταῖς λέξεσιν ἅς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν πρώτων γινωσκόντων αὐτοὺς γεγράφαμεν· εἶτα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὐθις τὸ βιβλίον ἠκριβώσαμεν...

*...The nature [of the void exists] in this context according to the idea of one primarily considering the void in this context, either instantly and intermittently. Thus, this [nature of the void] also is conceived in those phrases which we have composed in the manner of those primarily identifying those [phrases]. Subsequently, revisiting the book again, we made [it] more accurate...

[Sedley] ...The nature [of the void is] here, according to the opinion of the first man to think of void in terms of immediacy and time and place. Consequently, void too is given this meaning in those expressions which we have written in our work concerning the men who first had knowledge of them. We subsequently resumed that book and made a study of...

Dēmétrios Laco, On Textual Criticism, P.Herc. 1012, col. 67, lines 7 – 9

Dēmétrios Laco (fl. about 90 BC) was an Epicurean who wrote about geometry, poetry, music, meteorology, and the nature of the gods.

Φύσει τὰς πρώτας τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀναφωνήσεις γεγονέναι λέγομεν.

We say that the first declarations of words came into being by nature.

[U4]

4. Antídōros

in two books

Ἄντιδωρος β'

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Μητρόδωρος ε'. Ἄντιδωρος β'. Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην...

...Mētródōros, in five books. Antídōros, in two books. Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs...

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 32, p. 1126A

Εἰ γὰρ Πρὸς Ἄντιδωρον ἢ Βίωνα τὸν σοφιστὴν γράφων (Κολιότῆς) ἐμνήσθη νόμων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ διατάξεως, οὐκ ἂν τις εἶπεν αὐτῷ "μέν', ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις περιστέλλων τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείτωσαν."^[Euripides, Orestes, 258] εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι πάντες οἷς Κωλώτης λελοιδόρηκεν.

If, (Kōlōtēs) had directed a book against Antídōros or the sophist Bíon, regarding laws and government and ordinances, no one would have retorted, "Oh poor wretch, lie still in your blankets, and cover your miserable flesh; accuse me of these things only after having real-life experience managing a household and political service." But such are exactly whom Kōlōtēs has insulted.

Antídōros of Cumae was an Ancient Greek grammarian who lived during the time of Epíkouros. His work in grammar was influenced by Eratosthénēs.

Diogénēs Laértios 10.8

...[Ἐκάλει] καὶ Ἄντιδωρον Σαννίδωρον...

...[Epíkouros used to call him] Antídōros Sannídōros ("Antídōros, the Provider of Absurdities")...

σαννυρίζειν

to mock

ΣΑΝΝΥΡΙΖΕΙΝ

to poke
repeatedly

5. Aristóbuolos Ἀριστόβουλος

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Φαντασίας. Ἀριστόβουλος. Περὶ Μουσικῆς...

...On Sensory Presentation. Aristóbuolos. On Music...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 22.1103A

Ἐπικούρω καὶ Μητρόδωρος καὶ Πολύαινος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος "ἐκθάρσημα" καὶ "γῆθος" ἦσαν – ὧν τοὺς πλείστους θεραπεύων νοσοῦντας ἢ καταθρηνῶν ἀποθνήσκοντας διετέλεσε.

To Epíkouros, Mētródōros, Polýainos, and Aristóbuolos were [sources of] "security" and "gaiety" – indeed he continually cared for them when they were ill and mourned them when they died.

τό γῆθος
τοῦ γήθεος

gaiety

ΓΗΘΟΣ

joy

This is an uncommon word and it is associated with Epíkouros.
It seems to be a shortened version of the more common:

ἡ γηθοσύνη
τῆς γηθοσύνης

gladness

ΓΗΘΟΣΥΝΗ

condition of joy

Diogénēs Laértios 10.3

Συμφιλοσόφουν δ' αὐτῷ προτρεψαμένῳ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τρεῖς ὄντες, Νεοκλῆς Χαιρέδημος Ἀριστόβουλος, καθά φησι Φιλόδημος ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων συντάξεως.

At his instigation his three brothers, Neoklēs, Chairédēmos, and Aristóbuolos, joined in his studies, according to Philódēmos the Epicurean in the tenth book of his comprehensive work On Philosophers.

Epíkouros titles many of his book with the name of an individual. He dedicated books to the memory of his brothers, Neoklēs, Chairédēmos, and Aristóbuolos, and wrote other books that contained the praise of his friends, such as Eurýlochos, Hēgēsíanax, Themísta, and Mētródōros. In contrast, he also wrote books that contained criticism of others, such as Antídōros and Timokrátēs.

It seems to be along these lines that the Epicurean Karneîskos, wrote a book about Philísta (Φιλίστα), of which some tattered remains were preserved in the Herculaneum papyrus. Along with the title Καρνείσκου Φιλίστα, this work reveals that a certain Philísta was presented as a model for wisely regulating life, giving instructions on how to live, discussing questions, and refuting the opinions of others. If you follow these traces of imitation, you will understand how it could happen that praises of Mētródōros or Themísta by Epíkouros could grow into both numerous and large volumes.

Karneîskos, Philísta (P.Herc. 1027, fr. 192, col. 11, 12)

Karneîskos (fl. around 285 BC) was an Epicurean philosopher and disciple of Epíkouros.

...Ἄλλὰ γόη[τες πάν]τε[ς ε]ὑρίσκοντα[ι] κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρό[πον] ἀποθεω[ρο]ύ[μ]ενοι, μακρὰν ἀ[πέ]χοντες τοῦ τῶν δεόντων λέγειν περὶ φιλίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν ὅσα συντεί[ν]ει πρὸς τὸ βιώσαι μακαρίως. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ Φιλίσταν καλῶς ἐκ **μειρακίου** κατακοσμηθένθ' ὑπὸ τοιοῦτου [ε]ἰ[δ]ον λό[γ]ο]υ μέχρι τε[λευτῆς, ὥσπερ] καὶ δε[ρό]ν[τως τὸν οὐ]δεμίαν πω [κακίαν λ]αβόντα... καὶ ἀεὶ μεμνημένον, καθ' ὃν ἔζη χρόνον, τοῦ φυσικοῦ τέλους καὶ οὐθὲν ἐλλιπόντα τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου παρὰ τὸ μὴ τυχεῖ[ν] τῶ[ν] παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖ[ς] περιβλέπτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος οὐθὲν ἔχοντα δυσχερὲς οὐδ' εἰ[ς] τὸν λοιπὸν αἰῶνα σχ[ί]σοντα·

* ...However, all charlatans, perceiving things from a distance in a prescribed way, distance themselves from discussing the essentials of friendship or other matters that aid in leading a blissful life. But Philísta was rightly groomed **from her youth** by teachings until her death, as one who embraced no wrongdoing... always mindful, during her life, of the natural goal and never missing the best of life except for not achieving what is esteemed by the many. And in the present, she is facing nothing troublesome nor will in her remaining years.

6. On the Atoms & the Void **Περὶ Ἄτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Φύσεως ΛΖ. Περὶ Ἄτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ. Περὶ Ἐρωτος...

...On Nature in thirty-seven books. On the Atoms and the Void. On Love...

7. On the Angle of the Atom **Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ τοῦ Ὅραϊν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας. Περὶ Ἀφῆς...

...On Vision. On the Angle of the Atom. On the Sensation of Touch...

8. On the Sensation of Touch **Περὶ Ἀφῆς**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας. Περὶ Ἀφῆς. Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης...

...On the Angle of the Atom. On the Sensation of Touch. On Destiny...

Plato, Republic, 7.523E

Τί δὲ δὴ; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν **σμικρότητα** ἢ ὄψις ἄρα ἰκανῶς ὄρα, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἢ ἀφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἄρ' οὐκ **ἐνδεῶς** τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν;

But what then? Does sight adequately perceive their **size** and **smallness**, and does it make no difference to it whether some of them are in the middle or at the extreme? And similarly, does touch perceive thickness and thinness, or softness and hardness? And do not the other senses also indicate such things **inadequately**?

But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision's view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things?

Aristotle, Nikomácheian Ethics, 1118b.1

Κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία: καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἧ ἄνθρωποι ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἧ ζῶα – τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηται: οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι – οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινα μέρη.

Indeed, [it is] **the most common of the sensations through which** lack of self-control [exists]: and there appears to be good ground for the disrepute in which it is held, because it does not exist [for us] in so far as we are humans, but to the extent [that we are] animals – therefore to enjoy and love these things most of all is **bestial**. We do not refer to the most refined of the pleasures **through touch**: such as the enjoyment of a massage and warm baths in the gymnasia – for the touch **of the unrestrained** [is] **not about the entire body**, but certain only parts.

9. On Kingship **Περὶ Βασιλείας**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Καλλιστόλας. Περὶ Βασιλείας. Αναξιμένης...

...Kallistólas. On Kingship. Anaximénēs...

[U5]

Entertainment

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1095C

Ἐπίκουρος... προβλήμασι μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺς χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλέων παραινῶν στρατηγικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν προβλημάτων περαιομένους. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Βασιλείας*.

Epikouros... does not allow **room for musical problems** or **critical philological inquiries** [even] **with a drink**, but actually advises a cultivated monarch to put up with recitals of stratagems and with vulgar buffooneries at his drinking parties sooner than with the discussion of problems in music and poetry. Such is what he is presumed to have written in his book *On Kingship*.

[U6]*

Vanity of Political Awareness

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 33.1127A

Καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινόν ἐστι, ὅτι τοσοῦτων ὄντων φιλοσόφων μόνοι σχεδὸν ἀσύμβολοι τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀγαθῶν κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ τραγωδιῶν ποιηταὶ καὶ κωμωδιῶν ἀεὶ τι πειρῶνται χρήσιμον παρέχεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας: οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευόμεθα – καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν – καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι

And it is not the greatest indignity, that, of so many sects of philosophers as have been extant, they alone should enjoy the benefits that are in cities, without having ever contributed to them any thing of their own; but far worse is it that, while there are not even any tragical or comical poets who do not always endeavor to do or say some good thing or other in defense of the laws and policy, these men, if peradventure they write, write of policy, that we may not concern ourselves in the government of the commonweal — of rhetoric, that we may not perform an act of eloquence — and of royalty, that we may shun living with kings.

What is grave is not so much that among so many philosophers these alone (one might say) enjoy the advantages of civilized life without paying their share; it is that poets, both tragic and comic, are always trying to convey some useful lesson and take the side of law and government; whereas these men, if they write about such matters at all, write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Epameinondas (fl. 375 BC) was an elite Theban, statesman, and general whose victories notably weakened Spartan dominance and led to the brief period of Theban hegemony. Despite his significant impact, the effects of his reforms were short-lived and helped set the stage for the rise of Macedonian power under Alexander the Great.

Τοὺς δὲ πολιτικούς ἀνδρας ἐπὶ γέλῳτι καὶ καταλύσει τῆς δόξης ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν "ἔσχηκέναι τι" λέγοντες ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦτο δὲ "μικκόν" – οὕτωςι τῷ ῥήματι φράζοντες! αὐτὸν δὲ "Σιδηροῦν Σπλάγχνον" ἀποκαλοῦντες καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τί παθῶν ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μέσης καὶ οὐ πιλίδιον ἔχων οἴκοι καθῆτο δηλαδὴ περὶ τὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν ὄλος καθεστῶς. ἃ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ περὶ Φιλοσοφίας ἐξορχούμενος πολιτείαν γέγραφε οὐκ ᾧμην δεῖν παρεῖναι λέγει δέ, ὅτι "τῶν σοφῶν τινες ὑπὸ δαψιλείας τύφου οὕτω καλῶς συνέιδον τοῦργον αὐτῆς, ὥστ' οἴχονται φερόμενοι πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς Λυκούργῳ καὶ Σόλωνι ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ βίων λόγους καὶ ἀρετῆς."

Nor do they ever name any of those great personages who have intermeddled in civil affairs, but only to scoff at them and abolish their glory. Thus they say that Epameinondas had "something of good" but "very little" – for that is the very word they use! They moreover call him "iron-hearted," and ask what ailed him that he went marching his army through all Peloponnesus, and why he did not rather keep himself quiet at home with a night-cap on his head, employed only in cherishing and making much of his belly. But methinks I ought not in this place to omit what Mētródōros writes in his book of Philosophy, when, utterly abjuring all meddling in the management of the state, he said thus "Some, through an abundance of vanity and arrogance, have so deep an insight into the business of it, that in treating about the precepts of good life and virtue, they suffer themselves to be carried away with the very same desires as were Lycurgus and Solon."

They mention statesmen only to deride them and belittle their fame, for instance Epameinondas, who they say had but "one good thing about him," and even that "small" (for this is their expression), and dubbing the man himself "iron-guts" and asking what possessed him to go walking across the Peloponnese and not sit at home with a nice felt cap on his head, wholly concerned (we must suppose) with the care and feeding of his belly. And Mētródōros' frivolous dismissal of the state in his work On Philosophy should not, I believe, be allowed to pass unnoticed. "Certain sages," he says, "in their prodigality of conceit, have been so well able to detect the function of the state that in their discourse about ways of life and about virtue they go flying off after the same desires as Lycurgus and Solon."

σιδηροῦς -οῦν	made of iron	ΣΙΔΗΡΟΥΣ <i>iron</i>
τὸ σπλάγχνον	guts	ΣΠΛΑΓΧΝΟΝ <i>entrails of a sacrifice</i>
σιδηροῦς σπλάγχνος	iron guts	ΣΙΔΗΡΟΥΣ ΣΠΛΑΓΧΝΟΣ

10. On Lifecourses

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.27

...Ἡγησιάνναξ. Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα. Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας...

...Hēgēsíanax. On Lifecourses, in four books. On Fair Dealing...

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.30

Τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν (ἔχει) τὰ περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς Περὶ Βίων βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ Περὶ Τέλους.

His ethical doctrine deals with choice and avoidance, which may be found in the books *On Lifecourses*, in the letters, and in the book *On the End-Goal*.

[U7]

Book 1

Pleasures of Body & Mind

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.136

...Ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Αἰρέσεως καὶ Φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ...

...[Epíkouros] admits both: [pleasure] of mind and of body, as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End*, and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene...

[U8]

Avoid Politics

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.119

Οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεται [ὁ σοφός], ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Βίων. οὐδὲ τυραννεύσειν.

Nor will [the wise man] take part in politics, as is stated in the first book *On Life*; nor will he make himself a tyrant.

[The Sage] will not get involved in politics, as he relates in his first book *On Lifecourses*, nor will he make himself a tyrant.

Cicero, Letters to Atticus, 14.20,5

Epicuri mentionem facis et audes dicere "μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι."

You mention Epíkouros and dare to say "stay out of politics."

Cicero, Letters to Friends, 7.12 (February, 53 BC)

Mirabar quid esset, quod tu mihi litteras mittere intermisisses: indicavit mihi Pansa meus Epicureum te esse factum. O castra praeclara! quid tu fecisses, si te Tarentum et non Samarobrivam misissem? iam tum mihi non placebas, cum idem tuebare quod Zeius, familiaris meus. sed quonam modo ius civile defendes, cum omnia tua causa facias, non civium? Ubi porro illa erit formula fiduciae 'UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET?'

I was wondering what had made you [Caius Trebatius Testa] cease writing to me. My friend Pansa [Caius Vibius Pansa] has informed me that you have become an Epicurean! What a wonderful camp yours must be! What would you have done if I had sent you to Tarentum instead of Samobriua? I was already a little doubtful about you, when I found you supporting the same doctrine as my friend Selius! But on what ground will you support the principles of civil law, if you act always in your own interest and not in that of your fellow citizens? What, too, is to become of the legal formula in cases of trust, "as should be done among honest men"?

Quis enim est, qui facit nihil nisi sua causa? quod ius statues 'COMMVNI DIVIDVNDQ,' quom commune nihil possit esse apud eos, qui omnia voluptate sua metiuntur? quo modo autem tibi placebit 'IOVEM LAPIDEM IVRARE,' cum scias Iovem iratum esse nemini posse? quid fiet porro populo Ulubrano, si tu statueris πολιτεύεσθαι non oportere? qua re si plane a nobis deficis, moleste fero, sin Pansae adsentari commodumst, ignosco; modo scribe aliquando ad nos quid agas et a nobis quid fieri aut curari velis.

For who can be called honest who does nothing except on his own behalf? What principle will you lay down "in dividing a common property" when nothing can be "common" among men who measure all things by their own pleasure? How, again, can you ever think it right to swear by Jupiter lapis, when you know that Jupiter cannot be angry with anyone? What is to become of the people of Ulubrae, if you have decided that it is not right to take part in civic business? Wherefore, if you are really and truly a pervert from our faith, I am much annoyed; but if you merely find it convenient to humor Pansa, I forgive you. Only do write and tell us how you are, and what you want me to do or to look after for you.

Cicero, On the Laws, 1.13.39

Sibi autem indulgentes et corpori deseruientes, atque omnia quae sequantur in uita quaeque fugiant uoluptatibus et doloribus ponderantes, etiam si uera dicant — nihil enim opus est hoc loco litibus — in hortulis suis iubeamus dicere, atque etiam ab omni societate rei publicae (cuius partem nec norunt ullam neque umquam nosse uoluerunt) paulisper facessant rogemus.

To those, however, indulgent and subservient to the body, and weighing all things that follow in life and that they seek or avoid according to pleasures and pains, even if they speak truths — for there is no need for disputes here — in their small gardens let us allow them to speak, and even from all association with the state (of which part they neither know any nor ever wished to know) let us ask that they withdraw for a while.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1127D

Εἴπερ οὖν οἱ νόμοι καὶ πολιτείας ἀναιροῦντες τὸν βίον ἀναιροῦσι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ καὶ Μητρόδωρος τοῦτο ποιοῦσι, τοὺς μὲν συνήθεις ἀποτρέποντες τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν – τοῖς δὲ πράττουσιν ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοὺς δὲ πρώτους καὶ σοφωτάτους τῶν νομοθετῶν κακῶς λέγοντες τῶν δὲ νόμων παρακελευόμενοι περιφρονεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ προσῆ φόβος πληγῆς καὶ κολάσεως: οὐκ οἶδα τί τηλικοῦτο κατέψευσαι τῶν ἄλλων ὁ Κωλώτης – ἠλίκον ἀληθῶς τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ δογμάτων κατηγορήκεν.

If then those who abolish the laws, governments, and policies of men subvert and destroy human life, and if Mētródōros and Epíkouros do this, dissuading their friends from doing common things – being hostile to those who are actively engaged, and speaking ill of the foremost and wisest lawmakers, urging to despise the laws, unless there is present a fear of strike and chastisement: I do not see that Kōlōtēs has falsely attributed against the other philosophers – as much as he has alleged true ones against the writings and doctrines of Epíkouros.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1127A

Οὗτοι δέ, κἄν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευόμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι.

...But these men, if they write about such matters at all, write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 31.1125C

Οὐδείς οὖν ἔπαινος ἄξιος ἂν γένοιτο τῶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη τὰ θηριώδη νόμους θεμένων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ νόμων διάταξιν. ἀλλὰ τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ταῦτα συγγέοντες καὶ καταλύοντες καὶ ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες; οὐχ οἱ πολιτείας ἀφιστάντες αὐτούς καὶ τοὺς πλησιάζοντας; οὐχ οἱ "τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις" λέγοντες;

No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from the government? Are they not those who say that "the crown of tranquility is incompatible with great positions of leadership"?

Plutarch, Advice about Keeping Well, 135B

Οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον οὐδὲ πολιτικὸν οὐδ' ἀνθρωπικὸν ἀλλ' ὀστρέου τινὸς ζωῆ προσεικὸς ἢ στελέχους τὸ ἀμετάστατον τοῦτο καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἐν τροφαῖς καὶ ἀποχαῖς καὶ κινήσει καὶ ἡσυχίαις εἰς ἐπίσκιόν τινα βίον καὶ σχολαστὴν καὶ μονότροπὸν τινα καὶ ἄφιλον καὶ ἄδοξον ἀπωτάτω πολιτείας καθίσασιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ συστειλάσιν· οὐ "κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμήν" ἔφη, "γνώμην."

For it is not safe, nor easy, nor befitting a citizen or a man, but like the life of an oyster or the trunk of a tree—this immutability and forced compliance in the matter of food and abstinence, movement and rest; it is fitting only for men who have reduced and restricted themselves to a retired, idle, solitary, friendless, and inglorious life, far removed from the duties of citizenship. 'No,' said he 'it fits not with my opinion.'

For it is a life neither safe, easy, politic, nor like a man, but more like the life of an oyster or the trunk of a tree, to live so without any variety, and in restraint as to our meat, abstinence, motion, and rest; casting ourselves into a gloomy, idle, solitary, unsociable, and inglorious way of living, far remote from the administration of the state, at least (I may say) in my opinion.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀργίας ὦνιον ἢ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀπραξίας, ἃ γε δὴ μέγιστα κακῶν ταῖς νόσοις πρόσεσι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ τὰ ὄμματα τῷ μὴ διαβλέπειν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τῷ μὴ φθέγγεσθαι φυλάττοντος ὁ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀχρηστία καὶ ἡσυχία σώζειν οἴομενος·

For health is not to be purchased by idleness and inactivity, which are the greatest evils attendant on sickness, and the man who thinks to conserve his health by uselessness and ease does not differ from him who guards his eyes by not seeing, and his voice by not speaking.

For health is not to be purchased by sloth and idleness, for those are chief inconveniences of sickness; and there is no difference between him who thinks to enjoy his health by idleness and quiet, and him who thinks to preserve his eyes by not using them, and his voice by not speaking.

Avoid Public Service

Plutarch, Advice about Keeping Well, 135C

Πρὸς οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑαυτῷ χρήσαιτ' ἂν τις ὑγιαίνουντι κρεῖττον ἢ πρὸς πολλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους πράξεις. ἥκιστα δὴ τὴν ἀργίαν ὑγιεινὸν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ τὸ τῆς ὑγείας τέλος ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας·

For a man in good health could not devote himself to any better object than to numerous humane activities. Least of all is it to be assumed that laziness is healthful, if it destroys what health aims at; and it is not true either that inactive people are more healthy.

For such a man's health will not be any advantage to him in the performance of many things he is obliged to do as a man. Idleness can never be said to conduce to health, for it destroys the very end of it. Nor is it true that they are the most healthful that do least.

Οὔτε γὰρ Ξενοκράτης μᾶλλον διυγίαινε Φωκίωνος οὔτε Δημητρίου Θεόφραστος, Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ὤνησε πρὸς τὴν ὑμνουμένην "σαρκὸς εὐστάθειαν" ἢ πάσης φιλοτιμίαν ἐχούσης πράξεως ἀπόδρασις. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέραις ἐπιμελείαις διασωστέον ἐστὶ τῷ σώματι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἔξιν, ὡς παντὸς βίου καὶ νόσον δεχομένου καὶ ὑγίαιαν.

For Xenocrátēs did not keep in better health than Phōkíōnos, nor Theóphrastos than Dēmétrios, and the running away from every activity that smacked of ambition did not help Epíkouros and his followers at all to attain their much-talked-of condition of "perfect bodily health." But we ought, by attention to other details, to preserve the natural constitution of our bodies, recognizing that every life has room for both disease and health.

For Xenocrátēs was not more healthful than Phōkíōnos, or Theóphrastos than Dēmétrios. It signified nothing to Epíkouros or his followers, as to that so much talked of "good habit of body" that they declined all business, though it were never so honorable. We ought to preserve the natural constitution of our bodies by other means, knowing every part of our life is capable of sickness and health.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 90.35

Non de ea philosophia loquor, quae ciuem extra patriam posuit, extra mundum deos, quae uirtutem donauit uoluptati.

The philosophy I speak of is not the one which takes the citizen out of public life and the gods out of [our] world, and hands virtue over to pleasure.

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), 2.380

Epíkouros cum dicat propter uoluptatem omnia esse facienda, excludit ab officiis actuque ciuili sapientem et sibi tantum oportere uiuere adfirmat.

Epíkouros, saying that everything is done for the sake of pleasure, dissuades the Sage from duty and political activity, and asserts that he need only live for himself.

[U9]

Seneca, On Leisure (to Serenus), 3.2

Duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae Epicureorum et Stoicorum sed utraque ad otium diuersa uia mittit, Epíkouros ait "non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens nisi si quid interuenerit." Zénōn ait "accedet ad rem publicam nisi si quid inpedierit." alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa.

The two most prominent sects, the Epicureans and the Stoics, disagree especially in this matter, but each sends [its followers] to leisure by a different path, Epíkouros says "The Sage will not engage in public affairs except in an emergency." Zénōn says "He will engage in public affairs unless something prevents him." One seeks leisure purposefully, the other as a consequence.

[U10]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 27 (32)

Κα[τ'] οὐδ[έτερο]ν γὰρ τ[ρό]πον τῶν ἐ[κ]κειμένων τέχνην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικὴν: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχε[ι] τὴν μεθοδικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ τὴν τὸ ἐστηκὸς προσφερομένην, ὁμολογοῦσιν – ὅτι [δ'] οὐδὲ τὴν παρατήρησιν (τῆ[ν τοῦ] ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ κα[ί] κατὰ τὸ εὐλογον στοχαζομένην) – Ἐπίκουρ[ος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Π[ερὶ] Βίων καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορ[ικ]ῆς ποιεῖ φα[νερόν] καὶ Μ[η]τρόδωρ[ος] ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυσ[ιολογί]ας Λέγο[ν]τ[α]ς Ἀγα[θ]οὺς εἶ[ν]α[ι] Ῥήτορας.

[Chandler] For in neither one of the two senses which have been set out is it possible to say that **political rhetoric** is an **art**: for they are in agreement that it does not possess methodical transmission which contributes to stable knowledge – but that it doesn't [even possess] **observation** (which aims to achieve its goal most of the time with a reasonable chance of success) – Epikouros makes clear in the first book of *On Ways of Living* and in his *On Rhetoric*, as does Metrodorus in his *Against Those Who Say That From The Study Of Nature Come Good Orators*.

[U11]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 57

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολ[λ]ῶν α[ὐ]τοῦς Ἄνα[πα]ύσωμεν ἐρ[ε]ύνης κα[ί] ἐρωτήσεως: οὐκ ἐν τῷ[ι] Συμποσίω[ι] Λέγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Βίων – οὐδὲ κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμέν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστ[η]ικὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κὰν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κ[ρί]σιν, ἀλλὰ χρεῖαν γ' ἔχει λόγου τυχεῖν

* however, We relieve **them** from **much questioning** and **from many inquires**: We do not say that [a direct quote on the topic] is in the *Symposium* nor in [the works] *On Lives* – nor do We order **him to seek a pebble** in the sea – but through what [we have cited] and through what we claim, We [already] have set forth that *Sophistic Rhetoric* is shown to exist as an art – [general quotes] which, even though they can be shown to enlarge our judgment, nevertheless **still require having a reasoning** {i.e., giving an explanation}

[Chandler] However, in order to relieve them from having to ask a lot of questions from a lot of people, we say that it is not in the *Symposium* nor in the *On Ways of Life*, nor are we telling them to look for a needle in a haystack. But we have already cited where and on what grounds we say that the fact that sophistic rhetoric is an art is revealed – even if the (citations) are shown to strengthen our own judgement, yet they require an argument for all the members of our philosophical school.

Below [U49] Philodemus shows that *Sophistic Rhetoric* is the practice of composing arguments together and conducting lectures.

[U12]

Book 2

Observe Customs

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.31.877-898

...Φύ[σιν] τὴν κατὰ τὸ κρ[ι]τήριον ποι[ου]μένη[ν] ὀρθῶς ἐπί[νοι]αν ὠ[φελεί]ας νομίζεσθαι. [ἵνα δὲ μὴ] ἐκτείνω [τὸν λόγον,] πάλιν· "ἡμ[εῖς] θεοῖς θύωμέν" φησιν "[ὁσί]ως καὶ καλῶς οὐ [καθ]ήκει κα[ί] κ[αλῶ]ς πάντα πράττωμεν [κα]τὰ τοὺς νόμους, μ[η]θέ[ν] ταῖς δόξαις α[ὐ]τοῦς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων κ[αί] σεμοντάτων διαταράττοντε[ς]. ἔτι] δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι] θύω]μεν ἀφ' ἧς ἔλε[γον] δόξ]ης. οὕτω γὰρ [ἐν]δέχεται φύσ[ιν] θνη]τὴν ὁμοίω[ς] τῷ Δι]ὶ νῆ Δία [δι]άγειν, [ὡς φαί]νεται." κὰν [τοῖς Περὶ Βίων δὲ περὶ τῆς] προσκυνή[σεως...]

[Obbink] ...To conceive of their nature as accurately constituting the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard. And, lest I extend my discussion, again "Let us sacrifice to the [gods]" [Epíkouros] says "devoutly, and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live [like Zeus], as it seems." And concerning obeisance in *On Lifecourses*...

[U13]*

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.26.730-751

[Ὁ δ'] Ἐπίκουρος φανή[σεται] καὶ τετηρηκῶς [ἅπαν]τα καὶ τοῖς φί[λοις τ]ηρεῖν παρεγ[γνηκ]ῶς, οὐ μόνον [διὰ τ]οὺς νόμους – ἀλλὰ διὰ φυσικὰς [αἰτίας.] προσεύχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ [Βίων]* οἰκεῖον εἶναι [ἡμεῖ]ν φησιν, οὐχ ὡς [δυσ]μενῶν τῶν [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιή[σομεν], ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν ὑπερβαλλουσῶν [δυνά]μει καὶ σπου[δαιότ]ητι φύσεων [ἵνα τὰ]ς τε τελ[λ]ε[ιότη]τας γινώσκω[μεν καὶ] τοῖς νόμοις [συμπερι]φοράς.

[Obbink] Furthermore, it will appear that Epíkouros loyally observed all the forms of worship and enjoined his friends to observe them, not only because of the laws – but for physical [causes] as well. For in *On Lifecourses* he says that to pray is natural for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we may realize our fulfillments and social conformity with the laws.

[U14]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.119

Οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ *Περὶ βίων*, οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν.

[The Sage] does not behave like a Cynic, [As Epíkouros says] in the second book *On Lifecourses*, nor becomes a beggar.

[U15]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.119

Ἀλλὰ καὶ πηρωθέντα τὰς ὄψεις μὴ ἐξάξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φησι.

Even if one's eyes are blinded, he should not remove himself from life, as stated in the same [source].

* But also, one who has lost their sight should not take themselves out of life, as he says in the same place.

11. Against Democritus **Πρὸς Δημόκριτον**

This may not have been stand-alone work, but only a section of On Nature.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1100A

Τί δ' οὐκ ἔμελλεν αὐτὸς οὕτω σπαργῶν περιμανῶς καὶ σφαδάζων πρὸς δόξαν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀπολέγεσθαι τοὺς καθηγητὰς μηδὲ Δημοκρίτῳ τῷ τὰ δόγματα ῥήμασιν αὐτοῖς ἀφαιρουμένῳ ζυγομαχεῖν περὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ κεραιῶν, σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν...

Why should he not, when he himself had such a furious lechery and wriggling *after glory* as made him not only to disown his masters and scuffle about syllables and accents with his fellow-pedant Democritus (whose doctrines he stole verbatim), and to tell his disciples there never was a wise man in the world besides himself...

Would not he himself, thus violently thrashing and eagerly wriggling towards glory, so as not only to disavow his teachers and to quarrel over syllables and letters with Democritus, while pilfering his doctrines of their very words, and to claim no one else but himself and his students as wise...

...Ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφειν ὡς Κωλώτης μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα προσκυνήσειε γονάτων ἀψάμενος – Νεοκλῆς δ' ὁ ἀδελφὸς εὐθύς ἐκ παίδων ἀποφαίνοιτο "μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου γεγονέναι μηδ' εἶναι" ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν; ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν;

...But also to put it in writing how Kōlótēs performed adoration to *him*, as he was one day *philosophizing about nature*, by touching his knees – and that his own brother Neoklēs used from a child to say "no one has been or is *wiser than Epíkouros*" and that his mother had just so many atoms within her as, when they came together, must have produced a complete wise man?

...But also to write how Kōlótēs, while he was philosophizing, would worship him by touching his knees – and Neoklēs, his brother, would declare from childhood that "there was no one wiser than Epíkouros" and that his mother had in herself so many atoms, which coming together would have produced a wise man?

[U16]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 20, col. 123

...Φωναῖ[ς μετρίαις θεραπ]εύω, διὰ δὲ τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν, εἴ γ' ἐδυνήθησαν, ὠφελίαν ἡμῶν, ἔτι δὲ τῆ[ν] μεριζομένην συνγ[ν]ώ[μ]ην ἐν οἷς διέπεσον, ὡς ἐν τ[ε] τοῖς πρὸς Δημόκρ[ι]τον ἴσταται διὰ τέλους ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κ[αὶ πρὸς] Ἡρακ[λ]είδην...

...[Admonishing] with [moderate] words, because of their [eagerness] and their benefit to us [if] they were able, and further because of the pardon meted out for the things in which they slipped up, as Epíkouros consistently maintains both in his book *Against Democritus* and *Against Hērakleídēs*...

Hērakleídēs of Pontus (fl. 350 BC) was a pupil of Plato, playwright, and astronomer.

[U17]*

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.82

Fac enim sic animum interire ut corpus: num igitur aliquis dolor aut omnino post mortem sensus in corpore est? nemo id quidem dicit, etsi Democritum insimulat Epíkouros, Democritii negant.

For let the soul perish as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all in the body after death? No one, indeed, asserts that; though Epíkouros charges Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it.

Ne in animo quidem igitur sensus remanet; ipse enim nusquam est – ubi igitur malum est, quoniam nihil tertium est? an quod ipse animi discessus a corpore non fit sine dolore? ut credam ita esse, quam est id exiguum! sed falsum esse arbitror, et fit plerumque sine sensu, non numquam etiam cum voluptate, totumque hoc leve est, qualecumque est; fit enim ad punctum temporis.

No sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere – where, then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected without pain? but even should that be granted, how small a pain must that be! Yet I think that it is false; and that it is very often unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with pleasure: but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is, for it is instantaneous.

12. Problems Διαπορίαι

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27:

...Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. Διαπορίαι. Κύριαι Δόξαι...

...Against the Megarians. Problems. Principal Doctrines...

[U18]

Laws

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 34 sup., 1127D

“Ὅτι δ’ οὐ νομοθέταις ἀλλὰ νόμοις ἐπολέμουν, ἕξεστιν ἀκούειν Ἐπικούρου: ἔρωτᾷ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις "εἰ πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφός, ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει" καὶ ἀποκρίνεται "οὐκ εὐοδὸν τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ κατηγόρημα" – τουτέστι 'πράξω μὲν οὐ βούλομαι δ’ ὁμολογεῖν.' πάλιν δέ, οἷμαι, γράφων πρὸς Ἰδομενέα διακελεύεται "μὴ νόμοις καὶ δόξαις δουλεύοντα ζῆν – ἐφ’ ὅσον ἂν μὴ τὴν διὰ τοῦ πέλας ἐκ πληγῆς ὄχλησιν παρασκευάζωσιν."

* "The simple (minded) set-up is not easy (to navigate)"

* "to live without being enslaved to laws and opinions – insofar as they do not cause disturbance by a strike from another person ."

But that they made war not against the lawgivers but against the laws themselves, one may hear and understand from Epikouros. For in his *Questions*, he asks himself "whether a wise man, will do any thing that the laws forbid, being assured that it will not be known." and he answers "that is not so easy to determine simply" – which means 'I will do it indeed, but I am not willing to confess it.' And again, I suppose, writing to Idomeneús, he exhorts him "not to make his life a slave to the laws or to the opinions of men – unless it be to avoid the trouble they prepare, by scourge and chastisement, so near at hand."

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.9.28

Ex eo quod eam uoluptatem, quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant, uidetur amplexari saepe uehementius, in magnis interdum uersatur angustiis – ut hominum conscientia remota nihil tam turpe sit quod uoluptatis causa non uideatur esse facturus.

Because he seems often more vehement in embracing the pleasure which all people call by that name, he sometimes finds himself in great difficulties – so that, with human conscience set aside, there seems to be nothing so disgraceful that he would not appear to do it for the sake of pleasure.

He often seems unduly eager to approve of pleasure in the common definition of term, and this occasionally lands him in a very awkward position – it conveys the impression that that no action is so base that he wouldn't do it for the sake of pleasure, as long as a guarantee of secrecy was provided.

[U19]

[=U94] Diogēnēs Laértios 10.119

Καὶ μὴδὲ καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις – καὶ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως*, κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν.

The wiseman will not marry or sire children, as Epikouros says in the *Problems* – and in *On Nature*, according the situation of his life at some point he may marry.

Nor, again, will the Sage marry and rear a family – so Epikouros says in his *Problems* and in the work *On Nature*. Though occasionally he may marry in accordance with special circumstances in his life.

Children

Arrian, *Discourses on Epictetus*, Πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον 1 - 10

Ἐπινοεῖ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὅτι φύσει ἐσμὲν κοινωνικοί, ἀλλ' ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ κελύφει θεῖς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν. πάλιν γὰρ ἐκείνου λίαν κρατεῖ ὅτι "οὐ δεῖ ἀπεσπασμένον οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐσίας οὔτε θαυμάζειν οὔτ' ἀποδέχεσθαι" καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ.

Even Epikouros perceives that we are by nature social, but having once placed our good in the husk [in the body] he is no longer able to say anything else. For again, he strongly says that "it is necessary to not marvel at nor accept anything apart from the property of the good" and he is right in maintaining this.

Even Epikouros is sensible that we are by nature sociable beings; but having once placed our good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing afterwards inconsistent with that; for again, he strenuously maintains that "we ought not to admire or accept anything separated from the nature of good" and he is in the right to maintain it.

Πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσικὴ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία; διὰ τί ἀποσυμβουλευεῖς τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῆ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; διὰ γὰρ τὸν μῦν τὸν ἔσω τρεφόμενον ἐμπίπτει; τί οὖν αὐτῷ μέλει, ἂν μυΐδιον μικρὸν ἔσω κατακλαίῃ αὐτοῦ;

How then are we concerned [for them], if we have no natural affection to our children? Why then do you advise the wise man not to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may thus fall into trouble? For does he fall into trouble on account of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What does he care if a tiny little mouse inside [the house] cries out to him?

But how, then, arise any affectionate anxieties, unless there be such a thing as natural affection towards our offspring? Then why do you, Epikouros, dissuade a wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid that upon their account he may fall into anxieties? Does he fall into any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What is it to him, if a little mouse bewails itself there?

Ἄλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι, ἂν ἅπαξ γένηται παιδίον, οὐκέτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι μὴ στέργειν μὴδὲ φροντίζειν ἐπ' αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν οὐδὲ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα: οἶδεν γὰρ τίνα δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν πολιτευόμενον: ἐπεῖτοι εἰ ὡς ἐν μυΐαις μέλλεις ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τί κωλύει;

But [Epikouros] knows that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care about it. For this reason, Epikouros says, that a man who has any sense also does not engage in political matters; for he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such things; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as you would among a swarm of flies, what hinders you?

But Epíkouros knew that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for it. On the same grounds he says that a wise man will not engage himself in public business, knowing very well what must follow. If men are only so many flies, why should he not engage in it?

Ἄλλ' ὅμως εἰδὼς ταῦτα τολμᾷ λέγειν ὅτι "μὴ ἀναιρώμεθα τέκνα." ἀλλὰ πρόβατον μὲν οὐκ ἀπολείπει τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕγγονον οὐδὲ λύκος, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἀπολείπει; τί θέλεις; μωροὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι ὡς τὰ πρόβατα; οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα ἀπολείπει. θηριώδεις ὡς τοὺς λύκους; οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι ἀπολ εἶπουσιν.

But Epíkouros, who knows this, ventures to say that "we should not bring up children." But a sheep does not desert its own offspring, nor yet a wolf; and shall a man desert his child? What do you mean? that we should be as silly as sheep? but not even do they desert their offspring: or as savage as wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young.

And does he, who knows all this, dare to say "we should not raise children"? Not even a sheep, or a wolf, deserts its offspring; and shall man? What would you have, that we should be as silly as sheep? Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them.

Ἄγε, τίς δέ σοι πείθεται ἰδὼν παιδίον αὐτοῦ κλαῖον ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πεπτωκός; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐμαντεύσατο ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι μέλλεις ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν σε ἔρριψαν.

Well, who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping after falling on the ground? For my part I think that even if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle that you would say what you have said, they still would not have cast you away.

Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his child fallen upon the ground and crying? For my part, I am of opinion that your father and mother, even if they could have foreseen that you would have been the author of such doctrines, would not have thrown you away.

Seneca, On Marriage Fragment 45 [Haase] by way of St. Jerome, Against Jovinianus, 1.48

Epíkouros uoluptatis assertor, quamquam Mētródōros discipulus eius Leóntion habuerit uxorem, raro dicit sapienti ineunda coniugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt nuptiis.

Epíkouros, champion of pleasure, though his disciple Mētródōros had Leóntion as his wife, he said the wise rarely enter into marriage, seeing that marriage entails many nuisances.

Et quomodo diuitiae et honores et corporum sanitates et cetera quae indifferentia nominamus, nec bona nec mala sunt sed uelut in meditullio posita usu et euentu uel bona uel mala fiunt – ita et uxores sitas in bonorum malorumque confinio.

And just as riches, honors, bodily health, and other things which we call indifferent, are neither good nor bad, but stand "midway" so to speak, and become good and bad according to the use and issue – in this way, wives stand on the borderline of good and bad.

Graue autem esse uiro sapienti uenire in dubium, utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.

It is, moreover, a serious matter for a Sage to ponder whether he is going to marry a good or a bad woman.

[U20]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1095C

Καίτοι τᾶλλα μὲν ἡμῖν ὡς ἐπῆλθεν εἴρηται μουσικὴν δ' ὅσας ἡδονὰς καὶ χάριτας οἷας φέρουσιν ἀποστρέφονται καὶ φεύγουσι, βουλόμενος οὐκ ἂν τις ἐκλάθοιτο, δι' ἀτοπίαν ὧν Ἐπίκουρος λέγει.

So far I have mentioned their views just as they happened to occur to me, but no one could forget, even if he wished, their rejection and avoidance of music with the great pleasures and exquisite delight it brings; the absurd discrepancy of Epíkouros' statements sees to that.

Φιλοθέωρον μὲν ἀποφαίνων τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις καὶ χαίροντα παρ' ὄντιν' ἕτερον ἀκρόασι καὶ θεάμασι Διονυσιακοῖς, προβλήμασι μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺς χώραν.

On the one hand, he declares in his *Problems* that the Sage is a lover of spectacles and yields to none in the enjoyment of theatrical recitals and shows; but on the other, he does not allow room for musical problems or critical philological inquiries [even] with a drink.

Ἄλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλέων παραινῶν στρατιωτικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν προβλημάτων περαιομένους. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Βασιλείας*.

But he actually advises a cultivated monarch to put up with recitals of stratagems and with vulgar buffooneries at his drinking parties sooner than with the discussion of problems in music and poetry. Such is what he is presumed to have written in his book *On Kingship*.

[U21]*

Aging

Plutarch, Non Posse 1094E

Ὅτι τοίνυν αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἐτησίου μαραίνονται μετὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ ἀπολήγουσιν, οὐ λέληθε τὸν Ἐπίκουρον:

Now it has not escaped Epíkouros that bodily pleasures, like the Etesian winds, after reaching their full force, slacken and fail.

Διαπορεῖ γοῦν, εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὧν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν καλῶν ἀφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσειν. οὐ ταῦτά μὲν τῷ Σοφοκλεῖ διανοούμενος, ἀσμένως ἐκφυγόντι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην, ὥσπερ ἄγριον καὶ λυττῶντα δεσπότην.

Thus he raises the problem, if the old wise man, not being able to have intercourse, still enjoys the touches and caresses of the beautiful. In this he is not of the same mind as Sophocles, who was as glad to have got beyond reach of this pleasure as of a savage and furious master.

13. On Fair Dealing **Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας**

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα. Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας. Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίستان...

14. On Justice & the Other Virtues Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Μουσικῆς. Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν. Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος...

...On Music. On Justice and Other Virtues. On Gifts and Gratitude...

Cicero, de finibus 2.16, 51

Istorum uerborum, quae perraro appellantur ab Epicuro: sapientiae fortitudinis iustitiae temperantiae.

Those words, which are very rarely used by Epíkouros: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance.

15. On Gifts and Gratitude Περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν. Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος. Πολυμήδης...

...On Justice and Other Virtues. On Gifts and Gratitude. Polymédēs...

[U22]

Literacy

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 1.49

Πλὴν διττῆς οὔσης γραμματικῆς ^[1] τῆς μὲν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς τούτων συμπλοκάς διδάξειν ἐπαγγελλομένης καὶ καθόλου τέχνης τινὸς οὔσης τοῦ γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν ^[2] τῆς δὲ βαθυτέρας παρὰ ταύτην δυνάμεως: οὐκ ἐν ψιλῇ γραμμάτων γνώσει κειμένης, ἀλλὰ κὰν τῷ ἐξετάζειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα λόγου μέρη καὶ εἴ τι τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας θεωρεῖται, πρόκειται – νῦν ἀντιλέγειν οὐ τῇ προτέρᾳ. συμφώνως γὰρ κατὰ πάντας ἐστὶ χρειώδης.

However, with the study of grammar being **twofold** ^[1] the one promising to teach **the elements** and **their combinations** and being in general an art of **writing** and **reading**, and ^[2] the other being, **in comparison**, a **deeper** ability: not consisting merely in the bare knowledge of letters but also in the investigation of their discovery and their nature, and in addition the parts of speech composed of letters and all other matters of the same kind – it is not our purpose now to invalidate the first; for that it is useful is agreed by all men.

Ἐν οἷς θετέον καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διεχθραίνειν· ἐν γοῦν τῷ περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος ἱκανῶς πειρᾶται διδάσκειν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τοῖς σοφοῖς μανθάνειν **γράμματα**. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴπαιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς, οὐ σοφοῖς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις.

And amongst them we must place Epíkouros, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the Professors of Arts and Sciences; in his book *On Gifts and Gratitude* he definitely tries to prove that it is necessary for the wise to learn grammar. Necessary, as we should say, not for the wise only but for all men.

16. On Films Περὶ Εἰδώλων

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Προτρεπτικός. Περὶ Εἰδώλων. Περὶ Φαντασίας...

...Exhortation to Study Philosophy. On Films. On Sensory Presentation...

17. On Destiny Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Ἀφῆς. Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης. Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην...

...On the Sensation of Touch. On Destiny. On Theories about Feelings, against Timokrátēs...

[U23]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.37.1061

...Κάν τ[ῶι γε Π]ερὶ τῆς Εἰμ[αρμέ]νης ὑπέρ τ[ῆς] ἐκ[εἰ]νων συνεργία[ς] ἀποφαίνεται.

And in his book *On Destiny* there is an exposition concerning the assistance provided by them.

18. The Big Summary Μεγάλη Ἐπιτομή

[U24]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Diogénēs Laértios 10.39

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ φησι κατ' ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄ Περι Φύσεως "τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶ σώματα καὶ κενόν – σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ – καθ' ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι."

* Further, this he says also in the *Larger Epitome* near the beginning and in his First Book *On Nature* "Everything is objects and void – that objects exist, perception itself everywhere testifies – relying on perception, it is necessary to judge [from indications] the unclear by deliberation."

[Hicks] ..."the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known."

[Bailey] ..."Moreover, the universe is bodies and space; for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning."

Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Diogénēs Laértios 10.40

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ τῇ ἰδ' καὶ ἑ' καὶ τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ* "σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις – τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποιήνται."

* Again he repeats this in the first [book] and in the 14th and 15th of the work *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome* "Some objects are combinations – and others [are objects] out of which composites are made."

[Hicks] "Again of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made."

[Yonge] "Now, of bodies, some are combinations, and some are the elements out of which these combinations are formed."

[Bailey] "Furthermore, among bodies, some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed."

^[=U79] *Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Diogénēs Laértios 10.73*

καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἰδίον τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔννοοῦντες – καθ' ὃ "Χρόνον" ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ*}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We internalize, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] – according to which We use the word "Time" {He says this in both the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

[Hicks] "No further proof is required we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts – and likewise to feelings [of pleasure and pain] and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word 'time.'"

[Bailey] "For indeed this requires no demonstration, but only reflection, to show that it is with days and nights and their divisions that we associate it – and likewise also with internal feelings or absence of feeling, and with movements and states of rest; in connection with these last again we think of this very perception as a peculiar kind of accident, and in virtue of this we call it time."

19. The Small Summary Μικρὰ Ἐπιτομή

The Minor Abridgment is usually considered to be the letter to Hēródotos, but the quote below is not preserved in the letter to Hēródotos.

Diogénēs Laértios 10.135

Μαντικήν δ' ἅπασαν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀναιρεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μικρᾷ Ἐπιτομῇ*, καὶ φησι "μαντική οὔσα **ἀνύπαρκτος** – εἰ δὲ καὶ **ὑπαρκτή**, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς **ἠγητέα** γινόμενα."

* Elsewhere he rejects the whole of divination, as in the *Short Epitome*, and says "divination is **non-existent** – but even if **existent**, what comes from it **ought to be considered nothing** to us."

In other places, he refutes every type of prognostication, as in *The Small Summary*, saying that "prognostication does not exist, and if even if it did, we must regard whatever it predicts **as nothing** to us."

ἀνύπαρκτος (ov)	non-existent	ΑΝΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ <i>without existing</i>
ὑπαρκτός (ή, όν)	existent	ΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ

Divination does not exist, but even if the predictions of diviners were real, they are too ambiguous to be actionable.

20. On Love Περὶ Ἔρωτος

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...*Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ. Περὶ Ἔρωτος. Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικοὺς...*

...*On the Atoms and the Void. On Love. Summary of Objections to the Physicists...*

21. Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...*Συμπόσιον. Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον. Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾶν...*

...*Symposium. Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros. On Vision...*

22. On Piety Περὶ Εὐσεβείας

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.14.115

(Cotta) **At etiam De Sanctitate, De Pietate aduersus deos libros scripsit Epíkouros. at quo modo in his loquitur? ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaeuolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas, non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem – nec manibus, ut Xerxes, sed rationibus – deorum immortalium templa et aras euerterit.**

(Cotta) It is true that Epíkouros wrote books *On Sanctity* and *On Reverence* towards the gods. But what does he actually say? You would imagine that you were listening to the high priests such as Coruncanianus or Scaevola and not to the man who destroyed the whole foundation of religious faith – not by **by force**, as Xerxes did, but **by deliberation** – and overturned the altars and the temples of the gods.

Quid est enim cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dei non modo homines non colant – sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant?

How can you say that mankind should revere the gods, if the gods **not only** have no care for **man** – but they care for **nothing whatsoever**, doing **nothing**?

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.14.123

(Cotta) **At etiam liber est Epicuri De Sanctitate. ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero! quae enim potest esse sanctitas – si di humana non curant?**

(Cotta) But there even is a book by Epíkouros *On Sanctity*. In this book the reader is fooled by a man who wrote not so much with irony as with wild abandon! For how is holiness able to exist – if the gods do not care for humans?

23. Hēgēsíanax **Ἠγησιάναξ**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Ὁσιότητος. Ἠγησιάναξ. Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα...

...On Holiness. Hēgēsíanax. On Lifecourses, in four books...

[=U120] Plutarch, Non Posse, 1101A

(ὄτι) τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμούς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς, μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι "**τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ' ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν: ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης – διὸ, πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ, νῆ Δία, λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς καὶ τήκεσθαι**" καὶ ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες **ὕγροί** τινες εἶναι καὶ **φιλικοὶ** δοκοῦσι. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἶρηκε καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἠγησιάνακτος τελευταίας πρὸς Δωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Φύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολάς διήλθον αὐτοῦ...

To those who remove griefs and tears and sighs over the deaths of friends, and they oppose and say that "**the painlessness which is established in impassivity exists because of another greater evil: of harshness or of excessive pride and madness** – therefore, to suffer **something is better**, and to grieve and, by god, to moisten **the eyes** and to melt into tears" and indeed they seem to be **moist** ^[tipsy] and **friendly**, both experiencing and writing such things. For Epíkouros has said these things in many other contexts and also in writing about the death of Hēgēsíanax to Dōsítheos, the father, and Phyrson, the brother of the deceased; for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

24. On Pleasure **Περὶ Ἡδονῆς**

Cicero, On Divination, 2.27.59

Nos autem ita leues atque inconsiderati sumus, ut si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus?... nam si ista sequimur, quod Platonis Politian, nuper apud me, mures corroserunt de re publica debui pertimescere? aut si Epicuri De Voluptate liber rosus esset – putarem **annonam in macello **cariores** fore?**

But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life?... Hence, if one follows this type of reasoning, the fact that, recently at my house, mice gnawed my Plato's Republic, should I have been terrified about the [Roman] state? Or what if my book by Epíkouros *On Pleasure* had been eaten – should I have thought that **the yearly produce** in the market will be **more expensive**?

25. Themísta Θεμίστα

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.21.67

In uestris disputationibus historia muta est, numquam audiui in Epicuri schola Lycurgum Solonem Miltiadem Themistoclem Epaminondam nominari, qui in ore sunt ceterorum omnium philosophorum... nonne melius est de his aliquid quam tantis uoluminibus de Themísta loqui?

In your discourses, history is mute. In the school of Epíkouros, I never heard one mention of Lycurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Epaminondas, who are always on the lips of the other philosophers... Would it not be better to talk of these than to devote those bulky volumes to Themísta?

[U28]*

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 26.62

Inrisa est abs te paulo ante M. Pisonis cupiditas triumphandi... ea contemnis quae "illi idiotae" ut tu appellas, praeclara duxerunt... tu tantis nationibus subactis, tantis rebus gestis minime fructum laborum tuorum, praemia periculorum, uirtutis insignia contemnere debuisti. neque uero contempsisti, sis licet Themísta sapientior...

A short while ago Marcus Piso's desire **for a triumph** was **absurd to you**... and you despise the things which "those idiots" as you are pleased to call them, deemed **glorious**... You, who have conquered nations so mighty, and done deeds so spirited, ought to have been the last to despise the fruit of your labors, the rewards of your risks, and the decoration due to your heroism. Nor indeed did you despise them, even if [you are] wiser **than Themísta**...

After his praetorship, Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus was assigned the province of Spain as proconsul, and when he returned to Rome in 69 BC, he was given a triumph. Lucretius was around 30 years old at the time.

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 25.60

Vertes te ad alteram scholam; disseres de triumpho "quid tandem habet iste currus, quid uincti ante currum duces, quid simulacra oppidorum, quid aurum, quid argentum, quid legati in equis et tribuni, quid clamor militum, quid tota illa pompa? inania sunt ista, mihi crede, delectamenta paene puerorum, captare plausus, vehi per urbem, conspici uelle. quibus ex rebus nihil est quod solidum tenere, nihil quod referre ad voluptatem corporis possis."

Turn to another school, and then speak thus of a triumph "What is the meaning of that chariot? What is the use of those generals bound in front of the chariot? and of the images of towns? and of the gold? and of the silver? and of the lieutenants on horseback? and of the tribunes? What avail all the shouts of the soldiery? and all that procession? To hunt for applause, to be carried through the city, to wish to be gazed upon? Those are mere **trifles**, believe me, things to please children. There is nothing in all those things which you can grasp as **solid**, nothing which you can refer to [as causing] **pleasure to the body**."

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.65

Fac huius odi tanti ac tam universi periculum, si audes. instant post hominum memoriam apparatissimi magnificentissimique ludi, quales non modo numquam fuerunt, sed ne quo modo fieri quidem posthac possint possum ullo pacto suspicari. da te populo, committe ludis. sibilum metuis? ubi sunt vestrae scholae?

Make experiment of this excessive and universal hatred if you dare. The most carefully prepared and magnificent games within the memory of man are just at hand, games such as not only never have been exhibited, but such that we cannot form a conception how it will be possible for any like them ever to be exhibited for the future. Trust yourself to the people, join in the games. Are you afraid of hisses? Where are all the precepts of your schools?

Ne acclametur times? ne id quidem est curare philosophi. manus tibi ne adferantur? "dolor enim est malum" ut tu disputas; existimatio, dedecus, infamia, turpitudine verba atque ineptiae! sed de hoc non dubito: non audebit accedere ad ludos. convivium publicum non dignitatis causa inibit, nisi forte ut cum P. Clodio, hoc est cum amoribus suis, cenet, sed plane animi sui causa – ludos nobis 'idiotis' relinquet.

Are you afraid that there will be no acclamations raised in your honor? Surely it does not become a philosopher to regard even such a thing as that. You are afraid that violent hands may be laid on you? "Indeed, pain is evil" as you assert. The opinion which men entertain of you, disgrace, infamy, baseness – these are all empty words, mere trifles! But about this I have no question: he will never dare to come near the games. He will attend the public banquet not out of regard for his dignity (unless, perchance, for the purpose of supping with Publius Clodius, that is to say, with those men who love him) but merely for the sake of gratifying his appetite – the games he will leave to us 'idiots.'

26. Against Theóphrastos

in at least two books

Πρὸς Θεόφραστον

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.93

(Cotta) ...**Quando quidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem voltis. Istisne fidentes somniis – non modo Epíkouros et Mētródōros et Hermárchos contra Pythagoram Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt – sed meretricula etiam Leóntion contra Theophrastum scribere ausast? scito, illa quidem sermone et Attico – sed tamen, tantum Epicūri hortus habuit licentiae! (et soletis queri; Zénōn quidem etiam litigabat) quid dicam Albutium?**

(Cotta) ...Since indeed you want these [parts of the body] to exist in god because of beauty. Believing in these dreams [of anthropomorphic gods] – not only Epíkouros, Mētródōros, and Hérmarchos spoke against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles – but even that little harlot Leóntion dared to write against Theóphrastos? Mind you, she indeed [wrote] even in the Attic diction – nevertheless, so much did the garden of Epíkouros have of these liberties! (as you all are accustomed to complain; indeed, Zénōn even used to litigate.) Why need I mention Albutius?

[Rackham] ...Since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epíkouros and Metrodorus and Hérmarchos to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontium to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! such was the license that prevailed in the Garden of Epíkouros. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albutius.

Titus Albucius (praetor c. 105 BC) studied in Athens and was well known in Rome for his interest in Greek literature generally, and Epicurus specifically. Cicero remarked that he was "nearly a Greek."

He unsuccessfully accused Mucius Scaevola, the augur, of maladministration in his province. In turn, he was accused of the same offense by Gaius Julius Caesar (the elder) in 103 BC and was condemned.

Although he faced satire from Lucilius and criticism from Cicero, Albucius' commitment to the Greek language and philosophy was present throughout his life. He continued his philosophical endeavors during his exile in Athens.

Nam **Phaedro** nihil elegantius nihil humanius, sed stomachabatur senex si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epíkouros **Aristotelem** vexarit **contumeliosissime**, **Phaedoni** Socratico **turpissime** male dixerit. **Metrodori sodalis sui fratrem Timocraten**, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, **totis voluminibus** conciderit. **in Democritum ipsum** quem secutus est fuerit ingratus – **Nausiphanem magistrum suum (a quo non nihil didicerat)** tam male acceperit.

Nothing could be more elegant or humane than **Phaedrus**, but the old man was offended if I said something rather harsh. Epíkouros treated **Aristotle** with the most contempt. **Phaedo**, the disciple of Socrates, he **fouly** slandered. He also pelted **Timokrátēs**, the brother of his companion **Mētródōros**, with whole volumes because he disagreed with him in some trifling point of philosophy. He was ungrateful even to **Democritus** himself, whose follower he was; **Nausiphánēs**, his teacher (from whom he had learned something) he treated very badly.

As for **Phaedrus**, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too coarsely; although Epíkouros attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates' pupil **Phaedo** quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on **Timokrátēs**, the brother of his own associate **Metrodorus**, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward **Democritus** himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master **Nausiphánēs**, from whom he learned something.

Pliny, *Inquiry on Nature*, Preface 28 - 30

Ego, plane **meis adici posse multa** confiteor, nec **his solis**, sed et **omnibus quos** edidi, ut obiter caveam '**istos Homeromastigas**' (ita enim verius dixerim) quoniam audio et **Stoicos et dialecticos**, **Epicureos** quoque (nam **de grammaticis** semper expectavi) **parturire adversus libellos quos de grammatica** edidi, et subinde **abortus facere iam decem annis** – cum celerius etiam elephantum pariant!

I plainly confess that **many things can be added to my works**, not only to these alone, but also to all that I have published, so that in passing I may insure myself against '**those scourges of Homer**' (that would be the more correct term) as I am informed that both the **Stoics** and the **dialecticians**, and even **Epicureans** (for I have always expected [this] regarding the grammarians) **they are laboring against the booklets** I published on grammar, and **for ten years now they've had miscarriages** – while even elephants give birth more quickly!

Homēromastix		HOMEROMASTIX
Homēromastigēs		ΟΜΗΡΟΜΑΣΤΙΞ
	an editor	<i>Homer whipper</i>
Ὁμηρομάστιξ		
οἱ Ὁμηρομάστιγες		

Ceu vero nesciam **adversus Theophrastum** (hominem in eloquentia tantum ut nomen '**divinum**' inde invenerit) **scripsisse etiam feminam et proverbium inde natum** "**suspensio arborem eligendi**."

As if indeed I did not know that **against Theóphrastos** (a man so distinguished in eloquence he derived the name '**divine**' from it) **a woman even did the writing** and from there **a proverb was born** "choosing a tree for hanging."

This proverb can probably be interpreted that Theóphrastos is the tree, and Leóntion, by choosing to write against (from Pliny's perspective) such an eloquent man as Theóphrastos, was "choosing a tree to hang herself on." That is, she was "destroying her reputation" specifically, and the garden generally, by writing her book.

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales] 1, P.Herc. 1005, col. 5, lines 4-20

...βαθυτέρων ὡς ἐν [δέ]χεται φανότατα πέφρασ[θαι] καὶ νοεῖ ταυτό παν[ταχῆ]ι. ὤδε ποῦ δυνησό[μεθ' ἐκ βυβλί]ων σοφώ[τατ' ἐ]ξενεγκεῖν; ἐ[πι]ιδεί[κνυ]ται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν [ὄλων ἐν τοῖς βυβλί]οις, τα[ράττων καὶ] θρυλῶν ὅτι Λε[ό]ντιον καὶ ἑτέρα «ἐταίρα» τις ἐν τῇ πραγματεία μνημονεύεται – καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἑρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαρμά[ρι]ον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημη[τρ]ία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθο[κλ]έους π[αιδ]αγωγὸς Πολύ[αινος]...

* ...regarding deeper matters, as can be most clearly received and comprehend the same everywhere. So, where are we able to extract the wisest [insights] from books? Also, it displays the retention of [everything] within the books, [unsettling] and whispering that Leóntion and another «companion» is mentioned in the treatise – and that the lover of Idomeneús was Nikídion, and of Leonteús was Mammáριον, and of Hérmarchos was Dēmētría – and such a kind also was Polýaenus, tutor of Pythoclês.

The "other companion" is probably Themísta. Nikídion was the lover of Idomeneus, Mammáριον was the lover of Leonteús, Demetria was the lover of Hérmarchos, and Polyaeus was the tutor of Pythoclês.

Pliny, Inquiry on Nature, 35.144

Theorus *Se Inungentem*, idem *Ab Oreste Matrem et Aegisthum Interfici*, *Bellumque Iliacum pluribus tabulis*, quod est *Romae in Philippi porticibus*, et *Cassandram*, quae est in *Concordiae Delubro*, *Leontium* (Epicuri) *Cogitantem*...

[The painter] Theorus [painted] a "*Man Anointing Himself*," and also "*Mother and Aegisthus killed by Orestes*," and the "*Trojan War*" in a series of pictures which is now in Philippus' Portico at Rome and a "*Cassandra*," which is in the shrine of Concordia, a "*Leóntion* (of Epíkouros) *Contemplating*"...

[U29]

Book 2

Aetius, Doxography, 1.15,9

Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος τὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ σώματα χροῖαν οὐκ ἔχειν.

* Epíkouros and Arístarchos [say] that objects in the dark do not have color.

Arístarchos was born in Samos in 310 BC (when Epicurus was 40 years old) and became a student of the Lyceum.

[U30]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1110B - D

Ἵτι δὲ τούτοις πρὸς πᾶν ἔστι χρῆσθαι τὸ καλούμενον καὶ νομιζόμενον πικρὸν, γλυκὺ, καθαρτικὸν, ὑπνωτικὸν, φωτεινόν: ὡς οὐδενὸς ἔχοντος αὐτοτελεῆ ποιότητα καὶ δύναμιν, οὐδὲ δρῶντος μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχοντος, ὅταν ἐγγένηται τοῖς σώμασιν, ἄλλην δ' ἐν ἄλλοις διαφορὰν καὶ κρᾶσιν λαμβάνοντος – οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν.

Because it is possible to use these [arguments in support of relative impressions of the senses] for everything that is called and considered bitter, sweet, cathartic, soporific, and illuminating: as none of these have any self-sufficient quality and power or are active rather than passive when they enter into [our] bodies, but takes on other forms and mixtures in different [bodies] – this is not obscure.

Αὐτὸς γὰρ οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν *Πρὸς Θεόφραστον* "οὐκ εἶναι" λέγων "τὰ χρώματα συμφυῆ τοῖς σώμασιν – ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιᾶς τινὰς τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν" οὐ μᾶλλον φησι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀχρωμάτιστον σῶμα εἶναι ἢ χρῶμα ἔχον.

Epikouros himself in the second book of his *Reply to Theophrastos* says that "colors are not intrinsic to bodies – but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye" is asserting by this reasoning that body is no more colorless than colored.

* "colors are not inherent in objects – but are generated according to some specific orders and positions in relation to sight."

Ἀνωτέρῳ δὲ κατὰ λέξιν ταῦτα γέγραφεν "ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τούτου τοῦ μέρους, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ σκοτεινῷ ταῦτ' ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα ἔχειν – καίτοι πολλάκις ἀέρος ὁμοίως σκοτώδους περικεχυμένου: οἱ μὲν αἰσθάνονται χρωμάτων διαφορᾶς, οἱ δ' οὐκ αἰσθάνονται δι' ἀμβλύτητα τῆς ὄψεως! ἔτι δ' εἰσελθόντες εἰς σκοτεινὸν οἶκον, οὐδεμίαν ὄψιν χρώματος ὁρῶμεν – ἀναμείναντες δὲ μικρὸν, ὁρῶμεν."

* Previously, however, he has written these things verbatim "But even without this part, I do not know how it is necessary to say that those things which are in the dark have colors – and yet, often, with similarly dark air surrounding: some people have perception of differences of colors, while others do not have a perception due to the dimness of vision! Moreover, having entered into a dark room, we see no sight of color – but having waited a little, we see."

Οὐ, μᾶλλον οὖν, ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα ῥηθήσεται τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον. εἰ δὲ τὸ χρῶμα πρὸς τι, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἔσται πρὸς τι καὶ τὸ κυανοῦν – εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν: ὥστε, κατὰ πάσης ποιότητος, ἀληθῶς τὸ "μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι" κατηγορεῖσθαι – τοῖς γὰρ οὕτω πάσχουσιν ἔσται τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ τοῖς μὴ πάσχουσι.

Therefore, it will not be said that each of the objects has or does not have color. But if color exists with respect to something, then both white and blue will exist with respect to something – and if these, then also sweet and bitter: therefore, according to every quality, it is truly said that "it is no more to be than not to be" – for it will be like this for those affected in this way, but it will not be for those not affected.

Therefore no body will any more be said to have colour than not. If colour is relative, white and blue will be relative – and if these, then also sweet and bitter: so that of every characteristic we can truly say "It is no more this than it is not this" for to those affected in a certain way the thing will be this, but not to those not so affected.

27. On the Gods Περὶ Θεῶν

Diogenēs Laërtios 10.271

...Χαιρέδημος. Περὶ Θεῶν. Περὶ Ὁσιότητος...

...Chairédēmos. On the Gods. On Holiness...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1102 B - D

...Μᾶλλον δὲ ὄλως ἀτερπὲς αὐτῷ καὶ λυπηρόν: ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις (οὐδὲν δεόμενος) διὰ τὸν φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ: καὶ θύων – μὲν ὡς μαγεῖρω – παρέστηκε τῷ ἱερεῖ σφάττοντι. θύσας δ', ἅπεισι λέγων τὸ Μενάνδρειον "ἔθουον οὐ προσέχουσιν οὐδὲν μοι θεοῖς."

Rather, [a festival] is altogether unpleasant and painful to [Epíkouros]: (although needing nothing) he feigns prayers and acts of worship because of the fear of the many, and he speaks words contrary to what he philosophizes: and while sacrificing – as if by a cook – he stands by the slaughtering priest. And, having sacrificed, he goes away while quoting the Menandrian line "I sacrifice to gods who pay no attention to me at all."

Οὕτω γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἶεται δεῖν σχηματίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ φθονεῖν μηδ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἷς χαίρουσιν ἕτεροι πράττοντες, αὐτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας. "πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον Πρᾶγμα' ἀνιερὸν ἔφυ" κατὰ τὸν Εὐήνον – ἧ καὶ τοὺς Δεισιδαίμονας, οὐ χαίροντας ἀλλὰ φοβουμένους, οἶονται θυσίαις καὶ τελεταῖς ὁμιλεῖν.

For in this way Epíkouros thinks that it is necessary to conform oneself and not to envy nor to be hostile to the many things which others rejoice when practicing, while they find it troublesome themselves. "every necessary Thing is difficult" according to Eúēnos [Páros] – whereby they also think that the Superstitious, not while rejoicing but while fearing, engage with sacrifices and rituals.

μηδὲν ἐκείνων Αὐτοὶ διαφέροντες, εἴ γε δὴ διὰ φόβον ταύτᾳ δρῶσιν, οὐδ' ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μεταλαγχάνοντες – ἀλλὰ μόνον δεδιότες καὶ ταραπτόμενοι μὴ φανεροὶ γένωνται, τοὺς πολλοὺς παραλογιζόμενοι καὶ φενακίζοντες – ἐφ' οὓς καὶ τὰ *Περὶ Θεῶν* καὶ *Ἐπιότητος αὐτοῖς* Βιβλία συντέτακται "ἑλικτὰ κούδεν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ" ἐπαμπεχομένοις καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένοις διὰ φόβον ἃς ἔχουσι δόξας.

Themselves [the Epicureans] differing in no way from the others, if indeed they do the same things because of fear, while not sharing as much good hope as those [the rest of the public] – but only fearing and being troubled lest they become exposed, while deceiving and cheating the many – for whom also the Books *About the Gods* and *Piety* have been composed by them, "twisting and nothing sound, but everything around" who cover up and conceal in fear the opinions they hold.

[Euripides, *Andromeda*, 448] "ἑλικτὰ κούδεν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ φρονοῦντες."

* "Twisted and unsound [thoughts] – but thinking everything around."

[U31]

Philódēmos, On the Gods, Book 3, P.Herc. 152 fr. 5

...Διαστέλλεται δὲ καὶ [πε]ρὶ τούτων ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Θεῶν* – διό περ καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ σάρκινον φθορᾶς εἶναι δεκτικὸν λέγει...

...Epíkouros makes a distinction for these [the gods] in the book *On the Gods* – In which he also affirms that what is made of flesh is susceptible to decay...

[U32]

Philodemus defends our school against charges of impiety by citing a passage from Epíkouros' On the Gods about how, although all flesh is susceptible to decay, the gods can exist as material compounds.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.7.190

[Obbink] [Ἐπι]κούρω δ' ἐν [τῷ *Περὶ Θεῶν*] "τὸ μὴ [τῆ] φύσει τὴν α[ι]σ[θανομένη]ν σύγκρισιν ἔχον, σύμφω[νον τῷ θείω] – καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆς [φύσεως ὄν] μετεχού[σης τῶ]ν ἀληθό[νων], ὥστ' ἐξ ἀν]άγκης μα[λακίας πολ]λὰς ποῆσαι. [ἡ θεία φύ]σις οὕσα, [φαίνεται] καὶ τις [δαιμόνιος]."

[Obbink] And according to Epíkouros in *On the Gods* "that which does not have in its nature a sensitive constitution is consistent with divinity – and [divine nature appears to be] that which is not of the nature that partakes of pains, so that it necessarily creates many weaknesses – and to be a kind of divinity."

[U33]

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, 1.44.1255

...Καὶ τὸ **ἀλλότριον** διαλυ[σαί, τε] καὶ κοσμή[σαι τὸ] **κατισχῦον** **πάν** – οὐδ[ὲ κ]ωλυόμε[νον] **ταῦτα** πράτ[τειν ἐν] **τῷ** *Περὶ Θεῶν* [φησιν.]

* ...And [the gods] dissolve **the unfamiliar**, and organize **all that prevails** – not being hindered in doing **these things**, [he mentions] in *On the Gods*.

[Obbink] ...And to dispel what is **foreign to its nature**, and to marshal **all [its] overpowering strength** – nor in *On the Gods* [does he say] anything conflicting with one's doing **these things**.

[U34]

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, 1.14.381

...[Ἐν] **τῷ** *Περὶ Θεῶν* ἀναμφιλέκτως **τίθε**ται τὸ τὴν...

[Obbink] ...In his book *On the Gods* it is indisputably set forth that the...

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, 1.36.1043

Ἐν τε γὰρ **τῷ** *Περὶ* *Θεῶν* **ποία** **τίς** **αἰτία** **ν**[εμέσεως] **καὶ** **σωτηρία**[ς **ανθρώ**]ποις **διὰ** τοῦ **θε**[οῦ] **κα**[ταλειπτέον] **ὑπ**[ογρά]φει **διὰ** **πλεό**[νων].

And in *On Gods* **what kind of source of troubles** and **of preservation towards humans** from the god **must be accepted** [Epikouros] outlines in some detail.

28. Kallistólas Καλλιστόλας

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...*Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην. Καλλιστόλας. Περὶ Βασιλείας...*

...Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs. Kallistólas. On Kingship...

29. On Criterion, or Canon Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανῶν

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...*Περὶ Τέλους. Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανῶν. Χαιρέδημος...*

...On the End Goal. On the Criterion, or The Canon. Chairédēmos...

Athēnaïos, *Deipnosophists*, 3.102B (Damoxenes, *The Cook*)

A. Ἐπικούρου δέ **με** ὄρᾳς **μαθητὴν ὄντα** τοῦ σοφοῦν – **παρ’ ᾧ** ἐν **δύ’** ἔτεσιν **καὶ** **μησὶν** οὐχ ὄλοις **δέκα** **τάλαντ’** ἐγὼ **σοι** κατεπύκνωσα **τέτταρα**.

A. You see **me here** as a pupil of the wise Epikouros – from whom in two years and ten months or less, I condensed **for you** **four talents**.

B. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστίν; εἰπέ **μοι**.

A. καθήγισα. μάγειρος ἦν κάκεινος – οὐκ ᾔδει, θεοί, ποῖος μάγειρος: "ἡ φύσις πάσης τέχνης ἀρχέγονον ἐστ', ἀρχέγονον, ὦλιθήριε! οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν νοεῖν σοφώτερον! πᾶν τ' εὐχερές τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦ λόγου τριβὴν ἔχοντι τούτου – πολλὰ γὰρ συμβάλλεται!"

I have initiated. And that one was a cook – he did not know, oh gods, what kind of a cook: "Nature is the origin of every art, the origin, wretched man! There is not even one thing wiser to think of! Every act is easy for the one having experience of this reasoning – then many things come together!"

A. διόπερ μάγειρον ὅταν ἴδῃς ἀγράμματον μὴ Δημόκριτόν τε πάντα διανεγνωκότα (μᾶλλον δὲ κατέχοντα!) καταγέλα ὡς κενοῦ – καὶ τὸν Ἐπικούρου Κανόνα? μινθώσας, ἄφες! ὡς ἐκ διατριβῆς τοῦτο δεῖ γὰρ εἰδέναί: τίς ἔχει διαφορὰν πρῶτον (ὧ βέλτιστε σύ) γλαυκίσκος ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ θέρει πάλιν ποῖος περὶ δύσιν Πλειάδος συνειδέναί ἰχθύς ὑπὸ τροπᾶς τ' ἐστὶ χρησιμώτατος!

And therefore, when you see a cook who is illiterate, not understanding everything by Democritus (he must remember him as well!) laugh at him as empty – and [he does not understand] the Canon of Epikouros? Having scrutinized [the cook], discharge [him]! For it is necessary to know this from practice: first, how great the difference (my friend) the glaukiskos has in winter and again in summer – what kind of fish is most useful to recognize around the setting of the Pleiades and under the solstices!

ὁ γλαυκίσκος	"little gleaming fish" (possibly) anchovy	ΓΛΑΥΚΙΣΚΟΣ gleaming little
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Diogénēs Laértios 10.30

Ἀρκτέον δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ὀλίγα προειπόντα περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν φιλοσοφίας. Διαιρεῖται τοίνυν εἰς τρία: τὸ τε Κανονικόν, καὶ Φυσικόν, καὶ Ἠθικόν – τὸ μὲν οὖν Κανονικόν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Κανών.

We ought to begin at first with a few things said beforehand concerning the division philosophy according to him. It is divided into three: the Canon, Physics, and Ethics – the Canon forms the introduction, and is contained in the one book titled Canon.

Diogénēs Laértios 10.14

Ἄριστων δὲ φησιν ἐν τῷ Ἐπικούρου Βίῳ τὸν Κανόνα γράψαι αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ναυσιφάνους Τρίποδος – οὗ καὶ ἀκοῦσαί φησιν αὐτόν – ἀλλὰ καὶ Παμφίλου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ ἐν Σάμῳ.

Aríston says in his Life of Epikouros that [Epikouros] wrote The Canon from the Tripod of Nausiphánēs – to whom [Aríston] says [Epikouros] even listened – but also to Pamphílos the Platonist in Samos.

Peripatetic Aríston of Khîos (fl. c. 225 BC) or Stoic Aríston of Khîos (fl. c. 260 BC) or Aristo of Alexandria?

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.19.63

(Torquatus) Tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa – quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium – regula ad quam omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur: numquam ullius oratione victi, sententia desistemus.

(Torquatus) Indeed if we will hold a stable knowledge of things, with that being preserved – which has fallen as though from heaven for the knowledge of all – the rule to which all judgments of things will be directed: then never, having been convinced by anyone's speech, will we abandon our knowledge

(Velleius) **Ea qui consideret (quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur) venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero (de quibus haec quaestio est) habere debeat!**

(Velleius) Whoever considers **these things** (how rashly and recklessly they are said) ought to revere **Epíkouros** and hold him in the number of those themselves (about whom this question exists)!

Solus enim vidit, primum, esse deos quod in omnium animis eorum notionem inpressisset ipsa natura. Quae est, enim, gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat, sine doctrina, anticipationem quandam deorum?

For he alone saw, first, that **gods exist** because **into the minds of all [men]** nature herself had impressed **a notion of them**. In fact, what nation or race of men exists that does not have, **without teaching, some anticipation of the gods?**

ea nōtiō nōtiōnēs	notion	NOTIO <i>the result of becoming familiar</i>
ea anticipātiō anticipātiōnēs	anticipation	ANTICIPATIO <i>the result of taking before</i>

Quam appellat "πρόληψιν" Epíkouros – id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem – sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. quouis rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de Regula et Iudicio volumine accepimus.

Such [a notion] Epíkouros calls "prólēpsis" – that is, **some information in the mind obtained before [thinking]** without which nothing is able to be understood, questioned or disputed. We have received **the strength and benefit of this reasoning** from that celestial volume of Epíkouros *on the Rule and Judgment*.

ἡ πρόληψις ἡ προλήψεις	preconception <i>(anticipation)</i>	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>grasping before</i>
anteceptus <i>(a, um)</i>	obtained before <i>[thinking]</i>	ANTECEPTUS <i>taken before</i>
ea infōrmātiō infōrmātiōnēs	information	INFORMATIO <i>making into shape</i>
antecepta infōrmātiō	information obtained before <i>[thinking]</i>	

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1118A

Οὐ γὰρ Κωλώτῃ μὲν ὁ ἄρτος ἄρτος ἐφαίνετο καὶ χόρτος ὁ χόρτος ὅτι τοὺς 'διοπετεῖς' ἀνεγνώκει Κανόνας (ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ὑπὸ ἀλαζονείας ἄρτου μὲν ὡς χόρτου, χόρτου δὲ ὡς ἄρτου φαντασίαν ἐλάμβανε). δόγμασι γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ λόγοις οὗτοι χρῶνται βελτίοισιν οἱ σοφοί – ὁ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα κοινόν ἐστὶ πάθος ἀλόγοις περαινόμενον αἰτίαις.

Bread did not appear to Kōlōtēs as **bread** and grass as **grass** because he had studied **the 'heaven-sent' Canons** (Socrates by false pretense perceived **an image of bread as grass and grass as bread**). For these wise men use **doctrines and arguments superior to ours** – but perceiving and being affected by appearances is **a common feeling** that is determined by **irrational causes**.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1123F

Εἰ γὰρ οὐ κραιπαλῶντες οὐδὲ φαρμακῶντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ παρακόπτοντες – ἀλλὰ νήφοντες καὶ ὑγιαίνοντες καὶ γράφοντες περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ Κανόνων καὶ Κριτηρίων ἐν τοῖς ἐναργεστάτοις πάθεσι καὶ κινήμασι τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἢ 'τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἀληθές' ἢ 'ψεῦδος καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον' ἡγοῦνται 'τὸ ἀληθές' – οὐκ εἰ περὶ πάντων ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀλλ' εἴ τισιν ὅλως ἄνθρωποι συγκατατίθενται, θαυμάζειν ἄξιον!

For if men are neither intoxicated nor on drugs and raving – but rather are sober and healthy and writing about truth and Standards and Measurements in the clearest experiences and movements of sensations, if [such sober men] consider either 'the non-existent is true' or 'the false and non-existent is the truth' – then not if they are at peace about everything, but if the men agree in anything at all, is worthy of wonder!

Alciphron, Letters, 17.2.2

(Leóntion scribentem ad Lamiam facit) Μέχρι τίνος ὑπομενεῖ τις τὸν φιλόσοφον τοῦτον; ἐχέτω τὰ "Περὶ Φύσεως" καὶ τὰς Κυρίας Δόξας καὶ τοὺς διεστραμμένους Κανόνας – ἐμὲ δὲ ἀφέτω τὴν φυσικῶς κυρίαν ἐμαυτῆς, ἀστομάχητον καὶ ἀνύβριστον.

(Leóntion depicted as writing to Lamia) How long can one suffer this philosopher? Let him keep that "On Nature," the Principal Judgements, those twisted Canons – let me retain my natural mastery over myself, unchallenged and uninsulted.

Alciphron, Letters, 17.2.7

...Κολακεύειν αὐτὸν καὶ καθυμνεῖν τὰς ὑπηνέμους αὐτοῦ Δόξας...

...To flatter him and to sing the praises of the sheltered Judgements of his...

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.23.21

εἶτα τηλικαύτη Δύναμις οὔσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη, παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα – οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ Σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἡνέσχετο ἂν τις αὐτῆς

then, being so great a Power and set over all the rest, let [the power of the will] come forward and let it say to us that the most excellent of all things is the flesh – not even if the Flesh itself declared that it itself is the most excellent, would anyone be tolerant of this

νῦν δὲ τί ἐστίν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ Τέλους συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰς Φυσικάς; τὸ περὶ Κανόνος; τὸ τὸν πώγωννα καθεικός; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνησεν, ὅτι "τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες, ἅμα, καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;" ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς! καὶ οὐ μαίνη; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς εἶ;

but now which is it, Epikouros, which declares these things? Which one wrote about The End, which one wrote on Nature? Which one wrote about the Canon? Which one let grow the beard? Which one wrote when it was dying that it was "spending the last and, at the same time, also happy day?" Was it the flesh or the will? And then you agree to having something superior to this [the will]! Are you not insane? Are you so blind and deaf to the truths?

[U35]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.31 sup.

Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν, ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς Φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους. ἐν, τοίνυν, τῷ Κανόνι, λέγων ἐστίν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς ^[1]αἰσθήσεις καὶ ^[2]προλήψεις καὶ τὰ ^[3]πάθη, οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ ^[4]τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας.

* [Epicureans] reject **dialectic** as **misleading**, [saying that] it is sufficient for the **Physicists to proceed** according to the [common] words for things. Therefore, In *The Canon*, Epíkouros affirms the **standards of truth** are the ^[1]**sensations** and the ^[2]**preconceptions** and the ^[3]**feelings**, and the Epicureans [also affirm] the ^[4]**image-based focus of the mind**.

[U36]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.31 fin.

Λέγει δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον Ἐπιτομῇ καὶ ἐν ταῖς Κυρίαις Δόξαις, "πᾶσα γάρ" φησὶν "αἰσθησις **ἄλογός** ἐστὶ καὶ **μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτικὴ** – οὔτε γὰρ **ὑφ' αὐτῆς** οὔτε **ὑφ' ἑτέρου** κινηθεῖσα, **δύναται τι προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν**."

As he also says in the *Letter to Hēródotos* and in the *Primary Judgements*, he says "Every sensation is **devoid of reason** and **capable of no memory** – for neither when moved by itself nor by another, is [a sensation] able to add **anything** or take [anything] away."

Diogénēs Laértios 10.32

οὐδὲ ἔστι Τὸ δυνάμενον **αὐτὰς** διελέγξαι: οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμογένεια Αἰσθησις **τὴν ὁμογενῆ** διὰ τὴν **ἰσοσθένειαν** – οὔθ' ἡ ἀνομογένεια **τὴν ἀνομογένειαν** – οὐ γὰρ **τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικαί**

nor is there Anything able refute **them**: for neither does the like Sensation [refute] **the like [sensation]** through equal force – nor the unlike [sense refute] **the unlike** – for they are **not critical of the same things**

οὔτε, μὴν, Λόγος – πᾶς γὰρ Λόγος **ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων** ἤρτηται! οὔθ' ἡ ἑτέρα **τὴν ἑτέραν**, **πάσαις** γὰρ προσέχομεν – καὶ Τὸ **τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ' ὑφεστάναι**, πιστοῦται **τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν**

* indeed, neither [can] Reason [refute the senses] – for all Reason has been held up by the sensations! Nor [does] one [sense refute] **another**, for we cling to all – and the Fact that **the impressions are established**, confirms **the truth of the senses**

ὑφιστάναι	to be established, to subsist	ΥΦΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>to set up under</i>
<i>consistent sense impressions show that these impressions match their source accurately</i>		

ὑφέστηκε δὲ τό τε Ὅραν **ἡμᾶς** καὶ Ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλγεῖν, ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων **ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων** χρῆ Σημειοῦσθαι: καὶ γὰρ καὶ Ἐπίνοιαὶ πᾶσαι **ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων** γεγόνασι – **κατὰ τε** ^[1]**περίπτωσιν** καὶ ^[2]**ἀναλογίαν** καὶ ^[3]**ὁμοιότητα** καὶ ^[4]**σύνθεσιν** – **συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ**

* Seeing and Hearing have been established for us, just like feeling pain, where Taking signs from what is visible is also necessary for unseen things: for indeed, all Thoughts have arisen from the sensations – according to ^[1]circumstance, ^[2]analogy, ^[3]similarity, and ^[4]synthesis – with reasoning also throwing in something

ἡ περίπτωσις αἱ περιπτώσεις	circumstance	ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ <i>fall around</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning again</i>
ἡ ὁμοιότης	similarity	ΟΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>the same</i>

τά τε τῶν μαινομένων Φαντάσματα καὶ τὰ κατ' ὄναρ ἀληθῆ – κινεῖ γάρ – Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, οὐ κινεῖ

the Impressions of maniacs and [impressions] in dreams are real – because they move [the mind] – and What does not exist, does not move

30. Against the Megarians **Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς. Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. Διαπορίαι...

...Summary of Objections to the Physicists. Against the Megarians. Problems...

After the death of his teacher Sōkrátēs, Eukleídēs of Mégara founded a school in Mégara (a city 25 miles west of Athens and 30 miles east of Corinth), where many students of Sōkrátēs took refuge with him.

The school formed into a group of thinkers known for studying logical puzzles and paradoxes (such as 'the Horns,' 'the Sorites,' and 'the Covered Father'). Eukleídēs was interested in the dilemmas of logic and criticized the use of analogy.

According to Diogénēs Laértios, Eukleídēs declared that "the good is one – though it is called by many names: sometimes wisdom, sometimes god, sometimes mind, and so forth." Eventually the Stoics would take much inspiration from this school.

31. Mētródōros

in five books

Μητρόδωρος ε΄

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Τιμοκράτης γ΄. Μητρόδωρος ε΄. Αντίδωρος β΄...

...Timokrátēs, in three books. Mētródōros, in five books. Antídōros, in two books...

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? 1129A

αἱ τοσαῦται Μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον, ἐπὶ Ἀριστόβουλον, ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον γραφόμεναι καὶ συνταττόμεναι φιλοπόνως...

These so many Myriads of lines on Mētródōros, on Aristóboulos, and on Chairédēmos, written and composed diligently...

Book 1

[U37]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.23

ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος πρὸς τε τὰς ὀχλήσεις καὶ τὸν θάνατον, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Μητροδώρῳ φησί

[Mētródōros] also was not struck down by troubles and death, as Epíkouros says in the first book of his Mētródōros memoirs

32. On Music Περὶ Μουσικῆς

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Ἀριστόβουλος. Περὶ Μουσικῆς. Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἄρετῶν...

...Aristóbuolos. On Music. On Justice and Other Virtues...

33. Neoklēs *Dedicated to Themísta* Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας. Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν. Συμπόσιον...

...On Fair Dealing. Neoklēs, Dedicated to Themísta. Symposium...

34. Theories about Diseases *Dedicated to Míthrēs* Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι, πρὸς Μίθρην

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Ἀντίδωρος β'. Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην. Καλλιστόλας...

...Antídōros, in two books. Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs. Kallistólas...

35. On Vision Περὶ τοῦ Ὁραῖν

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον. Περὶ τοῦ Ὁραῖν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας...

...Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros. On Vision. On the Angle of the Atom...

36. On Holiness Περὶ Ὁσιότητος

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Θεῶν. Περὶ Ὁσιότητος. Ἡγεσιάναξ...

...On the Gods. On Holiness. Hēgēsíanax...

[=U30] Plutarch, Non Posse, 1102C

...τὰ Περὶ Θεῶν καὶ Ὁσιότητος αὐτοῖς βιβλία συντέτακται "ἐλικτὰ κούδέν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ Πᾶν περίξ" ἐπαμπεχομένοις καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένοις διὰ φόβον ἅς ἔχουσι δόξας

...the Books *About the Gods* and *Piety* have been composed by them "twisting and in no way sound, but Everything around" who cover up and conceal in fear the judgements they hold

[=U27] Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 1.41.115

(Cotta) at etiam *De Sanctitate*, *De Pietate* aduersus deos libros scripsit Epicurus – at quo modo in his loquitur? ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaeuolam pontifices maximos te audire Dicas...

(Cotta) it is true that Epíkouros wrote books *On Sanctity* and *On Reverence* towards the gods – but in what manner does he actually speak in them? so that You might say that you were listening to the high priests Coruncianus or Scaevola...

[U38]

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, 1.44.1258

Κα[λεῖ] δὲ καὶ τὸν τ[ε]λειό[τητος] βίον "ἡ]διστον καὶ μα[καρι]ώτατον" ἐν [τῷ] *Περὶ Ὁσιότη[τος]* – καὶ Κ[α]ταξιοῖ πᾶ[ν τὸ μ]αρόν φυλάτ[τεσθαι νοή]σεως συ[ν]ορω[μένης] τὰ[ς καλὰς] διαθέσεις – [τοῦ πάν]τα γ' οἰκε[ιοῦν τὰ] γιν[ό]μεν[α] ἡμῖν] πρ[ὸς] μακ[αριότητα] καὶ ἀπηρτισμένα [γ' ἔ]χε[ιν]

He also calls the life of integrity "the most pleasant and most happy" in the work *On Holiness* – and He considers it necessary that all that is base is guarded by our mind paying attention to good attitudes – for making suitable all that happens to us for having happiness and particularly for having [it be] adequate

[Obbink] And in *On Holiness* he calls the life of perfection "the most pleasant and most blessed" – and instructs us to guard against all defilement, with our intellect comprehensively viewing the best psychosomatic dispositions – for the sake of fitting all that happens to us to blessedness and especially having it in good order.

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, 1.40.1127

[Ἐγὼ] δὲ τούναντίον – [οὐχ] ἡγοῦμαι [τόνδε τὸν] τρόπον [διὰ τὰ τοι]αῦτ' ἀνο[σίως ἐ]ξελέσθαι τὴν πᾶσαν ὀσιότητα σὺν τῷ τ[ὰ κοινὰ] φυλάττειν (ῶ[ς] δ' Οἱ λεγόμε[νοι δει]σιδαίμονες) εἰς ἀνυ]πέρβλητον ἀ[σέβει]αν ἐκβάλλειν

[I think] the opposite – I do not consider this manner [of thinking] regarding these things unlawfully eliminates all holiness along with the protection of the state and (as Those called superstitious think) extends [us] into unparalleled impiety

[Obbink] But I by contrast – do not think that this manner on account of these things impiously does away with the whole [notion of] holiness together with the preservation of common beliefs and that (as those who are said to be religious think) it hurls us into unsurpassable impiety.

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, 1.40.1138

[ὁσιος] γὰρ Ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[ασίαν] κα[ὶ τ]ὴν ἄκραν μακα[ριότητα] τοῦ θε[ε]οῦ σώ[ζων] (σὺ]ν ἅπασιν] τοῖς συναπτομένοις ἡμῖν) – ἀ]σεβῆς δὲ περ[ὶ θεό]ν Ὁς ἐκά[τε]ρον [ἐξορ]ίζει

pious is the He who preserves the immortality and the supreme blessedness of god (along with all those things connected to us) – but impious towards god [is he] Who banishes either one

[Obbink] For pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God (together with all the things included by us) – but impious is the person who banishes either [blessedness or immortality] where God is concerned.

Ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν χωρὶς ὀργῆ[ς καὶ] χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ
 παρασκε[υὰς] τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ] τῶν κακ]ῶν ἀπο[φαί]νεται [αὐτὸν τ]ῶν
 ἀνθρ[ωπείω]ν μηδ[ε]νὸς [προς]δεῖσθαι...

He who deliberates without anger and without weakening of favor on the
 procurement from [god] for both benefits and harms shows [god] to be in
 need of nothing from humans...

[Obbink] And the person who sees also that the good and ill [sent us by God]
 come without any unhealthy anger or benevolence – declares that God has
 no need of human things...

[U39]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.8.205

Γράψας [δὲ] καὶ *Περὶ Ὁσιότητος ἄλλο βιβλίον*, κὰν τούτῳ διασαφεῖ τὸ (μὴ
 μόνον ἀφθάρτως, ἀλλὰ κ[αὶ] κατὰ συντέλε[ιαν] ἔ[ν] καὶ ταύ[τὸν] συν]εχῶ[ς]
 ὑπάρχον) καθ' "ὀ]μλ[ίαν ἐνότητος]" προσαγορεύε[σθαι] – τὰς μὲν ἐκ [τῶν
 ὄντων] τῶν αὐτῶ[ν] ἀποτε]λεῖσθαι, τὰς δ' ἐκ τῶν] ὁμοίων

[Epíkouros] also wrote another book *On Holiness*, in it he makes clear
 that it [the nature of the gods] (which exists continuously as one and the same, not
 merely in an imperishable manner, but also according to an influx of
 provisions) is called "an association [of unity]" – both those [unities]
 composed from the same things, and those from the similar things

[Obbink] And having written another book *On Holiness*, in it too he makes clear
 that not only that thing which exists indestructibly, but also (that which)
 continually exists in perfection as one and the same entity: are termed in the
 common usage "[unified] entities" – some of which [entities] are perfected
 out of the same elements, and others from similar elements.

εἷς (μία, ἓν)	one	ἜΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἘΝ
ἡ ἐνότης αἱ ἐνότητες	unity	ΕΝΟΤΗΣ condition of oneness
ἡ ὁμοιότης αἱ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ΟΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ condition of sameness

[U40]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.347

στοιχ[εῖω]σιν ὁ[μοίων] οὔσα], φαίνο[ιτ'] ἄ[ν]Ἐν]ότης, δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς
 ὁμοιότητος ὑπάρχουσι *δαιώνιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν* – ἐπειδὴ περ
 οὐχ ἦττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων στοιχείων Ἐνότητες ὑποτελεῖσθαι
 δύνανται (καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου καταλείπονται, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ
 Ὁσιότητος, αὐτότατα*)

with the composition of similar [elements] that exist, a Unity emerges, for it
 is able to possess out of similarities eternal perfect happiness – since no less
 from the same or similar elements can Unities be composed (and are left
 undisputed by Epíkouros as the same things, just as [he says] in *On Holiness*)

[Obbink] Its constitution out of things similar would obviously be a unified
 entity: for it is possible [for beings constituted] out of similarity for ever to
 have perfect happiness – since [unified] entities can be formed no less out of
 identical than out of similar elements ([and both kinds of entity] are
 recognized by Epíkouros as [being] exactly the same things, for example in
 his book *On Holiness*.)

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.364

τ[ὸ δ]ὲ μηδεμίαν ὑπε[ναν]τιολογίαν εἶναι παρα[ιτη]τέον Ὑποδεικνύειν: Εἴωθε, τοίνυν, [πά]νθ' ὁμῶς Ταῦτα φύ[σι]ν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγειν – τὰ Πολλὰ [μέ]ν ἐπειδὴν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοίων [καὶ ἄ]λλων [ἐπι]συνκρί[σεως ἀ]τόμ[ων γέ]νηται...

Proving that **there is no logical contradiction must be declined**: accordingly, [Epikouros] used to say that **all These things are equally brought to completion by nature** – indeed many Things come into existence from the aggregation of similar and different atoms...

[Obbink] The demonstration that this involves no contradiction may be passed over: Therefore he was wont to say that nature brought all these things to completion alike – and that for the most part many things come about [when they are formed] from an aggregation of various similar particles...

[U41]

☞ [=U88] Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111

...[Καὶ ἄ]λληι κὰν [τῶι *Περὶ Ὁ*]σιότητι[ος, κὰν τῶι] δωδεκά[τῳ καὶ] τρεῖσκα[ιδεκάτῳ] *Περὶ Φύσε[ως, κὰν τῶι]* πρώτῳ[ι τῶν *Περὶ*] *Τιμοκράτους*.

...In other places, such as in *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th [books] *On Nature*, and in the first of [his books] *On Timokrátēs*.

37. On Theories about Feelings

against Timokrátēs

Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι, πρὸς Τιμοκράτην

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...*Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης. Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην. Προγνωστικόν...*

...*On Destiny. On Theories about Feelings, against Timokrátēs. Prognostication...*

38. On Wealth

Περὶ Πλούτου

[U42]*

Philódēmos, On Vices and the Opposite Virtues, Book 9, On Property Management, P.Herc. 1424, col. 12, line 5 -17

Διαλεξόμεθα, τοίνυν, οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκῳ καλῶ[ς] ἔστιν βιοῦν – ἀλλ' ὡς ἴσασθαι δεῖ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς: περὶ [ἃ], τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν οἰκονομικὸν ἰδίως νοεῖσθαι Συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲν διαφερόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς ὀν[ό]μασιν ὑποτάττειν προαιρ[ο]ύμενους, καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλοσόφῳ δεούσης κτήσεως, [οὐ] τῆς ὅτι[δή]ποτε

We will explore, therefore, not **how to live well** at home – but **how it is necessary to be positioned** in regards to gaining and guarding of what we need: regarding which, It has come to be that **economic [management]** and **economical [principles]** are **perceived distinctly** – making no distinction towards those who choose to submit **other things to these names**, and concerning the possession required **by philosophy**, not just of any sort [of possession]

[Tsouna] We shall discuss, then, not **how one can live well** at home – but what attitude one must take up both with regard to the acquisition and the preservation of wealth, concerning which **property management** and the **property-management expert** are in fact conceived specifically, (and we shall do so) without contending at all with those who prefer to make other meaning underlie the terms and, moreover, discussing the acquisition (of property) that is appropriate for the philosopher, [not] for just anyone.

...κα[ῖ]τὸ πάντως κα[τ'] ἐναντιό[τ]ητα τῶι πλού[τ]ωι τ[ῆ]ν πενίαν τίθεσθαι: καὶ τὸ μὴν [ἐνί]οτε ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ μ[έ]γα – σὺν ταῖς καὶ πρὸς π[ε]ν[ί]αν... Ἐπικούρου λέγοντος ἀδρὰν...

...and always Placing poverty in opposition to wealth: and Saying that wealth [is] sometimes good and significant – particularly in the [context] of poverty... Epikouros asserts strongly...

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.17.55

(Cicero ad Torquatum) tenuit permagnam Sextilius hereditatem, unde, si secutus esset eorum sententiam Qui honesta et recta emolumentis omnibus et commodis anteponebant, nummum nullum attigisset. num igitur Eum postea Censes anxio animo aut sollicito fuisse? nihil minus. contraque, illa hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus

(Cicero to Torquatus) Sextilius held a very large inheritance, from which, if he had followed the opinion of those Who place honorable and upright things above all benefits and advantages, he would not have touched a single coin. Do You think, then, that he was later with an anxious or worried mind? Not at all. On the contrary, he was wealthy from that inheritance and happy because of it

magni enim Aestimabat pecuniam, non modo non contra leges, sed etiam legibus partam – quae quidem vel cum periculo est quaerenda vobis – est enim Effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum

For he valued money highly, not only not contrary to the laws, but even acquired by the laws – Which according to you all ought to be sought indeed even with danger – for it is the Producer of many and great pleasures

[U43]*

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 47/16, lines 9 - 12

...[Ἐπ]ίκου[ρος τῆ]ν φι[λοσ]ο[φ]ία[ν ἐ]ν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναπλώσει – τὴν γὰρ πενίαν [τ]ο[ῦ] Καθηγ[ε]μόνος ἀγαθὸν [ε]ῖναι νομίζον[τος] ἐ[ν τῶι] δευτέρ[ωι]...

...Epikouros [considers] philosophy in [the context of] the fulfillment of goods – with [our] Leader considering poverty to be good in a secondary [role]...

[U44]*

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 40/9, lines 7 - 14

* καὶ θαρ[ρ]ούντως εἶ[π]ε, δὴ καὶ καθάπερ ἔφησε Πολύαινος "σ[υ]μμ[ε]τρῶς ἐθεράπευεν [τὸ ἄλ]γος" – καὶ το[ῦ]το ποεῖ, κ[αθ]άπερ εἶπεν Ἐπίκουρος, [ὅτ]α[ν] παρῆι ποτὲ πεσῶ[ν... ὁ Σο]φὸς εἰς πενίαν, μόνον [τρέ]πεται...

and indeed He confidently said, and just as Polýainos declared "he was suitably treating [the pain]" – and this occurs, just as Epikouros said, whenever the Wiseman sometimes happens to fall into poverty, he only is turned...

(alternative) "ὅπερ ἔτρωσε θεραπεύει [ὁ λό]γος "

(alternative) "the same [reasoning which] wounded, heals"

[U45]*

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 45/14, lines 31 - 40

...Διὰ [ταῦτ]α [τῶν] Ἐπι[κ]ουρείων λέγοντα[ί τι]νες ὑ[πέρ το]ῦ κακὸν εἶνα[ι τή]ν πε[νί]αν ἐπιλογισ[μ]ο[ῖ]ς χρῆσθαι τοιούτοι[ς]. ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἔν τε ἄλλοις πο[λλο]ῖς φησι τὴν πενία[ν κ]ακὸν εἶναι – καὶ ἐν [τύχαις] δ' ἑτέραις [σ]υναφθεῖσα[ν], μὴ φέρε[σθαι].

...Because of these [reasons], some of the Epicureans say for the [purpose of arguing that] poverty is an evil, using such types of reasoning. Epíkouros says in many other [contexts] that poverty is an evil – and when combined with other [circumstances], it is not endured [well].

39. Polymédēs **Πολυμήδης**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος. Πολυμήδης. Τιμοκράτης γ'...

...On Gifts and Gratitude. Polymédēs. Timokratēs, in three books...

40. Prognostication **Προγνωστικόν**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι Πρὸς Τιμοκράτην. Προγνωστικόν. Προτρεπτικός...

...On Theories about Feelings, against Timokratēs. Prognostication. Exhortation to Study Philosophy...

41. Exhortation to Study Philosophy **Προτρεπτικός**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28:

...Προγνωστικόν. Προτρεπτικός. Περὶ Εἰδώλων...

...Prognostication. Exhortation to Study Philosophy. On Films...

42. On Rhetoric **Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς**

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1127A

Οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι.

...But these men, if they write [about such matters at all], write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (fl. 75 AD) was a Roman orator and politician, who wrote "Institutio Oratoria" or "The Institutes of Oratory," a detailed twelve-volume treatise on rhetoric crafted around 95 AD. The work extensively discusses rhetorical methods and the training of orators. His notable pupils included Pliny the Younger, and Emperor Vespasian honored him with a consulship.

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 2.15 - 17

Agnon quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est. nam de Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil miror! hi complura dicunt sed ex paucis locis ducta; itaque potentissimis eorum breviter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio evadat.

Agnon renders himself suspect by the very title of his book in which he proclaims that he is going to indict rhetoric. As to [the statements of] Epíkouros, who flees all training, they cause me no surprise! These gentlemen talk a great deal, but the arguments on which they base their statements are few. I will therefore select the most important of them and will deal with them briefly, to prevent the discussion lasting to all eternity.

Prima iis argumentatio ex materia est: omnes enim artes aiunt habere materiam, quod est verum; rhetorices nullam esse propriam, quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo.

Their first contention is based on the subject-matter: for they assert that all arts have their own subject-matter (which is true) and go on to say that rhetoric has none, which I shall show in what follows to be false.

[U46]*

Art has a definite set of external principles which can be imparted from teacher to student. Ability, in contrast, is the result of personal practice and experience.

Keeping in mind that rhetors called their own instruction books "technai" "technical [manuals]" – questioning to what extent rhetoric is an "art / techne" cuts to the base of the whole profession because it asks: to what extent do these "technical manuals" actually have any repeatable and teachable technique ("art / techne") at all?

Philodemus informs us that some Epicureans in Rhodes argued that Epíkouros thought that no form of rhetoric was an art. However, most of the students in Athens, following Zeno of Sidon, disagreed and argued that Epíkouros thought that the study of the principles of composition is in fact an art (but they all agreed that Epíkouros thought that forensic and deliberative oratory, as well as political science, are not arts).

Below, Philodemus argues that when the verb "estí" is combined with the genitive in order to indicate the method by which something is achieved, it doesn't necessarily suggest exclusivity of the method. Additional clarification would be required from the author to unambiguously state that it is the sole method used. Philodemus notes that since Epíkouros does not include an adjective such as "only," it should not be implicitly assumed by the reader. Philodemus references normal usage of Greek as a guide to understand Epíkouros' intent.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 18

Οὕτως τοίνυν, εἰπόντος Ἐπικούρου διότι "πολλῆς ἐσ[τι]ν ἡ ῥητορικὴ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας" οὐχ ὑπ[α]κουστέον τὸ "μόνης" – ἀλλὰ μό[νον] τὸ "[δεῖ]ται πολλῆς τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας." τὸ γὰρ "ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ "δεῖται" τίθησιν, ὅταν οὕτως ὀμιλώμεν – ἡ συνηθε[ε]ία τό γε μετριώτα[ο]ν ὑπὸ [τ]ῶν λέξεων σημαίνεται, καὶ οὐχ[ὶ] θάτερον μόνον ἀεὶ [συ]νόλω[ς] σημαίνεσθ[αι] ῥητέον... ...ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἦ καὶ διὰ τέχνης καὶ τριβῆς (καὶ) οὐδ' ὄλως ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας...

[Chandler] So in this way, when Epíkouros said that "rhetoric is (the result) of much practice and familiarity" one should not understand the word "alone," but only the meaning "requires much practice and familiarity." For he writes the word "is" in place of "requires," just as we do when we speak in ordinary conversation, where by the standards of common parlance the most normal (meaning) is meant by the words; and one should not insist that the other meaning only is all the time meant in general... ✱ ...for the sake of the expression which this man has used, I say that it is unclear whether Epíkouros means [that ⁽¹⁾rhetoric comes about] from familiarity and practice alone [or ⁽²⁾rhetoric comes about] not entirely from practice and familiarity [but also art]

Therefore, given that Epikouros said "rhetoric is of much practice and habit" this should not be considered to mean "[rhetoric] **only** [requires much practice and habit]" – but only that "[rhetoric] does require much practice and habit." For "is" means "requires," when we speak **in this way** – habit indicates **the most regular** [usage] **by these words**, and it must not be said that **it signifies** only **the other** [meaning of exclusivity] altogether... ✱
...Epikouros, whether through skill and effort, or not at all from habitual practice...

Philodemus advocates for an interpretation of "estí" which he asserts is the most common in this specific context. While Philodemus acknowledges the potential for the sentence to be understood in the manner preferred by "the Rhodian," he contends that in cases of ambiguity like these, ordinary language stands as the only reliable criterion.

Another question to consider is whether requiring "practice" (tribé) and "habit" (synéatheia) inherently exclude sophistic rhetoric (composing arguments together and conducting lectures) from being considered an art. Philodemus says that they do not, as the founders recognized that some arts demand significant practice.

[U47]*

Mētródōros, On Poems Book 1, quoted by Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672 col. 22

Πότερον οὖν ⁽¹⁾ τὴν [ῥη]τορικὴν δύναμιν λέγει[ν] τις βλέπων ἐπὶ τὴν διάγνωσιν τοῦ ὁ πρακτέον ἐστὶν τῷ μέλλοντι εὐδαίμον[ε]ι εἶναί τε καὶ ἔσσεσθαι – καὶ ἅ [ου πρ]ακτέον, καὶ ταύτην φησὶν ἀ[π]ὸ φ[υσι]ολογίας παραγείνεσθαι, [ἢ κ]αὶ ⁽²⁾ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐμπειρ[ί]αν καθ' ἣν ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ ἱστορίας τῶν πόλεως πραγμάτων συνορώη ἂν τις οὐ κακῶς τὰ πλήθει συμφέροντα;

Is one then to speak of ⁽¹⁾ rhetorical power by being aware of the discernment of what ought to be done for the one intending to be and to continue being fortunate – and what should not be done, and say that this comes from natural philosophy, or [is one to speak of] the ⁽²⁾ political experience through which a man, from the practice and history of city affairs, could quite properly observe what is beneficial for the masses?

[Chandler] So does one speak of ⁽¹⁾ rhetorical capability by looking to the distinction of what must be done and must [not] be done by the man who intends to be, and to continue to be, successful, and say that this (capability) derives from the science of nature, or does one speak of ⁽²⁾ political experience in accordance with which one is likely to observe from practice and research in the affairs of a city that which is advantageous to the people?

Philodemus cites Metrodorus' statements from the first book of "De Poematis," where he says that Metrodorus states clearly that civic rhetoric is not a science but rather grounded in experience and observation. It seems Metrodorus is addressing a certain vagueness about what is meant by "rhetorical advances."

Philodemus appears mainly focused on how Metrodorus highlights the empirical and practical elements crucial for success in politics. The term "political experience (politikè empeiria)" and its definition as deriving "from the experience and history of the city's affairs" strongly imply that Metrodorus does not view political activity as an art, but as practical knowledge gained through active political engagement.

[U48]*

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672 col. 12

Οὐδὲ πολιτικόν] καὶ δικανικὸν ἐρεῖ[ν] ἑαυτὸν λαμβάνειν μέρος. ὧ[δε] γὰρ ῥητῶς "τὴν ῥητορικὴν" λέγει κα[ὶ] πρὸς τὸν ἐπαγγελλόμεν[ο]ν σοφιστὴν πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. διόπερ οὐκ ἀπόχωρήσαντος, γελοίως ὁ Ἐπίκουρός ἐστ[ι] τῆ μεταβάσει κεχημένος.

[Chandler] For one will say that [Epikouros] does not accept a political and judicial branch. For he **explicitly** says "rhetoric" when replying to the sophist who claims he possess all the branches. Therefore since he does not retract, Epikouros has made use of the analogy in a humorous fashion.

Neither in politics nor in law does he claim a role for himself. He declares **unequivocally** "rhetoric" when directed at the sophist who avowed that he encompasses all elements. Therefore, not having retreated, Epíkouros employs the shift humorously.

Philodemus reminds us that the speaker in Epíkouros' Symposium used the term "rhetoric" and meant by that all the categories which the youth claimed to possess. The claim is erroneous, so Epíkouros has used a metabasis (shift from one point to another) with ironic intent.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 16, line 10

* Φ[ήσ]ει δὲ πρὸς τὸ συστήσαι, διότ[ι δὴ], **τέχνη κατ' Ἐπίκουρόν** [ἐ]στιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ – τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς παρετίθεμεν, λέγ[ο]ντες· εἰ μὲν [δὴ] τε()[ι]βὴν αὐτὴν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι καὶ συν[ήθ]ε[ια]ν [οὐκ] ἂν τὸ "δοκεῖ" προσέ[θη]κεν. [οἱ] δὲ ἔφησαν οὐ δηλοῦ[σθαι] τὸ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, [ἦ][τοι] μὴ τοῦτο δηλοῦσθ[αι] μ[όν]ον. εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ συν[ί]ε[με]ν ἡμεῖς Ἑλληνιστὶ ο()ια[λε]γ[ο]μένων· εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύ[τε]ρο[ν, δι]ὰ τίν' αἰτίφ[ι] αὐτοὶ χρῶν[ται ἀ]μφιβόλοις λέξεσιν [ἐν] [τοῖς πρὸς] ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχου[σιν];

[Chandler] He [will speak] for the purpose of organizing (an argument), because [if] rhetoric is [not] an **art according to Epíkouros** – then we have shown it is by saying if he considered it to be a practice and familiarity he would [not have added] the word "seems." But they said that our argument was not made clear by us, or at least this point alone is not made clear. If the former is the case, then we do not understand people who speak Greek; if the latter, then why do they themselves use ambiguous terms in their refutations [in response to] us?

[U49]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 23, line 34 – col. 24, line 7

Τῶν τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἀποφ[αι]νομένων τέχνην εἶναι τὴν σοφιστικὴν τ[οῦ] λόγου [συ]γγράφειν καὶ ἐπιδειξίεις ποι[εῖ]σθαι, [τοῦ] δὲ δίκας λέγειν καὶ δημηγορεῖν οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην.

[Chandler] Since Epíkouros and his followers reveal that **sophistic is an art of writing** speeches and **composing** display pieces, and is not an art of **pleading** cases and **addressing the people**.

...while those around Epíkouros show that **the sophistic art is composing together** arguments and **conducting** lectures, whereas **pleading** in courts and **demagoguery** is not an art.

ἡ τέχνη αἱ τέχναι	art	ΤΕΧΝΗ <i>technique</i>
σοφιστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sophistic	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>profession of the wise</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i>
συγγράφειν	to compose together	ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ <i>writing together</i>
ἡ ἐπίδειξις αἱ ἐπιδείξεις	lecture	ΕΠΙΔΕΙΞΙΣ <i>upon pointing out</i>

Above, Philodemus has quoted Epíkouros as saying "rhetoric is of much practice and habit."

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, P.Herc. 1427, col. 7, line 9

Τοῖς δ' ἡμετέροις μεμπτέον ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττότερον τοῖς γέ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὅσοι καὶ τὴν σοφισ[τ]ικὴν ῥητορικὴν οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην διελήφασιν καὶ τούτου συστατικούς λόγους πεποιήκασιν. εἰ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἔτι δ' Ἑρμαρχος ἀποφαίνονται τέχνην ὑπάρχειν τὴν τ[οι]αύτην (ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ὑπομνήσομεν) οἱ τούτοις ἀντιγράφοντες οὐ πάνυ τι μακρὰν τῆς τῶν πατραλοίων καταδίκης ἀφεστήκασιν.

[Chandler] Our people might have to be censured and particularly all those sort of people who assume that sophistic rhetoric too is not an art – and have composed confirmatory arguments of this view. For if Epíkouros and Metrodorus and moreover Hérmarchos declare such a practice to be an art (as we shall record in what comes next) then those who write against them are not very far from being condemned as parricides.

For our own people, it would indeed be necessary to censure even more those of such a kind as have decided that sophistic rhetoric is not an art – and have made arguments establishing this. If indeed Epíkouros, Metrodorus, and also Hérmarchos declare that such is indeed an art (as we will remind in what follows) those who write against them are not far removed from condemnation as patricides.

[Hubbell] Those Epicureans are to be censured who assume that sophistic is not an art, and thus run counter to the teachings of Epíkouros, Metrodorus and Hérmarchos, as we shall show later. Such Epicureans are almost guilty of parricide.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 4

Κἂν ἔχη[ι] τις καθ' ὑπόθεσι[ν] διὰ παντὸς πείθο[υ]σαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δύναμι[ν] – οὐκ ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ κα[κῶν] μεγάλων αἰτίαν εἶναι ταύτην. καὶ τού[των] ἕκαστον [κα]τασ[κευάσας] (ὡς νομίζει) ποικί[λως], οἷεται κατ' ἄκρας ἀποδεδειχέναι τὸ: παρ' Ἐπίκουρον [ἔ]στασ[θαι] το[ύς] [ἦ] πᾶσαν τὴν ῥη[το]ρικ[ή]ν [ἦ] μέρος αὐτῆς ἐν τ[ε]χ[ν]ον ἀ[πο]φαινο[μένους].

[Chandler] ...And that even if someone, for the sake of argument, has an ability to persuade the majority on every occasion – this is a cause not of good things but great evils. And having constructed each one of these [arguments] in an artful way (so he thinks), he supposes he has shown thoroughly that: those who demonstrate that either the whole of rhetoric or a branch of it is technical are adopting a position contrary to Epíkouros.

Under a certain assumption, if someone has a power at all times persuasive over many – this [is] the cause not of goods things of great harms, and having fully crafted in various ways each of these [arguments] (as he believes), he presumes to have shown extensively that: those who are revealing either all rhetoric or a part of it to be art stand [contrary] to Epíkouros.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 18

[Ἐγ]ὼ δ' [ἀ]μέλει κα[ὶ] τῶ[ν] ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγ[α]μ[α]ι τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήγησιν ἀ[ν]δρός· ὧ[ν] Ὀ[ὐ] μὲ[ν] [ἐ]ν τῶ[ν] Συμ[πο]σίωι Π[ε]ρὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ἔφη] [συ]γγεγράφθαι – π[ι]στεύ[ε]ι[ν] [ε]ἰ Χρῆ τοῖς λέγουσιν, ο[ὐ]δ' ἴσως φιλοσόφους περὶ [φι]λοσόφων πιστεύ[ε]ι[ν] – Ὀ[ὐ] δ' οὐκ ἔφη] γινώσκειν [ὅ]που λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

* Yet I certainly wonder at what is heard from the man who [currently] has leisure in Athens. One of them says [it] was written in [Epíkouros'] Symposium on Rhetoric – if it is necessary to trust in the speakers, or [it is] not [necessary] to believe the philosophers about philosophers – yet He denies knowing where those [originally] around Epíkouros said [this]

[Chandler] I, of course, am amazed at the students of the man who lectures at Athens. One of them said that he believed that Epíkouros wrote about rhetoric in the Symposium, if one should trust those who speak – not perhaps as philosophers, about philosophers – the other said he did not know where Epíkouros and his followers say (this).

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 15, line 3

* Ὁ δ' ἐπαγγελ[ό]μενος ῥητὰς παρατε[θ]ή[σε]σθαι διαλέκτους οὐ λιπαρεῖν ὀφείλει τοῦτ' ἐγδέχ[ε]σθαι τοὺς ἀκο[ύ]οντας ὃ βούλεται – καὶ ἄλλων δηλουμένων. καὶ δὴ γὰρ [[δη]] οὐ φησι τῆ[ι] "ὑπο[σ]τελ[λ]όμενον τὸν" Ἐπίκουρον λέγειν] δι[ιαλέκ]τῳ συνκατατίθ[ε]σθαι τέ[χνην] εἶν[αι] τῆ[ν] ῥητορικὴν: ἀ[ύ]του [του]τό τε δὴ καὶ σαφῶς λέγοντος κ[αὶ] ἐν ἄλλοις – τέχνην εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὃ στυγ[ε]ρ[ο]σμὸν τοῦ ῥητοροῦ καμ[ε]ῖν [οὐ] μανικόν;

[Chandler] The man who claims he is going to quote arguments word for word must not insist that his audience accept (the meaning) that he wants – if other (interpretations) are revealed too. For in fact, he says that with the term "hesitating" Epikouros does not mean by the term that he agrees with those who say that rhetoric is without method, especially since in other places it is clearly revealed to be an art in reality. Is it not madness to call this an allusion to the rhetor?

The Rhodian must have made the argument that Epikouros' use of the term "hesitating" in his Symposium supported the conclusion that no part of rhetoric is an art, even sophistic rhetoric (composing arguments together and conducting lectures).

[U50]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 43, line 25

Νῦν ἐπ' [ἐ]κεῖν[ο] βαδίζωμεν, ὅτι τέχνην οὐχ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὴν σοφιστικὴν – οἱ δὲ τὴν αἴ[ρ]εσιν κτίσαντες ἡμῶν ἀντιφωνοῦσιν: καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἱστορίαν τινὰ καὶ παρατήρησιν συνησκημένην οὐχ ἡμεῖς. ἀλλὰ κάκεῖνο παραθήσομ[εν]α[ι] ὅπου καὶ δι' ὧν ἔφα[ίνο]ν [[το]] [Ζ]ήνων ταῦτα διασαφεῖσθαι.

[Chandler] [But] Now let us proceed to the claim that it is not we who say that sophistic is an art, but that the Founders of our School stated it in the course of their polemics, and (they who said) that political rhetoric is a certain research and practiced observation, not we. But I shall also set out where and how Zeno said these things were made clear.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 44

Ὁ τοίνυν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν [τ]ῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ὅτι μὲν διατελεῖ[τ] λέγων "τὰ διδα[σ]καλεῖα τῶν ῥητορικῶν" καὶ "το[ύ]ς ἐκ τῶν διδα[σ]καλείων" [κ]αὶ "τὰς δυνάμεις τὰ[ς] ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων" – πρὸς δὲ τούτοις "τ[ὰ]ς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων [εὐ]μορφίας", καὶ διότι κ[αὶ] "πρα[γ]ματεῖαν αὐτῶν" καὶ "τὰς παρ[α]δόσεις καὶ παραγγελίας περὶ τε λόγου καὶ ἐνθ[υ]μημάτων [κ]αὶ τῶν ἄλλων," καὶ τάν[α]λ[ογα] πάντα το[ύ]τοις τί ἂν λέγοι [τις]; [ἀ]λλὰ μὴν καὶ Ἐρμα[ρ]χος ἐπὶ Μενεκλέου[ς] [ἔ]ν τινι πρὸς Θεοφείδην ἐπιστολῆ[ι] τὴν αὐτῆ[ν] ἔχε[ι] γνώμην.

[Chandler] Well then, what could one say of the fact that Epikouros in his *On Rhetoric* continually mentions "those who come from the schools," and "the capabilities that come from the schools" – and in addition "the symmetries that come from the schools," and "the teachings of the rhetoricians," and "their business," and "the teaching and instruction concerning both speech and enthymemes and the rest," and everything analogous to these things? Furthermore Hermarchos too, in a letter addressed to Theopheidēs in the archonship of Menekleús, has the same opinion.

[U51]*

Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, 30.4, 3

Ammianós Markellínos (fl. 370 AD) was a Greek, an officer in the army of Emperor Julian, and author of Res Gestae, a history of Rome from 100 AD to 378 AD.

Hanc professionem oratorum forensium "πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον" id est civilitatis particulae umbram vel adulationis partem quartam esse definit amplitudo Platonis – Epikouros autem "κακοτεχνίαν" nominans inter artes numerat malas.

This forensic oratory profession the rich genius of Plato defines as "*politikēs moriōu eídōlon* (an image of a part of politics)" that is, the shadow of a small part of the science of government or as the fourth part of flattery – but Epíkouros counts it among evil arts, calling it "*kakotechnía* (a vile technique)."

ἡ **κακοτεχνία**
αἱ **κακοτεχνίαι**

harmful art

KAKOTECHNIA
bad technique

[U52]*

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 28

{[Πολλά δ' ἔστι τε τεκμήρια τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικὴν στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ]} ...ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ [πολὺ] καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐλογον, καὶ δῆτα καὶ φέρεται πρὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον. λέγω δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀόριστον καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅτε μὲν πειθόμενον ὅτε δὲ προσκόπτον.

[Chandler] { *too fragmentary* } ...for the most part and with a reasonable chance of success and it is certainly taken from Epíkouros and his followers. I mean the uncertainty of many (in that) it is sometimes believed by, and sometimes gives offence to, the same people...

[U53]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 50, line 16 - line 32

[Ἄλλα μὴν οὐχ ἔνε[κα] τοῦ κοινοποιῆσαι μόνον τὸ τεκμήριον εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο νομιστέον πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις – καὶ πλανῶνται πάντες οἱ σοφισταῖς ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκοντες. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσωσι[ν αὐ]τῶν ἐν ταῖς δειξέσι[ι] καὶ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι, [φησ]ὶν [ὁ] Ἐπίκουρος, κα[ὶ] ψυ[χα]γωγῆθῶσι διὰ τ[ὸ] μ[ὴ] [εἶ]ναι περὶ συ[μ]βολ[α]ίου τινὸς τὸν λόγον[ν μηδὲ τῶ]ν συμφερόν[των] – ὃ ἐ[ν] τ[αῖς] ἐκκλη[σι]αῖς [κ]αὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις [γ]ίνεται.

But one should not consider that this was said merely to make the argument common knowledge to us, but rather for the sake of truths – all those who spend money on sophists are in error. For whenever they listen to [sophistic orators] at displays and festivals, Epíkouros says, they are entertained because the speech is not about a treaty or agreements – as happens in the assemblies and law courts...

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 50, line 33 – col. 51, line 21

Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τούταις ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνκειμέ[νου] διαλεγόμενοι κινδ[υ]νεύοντες ὅταν ἐκκλησιάζωσιν, ὅταν δὲ δι[κάζωσιν,] τὸν ὄρκον φοβο[ύ]μενοι προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι καὶ δειξέσι τῶν σοφιστῶν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ὑπὲρ [ὄρ]κου φ[ρο]ντίζον[τες] - οὐ γὰρ ὁ[μω]μόκασιν ὁ[ρθῶς] κ[ρι]ν[ε]ῖν. οὔθ' ὑπὲρ τῶ[ν] λεγομ[ένων], εἰ συμφέρει [τῆ] πόλει ἢ μή - οὐ γὰρ ἔστι[ν] ὑπ[ὲρ] πο[λέμου] καὶ [εἰρ]ῆνης ὁ λόγος, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀτταδήποτε ψηφίσασθαι· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ἢ γ' ἢ καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλη[σίαι]ς [β]ουλεύονται, οὐ περὶ κατεπε[ίγο]ντός τινος [ἢ] οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁ λόγος.

...For in [law courts], as the saying goes, they risk their neck whenever they serve as assemblymen, and whenever they judge cases, they pay attention to what's being said because they fear their oath but in the assemblies and displays of the sophists, they do not care at all, either about an oath (because they have not sworn to judge correctly) nor about whether what's being said is beneficial to the city or not (because the speech is not about war and peace, about which we must sometimes vote, or if it does happen to be about war and peace or some other thing that they deliberate in their assemblies, the speech at that moment is not about anything pressing at all).

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 51, line 25 – col. 52, line 7

“Ὡστε σφ[ό]δρα ἔξωι ὄντες τοῦ ἀγω[νιᾶν] ἀκούουσιν ἐν [τα]ῖς πανηγύρεσιν – ὅταν δ' οὐ[τ]ως ἀκού[ω]σι, τοῖς μὲν λεγομένοι[ς] οὐ πρ[ο]σέχ[ο]υ[ς]ιν, [πότ]ερα συμ[φ]έροντα ἢ [ο]ὐ συμ[φ]έροντα καὶ τὸ σύνολον [ἀ]ληθῆ ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἤχου καὶ τῶν περιόδων καὶ τῶν παρίσων καὶ ἀντιθέτων καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτων ψυχαγωγούμενοι ἤδη προσεδόκησαν, εἰ οὕτω λά[λο]ι ἦσαν, καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίοις εἴ[τε] ἀπ[α]λλάττειν οὐ συνορῶ[ν]τες, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἠ[ν]έ[σχο]ν[το], εἰ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίωι [οὐ]τωι λαλοῦντος ἤκουον ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναλίσκειν μισθὸν τοῖς σοφισταῖς. [Εἴ]τ' εὐθὺς γινώσκουσ[ιν] ὅτι ἀπολωλέκασι τὸ ἀργύριον.

Therefore, they are **entirely outside of competition** while they listen at the festivals – but whenever they listen in this way [sc. to a display oration at a panegyris (national assembly or festival)], they do not pay attention to whether what is being said is beneficial or not, and, on the whole, true or not, but, entertained by the sound itself, the periods, balanced clauses, antitheses, and rhymes, they already expect to acquit themselves well, if they should speak like that, both in assemblies and in courtrooms, because they do not understand that they would not tolerate it if they heard someone speaking like that in an assembly or courtroom, on which grounds they came to hire sophists. Then they **immediately** recognize that they have wasted **their money**.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 52, line 8

Οὐθὲν γάρ, οἴμα[ι], αὐτοῖς συντελεῖται πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλ' ἢ δια[β]ολή καὶ ἀγωνία· δια[β]ολή μὲν ὡς [γ]εγυμ[ν]ασμένοις ῥητορεύειν, [καὶ] κατὰ τρόπον μὲν ἀ[παλ]λάττοντας κατὰ τῆ[ν] ἐν τῷ λέγειν ιδέαν δοκεῖν παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς, μὴ κατὰ τρόπον δὲ ἀποχωροῦντας διὰ κενῆς ἀργύριον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι σοφιστὴ ἀνηλωκένας· ἀγωνία δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐνθυμούμενοις καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ δόξει ἀπαλλάττειν ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δόξῃ παρακρού[ε]σθαι τοὺς δικαστάς. Ταῦτά τε δὴ αὐτοῖς περίεστιν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἅμα συ[νδ]έσμοις ἔπε[σθ]αι **προσεχῶς** καὶ [πτ]ώσεσιν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις μήτε τοῖς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναγγελλομένοις παρακο[λ]ουθεῖν μήτε τοῖς [ὑ]φ' ἐ[τέ]ρων.

* { Indeed, I believe, nothing is achieved by them in the matter but only defamation and anxiety; defamation insofar as trained to speak rhetorically, and in a manner, they seem to alienate the judges through their way of speaking, not properly withdrawing, thinking they have wasted money on sophistry; [they have] anxiety, however, concerning these considerations, and more so about how they might seem convincing in their speech rather than appearing not to convince the judges. These very issues are beset upon them by the situation, and they must meticulously follow the connections and downfalls in the statements, neither adhering to reports by themselves nor by others. }

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 10, line 24

Φησὶν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ [τῆς] Ῥητορικῆς* Ἐπίκουρος[ος], ὅτι τοῖς διατριβικοῖς οἱ π[ρο]σῖόντες ἀπατῶντα[ι] καὶ **οὐκ ἀπεικότης διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν** – ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούουσιν ἐν ταῖς δε[ί]ξεσιν καὶ πανηγύρεσιν τῶν [μ]ήτε π[ερ]ὶ συμβου[λ]ῆς μήτε περὶ τίνος τῶν τ[ῆ]ι π[ό]λει συμ[φ]ερόντων[ν]...

[Chandler] Epikouros in his *On Rhetoric* says that those who attend the professors of the schools are deceived, and **not unreasonably for the following reason** – for whenever they listen to speeches at displays and panegyrics, because [the speech] is neither concerned with deliberation [or] anything which is of advantage to the state...

* Epikouros states in *On Rhetoric* that those engaging in academic exercises, the participants deceive [themselves] and **not without justification for such a reason** – whenever they hear [speeches] at demonstrations and festivals that are neither about advice nor about anything of benefit to the city...

[U54]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.13

Κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρία κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων – ἦν ὅτι ιδιωτάτη ἐστίν, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς αἰτιάται. σαφὴς δ' ἦν οὕτως, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν.

He makes use of the principal term regarding subjects – which, because it is extremely idiosyncratic, Aristophanes the grammarian criticizes. He was so clear a writer that in the work *On Rhetoric* he considers clearness the sole requisite.

[U55]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col 21, line 22

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ Ἑρμαρχος, δι' ὧν παρεθέμε[θ]α, μετὰ δὲ τῆς πάσης ἐξεργασίας Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς τελειόθ[η]ς ἀνεπιμείκτους [δ]ιδάσκων τὰς δυ[ν]άμεις κ[αὶ] συνεργούσας μὲν οὐθὲ[ν] εἷς γε τὴν ἕξιν τὴν πολ[ι]τικὴν τὰς διατριβάς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ μεταβαλλού[σ]σατ[ε], ἃ προφέρεσθαι νῦν ἐμ μέσῳ κείμενα πᾶσιν μά[τα]ρ[ο]ν ἡσα[ο] [νετ]αι καὶ [περ]ιττόν. ✱

[Chandler] Hérmarchos too, by what we have cited, shows this, as does Epíkouros with his entire treatment in *On Rhetoric* by teaching that the capabilities are completely independent of one another and that the schools contain nothing for the political faculty, but often even change it, things which it seems pointless and superfluous to offer now when they lie exposed for everyone.

Maximus Planoúdēs, Commentary for Hermogenes On Stasis:

Máximos Planoúdēs (fl. 1300) was a Byzantine monk and translator.

Ὁ δὲ γε Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς αὐθαδέστερον οἶμαι λέγων φησὶν αὐτὸς μόνος εὐρηκέναι τέχνην πολιτικῶν λόγων. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀποσκορακίζων ῥήτορας ἑαυτῷ πως μαχόμενα λέγει. φύσις γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κατορθοῦσα λόγους, τέχνη δὲ οὐδεμία.

Epíkouros, in his treatise *On Rhetoric* is seen to speak quite arrogantly, stating that he alone has discovered the art of political speeches. He ridicules the other orators, claiming that they are only contesting against him. According to him, it is nature that succeeds in creating speeches, not any craft.

Philodemus frequently mentions Plato's Gorgias, where rhetoric is portrayed mainly as a tool for persuasion, disconnected from genuine truth. Epicureans who agree with Philodemus' interpretation of Epíkouros might see Plato's critical stance on rhetoric in this work as suggestive that that Epíkouros held a more nuanced view – and was less adversarial toward certain educational facets falling under the realm of "rhetoric" – specifically the study of the principles of composition.

43. Twelve Elementary Principles

Στοιχειώσεις Δώδεκα

[U56]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Diogénēs Laértios 10.44b

Φησὶ δ' ἐνδοτέρω, μηδὲ ποιότητά τινα περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ βάρους – τὸ δὲ Χρῶμα παρὰ τὴν θέσιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἀλλάττεσθαι, ἐν ταῖς Δώδεκα Στοιχειώσεσιν φησι.

He says, moreover, that there is no quality at all for the atoms except for shape, dimension, and weight – that Color varies with the position of the atoms, he states in the *Twelve Elementary Principles*.

44. Symposium

Συμπόσιον

...*Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν. Συμπόσιον. Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον...*

...*Neoklēs, Dedicated to Themísta. Symposium. Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros...*

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 1.0.1

Τὸ δ' ὅλως ἀμνημονεῖν τῶν ἐν οἴνῳ μὴ μόνον τῷ φιλοποιῶ λεγομένῳ μάχεσθαι τῆς τραπέζης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ἐλλογιμωτάτους ἀντιμαρτυροῦντας ἔχειν (Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοφῶντα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Σπεύσιππον, Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ Πρύτανιν καὶ Ἱερώνυμον καὶ Δίωνα τὸν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ὡς ἄξιόν τινος σπουδῆς πεπονημένους ἔργον ἀναγράψασθαι **λόγους παρὰ πότον** γενομένων).

But to deliver over to oblivion all sort of discourse that merry meetings do usually produce is not only repugnant to that endearing quality that most allow to an entertainment, but against the known practice of the greatest philosophers (for Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epíkouros, Prytanis, Hieronymus, Dion the Academic, have thought it a worthy and noble employment to deliver down to us those **discourses** they had **over drinks**).

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 186E

Ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν **περὶ τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν συμποσίων** λέξομεν. ἀφορίζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ ποιητὴς **χρόνους**, πρόσωπα, αἰτίας. τοῦτο δὲ ὀρθῶς ἀπεμάξατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν καὶ Πλάτων, οἱ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν ξυγγραμμάτων ἐκτίθενται τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ συμποσίου καὶ τίνες οἱ παρόντες. Ἐπίκουρος δὲ **οὐ τόπον, οὐ χρόνον** ἀφορίζει, **οὐ προλέγει οὐδέν**. δεῖ οὖν μαντεύσασθαι πῶς ποτ' ἄνθρωπος ἐξαπίνης ἔχων κύλικα προβάλλει ζητήματα καθάπερ ἐν διατριβῇ λέγων.

We will now talk **about the Homeric symposia**. In these, namely, the poet distinguishes **times**, persons, and occasions. This feature Xenophon and Plato rightly copied, for at the beginning of their treatises they explain the occasion of the symposium, and who are present. But Epíkouros specifies **no place, no time**; he has **no introduction whatsoever**. One has to guess, therefore, how it comes about that a man with cup in hand suddenly propounds questions as though he were lecturing before a class.

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 187B

Ἔτι δὲ ὁ μὲν Ὅμηρος ἡλικίαις εἰσάγει διαφέροντας καὶ ταῖς προαιρέσεσι τοὺς κεκλημένους – Νέστορα καὶ Αἴαντα καὶ Ὀδυσσεά – τὸ μὲν καθόλου σύμπαντας τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντεχομένους, εἶδει δὲ διαφόροις ὁδοῖς ὠρμηκότας ἐπ' αὐτήν. ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἅπαντας εἰσήγαγε **προφήτας ἀτόμων**, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔχων παραδείγματα τὴν τε τοῦ Ποιητοῦ τῶν συμποσίων ποικιλίαν καὶ **τὴν Πλάτωνός τε καὶ Ξενοφῶντος χάριν**.

Homer introduces guests who differ in their ages and views of life – Nestor, Ajax, Odysseus – all of whom, speaking generally, strive after excellence, but have set out in specifically diverse paths to find it. Epíkouros on the other hand, introduced none but **prophets of atoms**, although he had before him these as his models, such as the variety of symposia of the Poet, and the **charm of Plato** and Xenophon as well.

ὁ προφήτης οἱ προφήται	prophet	ΠΡΟΦΗΤΗΣ <i>to say before</i>
οἱ προφήται ἀτόμων	prophets of atoms	

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 177B

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ **συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων μόνων** πεποιήται.

Epíkouros, however, portrayed **a symposium of only philosophers**.

Καὶ πρὸ τοῦ θοινᾶσθαι δὲ ἄ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς διδάσκει πάλιν Ὅμηρος, ἀπαρχὰς τῶν βρωμάτων νέμειν τοῖς θεοῖς... ἄπερ καὶ Πλάτων φυλάσσει κατὰ τὸ συμπόσιον... παρὰ δ' Ἐπικούρω οὐ σπονδή, οὐκ ἀπαρχή θεοῖς – ἀλλ' ὡσπερ Σημωνίδης ἔφη περὶ τῆς ἀκόσμου γυναικός: "ἄθυστα δ' ἱρὰ πολλάκις κατεσθίει."

Again, Homer tells us what we are to do before we begin to eat, namely, we are to offer as first portions of the food to the gods... all of which Plato also retains in his symposium... But with Epíkouros there is no libation, no preliminary offering to the gods – on the contrary, it is like what Simonides says of the lawless woman: "Oftentimes she eats up the offerings before they are consecrated."

Simonides of Ceos (fl. c. 515 BC) was a lyric poet. He is credited for introducing Ω, Η, Ξ, and Ψ as new letters for the revised Greek alphabet.

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 182A

Ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἐπικούρου Συμποσίῳ κολάκων ἐστὶν ἄγυρις ἀλλήλους ἐπαινούντων – τὸ δὲ Πλάτωνος πλήρὲς ἐστὶ μυκτηριστῶν ἀλλήλους τωθαζόντων... παρὰ δ' Ὁμήρῳ κεκρότηται τὰ σῶφρονα συμπόσια.

In the Symposium of Epíkouros there is an assemblage of flatterers praising one another – while the symposium of Plato is full of men who turn their noses up in jeers at one another... In Homer, on the other hand, only sober symposia are organized.

[U57]

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 187C

Πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ ζητεῖ περὶ δυσπεψίας ὥστ' οἰωνίσασθαι, εἴθ' ἐξῆς περὶ πυρετῶν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρέχουσιν τῇ λέξει ἀρρυθμίαν τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;

Epíkouros poses questions in his Symposium about indigestion as a means of obtaining omens, and then immediately after this discusses fevers. Why should I even mention the rhythmlessness that permeates his style?

[U58]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1109E

Ὅρα δ' ἄ, περὶ τοῦ οἴνου τῆς θερμότητος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ, Πολύαινον αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον Ἐπίκουρος πεποίηκε, λέγοντος γὰρ "οὐ φησ εἶναι, ὧ Ἐπίκουρε, τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου διαθερμασίας;" (ὑπέλαβέ τις) "οὐ τὸ καθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι." (καὶ μετὰ σμικρόν) "φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου οὐκ εἶναι 'θερμαντικὸς ὁ οἶνος' – τοῦδε δὲ τινος ὁ τοσοῦτος εἶναι θερμαντικὸς ἂν ῥηθείη."

Observe what, regarding the heat of the wine in the Symposium, Epíkouros has [portrayed] Polýainos conversing with him, as he says "Do you deny, Epíkouros, the absolute heating effect caused by wine?" (Someone interrupts) "it is not a universal fact that wine seems fully warming." (And a little later) "For the universal fact does not seem to be that 'wine is warming' – but that a certain quantity for a certain person may be said to be warming."

Consider the discussion that Epíkouros holds in his Symposium with Polýainos about the heat in wine, when Polýainos says "Do you, Epíkouros, deny the existence of the warmth produced by wine?" (Some one interrupted) "It does not appear that wine is unconditionally productive of heat." (And a little later) "It seems that wine is not unconditionally productive of heat, but wine of a certain quantity might be said to produce heat for a given person."

[Alternative] (ὑπέλαβε) "τί δεῖ τὸ καθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι;"

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1109F – 1110A

Καὶ πάλιν, αἰτίαν ὑπειπὼν – θλίψεις τε καὶ διασπορὰς ἀτόμων, ἐτέρων δὲ συμμίξεις καὶ παραζεύξεις αἰτιασάμενος – ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καταμίξει τοῦ οἴνου, ἐπιλέγει "διὸ δὴ καθόλου μὲν οὐ ῥητέον τὸν οἶνον εἶναι θερμαντικόν – τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φύσεως καὶ τῆς οὕτω διακειμένης: θερμαντικόν τὸν τοσοῦτον – ἢ (τῆσδε) τὸν τοσοῦτον εἶναι ψυκτικόν!"

* And again, having hinted at a cause – he attributes ^[1] compressions and dispersals of [some] atoms and of others their ^[2] mixings and joinings – in the blending of the wine with the body, he states "therefore it should generally not be said that wine is warming – but of such a nature and of an arrangement in such a way that: this much is warming – but (in another case) this much is cooling!"

Again, after assigning as one cause ^[1] the crowding and dispersal of atoms, and as another, the ^[2] mixture and alignment of these with others, when the wine is mingled with the body, he adds in conclusion "Thus, one should not generalize that wine is productive of heat – but only say that a particular amount produces heat for a particular body in a particular condition, or that such an amount results in chilling for another!"

"Ἐνεῖσι γὰρ καὶ τοιαῦται ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἀθροίσματι φύσεις, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ψυχρὸν συσταίῃ – εἰς δέον τε ἐτέραις παραζυγεῖσαι: ψυχρασίας φύσιν ἀποτελέσειαν – ὅθεν ἐξαπατῶμενοι οἱ μὲν ψυκτικὸν τὸ καθόλου φασὶν εἶναι τὸν οἶνον, οἱ δὲ θερμαντικόν"

* "For there are such natures in such a conglomerate [as wine], from which coldness might be composed – and if in proper measure yoked with other [elements]: they would achieve a nature of cooling – therefore, while some are deceived and say that the universal fact is that wine is generally cooling, others [say it is] warming."

"For in an aggregate such as wine there are also certain natural substances of such a sort that coolness might be formed of them, or such that, when aligned with others, they would produce a real coolness. Hence, deceived by this, some generalize that wine is cooling, others, that it is heating."

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1110A

Ὅ δὴ λέγων ἐξηπατῆσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς, τὸ θερμαῖνον θερμαντικὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχὸν ψυκτικὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντας, εἰ μὴ νομίζοι "τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον" ἕκαστον ἀκολουθεῖν οἷς εἴρηκεν, αὐτὸς ἐξηπάτηται.

If then the man who asserts that the majority are deceived in supposing that what heats is heating or what cools is cooling should refuse to recognize "Everything is no more this than that" as a conclusion from his premises, he is himself deceived.

Προστίθησι δ' ὅτι "πολλάκις οὐδ' ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σῶμα θερμαντικὴν ἐπιφέρων ἢ ψυκτικὴν δύναμιν ὁ οἶνος – ἀλλὰ κινηθέντος τοῦ ὄγκου καὶ γενομένης τῶν σωμάτων μεταστάσεως: αἱ ποιοῦσαι τὸ θερμὸν ἄτομοι νῦν μὲν συνηλθον εἰς ταῦτ' καὶ παρέσχον ὑπὸ πλήθους θερμότητα καὶ πύρωσιν τῷ σώματι – νῦν δ' ἐκπεσοῦσαι κατέψυξαν."

* He adds that "Often the wine did not come into the body bringing either a heating or cooling power – but with the mass having been moved and a displacement of the objects having occurred: the atoms that produce heat now indeed came together and by the multitude provided heat and inflammation to the body – but now having fallen out, they cooled."

He proceeds to add "And often the wine does not even possess the property of heating or cooling as it enters the body – rather, the bodily mass is so set in motion that the corpuscles shift their position: the **heat**-producing atoms are at one time concentrated, becoming numerous enough to impart warmth and heat to the body, but at another time are driven out, producing a chill."

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 3.5, 652A

Διείλεκται δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμπόσιῳ πολλοὺς λόγους, ὧν τὸ Κεφάλαιόν ἐστιν, ὡς Ἐγὼ μαι, τοιόνδε: Φησὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν Οἶνον: ἀλλ' ἔχειν τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὐτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεσματικὰς – ἑτέρας δ' αὖ ψυχρότητος

Epicurus also discussed in the *Symposium* many arguments, the main point of them, as I understand it, as follows: for He says that **Wine is not hot in itself: but has certain atoms in itself productive of heat – and others again of coldness**

ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀποβάλλειν ὅταν εἰς τὸ σῶμα παραγένηται – τὰς δὲ προσλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ἂν ἔχῃ κρᾶσεως ἡμῖν ἢ φύσεως ὁμιλήσαι: ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἐκθερμαίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ τούναντίον πάσχειν μεθυσκομένους

[Epicurus says that] **some of these [atoms of wine] are shed whenever [wine] is in the body – but other [atoms] are taken along from the body in addition [to the wine],** depending on how they may be suited to interact with our constitution or nature: so that **Some [people] are warmed – but Others experience the opposite while they are intoxicated**

[U61]

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 653B

περὶ καιροῦ συνουσίας: Νεανίσκοι τινὲς, οὐ πάλαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λόγοις προσπεφοιτηκότες – ἐσπάραττον τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ὡς οὐ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐμβεβληκότα λόγον περὶ καιροῦ συνουσίας εἰς τὸ Συμπόσιον

about the proper time for intercourse: some Youngsters, not long acquainted with the ancient discussions, were tearing apart Epicurus, as though he had introduced a discussion that was neither good nor necessary about proper time for intercourse in the *Symposium*

ἡ οὐσία αἱ οὐσίαι	existence	ΟΥΣΙΑ <i>being</i>
ἡ συνουσία αἱ συνουσίαι	intercourse	ΣΥΝΟΥΣΙΑ <i>being together</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning [here, "discussion"]	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i>

μιμνήσκεσθαι γὰρ Ἀφροδισίων ἄνδρα πρεσβύτερον ἐν δεῖπνῳ μαιρακίων παρόντων – καὶ διαπορεῖν πότερον μετὰ δεῖπνον ἢ πρὸ δεῖπνου Χρηστέον, ἐσχάτης ἀκολασίας εἶναι

for an **older man to make mention of Aphrodisian activities** at a dinner-party with youths present – and **to be in doubt** whether it is necessary before dinner or after dinner is [they said] **extremely licentiousness**

πρὸς ταῦθ' οἱ μὲν τὸν Ξενοφῶντα παρέλαβον ὡς ἀπάγοντα τοὺς συμπότας μετὰ δεῖπνον οὐχὶ πεζοὺς ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἵππων ἐπὶ συνουσίας πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας. Ζώπυρος δ' ὁ ἰατρός, εὖ μάλα τοῖς Ἐπικούρου λόγοις ἐνωμιληκῶς, οὐκ ἔφη προσέχοντας αὐτοὺς ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ Ἐπικούρου Συμπόσιον

at this, some among our company brought up **Xenophon**, who, so to speak, took his guests home after dinner, not on foot, but on horseback, for intercourse with their wives. And Zopyrus the Physician, who was very well acquainted with the works of Epicurus, did not say that that **they were attentively reading the Symposium of Epicurus**

οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινοῦ καὶ καταστάσεως τοῦτο πρόβλημα ποιησάμενον εἶτα λόγους ἐπ' αὐτῷ περαίνειν – ἀλλὰ τοὺς νέους ἀνιστάντα μετὰ δεῖπνον εἰς περίπατον ἐπὶ σωφρονισμῷ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἀνακρούειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν – ὡς αἰεὶ μὲν ἐπισφαλοῦς εἰς βλάβην τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος (κάκιστα δὲ τοὺς παρὰ πότον καὶ ἐδωδὴν χρωμένους) αὐτῷ διατιθέντος

for it is not as if, from some principle and foundation, [Epíkouros] made this problem and then completed arguments upon it – but rather he made the young men rise after dinner for a walk to converse regarding moderation, and to push back away from desires – with [the discussion] being arranged by him that it is always risky regarding the harm of the circumstance (but especially for those engaging during drinking and eating)

"εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ προηγουμένως" εἶπεν "ἐζητεῖτο περὶ τούτου – πότερον οὐδ' ὄλως ἐσκέφθαι καλῶς εἶχε τὸν φιλόσοφον περὶ συνουσίας καιροῦ καὶ ὥρας; ἢ βέλτιον μὲν ἐν καιρῷ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν; τὸν δὲ καιρὸν ἄλλως μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν οὐκ ἄτοπον – ἐν δὲ συμποσίῳ καὶ περὶ τράπεζαν αἰσχρόν;"

"indeed, even if previously" he said "the inquiry had been about this, would it not be at all proper that the philosopher considered the proportion and time for intercourse? is it not better to do such things at the right time and with reason? or is it not inappropriate to examine the right occasion [for intercourse] at another [event] – but shameful to do so during a symposium or around the table?"

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 653F

πρὸς τοῦτο πληγέντες, οἱ Νεανίσκοι σιωπῇ κατέκειντο: τῶν δ' ἄλλων τὸν Ζώπυρον ἀξιούντων τοὺς περὶ τούτου λόγους Ἐπικούρου διελθεῖν, ἔφη τῶν μὲν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἀκριβῶς μνημονεύειν, οἴεσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τὰς ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας πληγὰς δεδιέναι – διὰ τὸν τῶν σωμάτων παλμὸν εἰς ταραχὴν καὶ σάλον ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ βαδιζόντων

struck by this, the young men sat down in silence. with the rest of the company asking Zopyrus to go through the reasonings of Epíkouros about this, and he replied that he did not remember accurately in detail, but thought that [Epíkouros] feared the afflictions resulting from intercourse – due to the pulsation of the bodies moving in the disturbance and agitation in such a state of movement

καθόλου μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἔδρας τὰ σώματα μεθιστάναι – πλήκτην ὄντα καὶ κινητικὸν ταραχῆς τὸν ἄκρατον: ἂν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα τὸν ὄγκον ἡμῶν γαλήνη μὴ παραλάβῃ καὶ ὕπνος], ἀλλ' ἕτεροι διὰ τῶν Ἀφροδισίων κινήσεις – ἐκθλιβομένων καὶ μοχλευομένων τῶν μάλιστα συνδεῖν καὶ κολλᾶν τὸ σῶμα πεφυκότων: Κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἀνέδραστον γίνεσθαι τὸν ὄγκον, ὥσπερ ἐκ θεμελίων γιγνόμενον

for in generally [wine] moves our body from its position – because it is impactful and the extreme of kinetic disturbances: and if tranquility and sleep do not take possession of our body when it is in this condition [of being full of wine or food], but instead different movements in line with Aphrodisian activities – then those things which are especially natural for connecting and joining together the body are pressed out and dislodged: there is a Danger that the mass will be become unsupported, as though becoming [shifted] from its foundation

οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖ ρεῖν, τηνικαῦτα, τὴν γονὴν, σφηνώσεως διὰ τὴν πλησμονὴν οὐσης, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ καὶ συμπεφυρμένην ἀποσπᾶσθαι: διὸ, χρῆναί φησιν ὁ Ἄνθρωπος ὅταν Ἕσυχία γένηται περὶ τὸ σῶμα (καὶ λωφῆσωσιν αἱ τῆς τροφῆς Ἀναδόσεις καὶ τὰ ῥεύματα διεξιούσης καὶ φευγούσης) τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν – πρὶν ἑτέρας αὖ πάλιν τροφῆς ἐνδεὲς γενέσθαι τὸ Σῶμα)

for, at that time [of being full of wine or food], our seed does not flow well, due to the [internal] constriction from the fullness, but rather it is pulled out with difficulty while being mixed together: consequently, [Epíkouros] says it is necessary to perform such actions [only] when Tranquility comes about for the body (and the Assimilation of nourishment and the Flows of processing and removal have ceased) – before the Body again becomes in need of [more] nourishment

Σκοπῶμεν οὖν εἰ δοκεῖ πότερον ἐμμελῶς καὶ προσηκόντως ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἢ παρὰ πᾶν δίκαιον ἀφαιρεῖ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην τῆς νυκτός

Let us then examine if it seems appropriate whether Epikouros fittingly and property, or contrary to all justice, removes Aphrodite from the night

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 655A

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ Σῶμα βλάπτει ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς συνουσίας μᾶλλον, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος οἶεται, μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον – ἂν γε μὴ (μεθύων Τις ἢ ῥηγνύμενος ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς) ἄπτηται καὶ βεβαρημένος: ἀμέλει γὰρ, οὕτως, ἐπισφαλές τὸ Πράγμα καὶ βλαβερὸν

surely the Body would not suffer greater harm by intercourse, as Epikouros thinks, after dinner – provided that Someone is not (while drunk or bursting from overindulgence) engaged and weighed down: for certainly, in that case, the Circumstance is precarious and harmful

αὐτοῦ μαλακοῦ γεγονότος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς παρεστῶσης διὰ χρόνου ποιῆται τὴν ἔντευξιν: οὔτε ταραχὴν ἀπεργάζεται μεγάλην διὰ τὸν ὄγκον, οὔτ' ἄλλο τι ὧν ἐπήγαγεν – ἢ Ψῦξις ἢ Μετάθεσις ἐξ ἔδρας ἀτόμων – φησιν Ἐπίκουρος.

[as long as] he arranges the encounter after some time while the [body] has become relaxed and the soul remains present: he neither causes a great disturbance because of the mass, nor [does he cause] anything else that would have come about – neither a Chilling nor a Change from the position of the atoms – as Epikouros claims

[U62]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.118 fin

[Usener]

Συνουσίη ὦνησε μὲν οὐδέποτε – ἀγαπητὸν δ' εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψε

Intercourse never is advantageous – but it is welcome if it has not harmed

[Henderson]

Συνουσίαν δὲ Φασιν ὄνησαι μὲν οὐδέποτε – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε

They say that although Intercourse never is advantageous – it is welcome if it has not also harmed

ἀγαπητός (ἴ, ὄν)	welcome	ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΣ love worthy
ἀγαπητόν [ἔστι]	"it is that with which one must be content"	"it is to be acquiesced in [as the least in a choice of evils]"
this implies a philosophical stance where one should be content or accept a situation as the least undesirable among available options		

Clement of Alexandria, Instructor, 2.10

Titus Flavius Clemens "Klēmēs of Alexandria" (fl. 190 AD) was a Christian theologian who wrote the Paedagogus. Although a Christian work, it also includes elements of ancient philosophy and references to Homer.

εὔ γοῦν Τις εἰρηκέναι φέρεται "Συνουσία ὦνησε μὲν οὐδένα – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν"

at least Someone is reported to have well said that "Intercourse has benefited no one – but it is welcome if it has not harmed"

Porphry, On Abstinence, 1.52

Porphyrus of Tyre (fl. 275 AD) was a native speaker of Aramaic, student of Plotinus, and one of the founders of Neoplatonism. He is known for his anti-Christian polemics and books on logic.

Οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστὸν τοὺς πολλοὺς οἶεσθαι εἰς ὑγίαιαν συντελεῖν τὴν κρεοφαγίαν· τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἦν καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις οἶεσθαι ὑγείας εἶναι τηρητικὰς καὶ τὰ Ἀφροδίσια, ὄνησαι μὲν οὐδένα τινά – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν.

It is not surprising that the public thinks meat-eating contributes to health, for they are just people who think that enjoyment and Aphrodisian activities preserve health, whereas these things have never profited anyone – but one must be content if it has not harmed.

Galen, Art of Medicine 24.1

Claudius Galenus of Pergamon (fl. 170 AD) was a Greek physician, surgeon, and philosopher.

...Ἀφροδισίων δὲ, κατὰ μὲν Ἐπίκουρον: οὐδεμία Χρῆσις ὑγιεινὴ

...but regarding Aphrodisian activities, according to Epikouros: no Use is healthy

Galen, comment on The Epidemics of Hippocrates 3.1.4, Art of Medicine 17

Τίς γὰρ ἦν ἀνάγκη γράφειν... εἰρηκέναι... Ἐπίκουρον, μηδέποτε μὲν ὠφελεῖν Ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν, ἀγαπητὸν δ' εἰ μὴ βλάψειεν;

* Why then was there a need to write... what Epikouros has said, that the use of Aphrodisian activities has never been beneficial – but one must be content if it did not harm?

[U63]

Diogēnēs Laērtios 10.119

[Usener] οὐδὲ μὴν τηρήσειεν ἐν μέθῃ [τὸν σοφόν] φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ

in fact, Epikouros says in the Symposium that [the wise man] will not stay guarded in drunkenness

[Henderson, Dorandi] οὐδὲ μὴν ληρήσειεν ἐν μέθῃ [τὸν σοφόν] φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ

in fact, Epikouros says in the Symposium that [the wise man] will not be foolish in drunkenness

τηρεῖν	to stay guarded	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ protecting / watching
ληρεῖν	to be foolish	ΛΗΡΕΙΝ trash / trifle
ἢ μέθη αἰ μέθαι	drunkenness	ΜΕΘΗ mead
τό μέθυ τά μέθουα	wine	

[U64]

* Philodēmos, On Rhetoric, VH² VII 184

* <...καὶ ζῶιον ἔμψυ[χον διὰ] ζωγραφίας ἀπο[τελεῖν ἐσ]ται. Ταῦτα μὲν ο[ἦν τοῦ]τον ὠικονομήθ[η τὸν] τρόπον – παρ' Ἐπικούρ[ω] δὲ τῶν λόγων ὁ Τύπ[ος] ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ διαλόγο[υ] συνθεῖναι τοιοῦτος: "[πρῶ]τον, Διομολογησώ[με]θα τί ἐστὶν οὗ χάριν [ἅπαν]τα Πράττο[μεν]..."

«...and to create a living being through realistic writing will be possible.»
 These things, therefore, were arranged in that way – while for Epíkouros the impression from his discourse is constructed like this by means of a dialogue: "first, let Us agree on what it is for the sake of which We do everything..."

<p>ἡ ζωγραφία αἱ ζωγραφαί</p> <p><i>this is an uncommon term, and is typically associated with painting</i></p>	<p>* realistic writing</p>	<p>ΖΩΓΡΑΦΙΑ <i>life writing</i></p>
<p>ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι</p>	<p>way</p>	<p>ΤΡΟΠΟΙ <i>method</i></p>
<p>ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι</p>	<p>impression</p>	<p>ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i></p>

[U65]

[=U49] Philódēmos, *On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 18*

[Ἐγ]ὼ δ' [ἀ]μέλει κα[ἰ τ]ῶ[ν] ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγ[α]μ[αί] τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήγησιν ἀ[ν]δρός· ὦ[ν] ὄ[ν] μέ[ν] [ἐ]ν τῶ[ν] Συμ[πο]σίω[ι] Πε[ρὶ] τῆς Ῥητορικῆ[ς] ἔφη] [συ]γγεγράφθαι – π[ιστε]ύ[ε]ι[ν] [ε]ἰ Χρῆ[ν] τοῖς λέγουσιν, ο[ὐ]δ' ἴσως φιλοσόφους περ[ὶ] [φι]λοσόφων πιστεύ[ε]ι[ν] – [Ὁ δ'] οὐκ ἔφη] γινώσκειν [ὄ]που λέγουσιν ο[ἱ] περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

* Yet I certainly wonder at what is heard from the man who [currently] has leisure in Athens. One of them says [it] was written in [Epíkouros'] Symposium on Rhetoric – if It is necessary to trust in the speakers, or [it is] not [necessary] to believe the philosophers about philosophers – yet He denies knowing where those [originally] around Epíkouros said [this]

[Chandler] I, of course, am amazed at the students of the man who lectures at Athens. One of them said that he believed that Epíkouros wrote about rhetoric in the *Symposium*, if one should trust those who speak – not perhaps as philosophers, about philosophers – the other said he did not know where Epíkouros and his followers say (this).

[=U11] Philódēmos, *On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 57*

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολ[λ]ῶν α[ὐ]τούς] Ἀνα[πα]ύσωμεν ἐρ[ε]ύνης κα[ἰ] ἐρωτήσεως· οὐκ ἐν τῶ[ν] Συμ[πο]σίω[ι] Λέγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Πε[ρὶ] Βί[ων] – οὐδὲ Κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμέν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστ[η]ικὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κὰν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κ[ρί]σιν, ἀλλὰ χρεῖαν γ' ἔχει λόγου τυχεῖν

* however, We relieve them from much questioning and from many inquires: We do not say that [a direct quote on the topic] is in the *Symposium* nor in [the works] *On Lives* – nor do We order him to seek a pebble in the sea – but through what [we have cited] and through what we claim, We [already] have set forth that *Sophistic Rhetoric* is shown to exist as an art – [general quotes] which, even though they can be shown to enlarge our judgment, nevertheless still require having a reasoning {i.e., giving an explanation}

[Chandler] However, in order to relieve them from having to ask a lot of questions from a lot of people, we say that it is not in the *Symposium* nor in the *On Ways of Life*, nor are we telling them to look for a needle in a haystack. But we have already cited where and on what grounds we say that the fact that sophistic rhetoric is an art is revealed – even if the (citations) are shown to strengthen our own judgement, yet they require an argument for all the members of our philosophical school.

Above [U49] Philodemus shows that *Sophistic Rhetoric* is the practice of composing arguments together and conducting lectures.

45. On the End-Goal

Περὶ Τέλους

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.27...**Περὶ Αἰρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν. Περὶ Τέλους. Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανῶν...**

...*On Choices and Avoidances. On the End Goal. On the Criterion, or The Canon...*

[=U6] Diogēnēs Laértios 10.30

τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν [ἔχει] **τὰ περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς** – ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς **Περὶ Βίων βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ Περὶ Τέλους**

but the ethical Part [concerns] **things** relating to choice and avoidance – and it is in the **books** *On Lifecourses*, in the letters, and in the book *On the End-Goal*

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.18.41

in eo quidem libro qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam... totusque liber, qui est De Summo Bono, refertus et uerbis et sentiētiis talibus.

indeed, in **that book**, which contains **all your teaching...** and the entire book, which is about *On the Highest Good*, is **filled** with such **words** and **sentiments**

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.19.44

haec Epicuro confitenda sunt, aut ea quae modo expressa ad verbum dixi, tollenda de libro – vel totus liber potius abiciendus – est enim confertus voluptatibus

these things must be admitted **by Epikouros**, or **what** I just **expressed** **verbatim must be removed** from the **book** – or rather the whole book should be thrown out – for it is **packed** with **pleasures**

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.7 [20]

duae sunt enim Res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes: unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. Vos, ex his tam dissimilibus rebus, non modo nomen unum – nam id facilius paterer – sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo potest! hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti: sicut facit re, neque tamen dividit verbis

for there are indeed two Things, lest you think there are only [two] words: One is to be **without pain**, the other is to be **with pleasure**. You all, from such **dissimilar things as these**, try not only to make **one name** – for that I might more easily tolerate – but also to make **one thing out of two**, which **in no way** can be done! He, who approves of **both [circumstances]**, ought to use **each [description]**: as he does **in fact**, and yet he does not divide them **with words**

cum, enim, eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine Omnes appellamus, Laudat locis plurimis: audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis – atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est Oratio De Summo Bono

indeed, when **in many places** He praises **that very pleasure, which** We all call **by the same name**: he dares to say that **he does not even suspect that there is any good separate** from that kind of pleasure characteristic of Aristippus – and he says **this** there, where all of his Discourse is about the *Highest Good*

[=U34] Arrian, *Discourses on Epictetus*, 2.23.21

εἶτα τηλικαύτη Δύναμις οὔσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη, παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα – οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἢ Σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἠνέσχετο ἂν τις αὐτῆς

then, being *so great* a Power and *set over all the rest*, let [the power of the will] come forward and let it say *to us* that *the most excellent of all things is the flesh* – not even if the Flesh itself declared that *it itself is the most excellent*, would anyone be tolerant of this

νῦν δὲ τί ἐστίν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ Τέλους συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰς Φυσικάς; τὸ περὶ Κανόνος; τὸ τὸν πώγωννα καθεικός; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνησεν, ὅτι "τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες, ἅμα, καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;" ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς! καὶ οὐ μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς εἶ;

but now which is it, Epikouros, which declares *these things*? Which one wrote *about The End*, which one wrote *on Nature*? Which one wrote *about the Canon*? Which one let grow *the beard*? Which one wrote when it was dying that it was "spending the *last and, at the same time, also happy day*?" Was it the flesh or the will? And then you agree to having *something superior to this* [the will]! Are you not insane? Are you so *blind and deaf to the truths*?

[U66]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.137 fin

ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν: τῷ τὰ ζῶα, ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι, τῇ μὲν εὐαρεστεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ πόνῳ προσκρούειν, φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου. αὐτοπαθῶς οὖν Φεύγομεν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα: ἵνα καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς – καταβιβρωσκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ χιτῶνος – βοᾷ, δάκνων, ἰύζων:

ἀμφὶ δ, ἔστενον Πέτραι: Λοκρῶν τ' ὄρειοι Πρῶνες, Εὐβοίας τ' Ἄκραι

and he uses *the proof that pleasure is the end-goal*: through the fact that *that living beings, starting right when they are born*, either [act] *by being satisfied* or *by recoiling from pain, naturally* and without reasoning: therefore, We flee from *pain* instinctively: so even Heracles – being dissolved *by his robe* – cries out, while gnawing and wailing:

and *around*, the Rocks lamented: both *the Locrian mountainous* Headlands, and the *Euboean* Heights
Sophocles, Trachiniae (The Women of Trachis), 786-87

In myth, Heracles was burned to death by putting on a tunic ("the shirt of Nessus") which his confused second wife Deianeira coated with the blood of the centaur Nessus. Nessus, in turn, had been poisoned by Heracles with an arrow coated with the poisonous blood of the Lernaean Hydra.

[U67]

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 12.67, 546E

οὐ μόνος δ' Ἀρίστιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονὴν ἠσπάζοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τούτου – καὶ ἵνα μὴ "τοὺς καταγιγισμούς" λέγω καὶ "τὰ ἐπεντρώματα" (ἅπερ πολλάκις προφέρεται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος) καὶ "τοὺς γαργαλισμούς" καὶ "τὰ νύγματα" – ἃ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* εἴρηκεν, τούτων μνησθήσομαι

not only Aristippus and those around him embraced *pleasure* from motion, but also Epikouros and those around him – and lest I mention "the *excitements*" and "the *delicacies*" (the very things which Epikouros often brings up) and "the *titillations*" and "the *pinches*" – which he has spoken about in *On the Goal*, I will make mention of these

ὁ καταγιγισμός

excitement
(gust of passion)

ΚΑΤΑΓΙΓΙΣΜΟΣ
full storm action

τὸ ἐπέντρωμα τὰ ἐπεντρώματα	delicacy (dessert)	ΕΠΕΝΤΡΩΜΑ over nibble in
ὁ γαργαλισμός	titillation (tickling)	ΓΑΡΓΑΛΙΣΜΟΣ tickle action
τὸ νύγμα τὰ νύγματα	pinch (nibble)	ΝΥΓΜΑ a sting

Athēnaïos, *Deipnosophists*, 7.11, 280A

κάν, τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* δέ Φησιν οὕτω πως "οὐ γὰρ" Ἐγωγε δύναμαι νοῆσαι **τάγαθόν** – ἀφαιρῶν μὲν **τάς** διὰ **χυλῶν ἡδονάς**, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ **τάς** δι' Ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ **τάς** δι' ἀκροαμάτων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ **τάς** διὰ μορφῆς κατ' ὄψιν **ἡδείας κινήσεις**."

again, in the work *On the End-Goal*, He speaks in such a way "for I myself am not able to conceive **the good** – removing **the pleasures** from flavor, or removing **those** from Aphrodisian activities, or removing **those** from auditory experiences, or removing **pleasurable movements** through form through appearance"

ὁ χυλός	flavor	sapor	"tasting"	ΧΥΛΟΣ juice
τὰ Ἀφροδίσια	Aphrodisian activities	res Veneriae	"touching"	ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΑ foam of god
τὸ ἄκροαμα τὰ ἀκροάματα	listening	auditus	"hearing"	ΑΚΡΟΑΜΑ hearing
ἡ μορφή	figure	fōrma	"seeing"	ΜΟΡΦΗ form

Athēnaïos, *Deipnosophists*, 7.8, 278F

καὶ γὰρ, οὐκ ἐγκαλυπτόμενος, ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει, ἀλλὰ μεγάλη τῇ φωνῇ "οὐ γὰρ" Ἐγωγε δύναμαι νοῆσαι **τάγαθόν** – ἀφελῶν μὲν **τὴν** διὰ **χυλῶν**, ἀφελῶν δὲ **τὴν** δι' Ἀφροδισίων **ἡδονήν**." οἶεται γὰρ οὕτως ὁ Σοφὸς **καὶ τὸν ἀσώτων βίον ἀνεπίληπτον** εἶναι – εἴπερ **αὐτῷ** Προσγένοιτο τὸ **ἀδέες** καὶ **ἴλεων**! διὸ καὶ οἱ τῆς κωμωδίας Ποιηταί, κατατρέχοντές **που τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀκρασίας**, **Ἐπικούρους** καὶ **Βοηθοὺς** βωῶσιν

and indeed Epikouros, while not hiding himself, says loudly "I myself am not able to conceive **the good** – if I removed **the pleasure** from flavor, and removed **the pleasure** from Aphrodisian activities." For this wise man believes that **even the life of profligates** can be **irreproachable** – if It should be **safe** and **favorable for one of them**! Therefore, the Poets of comedy, who are perhaps disdainful of **pleasure and intemperance**, call out **the Epicureans** and **Followers**

The version quoted by Diogenēs Laërtios (below) is slightly contracted.

Diogenēs Laërtios 10.6

"Ἐν τε τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* γράφειν οὕτως: "οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε" Ἐχω **τί** νοήσω **τάγαθόν** – ἀφαιρῶν μὲν **τάς** διὰ **χυλῶν ἡδονάς**, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ **τάς** δι' Ἀφροδισίων, καὶ **τάς** δι' ἀκροαμάτων, καὶ **τάς** διὰ μορφῆς"

[Epikouros] writes in this way in *On The End-Goal*: "for I myself do not possess **what** I would consider to be **the good** – if I remove **the pleasures** from flavor, and remove **those** from Aphrodisian activities, and **those** from auditory experiences, and **those** from form"

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.41

quid Tergiversamur, Epicure, nec fatemur **eam nos dicere voluptatem** – **quam Tu idem, cum os perfricuiisti, soles dicere? sunt haec tua verba necne? in eo quidem libro qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam** (Fungar enim iam **interpretis munere, ne Quis me putet fingere**)

why do We hesitate, Epíkouros, and not admit that **we are talking about that pleasure** – which You yourself, when you have wiped **your mouth**, are accustomed to talk about? Are these **your words** or not? Indeed, **in that book which contains all your teachings** (I will now perform **the duty of an interpreter**, lest Anyone may think **I am inventing**)

*In Roman rhetoric, **perfricare os** or **perfricare frontem** (to wipe one's mouth or forehead) symbolized wiping away a blush – and wiping away any embarrassment or restraint – allowing one to speak boldly or shamelessly.*

Dicis haec "nec equidem Habeo quod intellegam bonum illud – detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur Veneriis, detrahens eas quae auditu e cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis suavis motiones – sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu..."

You say this "nor indeed do I have **that which** I might understand **as good** – removing **those pleasures** that are perceived **by taste**, removing **those** that are perceived **in Venereal activities**, removing **those** from listening to songs, and even removing **those** that are perceived **from forms by the eyes as sweet movements** – or whatever other pleasures are generated in the entire person **by any sense...**"

"...nec vero ita dici potest mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis – laetantem enim mentem ita Novi: spe eorum omnium quae supra dixi – fore ut natura Is potiens dolore careat" atque Haec quidem his verbis, Quivis ut intellegat quam voluptatem norit Epicurus

"...nor, in truth, can it be said that **joy of the mind alone** exists **among the good things** – for I know **the mind rejoices** in this way: **by the hope of [enjoying] all those things that** I mentioned above – so that it will happen that He is **naturally** able to be free **from pain**" and indeed these things [he-said] **in these words**, so that Anyone may understand **what pleasure Epicurus knows**

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.46

non enim verbo solum Posuit voluptatem, sed explanavit quid diceret: "saporem" inquit "et corporum complexum et ludos atque cantus et formas eas quibus oculi iucunde moveantur"

for He did not define **pleasure** merely **in a word**, but explained **what he meant**: "taste" he said "and **the embrace of bodies, games and music**, and **those forms by which the eyes are pleasantly moved**"

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.7

(Torquatus) **"istam voluptatem" inquit "Epicurus ignorat?"**

(Cicero) **"Non semper" inquam "nam interdum nimis etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur – an Haec ab eo non dicuntur?"**

(Torquatus) **"this pleasure"** he asked "Epíkouros does not know?"

(Cicero) "Not always" I said "for sometimes he knows all too well, since he testifies that **he cannot even understand where or what any good is**, except **that which is found in food, drink, in pleasure of the ears, and in obscene pleasure** – or is This not said **by him?**"

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.20

cum, enim, eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine Omnes appellamus, Laudat locis plurimis: audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum

seiunctum ab illo Aristippeno genere voluptatis – atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est Oratio De Summo Bono

indeed, when in many places He praises that very pleasure, which We all call by the same name: he dares to say that he does not even suspect that there is any good separate from that kind of pleasure characteristic of Aristippus – and he says this there, where all of his Discourse is about the *Highest Good*

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.23

Nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere – mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis – vitantes cruditatem "quibus Vinum defusum e pleno sit chryson" ut ait Lucilius "cui Nihil dum sit, Vis et Sacculus abstulerit" – adhibentis ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum

None of us thinks that debauched people of that kind live pleasantly – [but instead] clean, elegant people, with the best cooks, bakers, fish, fowl, hunting-games, with all these exquisite things – avoiding rawness, "for whom Wine poured from a full vessel is golden" as Lucilius says "for whom there is Nothing, if Strength and Money are taken away" – employing games and those things which follow, those things, when removed, Epikouros shouts that he does not know what the good is

Cicero seems to be paraphrasing Lucilius here and adapts the poet's language to support his own argument and setting.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.29

hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse: voluptatem illam – qua sublata neget Se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum (eam autem ita persequitur: Quae palato percipiatur, Quae auribus; cetera Addit, quae si Appelles, Honos praefandus sit) – hoc igitur, quod "solum bonum," severus et gravis Philosophus novit, idem non videt ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non Desideremus, cum dolore Careamus

he truly does not see the greatest argument is: that this [kinetic] pleasure – which, when removed, He denies that he understands at all what the good is (but he nevertheless pursues it in this way: That which is perceived by the palate, That [which is perceived] by the ears; He adds other things, which, if You mention, Honor must [also] be proclaimed) – this [kinetic pleasure], therefore, which the severe and serious Philosopher knows to be "the sole good," he likewise does not see that it should not even be sought, because, according to this same author, We do not long for that pleasure when We are free from pain

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.30

hanc in motu voluptatem – sic enim has suaves et quasi dulces voluptates Appellat... interdum ita laudat ut quid praeterea sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem

this pleasure in motion – for in this way indeed He calls these pleasant and almost sweet pleasures... sometimes he praises in such a way that he denies he can even understand what else might be good

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.64

cetera illa adhibebat – quibus demptis negat Se Epicurus intellegere quid sit Bonum

[Thorius] added those other things – without which Epikouros denies that He understands what the Good is

Lucius Thorius Balbus was a moneyer who hailed from Lanuvium, where there was a cult of Juno Sospita.



Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.111

nullam enim Novistis nisi profectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem. non Arbitror te velle similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum – quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum – quibus Ille testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum quod sit seiunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus: quas, quidem, non erubescens, persequitur omnis nominatim!

(Cotta) for You know no pleasure of the soul except what originates from the body and returns to the body. I do not think you wish to be like the rest of the Epicureans – who may be shamed by certain words of Epíkouros – in which He declares that he does not even understand any good that is separated from refined and obscene pleasures: which, indeed, without feeling shame, he pursues them all with precise identification!

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 28.69

Epicurum diserte dicere existimare: Dicit autem, Opinor, se nullum bonum intellegere posse demptis corporis voluptatibus. quid multa?

[Piso] thinks that Epíkouros speaks eloquently: indeed, He says, I believe, that he cannot understand any good if bodily pleasures are removed – why [say] more?

[U68]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1089D

ὄθεν Αὐτοί μοι δοκοῦσι τούτων αἰσθόμενοι τῶν ἀτοπιῶν, εἰς "τὴν ἀπονίαν" καὶ "τὴν εὐστάθειαν" ὑποφεύγειν "τῆς σαρκός" – ὡς ἐν τῷ ταύτην ἐπινοεῖν περί τινος ^[1] ἔσομένην καὶ ^[2] γεγεννημένην τοῦ ἡδέως ζῆν ὄντος: "τὸ" γὰρ "εὐσταθές σαρκός Κατάστημα" καὶ "τὸ" περὶ ταύτης "πιστὸν" Ἐλπισμα" τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχειν τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις

because They seem to me to be aware of these absurdities, they retreat to "painlessness" and "health of the body" – as in conceiving this [state] about certain things in relation to living pleasantly both ^[1] existing in the future and ^[2] having already been: because the "stable Condition of the body" and "the sure Expectation" regarding [this stable condition] holds the greatest and most certain joy for those capable of considering

Ὅρα δὴ, πρῶτον, μὲν, οἷα Ποιοῦσι: "τὴν" εἶθ' "ἡδονὴν" ταύτην εἶτ' "ἀπονίαν" ἢ "εὐστάθειαν" ἄνω καὶ κάτω μετερῶντες ἐκ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν – εἶτα πάλιν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς ἐκεῖνο!

See then, first of all, what They are doing: transferring either this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stability" back and forth from the body to the soul – then back again from the [soul] into the [body]!

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 9.5.2

Epicurus voluptatem summum bonum esse ponit – eam tamen ita definit "σαρκός εὐσταθές Κατάστημα"

Epicurus places pleasure as the highest good – yet he defines it in this way: "the stable Condition of the body"

[U69]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.42

atque **haec quidem his verbis**, Quivis ut intellegat **quam voluptatem norit Epicurus**, deinde paulo infra: "saepe Quaesivi" inquit "ex is Qui appellabantur **sapientes**, **quid haberent quod in bonis relinquerent** – si **illa** detraxissent – nisi si **vellent voces inanis fundere**"

and **this indeed [is] in [his] words**, just a little below, so that Anyone may understand **what kind of pleasure Epikouros recognizes**: "I often asked" he says "from those Who were called **wise men**, **what would** they have **that they could leave remaining among the good things** – if they had taken **those [physical pleasures]** away – unless they just wanted to pour out **empty words**"

"**nihil ab is potui cognoscere** – Qui, si **virtutes ēbullire volent et sapientias**, **nihil aliud dicent nisi eam viam qua efficiantur eae Voluptates quas supra dixi.**" Quae **secuntur in eadem sententia sunt**, totusque Liber, qui est **de summo bono**, **refertus est et verbis et sententiis talibus**

"I could learn **nothing from them** – Who, if they want to babble on about **virtues and wisdoms**, will say **nothing other than that way by which those Pleasures I mentioned above are achieved.**" What follows is in the **same opinion**, and the whole Book, which is **about the highest good**, is full of **such words and ideas**

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.48

hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit: quam aut qualem esse velint Qui honestate summum bonum metiantur – si enim **ad honestatem omnia** referant **neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse**, Ait "**eos voce inani sonāre**" – **his enim ipsis verbis utitur** – **neque intellegere nec videre sub hanc vocem "honestatis" quae sit subicienda sententia**

Your Epikouros says that **he completely does not understand this**: **what thing or what quality it is that** Those who measure the highest good **by honor** want – for if they refer **everything to honor** and do not say that **pleasure is contained within it**, He says that "**they are making a sound with an empty word**" – for he uses **those exact words** – and [Epikouros says that he] **neither understands nor sees what concept should be placed under this word "honor"**

ut enim consuetudo loquitur: Id solum dicitur honestum Quod est populari fama gloriosum – "Quod" inquit "**quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius**, tamen expetitur **propter voluptatem**"

indeed It is said, **according to common usage**: only That is called **honorable** which is **glorious according to popular opinion** – "which" [Epikouros] says "although it is **often more pleasant than certain pleasures**, is nevertheless sought **for the sake of pleasure**"

[U70]

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 546F

κάν τῷ Περι Τέλους δὲ πάλιν Φησὶν "**Τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ τοιούτοτροπα** – **ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ** – **ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, 'χαίρειν' Ἐατέον**" – **σαφῶς ὑπουργὸν ἐν τούτοις ποιῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ Θεραπείης τάξιν ἐπέχουσαν**

and in the work *On the End-Goal* he again says "It is necessary to honor **the noble and the virtues and such things** – if they provide **pleasure** – but if they do not, It is necessary **to tell them 'goodbye'**" – clearly making **virtue a servant to pleasure** in these matters and **holding the rank of an attendant**

[U71]

46. Timokrátēs

in three books

Τιμοκράτης, Γ

cum Epicurus **Aristotelem** vexarit contumeliosissime – **Phaedoni Socratico** turpissime male dixerit – **Metrodori sodalis sui fratrem**, **Timocraten** (quia **nescioquid in philosophia** dissentiret) **totis voluminibus** conciderit

(Cotta) while Epíkouros insulted **Aristotle** in the most shameful manner – he was slanderous **toward Socrates' pupil Phaedo** in the most disgraceful way – **the brother of his own companion Mētródōros**, **Timokrátēs** (because he disagreed with him about **something in philosophy**) he attacked **in entire volumes**

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1126C

Ἐπίκουρος, μὲν γὰρ, εἰς Ἀσίαν ἐξέπεμπε **τοὺς Τιμοκράτει λαιδορησομένους**, καὶ **τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐξελῶντας αὐλῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον**, ὅτι **Μητροδώρω** προσέκρουσεν, **ἀδελφὸς ὢν** – καὶ **Ταῦτ' ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται τοῖς ἐκείνων!**

Epíkouros, in fact, sent **men into Asia to rail at Timokrátēs**, and **to expel the man from the royal court** – because he had clashed **with Metrodorus**, despite being **his brother** – and This is written **in those books of theirs!**

"The royal court in Asia" is probably the court of Séleucus I Nicátor – who founded the Seleucid Empire when Epíkouros was 36 years old.

When Ptolemy II Philadelphus became ruler of Egypt around 283 BC, Séleucus I was already an elderly ruler of Asia, and Epíkouros was 58 years old.

Later on, around 268 BC (after Epíkouros had passed away) Kōlōtēs would dedicate to Ptolemy II the treatise "On the Point that Conformity to the Views of the Other Philosophers Actually Makes It Impossible to Live."

[U72]

Book 1

Uncertain Author, VH² 10.201, fr. 44

...[κάν τῶι] **πρώτω**[ι τῶν **Περὶ**] **Τιμοκρ[άτους]**

[and in the] first [of those books *On*] *Timokr[átēs]*...

[U73]

Book 3

Diogénēs Laértios 10.23

Γέγονε δὲ **ἀγαθὸς πάντα** – καθὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος **ἐν προηγουμέναις γραφαῖς** μαρτυρεῖ καὶ **ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Τιμοκράτους**

and [Mētródōros] became **good in all respects** – just as Epíkouros also testifies in his previous writings and in the third [book] *On Timokrátēs*

47. On Sensory Presentation

Περὶ Φαντασίας

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Εἰδώλων. Περὶ Φαντασίας. Ἀριστόβουλος...

...*On Films. On Sensory Presentation. Aristóboulos...*

48. On Nature

in 37 Books

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Φύσεως ΛΖ. Περὶ Ἀτόμων Καὶ Κενοῦ...

...On Nature, in thirty-seven books, On the Atoms and the Void...

Diogénēs Laértios 10.30

...διαιρεῖται, τοίνυν, εἰς τρία: τὸ τε Κανονικόν, καὶ Φυσικόν, καὶ Ἠθικόν... τὸ δὲ Φυσικόν τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς Περὶ Φύσεως βίβλοις ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς κατὰ στοιχεῖον

...[Epikouros' Philosophy], therefore, is divided into three: the Canonical, the Physical, and the Ethical.... The Physical [part is] the entire theory about nature, and exists in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* and in the letters according to [their] basic components [i.e., in an abridged form]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.7

...ἐν ταῖς ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα βίβλοις ταῖς Περὶ Φύσεως τὰ πλεῖστα ταυτὰ λέγειν καὶ ἀντιγράφειν, ἐν αὐταῖς, ἄλλοις τε – καὶ Ναυσιφάνει τὰ πλεῖστα

[Timokratēs also says that Epikouros] in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* says mostly the same things and that he writes, in them, against others – and for the most part against Nausiphánēs

Nausiphánēs supported "science-based political rhetoric" as well as reductionist skepticism.

In support of science-based political rhetoric, Philodemus quotes him as saying, "honor depends on winning a reputation for cleverness in politics... the wise man is he who can persuade his hearers – and this power of persuasion belongs to the man of science."

In support of reductionist skepticism, Philodemus quotes him as saying, "of those things which appear to exist, nothing exists more than it does not exist."

Epikouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Diogénēs Laértios 10.35

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὧς Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν ἐξακριβοῦν – μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βιβλίου διαθερεῖν...

for those who are not able, Herodotus, to examine each of the things written by us about nature – nor inspect the larger books of what has been organized...

Epikouros, Letter to Pythoklēs, Diogénēs Laértios 10.84

Ἐδέου τε σεαυτῷ περὶ τῶν μετέωρων σύντομον καὶ εὐπερίγραφον διαλογισμὸν ἀποστεῖλαι – ἵνα ῥαδίως μνημονεύης: τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις ἡμῖν γεγραμμένα δυσμνημόνευτα εἶναι, καὶ τοι, ὡς ἔφη, συνεχῶς αὐτὰ βαστάξεις

You needed a brief and easily described discourse about celestial phenomena sent to you – so that you might easily remember: for the things that have been written by us in other works are difficult to remember, and indeed, just as you said, you continuously carry them

Epikouros, Letter to Pythoklēs, Diogénēs Laértios 91

καὶ πᾶν δὲ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος Ἔνσημα ῥαδίως διαλυθήσεται – ἐάν τις τοῖς ἐναργήμασι προσέχη – ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Φύσεως βιβλίοις δείκνυμεν

and every Objection to this part easily will be resolved – if one attends to what is evident – which we demonstrate in the books *On Nature*

Galen, *On Hippocrates' Nature of Man* 1.1, note 15

Τινές δ' οὐχ ἔν ἀλλὰ πλείονα βιβλία τῆς θεωρίας ἐποίησαντο ταύτης [τῆς περὶ φύσεως], ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ πάνυ πολλά – καθά περ' Ἐπίκουρος. ἄρχεται γὰρ καὶ αὐτός, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, ἀπὸ τοῦ ζητῆσαι πότερον ἔν τι καὶ ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν οὔ τὴν φύσιν εὐρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἢ σύνθετον ἔκ τινων ἑαυτοῦ προτέρων ἀπλῶν, ἃ περ οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς παλαιοὺς εἰθίσθησαν ὀνομάζειν "στοιχεῖα."

Some people have written not just one, but several books on this theory [concerning nature], and some even many – just like Epicurus. For he too begins, just like all the others, by investigating whether that which we try to discover the nature of is something one and simple, or composite from some simpler things preceding it, which those after the ancients have been accustomed to call "basic components"

Some composed not just one book, but quite a few on the study [of nature]. Certain others, however, composed truly a great many of them – such as Epikouros. He also, like all the rest, begins with the question of what might be most simple and universal thing that we can find in nature, or rather, what might the most fundamental and simple things be like, which the successors to the ancient philosophers were in the habit of calling "elements."

[U74]

Book 1

1.1 Atoms & Void

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1114A

Ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ τῆς πραγματείας ὑπειπὼν "τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν σώματα εἶναι καὶ κενόν" ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης εἰς δύο πεποιήται τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὧν θάτερον ὄντως μὲν οὐδέν ἔστιν, ὀνομάζεται δ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν "ἀναφές" καὶ "κενόν" καὶ "ἀσώματον."

When he proposes at the beginning of his treatise that "the nature of existence is atoms and void" he treats that nature as one, dividing it into two parts, one of them actually nothing, but termed by you and your company "intangible" "empty" and "incorporeal."

[U75]*

1.2 The All Never Changes

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, 3.333

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὴν τοῦ κενοῦ φύσιν "ὅλον" τε καὶ "πᾶν" προσαγορεύειν εἴωθεν. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φησιν ὅτι "ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ κενόν."

Epikouros was in the habit of using the terms "*hólon* (whole universe)" and "*rhân* (all existence)" equivalently when describing the nature of objects and of the void. For at one point he says, "the nature of the whole universe is atoms and void."

1.3 The All Consists Of Bodies And Void

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2.82

(Cotta) **Sunt autem qui omnia naturae nomine appellant, ut Epikouros, qui ita diuidit, omnium quae sint naturam esse corpora et inane quaeque his accident.**

(Cotta) There are, however, those who call everything by the name of nature, like Epikouros, who divides it thus, that the nature of all things that exist is bodies and void, and whatever happens to these.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1112E

Ἐπικούρου δὲ λέγοντος "ἡ τῶν ὄντων φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ τόπος" πότερον οὕτως ἀκούομεν, ὡς ἄλλο τι "τὴν φύσιν" παρὰ "τὰ ὄντα" βουλομένου λέγειν, ἢ "τὰ ὄντα" δηλοῦντος ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν; ὡσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ "κενοῦ φύσιν" αὐτὸ "τὸ κενόν," καὶ νῆ Δία "τὸ πᾶν" "παντὸς φύσιν" ὀνομάζειν εἴωθε;

When Epikouros says "nature of existing things is atoms and place" do we take him to mean that "nature" is distinct from "existing things," or simply indicate "existing things" and nothing more just as it is his habit for instance to use the expression "the nature of void" for "void" And indeed, by Zeus, he is accustomed to call "the all" "the nature of everything?"

Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Hērōdotos, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.39

Τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ ἐπιτομῇ φησι κατ' ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄ Περι Φύσεως "τὸ πᾶν ἐστι σώματα καὶ κενόν."

This he says also in the Big Summary near the beginning and in his first book *On Nature* "Everything is comprised of bodies and space."

[U77]

1.4 Composites

Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Hērōdotos, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.40

Τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ τῇ ιδ' καὶ ιε' καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ *Ἐπιτομῇ* "σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστι συγκρίσεις – τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποιήνται."

He repeats this in the first book *On Nature*, and in books XIV and XV, and in the *Big Summary* "some objects are combinations – while others [are objects] from which combinations are made."

[U78]

1.5 Collisions

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 16 (column 23)

Ἀ[να]γκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸ[ς] ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται – οὐθὲν ἦττον, παρὰ τὰς [ἐξ] ἡμῶ[ν], τ[ις] Σ[υμ]μετρ[ία] αὐτ[αῖς] γίγνε[σθαι]...

* It is necessary for [atoms] to exist with collisions with each other – as it has been said in the first writing – nonetheless, for those [atoms] that come from us, a certain Symmetry with them occurs...

[U79]

Book 2

2.1 On Time

^[=U26] *Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Hērōdotos, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.73*

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξωσ προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθει καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσει καὶ στάσειν): ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες – καθ' ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ *Ἐπιτομῇ*}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We internalize, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] – according to which We use the word "Time" {He says this in both the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.137

Ἐπίκουρος δέ, καθὼς Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων, φησί [χρόνον εἶναι] "σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων – παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς."

* Epíkouros, according to Demetrius the Lacedaemonian, claims [that time is] "a symptoms of symptoms [i.e., a separable characteristic of a separable characteristic] – accompanying days and nights and hours and experiences (feelings) and non-experiences and movements and stillness."

According to Dēmétrios Laco, Epíkouros defines time as "a concurrence of concurrences, concomitant with days and nights and seasons and affections and non-affections and motions and rests."

2.2 On Images

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 14

...οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδωλα, καθάπερ λέγω· οὐ γὰρ μοναχαὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ, λέγω δὲ τῷ προειρημένῳ [ι, ἀ]ποστ[άσεις] [ἐν] τοῖς σ[ώμασιν], ὡς εἴρητ[αι]...

* ...[they say] that images do not exist, just as I say [they do exist]; for they are not alone in this manner, I say, in the previously mentioned way, distances in the bodies, as it has been said...

2.3 Flow of Images

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 37

...ἀφ' ὅλης ρε[ύσει] πρὸς στε[ρε]μένιά τ[ινα] σώ[ματα] [τὰ] εἶδωλ[α]...

* ...the images flow from the whole towards certain solid bodies...

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 38

...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ὁμοιομορφίαν τοῦ σώματος [δ]ιασώζουσ[ιν] ἕως [ἂν] ἀπαντήσά[ν τι] [σ]τρέψῃ τινὰς ἄ[ς] ὁ διασπασμ[ὸς κ]αταστήσῃ εἰς ἄλλο [φ]ορᾶς εἶδος...

* ...and on the surface, they preserve the uniformity of the body until they encounter something that turns some of them, which the dispersion causes to assume another form of motion...

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 4

...[τ]ὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν εἶναι, ἀπείρων [ὄ]ντων οὐθέ[ν] πω τῶν σχημάτων... τῆι σ[υμμετρίαι] [πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα ἢ δέ] ἀπειρία – ὥστ[ε μα]κρὰν ἀπ[όστα]σιν ἀπέχειν τῆι [ἀλλή][λο]υχία[ι] τῆς...

* ...such a nature exists, with none of the shapes being infinite so far... in harmony with the phenomena, and the infinity – so as to be far removed from continuity with each other...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 80

...χύ[σ]εως συ[σ]τήι, ὡς τε καὶ στε[ρ]μένιό[ν] τι συστήναι τὸ ἄ[λλο] δήποτε ὄπ[ου] δήποτε [τό]που· ποῦ [γὰρ] το[σ]ούτου πλήθους ὁμοιον οἷς γ' ἄλ[λ]ως [συσ]τα[ί]η τ[ὸ] πλ[ῆ]θος...

* ...of a flow coming together, so that some solid thing also comes together with anything else in any place; for where in such a multitude is there a similar multitude that would come together in another way...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 92sup

...[έ]ν παρόδωι προ[σθεω]ρήσαιμεν· καὶ [ἔ]στι [κ]αὶ κατὰ τὸ[ν] ἔκτο[πι]στικὸν τρόπον] τῆ[ς] γενέσεως [αὐ]τῶν εὔ [δη]λόνως – ἡ [δ]έ ἀπειρ[ί]α ἢ [π]ροειρη[μ]ένη π[ο]νᾶ[ται] ἅμα νοήμ[α]τ[ι] – θεωρεῖν ὅτι σ[υν]ίστα[ι]τ' ἂν εἶδ[ω]λα,] καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀ[πειρίαν] αὐτῶ[ν] οὐκ ἀδύ[νατόν] ἐστι[ν]...

* ...while passing by, we might observe; and it is also clearly evident in the way they are displaced in their formation – the aforementioned infinity works together with the mind – to see that images would come together, and given their infinity, it is not impossible...

2.5 Speed of Images

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 1 (column 93sup)

...περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ὑπαρχούσης ταχυτή[τος] νῦν λέγειν ἐπιχ[ειρ]ήσομεν· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ λεπτότης, μακρὰν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λεπτότητος ἀπέ[χο]υσα, ταχυτήτα τῶν εἰδώλων κατὰ τ[ῆ]ν [φ]ο[ρ]ὰν ἀνυπέβλ[η]τον [έ]νδε[ί]κνυται...

* ...but now we will attempt to speak about the speed inherent in their motion; for first, their fineness, being far removed from the fineness perceived by the senses, shows the unparalleled speed of the films in their motion...

2.6 Dispersal of Images

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 2 (column 94sup)

...πολλὰ καὶ ἄ[πειρα] ἦν φορούμεν[α πάν]τως κοῦφα· εἰ δ' [ὑ]περ βαλλόντως [κοῦ]φα, δηλόνως καὶ ὑπερβαλλόντως ταχεῖα κατὰ τὴν φορὰν· εἴ τ[α] εἰ τὸ μὲν ὅ[λο]ν ἴσοταχεῖς εἰσιν αἱ ἄτομοι, λέγειν ἔδει ῥο[ῦ]ν ἕτερον [έ]τέρου τῶι ἐφ' ἓνα τρόπον φ[έ]ρεσθαι] περαιοῦν συνεχέστερο[ν], καὶ μὴ πυκνὸν εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους [τό] π[ο]υ[ς] ἀναφερό[μενον]...

* ...many and infinite things were being carried, certainly light; and if exceedingly light, clearly also exceedingly fast in their motion; then, if the whole, the atoms are equally fast, it would be necessary to say that one stream differs from another in that they move to a single place more continuously, and not dense towards the opposite direction...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 94inf

...δέ τις σύνκρι[σις] τοῦτο πράττο[υσα,] τ[ὰ]ς καλουμένας κλάσει[ς] τῶν μερῶν...

* ...but some combination doing this, the so-called breakages of the parts...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 101sup

...ὥστε μὴ [δια]β[ί]ναι τῆς [καὶ] τὰ μόρια τού[του] ἀύ[τά]ς παρασκευ[άζειν] τινὰς του[τ]...

* ...so that they do not pass quickly and prepare some parts of it themselves...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 1 (column 102in)

...ὥστ[ε τῆι φύσει τὴν] ἀλληλουχίαν τοῦ ἐξωτάτου χιτῶνος εἶναι τοιαύτην, τῶν ἐν τ[ῶ]ι ἐναπειλημμένωι ἔνδοθεν...

* ...so that by nature the continuity of the outermost layer is such, of those within the enclosed...

2.7 Obstruction of Images

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 103sup

...[οὐθέν πω ἀπ]είρων, ὥστε μὴ ν[ομ]ίζεῖν κατὰ τὴν σ[ύστ]ασιν τοῦ εἰδ[ώ]λου ἐκ [σ]υνκλάσ[εως τινὸς α]ὐτὰ τ[οὺς σκεδασμοὺς] λαμβ[άνειν] ἀλ[λ'] ὅτ[αν] καὶ πρ[ὸ]ς στερέμνιον [τι προ]σκ[ρ]οῦ[σα]ν τὴν σ[κέδ]ασιν λ[αμβάν]ειν...

* ...not at all ignorant, so as not to think that in the composition of the image from some combination they take the dispersions, but when they even strike against some solid, they take the dispersion...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 2 (column 103inf)

...ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὥ[σ]τε μὴ ἀντικόπτειν] ἢ{ι} ἀρτίως ἀντικ[ό]πτοντα εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους ἢ οὓς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐφέρετο τὴν ἀναχώ[ρη]σιν ποιεῖν...

* ...but rather so as not to strike against or just as striking against the opposite places or those it was initially moving from, to make the retreat...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 3 (column 104inf)

...νυνὶ μηκέτι [τῶι τ]οῦτο μὴ ἔχειν ἀ[λ]λα σύνεγγυς ἐληλυθέναι, μὴ οἶον καταλιποῦσαι τὴν παρ' ἀλ[λ]ή[λω]ν...

* ...now no longer for this to not have come near other things, not as having left behind what is beside each other...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 3 (column 105sup)

...[θ]έσιν καὶ τάξιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ταύταις προσχωρήσασαι ὧν [πρ]ότερον διαστήματα εἶ[χον], καὶ οἰονεὶ ἐκ τοῦ κατεναντίον αὐταῖς ἔχειν τὸ σῶ[μα ἐ]ν τῆι φύσει τι σχετ[ικὸν] καὶ οὐπω προσκροῦσας... τῶι στερεμνίωι [λ]αβεῖν τ[ι]να συνίζ[ησι]ν· καὶ ὅ[τ]αν οὖν [δῆ,] φημί, πρὸς στερέμ[νι]ὸν τ[ι] προ[σ]κροῦσα[ν]...

* ...position and arrangement, but only having approached those spaces which they previously occupied, and as if from the opposite having the body in nature in some way continuous and not yet having struck against... some solid to receive some compression; and whenever, therefore, I say, striking against some solid...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 4 (column 105inf)

...ἢ σύν[κρ]ισις ἐγ[έ]νετο τοῦ π[εραι]νοῦν ταχέως εἰς [μα]κρ[ο]ὺς τόπους· ὥστ[ε,] φημί, καὶ περὶ τὰ εἶδ[ωλ]α ἀναγκαῖον τ[ο]ιαύτην...

* ...the combination occurred with what quickly extends into distant places; so that, I say, it is necessary also for the images...

2.8 Generation of Images

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 5 (column 106inf)

...ὡς[τε μ]ῆ [εἶναι τὰ στε]ρ[έ]μν[ια] οἷς ἂν [μ]εγίστη ἐπιπ[ολῆ]ς ἀλληλουχία
ὑπάρχη[ι σ]ύμμετρ[α] εἰς ὃ λέγω εἶδος, τάπε()ντῶντα πολλὰ κ[αί] παντοῖα οὐκ
ὀλίγα [ῆ]σαν δι' αὐτὸ...

* ...so that the solid things are not those for which the greatest continuous
sequence exists proportionally to the form I speak of, the many and various
encountering them were not few because of it...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 6 (column 107inf)

...[μᾶλλο]ν [τῆι αὐτ]ῆι θέσ[ει] κ[αί] τάξ[ει] ἥπερ τὰ στερέμνια διὰ τὴν ἀφθονίαν·
πολλάκις γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀπαντᾷ σώματα ἃ τὴν...

* ...more in the same position and order than the solid things because of
abundance; for often such bodies meet them which the...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 7 (column 108inf)

...μηχανᾶσθαι, ἔ[τι τε τὴν συν]κρίσει ἀναλ[ογίαν] ἔχοντος οἷαν [εἰ]ῖρηκα· τί γὰρ
οὐκ ἂν μηχανηθεῖ μορφῆς εἶδος ὃ τὴν...

* ...to devise, and still having the proportion of combination as I have said;
for what form of shape would not be devised which...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 8 (column 109inf)

...προειρημένη[ν τα]χυτῆτα ἔχουσα[ν] συσφ[ώζεσ]θαι· αἱ γὰρ ἔν[δο]θεν θέσ[εις]
καὶ τάξεις, καθ' ἃς [ἔμ]ψυχον τόδε τι...

* ...having the aforementioned speed to be preserved; for the inner
positions and arrangements, according to which this certain living thing...

2.9 Mechanics of the Images

*Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 9 (column 110inf) | P.Herc. 1149
col. 4 (column 111sup)*

...[οὐδ]᾽ ἐκωλύομε[να] [δ]ηλ[ό]νως ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς [βά]θος παραλλαγῆς· τὸ δὲ περὶ
τὰ εἶδωλα οὕτως ἔχειν φάσκειν [ο]ὔθεν | ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ [το]ῖς φαινομένοις·
[κατ]αφα νὲς ο]ὔν πάλιν γί[νεται] ὅτι τὰ εἶδωλα ταχυτῆτά τινα ἀνυπέρβλητον
κέκτηται κατὰ τὴν [φο]ράν· καὶ ἐν τοιού τωι δὲ τινι τρόπῳ ἔσται περὶ τῆς
ταχυτῆτος τῶν εἰδώλων [ἀπ]όδειξιν ποιήσασ[θαι]· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ[ρ]... [τα]χὺν οὐ
μόν[ον καὶ] κουφότητα...

* ...and not being hindered clearly by the depth displacement; but to assert
thus about the images holds nothing in contradiction to the appearances; it
then becomes clear again that the images possess an unparalleled speed in
their motion; and in such a manner it will be possible to demonstrate the
speed of the images; for since...

2.10 Images from Images

*Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 10 (column 111inf) | P.Herc. 1149
col. 5 (column 112sup)*

...[ἀέ]ρα ἐξω[θεῖ]ν [δυνα]τὸν περαιοῖ, φα[ν]ερὸν ὡς καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις ὑπάρχει
καὶ [α]ὔτη ἢ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στερέμνιον μόνον ἠδύνατο τὰς | ἐξώσεις
π[οιεῖσ]θαι, τὸ δ' εἶδωλον μὴ, ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐ[ξ]ωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ στερέμνια
μόνον ταχέως δύνασθαι φέρεσ[θαι], [τ]ὰ δὲ εἶδωλα μὴ, κατὰ γε τὸν
ἐξωστ[ι]κό[ν], κα[τ]ὰ μέντοι τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον εὐθύ[ς ἐξ] ἐτ[ο]ίμου κενοῦ
διὰ τ[ὰς] συνιζήσεις τὰς ε[ἰς σ]τενότητα καὶ λεπτι[ό]τητα καὶ μι[κρ]ότη[τα]...

* ...expelling the air is possible to accomplish, it is clear that this power also belongs to the films; for if only the solid could perform the expulsions, and the image could not, then only the solids would be able to move quickly in the expelling manner, but not the images; however, in the case of the surrounding being immediately expelled from the ready void due to the compressions into narrowness, fineness, and smallness...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 17

...[φ]α[ν]ερ[ὸν] ὡς κα[ί] το[ῖς] εἰδώλοισ[ι] ὑπά[ρχει καὶ] αὕτη ἡ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στερέμιον μόνον ἡδύνατο τὰς ἐξώσεις πο[ιεῖν,] [τὸ δ'] εἶδω[λ]ον μ[ή,] ἦν ἄν κατὰ | τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ στερέμνια μ[ό]νον ταχέω[ς] [δ]ύνασθα[ι] φέρεσθαι, [τ]ὰ δ' εἶδωλα μ[ή,] κα[τά] γε τὸν ἐξωστ[ι]κόν, κατὰ μέ[ν]τ[οι] τὸ ἐπιλαμ[βα]νόμε[νον] εὐθύς ἐ[τοιμ]οῦ κ[ε]νοῦ διὰ τὰς συνι[ζ]ήσεις τὰς ἐ[ἰς] σ[τε]ν[ό]τητα καὶ [λ]επτότητα καὶ μικρότ[η]τα...

* ...it is clear that this power also exists in the films; for if only the solid could perform the expulsions, and the image could not, then according to the expelling manner, only the solids would be able to move quickly, but not the images; however, with the surrounding immediately expelled from the ready void due to the compressions into narrowness, fineness, and smallness...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 11 (column 112inf)

...πῶς οὐχί, ἐπει δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τῆς ταχυτήτος, νομιστέον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ...

* ...how not, since it indeed also has this manner of speed, it must be believed that it also belongs to them...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 18 | column 19

...ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδωλον δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐ[ξ]ωθεῖν πολλὰ σώματα, [ἔτι] μᾶλλον ἢ[περ κ]α[ὶ] ἡ ὑ[π]ὸ τὰ τὰ στερέμνια τ[ο]ῦτο πράττειν,] πῶς οὐχί, ἐπειδὴ καὶ [τ]οῦτον ἔχ[ε]ι τὸν τ[ρό]πον τῆ[ς] ταχυτήτος, νομ[ισ]τέο[ν] αὐτοῖς ὑπ[ά]ρχ[ειν] καὶ τοῦ[τον] τὸν τρόπον,] εἰ καὶ τιν[α] κατ[ὰ] [τὰ] σώματ[α] ἔχει [τὸν] τ[ρό]πον το[ῦ]το[ν] [ὅ]τα[ν] περα[ι]ώ[ν]τα[ι], καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰ[δ]ώλων φύσις, [ὡ]σ[περ] λέγω, κατὰ | τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τῶν ἀπαντῶντων[ν] σωματῶν[ν] [τ]ρόπον φέρεσθαι [δ]ύναται· ὁ τρόπος [δ'] ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν οὐ[ρίων] π[ο]υ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ περι[φο]ρούμενα...

* ...since the image is also capable of expelling many bodies, even more so than the solid objects themselves can do this, how could it not be so, since it also possesses this manner of speed, must we consider that they have this manner as well? If some bodies have this manner when they move, then the nature of the images, as I say, can also move in the expelling manner of the encountering bodies. This manner is also in some way that of boundaries. Since they are being carried around...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 12 (column 113inf)

...κρίσεις ἢ τὰς σφ[ό]δρα μικκὰς ἐξωθεῖν[ν] δυνάμενα αὐτ[αῖς] καὶ αὐτοῖς εὐοδί[αν] παρασκευάζειν, π[ῶς] οὐκ εὐοδον τὸ λέγειν...

* ...judgments or those very small things capable of expelling them and making an easy passage for themselves, how is it not straightforward to say...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 19 | column 20

...προσκηρ[ύ]σ[αντα] πρ[ὸς] τὰς ἐλαχίστας συγκρ[ί]σεις ἢ τὰ[ς] σφ[ό]δρα μικρὰ[ς] ἐξωθεῖν [δ]υ[ν]άμ[ε]να αὐτ[αῖς] καὶ ἑα[υτο]ῖ[ς] εὐοδίαν παρα[σ]κευά[ζε]ιν, π[ῶς] οὐκ εὐοδον τὸ λέγειν ὡς καὶ ταῖς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεσιν ἔν[ε]σι τινε[ς] συμμέτρως ἔχουσαι στερεμ[ν]ίους [δ]υνάμεις;

*...striking against the smallest combinations or the very small ones capable of expelling them and preparing an easy passage for themselves, how is it not straightforward to say that also in the nature of films there are certain powers proportionately fitting with solid objects?

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 13 (column 114inf)

...[μήκος περιλαμβάνο]υσαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξώσεσιν καὶ οὐ δυ[νά]μεναι ἐν τρόπῳ τινὶ πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς προσπίπτειν· καθ' ἅ...

* ...encompassing length in the expulsions and unable in any manner to encounter the small ones; according to which...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 21

...[τὰ] στερέμνι[α] μέγα μήκος περιλαμβάνουσαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξώσεσιν καὶ οὐ δύ[να]μεναι ἐν τρό[πῳ] τινὶ [πρ]ὸς [τὰς μ]ικρὰς προσ[π]ίπτειν· καθ' ἅπ[α]ντας οὔ[τε] τοῦ[ς] τ[ρόπ]ου[ς]...

* ...encompassing great length in the expulsions and unable in some manner to strike against the small ones; thus, in all respects...

2.11 Permeability of Images

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 22

...δεῖ δ' [ἐ]πι[β]λέπε[ιν] ὅτι κ[ατὰ] τὴν αὐ[τὴν] ἔμπτωσ[ιν] ῥαδί[ως] διὰ παντὸς πόρου τοῖς εἰδώλοις διέκδυσιν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔ[χ]ει...

* ...it must be observed that in the same collision, the films easily pass through any passage not without reason...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 24

...συνίζησιν ἰσχυράν, περαιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν αὐ[τὰ] αἰαῖσθήσει[ς] ἐπ[ι]μαρτυροῦσ[ιν]· [οὐθ]έν γὰρ ἄ[ν] μᾶλλον ἔνδοθεν τ[ι] πολ[ύ]κενον, [ὄ]μ[οι]ον δὲ φύσει τῷδε μὴ πολυκένωι...

* ...strong compression, passing through walls and other objects, as the senses themselves bear witness; for nothing internal with many voids, similar in nature to this but not having many voids...

2.12 False Analogy of Permeability

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 25

...[ἐ]πιτηδ[ε]ίων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἓνα τ[ι]νὰ φύσε[ι], ἀλλὰ πολ[ύ]λους καὶ [ἄ]λλο[υ]ς ἄλλως, λέγω δ' οἶον πυρὸς, καὶ πνεύματος καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτοτρόπων· ταῦτα γάρ, ἐν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τῆ[ν] λεπτομέρειαν ἔχοντ[α] ἢ περ ἐν ἑ[κ] ἑξ[ω]θεν μ[ὲ]ν ἀλληλοῦ[χο]ι [φύσεις, ἐνδοθ]ε[ν] [δέ] πολ[ύ]κε[νοι], δύνα[νται] τὰς διεκδύσεις [διὰ τῶν] στερεμ[νίων] φύ[σ]εω[ν] λαμβ[άνε]ιν· οἷς δ[έ]...

* ...suitable, not having a single shape by nature, but many and different in various ways, I speak of things like fire, air, and similar things; for these, having fineness in a different manner than the externally continuous natures, but internally with many voids, can achieve passages through solid natures; and with these...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 14 (column 117inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 9 (column 118sup)

...[λέ]γω δ' οἷον [πυρὸς καὶ] πνεύμα[τος καὶ τῶν τοιουτο[τρόπω]ν· ταῦτα γάρ, ἐν ἄλλω τρόπῳ | τὴν λεπτομέρειαν ἔχ[ο]ντα ἤπερ ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἔξωθεν μὲν [ἀ]λλη[λοῦ]χοι φύσεις, [ἔ]νδοθε[ν δὲ] πολύκενοι, δύ[να]νται τὰς [διεκδύσεις διὰ τῶν στερεμνί[ω]ν φύσε[ω]ν λαμβάνειν· οἷς δὴ, φημί, βλ[έ]ποντες [ἔ]τι τῶν εἰδώλων αὐτὸ τοῦτ[ο ἐ]γχει[ρο]ῦσιν κατ[α]δοξά[ζε]ιν διὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμ[ί]α[ν τὴν δὴ] τῆς λε[πτότητος]...

* ...I mean things like fire and air and similar things; for these, possessing fineness in a different manner than the externally continuous natures, but internally with many voids, can achieve passages through solid natures; thus, I say, observing this, they attempt to infer the same about films due to the similarity of fineness...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 26

...δὴ, φημί, β[λ]έ[π]οντες καὶ τῶν εἰδώλ[ω]ν ταῦτὸ τοῦτο ἐγχειροῦσιν [κ]ατ[α]δοξ[ά]ζε[ιν] [διὰ τὴν ὁμ]ων[υ]μίαν τὴν δὴ τῆς λεπτότητος, τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ προσθεωρ[ο]ῦντες... μ[ή]τε αὐτὰ μᾶλλο[ν] τὰς διαδύσει[ς] δύνασθαι ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν στε[ρεμν]ί[ων φύσε]ω[ν] συνβέβη[κ]εν ἤπ[ερ] τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς διὰ τῶν [χειρῶ]ν συγκρίσεις, ἂν μὴ [τ]ις τὸν τρόπον...

* ...thus, I say, seeing and attempting to assert the same about films due to the similarity of their fineness, not considering their difference... and it has not happened that they are more capable of making passages through solid natures than the striking combinations through the hands, unless someone...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 15 (column 118inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 10 (column 119sup)

...ω[ροῦ]ντες· ἢ δὲ γάρ] αἴ[σθησις].. μ[ή]τε αὐ[τὰ] μ[ᾶ]λλον τ[ὰς] δι[α]δύσεις δύ[ν]ασθαι [πο]ι[εῖ]σθαι διὰ τῶν [σ]τερεμνίων φύσεων συμβέβηκεν ἤπερ τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς | διὰ τῶν χειρῶν συγκρίσεις, ἂν μὴ τις τὸν τρόπον τῆς διαδύσεως, ὃν ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν, δεικνύηι δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ὄντ[α]· δεῖ οὖν, ὡσπερ εἴρη[κ]α, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος γεγονυῖ[α]ν οἰκονομίαν ἡμ[ῶ]ν ἐπιβλέπειν· ἔστι γάρ τι σύντομ[ον] πρὸς τὸ γνῶν[αι] καὶ τ[ῆ]ν [παραλλαγή]ν...

* ...[observing], for the sense does not more enable these to make their passages through solid natures than the striking combinations through the hands, unless someone shows that the manner of passage, which we have described, is possible for them to have; therefore, as I have said, we must observe the arrangement that has come into being in this form; for there is something brief towards knowing and the displacement...

2.13 Summary

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 16 (column 119inf) | 1149 col. 11 (column 120)

...ὥστ[ε] π[α]ραθεωρ[ε]ῖν· ἀποδ[έ]δεικτα[ι] οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ὅτι ἔστι <τι[νὰ] εἶδωλα καὶ ὅτι τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἄμανοήματι | συμβέβηκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι καὶ ἔτι τὰς φορὰς ἀνυπερβλήτους τοῖς τάχεσιν κεκτῆσθαι· τὰ δ' ἀρμόττοντα [ἐ]ξῆς τούτοις ῥηθῆναι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα διέξιμεν...

* ..so as to examine closely; it has thus been proven to us that (a) there are certain films and that (b) their creation occurs simultaneously with thought, and that (c) they possess unsurpassed speed in their movements; the details fittingly related to this will be discussed in the subsequent sections...

[Sedley] Thus we have proved (a) that images (εἶδωλα) exist, (b) that they have the property of being generated as quick as thought, and (c) that they have motions unsurpassed in speed. In what follows ['in the following books'] we will go through the topics which belong in sequence after these ones.

2.14 Composition of Films

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 27

...[τ]ῆς δ[ια]δύσεω[ς,] [ὄν] ἡμ[εῖς] εἰρήκαμεν, δ[ει]κνύη δυ[νατὸ]ν αὐτοῖς [ὑπάρ]χ[ειν ὄντα]· δε[ῖ] οὐ[ν], ὡσ[περ] εἴρηκα, καὶ τῆν [εἰς] τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος [γ]εγονυῖα[ν] οἰ[κ]ονομ[ία]ν ἡμῶν [ἐ]πιβλ[έπει]ν· ἔστι [γάρ] [τι σύντομ]ον [π]ρὸς τὸ γνῶν[αι] καὶ [τὴν παραλ]λαγὴν...

* ...the manner of passage, which we have explained, showing that it is possible for them to exist; therefore, as I have mentioned, we must also consider the arrangement that has come into being in this form; for there is something concise towards understanding and the displacement...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 28

...τ[ι] τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμα νοήματι συμβέβηκεν [ἀπ]οτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὅ[τι τ]ὰς φορὰς ἀνυ[περ]βλήτους τοῖς τά[χε]σι [κε]κτῆσθαι· τ[ὰ δ'] ἀρμόττοντα ἐξῆς τούτ[οις] ῥηθῆ[ν]αι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα διέξ[ιμε]ν...

* ...that their generation happens simultaneously with thought and that they possess unparalleled speed in their movements; what fittingly follows this will be discussed in the subsequent parts...

2.15 Film Speed Analogy from the Visible

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 6 (column 115sup)

...[π]αντας οὐ[ν] τοὺς [τρό]πους οὓς θεωροῦ[με]ν τὰς ταχυτήτας [ὑπ]αρχούσας σώμα[σί τισι]ν εὖ ἐπιβλέ[πομε]ν ὅτι καὶ τὰ εἴ[δωλ]α δύν[αται] τα[χέω]ς εἰς μακροὺς [τόπ]ους περαιοῦν· [δεῖ δ'] ἐπιβλέ[πε]ιν [ὅτι κατὰ] τὴν αὐτὴν [ἔμ]πτω[σι]ν ῥαδίως [διὰ π]α[ν]τὸς π[όρου] τοῖς...

* ...all the ways in which we observe speeds existing in certain bodies, we clearly see that images too can move quickly into distant places; it is necessary to observe that in the same manner they easily pass through any passage...

2.16 Against Complete Permeability

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 7 (column 116sup)

...πρ[ὸς τοῖς στε]ρεμνίους καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς διαστάσεις εἰς βάθος εἰληφός, πλὴν οὐχὶ τῶι ἐκ σωμάτων πολλῶν εἰς βάθος πε[ποιήσ]θα[ι, ἀλ]λὰ τῶι [τὴν] τοῦ [ἔνδ]οθεν [κενο]ῦ διά[στ]ασιν τὴν [α]ὐτὴν ἔχειν, λέγειν τολμῶσιν ἀλόγως πως ὡς διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα ῥαδίως δι[ὰ π]αντ[ὸς] πόρου [περ]αι[οῦν ἔδει], οὐδ' ἐν[θ]υ[μούμενοι]...

* ...towards the solid objects and having taken the same distances into depth, except not by the depth made by many bodies, but by having the same interval of the internal void, they irrationally dare to say that because of their fineness they should easily pass through any passage, not considering...

2.17 For Incomplete Permeability

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 8 (column 117sup)

...τῶν στερεμνίων· τοῦτο δ' αὐταὶ αἰσθήσεις ἐπιμαρτυροῦσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον ἔνδοθέν τι πολύκενον, ὅμοιον [δὲ] φύσει [τῶιδε] μὴ πο[λυ]κένωι, δύναιτο, [διὰ τῶν τοί]χων [περ]αιοῦν, τῆ[ν] ἐξῆς θέσιν διασώζει[ν] [πρ]ὸς στερέμνιον...

* ...of the solid objects; and this is testified by the senses themselves; for nothing more than something with many internal voids, similar in nature to this without many voids, could pass through walls, preserving its continuous position relative to the solid...

Ἐπικούρου Περί Φύσεως Β

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρο[υ] Περί Φύσεως Β

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2

[Book 3 - Vision, Truth And Falsity]

[U80]

[Book 4 - Sensations & Thought]

Philodemus, Περί θανάτου, P.Herc. 807

...οὐτ' Ἐπίκουρο[υ] λέγει γέν[ε]ν [ἐ]ν τῷ τετάρτῳ Περί Φύσεως...

...nor does Epíkouros say, in Book 4 of *On Nature*...

[Book 5 - Secondary Qualities]

Book 6

Cosmic Reciprocity

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.38.1077

...ὁμοίως καὶ [ἐν τῷ] ἔκτω[ι] περὶ [τοῦ] δικάζεσθαι... [καὶ] εὐόρκους [καὶ] δικαίους ταῖς ἀρίσταις διαδόσε[σι] κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους.

[Obbink] ...similarly in Book 6 concerning adjudication... ...and that those who are oath-keeping and just are moved by the most virtuous influences both from their own selves and from those.

[Obbink] ...similarly in Book 6 [On Nature] concerning forensic speaking... ...and [he says] that oath-keeping and just people are moved by the best transmissions both from their own selves and from [the gods].

[Alternative] ...ὁμοίως καὶ [ἐν τῷ] ἔκτω[ι] περὶ [τοῦ] εἰκάζεσθαι...

Similarly, in the sixth book about the act of imagining...

ἡ Διάδοσις	distribution (of movement), transference (of motion), communication (of energy), vibrations; exchange, communication; influence
A technical term for Epíkouros, referring to the transmission of motions to the soul from images, which affect us through transference of their motion. From ἡ δόσις "portion, dose." The 'best' transmissions perhaps contrast with the excessive or insufficient sensitivity of souls which have an unbalanced atomic composition.	
DRN 3.245 sēnsiferōs mōtūs quae dídit pṛíma per ártūs	"[the fourth nature of the soul] distributes the sense-giving motions through the limbs first."

Book 8

Benefit of Virtue

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.38.1082

[κ]αὶ εὐόρκους [καὶ δι]καίους ταῖς ἀ[ρ]ίσταις διαδόσε[σι] κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτούς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους. [κ]αὶ παρα[π]λησίως ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ. καὶ τὴν ὠφελίαν τ[ί]θενται [τὸν αὐ]τὸν τ[ρ]όπον, [ὄνπερ] Πολύ[αι]ος ἐ[ν τῷ] πρῶ[τῳ] *Πρ[ὸς Τὸ Πε]ρὶ Φιλοσοφί[ας Ἀρισ]τοτ[έ]λους* [τὴν τοῦ]των [τ]ῶν ἀ[γαθῶν] αἰτίαν ἡμεῖν ἀπε]φῆν[α]τ' εἶνα[ι] τ[ὴν] θεῖαν φύσιν.

[Obbink] ...and that those who are oath-keeping and just are moved by the most virtuous influences both from their own selves and from those. And similarly in book 8; and they define the notion of benefit in the same way as Polyaeus in the first book of his *Against Aristotle's On Philosophy* declared his opinion that divine nature is the cause for us of these goods.

[Obbink] ...and [he says] that oath-keeping and just people are moved by the most virtuous repercussions both from their own selves and from [the gods]. And similarly in book 8 [On Nature]; and [the kathēgemónes] define the notion of benefit [for humans] in the same way as Polyaeus in the first book of his *Against Aristotle's On Philosophy* declared his opinion that divine nature is the cause for us of these goods.

[Book 9 - Mortality and Corporeality]

Book 10

10.1 Time Not Existing Is Inconceivable

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 3

...[αὐ]τὸν οὐδ[ὲ] δυνά]μενον νοεῖσθαι[ι ὅτι] χρόνος οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐπιβλεπόμενον ὅτι τ[οῦ]τό τι νοεῖ ἐξ ἀν[άγ]κης...

...he himself cannot even comprehend that time would never exist, but immediately realizes that he perceives this necessarily...

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 11

...οὐ γὰρ τοιού[τοις τισίν] ἐγχειρήμασι π[ρὸς διά]νοιαν λόγοι γίνοντ[αι], ἀλλ' ὅταν τότε τ[ὸ] προειλημμένον δεικνύη τις κατὰ τὸ ἴδι[ον] ὄνομα, εἶτα ἐξ ἀποστή[μ]ατος κάτ[ω] προσυ[πο]μένοντο[ς]...

...for arguments are not formed by such attempts at understanding, but rather when one demonstrates this predetermined concept by its proper name, it is then further submitted from a distance...

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 12

...[οὐ]δέ τις [έσ]τι τότε τι ἄλλο νομίζειν δίκαιος· καὶ μά[λα] εὖ, **ἔφη**, μοὶ δο[κ]εῖς ἅπαντα τὰ προ[ειρη]μένα διειλέχθαι, [καὶ οὐ]κ ἀνυποπτεῦ...

...nor is it fair for anyone to consider this as something else. And very well, **he said**, it appears to me that you have thoroughly debated all the previously mentioned points, without any suspicion...

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 15

...[μ]ατος τεκμα[ιρόμε]νοι, τὰς δὲ γινομ[έ]νας φαντασίας ἡμῶν περὶ μεγέθους χρόνου μὴ συμφώνους τῷ πλήθει τοῦ [παν]τὸς ὡς ψευδε[ῖς, μη][δὲ πρὸς] τὸ ἄλλο μέγε[θος] προστυ[πουμένας·] [τ]ουτ[ο]νὶ ἔφη...

...using this as evidence, and considering our perceptions of the magnitude of time as inconsistent with the entirety of the universe as false, nor aligning with any other magnitude. He stated this...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 17

...[ἔ]χομέν [τινα φαν]τα[σίαν τῶν] ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν, καθ' ἡμ μῆκός τι νο[ο]ῦμεν περὶ αὐτὰς [κατα]μετρητικὸν [πασ]ῆς κεινήσεως· οὐ [γὰρ] θέλομεν αὐτο[ῖ] [ταῖς] αὐταῖς...

...we have some perception of the days and nights, through which we conceive a specific length regarding them, measurable for all motion. For we do not wish ourselves to be consistent with the same...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 20

...κον καὶ το... εἰ ἄρα σοι [περὶ] τα[ῦτα] ἐκ τῆς ἐκκειμ[ένης] λέξεως ὁ λόγος ἦ, οὐδ' ἂν ὀκνήσαιμι οὐ χρόνον εἶναι τὰς ἡμέρας φῆσαι καὶ τὰς νύ[κτας οὐ]δ' ἄμετρον...

...length and the... if therefore the discussion about these matters is from the stated words, I would not hesitate to say that neither the days are time nor the nights, nor are they immeasurable...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 22

...τὸ δ' ἕναν[τί]ον κατασκευάζομεν ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν ἀμφοτέροι οἱ λόγοι περὶ [ἔ]καστον ὑπάρχωσιν· ἀλλὰ προφά[σει]ς οἰόμεθ[α εἶ][ναι] τῶ[ν] τάσ[δε τὰς]...

...but we establish the opposite so that both arguments exist for us concerning each matter; however, we consider these to be the pretexts of those who...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 23

...[τὸ]ν οὐ νοούμεν[ον] [χρό]νον δὴ ὅποταν [ὕμ]ᾶς εἶπωμεν νοεῖν, τὸν χρόνον ὡσαν[εἰ] [συ]μβεβηκός τινα [φαντ]ασία[ι τ]ῆι τῶν...

...the time that is not conceived, indeed whenever we say you perceive time, it is as if time were an incidental impression to some...

10.2 Time Is a Characteristic of Movement

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 25

...κάκεινων [οὐχὶ ο]ὐθὲν τοδὶ προ[σομ]ετρεῖς ἐπειδάν τις λέγηι, τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου κίνησιν παραθεωρῶν πλε[ί]ω ἢ ἐλάττω χρόνον γινομένην, καταδοξάζειν [αὐ]τὸ καὶ τὸν χρό[νον] διὰ το[ῦ]ς...

...and they do not take this into account at all when someone, observing the movement of the sun, says that more or less time is passing, deeming both the movement and the time through...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 27

...ταύτου πλέον[ος] αὐτῶν ὄντος, ἕτερον δὲ καὶ οὐ ταῦτὸ πάλιν, ὅτι τὸ περὶ [τ]ῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ νοῦν συμ[πιτ]όντων αὖ...

...being mostly the same, and then another and not the same again, because concerning those things that do not coincide with the mind once more...

...καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πραγμάτων ἀτάρακτα [ἐ]πὶ τοῦ χρόνου οὐχ ὅτι ἤ[ρ]ξαν[το]...

...and of the other matters, remaining undisturbed over time, not because they had a starting point...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 31

...καὶ φαντασ[ί][α τ]ίς ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος [κι]νήσεως πάσης κα[τα]μετρητικὴ καὶ...

...and time is a kind of perception that measures all movement and...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 32

...τοῦτο [θ]έλου[σιν] κατη[γο]ροῦ[ντες] ταῖσδέ τισιν ἐρ[μη][νε]ίαις· καὶ π[άλι]ν πρὸς ὅλον [τρ]έποντος...

...this is what they desire, criticizing these specific interpretations; and once again, turning towards the entirety...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 34

...[ἐρ]μηνείαις χρῶ[νται]· ἀλλὰ γοῦν οὐ[δεπώ]ποτε οἱ τὸδ' ἡμ[ῶν] γενεᾶς [τὸ κ]ῦδος [ἐ]πὶ τοῦτο τὸ παράλλαγμα φέροντες...

...they employ interpretations; but indeed, the glory of our generation has never relied on this deviation...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 36

...κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἔχοντες, κατ' αὐτῶν τοιαύτην τ[ήνδε] φαντασίαν, ἣ [ὡς μῆ]κός τι {γ} ἄλλο, [κα]ὶ ὁμοία[ν τῷ] πλή[θει], εἰ ὑφ' ἡμ[ῶν]...

...we criticize, and, having the day, we maintain such a perception against them, where, regarding length, it differs and is similar to the general view, if by us...

10.3 Context of Time

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 37

...[εἰ δ]έ ποτ' ἐκ προ[οτέρων] θεωρ[ιῶν τοῦ]τό μο[ι λεί]ψει ἐξ ἀνάγκης, [ἀλλ'] ὁμῶς λέγομε[ν] ὅτι, ὅταν ὁ λό[γος περὶ τὸν] [χ]ρόνον πρὸς α[ὐτὰς ἀν][έλθῃ], ταύταις δέ [τ]οι δοκοῦσιν αἶ τε [ἐρμην]εῖαι καὶ αἶ φαν[τασ]ίαι ἐνδιαμέ[νειν] [ὡς ἀπ]ὸ τοῦ ὅλου κα[τὰ ταῦτα]ς τὰς ἐνχη...

...if ever from previous contemplations this necessarily escapes me, yet we assert that whenever the discussion about time arises concerning them, these interpretations and perceptions seem to persist as part of the whole according to these principles...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 38

...οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐνδιαμέ[νει] σώματι τὸ [κ]αθ' ἐ[αυ]τὸ μὲν καὶ τὸ [κα]τὰ [τῆ]ν ἰδιότροπον [πρόλ]ηψιν νοοῦμε[νον καὶ] οὐκ ἔχον δ[ί] αὐ[τὸ οὐδέ]ν τοῦτο ἄλλο[ν], ὡς μία ἡμέ[ρ]α διαφορᾷ καλεῖ[ται, κ]αὶ οὐ μόνον λέγομεν ἐν αὐτῇ ταύ[την διαφο]ρὰν ἐν[υπ]ά[ρ]χειν· ὁ θεωρῶ[ν] [καὶ] τὸ ὑπὸ ταύ[της]...

...does not persist in the body in the same way, the one considered by itself and according to its own peculiar apprehension, and not having anything else by itself, as one day is called different, and not only do we say that this difference exists within it; observing this and what is under it...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 18

...[βεβ]αιώσασθ[α]ι δ[υ]να[τ]όν· τὸ γὰρ κ[ατ'] αὐτὸ τοῦτοο πότερον ἐν[δέ]χεται ἢ [ο]ύκ ἐνδέχ[ε]ται πα[ντελ]ῶς γίνε[σθαι]...

* ...to confirm this is possible; for whether this itself can happen or cannot happen at all...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 19

...αἰ λαμβ[ά]ν[ει]ν παραλ[λαγ]ήν [δ]ι' ἀπειρία[ν], εἰ πρὸς [ἐ]κεῖνο περὶ μυρια...

* ...and to undergo change through infinity, if towards that concerning countless...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 23

...τα παρ' ἡμῖν τὰ τι ὀχεῖσθ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀ[έ]ρος] δυνάμενα καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι κ[α]ί...

* ...those things among us that are able to be carried on the air and to be suspended and...

11.2 Alternative Theory

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 27

...[δια]τηρητ[ι]κοὶ εἶ[ν]αι [τοῦ] ὠμοιωμ[ένου] τῶι [τοῦ] τυμ[πά]ν[ου] [έκτ]μή[μα]τι. οἷ μ[έ]ν γὰρ οἰο[υ]ν[ε]ἶ [τοί]χους το[ύς] κύκλ[ω]ι [έπε]νόησαν [ύ]πάρχον[τας] τῆι γῆι [τοι]αύτης...

* ...are able to maintain the similarity of the part of the drum. For they have imagined the walls as being like the earth in this way...

11.3 Atmosphere

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 11 (column 41)

...τάξεις [τ]ούτων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου τοῦ μέρους οὕτω διαληπτέον. τὰς δ' ὑπερεί[σ]εις τὰς κάτωθεν τῆς γῆς, ἅς φα[μ]εν τὴν [ἀρ]αιὰν φύσ[ιν] ὑ]πὸ...

* ...the order of these things. And about this part, it must be thus concluded. But the projections below the earth, which we say have the rarefied nature due to...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 12 (column 42)

...τούτων δύναται γίνεσθαι συνθεωρῶμεν, τῶν δ[έ] τὰς] ἰσότητος [α]ὐτὰς [αἰτί]ας εἶναι [τοῦ] μὴ κο[ιν]ωνε[ῖν]...

* ...of these can come to be, let us observe together, but the equalities themselves are the causes of not sharing...

11.4 Alternative Theory of Gravity

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 13 (column 43)

...ὁμοία οὔσα, παρεσκε[ύ]ακεν, ὡς [ἔφη] τις τ[ῶ]ν δίων: τὸ δὴ παρασκευάσας ἐν [μέ]σῳ τοῦ τρ[οχ]οῦ παντα[χόθ]εν ὁμ[οί]ω[ς] στ[ε]λλο[μέ]νην μὲν[ειν] ἐν τῶι [κόσμῳ] κ[ατ]ᾶ...

* ...being alike, it prepared, as one says of the gods: having set it in the middle of the wheel, it remains uniformly throughout the cosmos...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 14 (column 44)

...νομίζεῖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν πολλοῖς, ἐν πολλοῖς [δὲ κ]αὶ μάλιστα τῷ ὅλῳ τρόπῳ πολλῶι βελτίους, τινὰς δ[έ] καὶ παντελῶς ἄπλατ[ο]ν...

* ...to believe that among men, in many respects, and especially in general manner, some are much better, while others are completely unformed...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 3 (column 20)

...δους ταύτης, τιμ[ή]ν ὁ[ρ]ατὴν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῆσδε δυγ[άμε]ναι ἢ πρότερον [ἢ ὕστε]ρον ὥστε οὐ τὸ... ἀ[π]ειρίαὶ ἀκό[λ]ου[θ]ον τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὴ τὴν μὲν...

* ...giving this, to make a visible honor, and being able to do so either before or after, so that not... following the infinity of the whole, indeed the...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 4 (column 21)

...ἀπαντᾶν ἢ μὴ λ[ή]ρους ἀπαντᾶν, ἀπέριου δὲ μὴ ἀπαν[τᾶ]ν... ἀπαντᾶν ὡσ[τε] τὸ ἄ[π]ε[ρο]ν τὰς ὁμο[ί]ας φύ[σει]ς ἔχει καὶ μὴ...

* ...to encounter or not encounter nonsense, but the infinite not to encounter... to meet so that the infinite has similar natures and not...

11.5 Weight of Earth

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 5 (column 22)

...ἐκεῖνο, τὸ δὲ ὅτ[ι] μὴ φοβητέον τὸ βαρ[ύ] τῆς γῆς πρὸς τὸν μ[ε]τε[ω]ρισμὸν ὅταν...

* ...that, but that one should not fear the heaviness of the earth towards the elevation when...

11.6 Thought Experiment

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 2 (column 28)

...καὶ διὰ τοῦτ[ο] πα]νταχόθεν πρὸ ὁμμ[ά]των τιθέμενοι τὰς περιφερείας ὡς τοῦ α[ύ]τ[ο]υ π[ρά]γματ[ο]ς...

* ...and because of this, placing the circumferences everywhere before the eyes as of the same matter...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 6 (column 30)

...μί[ζοι]μεν, ἐν ταῖς μεταβάσε[σιν], ὁμ[ο]ιον εἶπεῖν, ταῖ[ς] ἐπὶ τὸ ἄν[ω], καὶ ὁ ὑπ[έ]ρ κεφαλῆς ἀρτίως εἶχε το[ῦτ' ἄ]ν ὑπὸ π[ο]σ[ί]ν ἰσχάνοι[μ]εν κατὰ τὴν μ[ε]τάβασιν φα[ί]νε[σθ]αι κάτω...

* ...we might perceive, in the transitions, so to speak, those upwards, and what was just above the head would now seem to be beneath the feet during the transition, appearing below...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 1 (column 32)

...ποσὶν αὐτῷ φαινομένου κατωτέρω τ[οῦ]το οὐ νοήσει, ὃ νῦν ἀναβὰς ὑπὸ ποσὶν ἔλαβεν, πρότερον ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἔχ[ο]ν [ἔ]δου... παρὰ τὸ οὔν, φημί, ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν γῆν τ[οῖ]ς τόποις... στρ[ο]γύλον ποιῶ γε[γε]νησθ[α]ί κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν [ἔ]ν μέσῳ ὡς [ἄ]ν...

* ...seeming to be below his feet, he will not perceive this, which now having ascended, he has taken under his feet, previously having above his head, has descended... therefore, I say, because the earth is in the middle of the places... having made the world round and the earth in the center as if...

11.7 Atmospheric Boundary

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 2 (column 33)

...τοίχους ἐν [κύκλ]ωι ποιήσαντες ἵνα φρά]ξωσιν ἡμᾶς πρ[ὸς τ]ὴν δῖναν, ὡς ἔξωθεν αὐτῆς περιφερομέ[ν]ης, πᾶ[σ]ιν [ὕ]π[ερ] [κε]φα[λ]ῆς τὰ ἄ[σ]τ[ρα] περιάγου[σι]ν...

* ...having made walls in a circle to enclose us from the whirl, as it revolves outside of it, they carry the stars above everyone's heads...

...creating circular walls to shield us from the vortex, as it revolves around the outside, they make the stars circle above everyone's heads...

11.8 Cosmological Observations

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 5 (column 37)

...ἀνατέλλων, ἀνατείνοντες εἰς τὸ μέρος τῆς πάσης γῆς, οὗ μετέβημεν, ἐκ τούτου ἡμῖν δυόμενος φαίνεται, οὐδὲ πολλὴν ἐνίστε πάνυ γῆν με[ταβ]εβηκόσιν· [ἀ]λ[λὰ τού]του οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ τ[ο]ῦς πλαγιασμοὺς α[ἰ]τιάσασθαι· τ[ί] γὰρ τὴν ἐν[θ]ένδε κ[α]ταστάθμη[σ]ιν {[ῆ] τῆ[ν] ἐνθένδε} {καταστάθμησιν} ἢ τὴν ἐνθένδε τινά...

* ...rising, extending into the part of the area of mainland where we have moved, from this point it appears to us to be setting, even when we have only moved a small distance across the earth; but this does not allow us to blame the tilts; for what about the alignment from here or some specific alignment from here...

[Sedley] *[The sun, if we walk towards the place from which it appeared to us] to rise, directing ourselves up into the mainland zone, appears to us to set where we previously passed by, sometimes even when we have not passed all that much ground. {**}*

Epikouros is describing the experience of when, while walking east at sunset and then looking back at the sun, it seems to set at the spot where you were formerly walking. According to Epikouros, this means that our position on Earth is not reliable for accurately tracking and measuring the different paths of celestial bodies.

11.9 Instruments

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 6 (column 38)

...μοίωμά τι λαβόντες συλλογίζεσθαι τι περὶ τούτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ περινοοῦντες, οἶμαι, λέγω δὲ τὰ [ὄρ]γανα, ἐν δ[ἐ] τοῖς κυ[λιν]δοῦντες αὐτούς, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰς [παρεμ]ποδείας, τὰς ὑπὸ τ[ῶν] διν[ευ]μάτων αὐτ[ο]ῖς παρα[γιν]ομένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν φασμάτων τῶν τ[ο]ῦ ἡλίου ἀοριστείας ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεω[ν] εἰκότῳ[ς] δια[νοί]α [οὐ] δύ[ν]ανται, [δι]ὰ τῶν ὀργάνων ο[ὐ]θὲν ἀπαρτίζοντες; {[δ]ιανοί}χαι} ὁμοιω[μα] λαβεῖν...

* ...taking some model, to consider something about these matters; for those who contemplate, I think, and I speak of the organs [of sense], while they themselves are rolling, not only because of the obstacles caused by the whirling motions, but also the uncertainties regarding the apparitions of the sun's risings and settings, cannot reasonably think through the organs [of sense], accomplishing nothing in their reflections; taking the likeness with their thoughts...

[alternative] ...μοιώματι λαβόντες συλλογίζεσθαί τι περί τούτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ περινοῦντες, οἶμαι, λέγω δὲ τὰ [ὄρ]γανα, ἐν δ[ἐ] τοῖς κυ[λιν]δοῦντες αὐτούς, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰς [ἀνδρα]ποδείας, τὰς ὑπὸ τ[ῶν] διν[ευ]μάτων αὐτ[ο]ῖς παρα[γινν]ομένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν φασμάτων τῶν τ[ο]ῦ ἡλίου ἀοριστείας ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεω[ν] εἰκότῳ[ς] διανοίᾳ [οὐ δύ]νανται, [δι]ὰ τῶν ὀργάνων ο[ὐ]θὲν ἀπαρτίζοντες; {[δ]ιανοί}{{αι}} ὁμοιω[μα] λαβεῖν...

...taking a certain likeness to consider something about these matters; for on the one hand, they contemplate, I think, the instruments, rolling themselves in the whirlings, not only in terms of servitude, which occur to them through the whirlings, but also those related to the indistinct apparitions of the sun's risings and settings. By reasonable thought, they cannot accomplish anything through the instruments.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 7 (column 39)

...προσποίημα καταλείπει καὶ παραβίασιν τοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου δείγματα τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν κατασκευάζειν το[ῖ]ς κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα φ[αι]νομένοις. διοριστέ[ο]ν γάρ, οἶμαι, πρῶτ[ο]ν [μ]ἔ[ν] τὸν εὐφρο[ν]οῦν[τα] ὅ τι διαλέγεται, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ [κ]όσμ[ου] διαλέγεται καὶ τῶν ἐ[ν] τῷ κόσμῳ φ[αι]νομένων, περὶ φάσμα[τό]ς τινος ἐκ... των τινῶν τῶν κατ' ὄψιν ἀναπεμπο[μέ]νων πρὸς ἐπίνο[ι]α[ν] ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ ψ[υχῇ] ἐ[ν]σεωσμη[μένη]...

* ...leaves a pretense and a distortion in creating the same proportion on the organ [of sense] as is seen in the heavens. For it is necessary, I think, first to distinguish what the intelligent person means when discussing the cosmos and the phenomena within it, concerning some apparition projected from certain things visible to perception, towards thought or impressed upon the soul itself...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 8 (column 40)

...δ' ὅταν, οἶμαι, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέπων τύχη κα[ὶ] μὴ διορῶν τό τε κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον λ[ε]γόμε[ο]ν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον [ὑπὸ] τῶ ὑποκειμέ[νου, κἂν] πολλὰ δὲ [ἀ]πὸ [το]ῦ ὑποκειμένου [φαντ]ασίαι γίνωντα[ι] τοῦ μικροτά[του, μ]ὴ ὅτι τοῦ κόσμ[ου], εἰκότῳ[ς] ἀδημονεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀ[ρ]τίως ῥηθέντων ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεων. ἄ[τοπ]ον μὲν γὰρ καὶ τά[χα] ἐ[στίν] ἕκαστα...

* ...but whenever, I think, he happens to look upon the underlying subject and does not discern both what is said according to the underlying subject and what is comprehended by the underlying subject, and even if many appearances arise from the underlying subject, let alone from the cosmos, it is naturally disturbing concerning what has just been said about the sun's risings and settings. For it is indeed strange and perhaps each thing...

11.10 Conceptualization of Motion

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 9 (column 41)

...ἡμῶν μὴ ἐναντίας ἀνατολῆς καὶ δύσεως βουλόμεθά τι συνάψαι φάσμα τούτοις ἐνπερινενοημένο[ν], ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμ[έ]νου ληπτέον φορὰν τινὰ τῇ διαν[οί]αι ἢ λ[ί]ου καὶ σελή[ν]ης [εἰς] ἀνατολή[ν] κα[ὶ] δύσιν, καὶ τὴν [α]ὐτ[ή]ν, φασί, γιγνομένην [ἐ]να[ν]τίως φατέον ἔχειν. κατὰ γε δὴ τὸ ὑπο[κεί]μενον καθ' ἐα[υτὸ] καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐτέρωθι μέντ[οι] ἄλλ[ας] κ[αὶ] ἄλλ[ας] εἶναι...

* ...we do not want to associate any apparition contrary to the rising and setting, which is conceived in these terms, but from the underlying subject, we must take some motion of the sun and moon in our mind towards rising and setting, and they say that the same motion is said to occur in the opposite direction. Indeed, according to the underlying subject itself and not in relation to us, there are other and different motions...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 10 (column 42)

...τιν[ος] διαστήματος ὀριζομένης· οὕτωι γὰρ ἀσφαλέστερον ἢ διάνοια τὴν μονὴν τῆι γῆι λήψεται – κα[ὶ] συνφωνότερον τοῖς κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις φαινομένοις. πυκνότητα [δ]ὲ τὴν κάτω [π]αρὰ [συνέ]χειαν αὐτῆι νοητ[έ]ον τῆς ἄνωθ[ε]ν, ἴν[α], ἐσθλαὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀ[ν]τ[έ]ρρυσιν, τοῦ μὴ φ[έ]ρ[ε]σθαι τὴν γῆν τὴν π[ρ]έπ[ου]σαν ἀναλ[ογί]αν [ῶ]σι[ν] κεκτημ[έναι]. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡμ[ῶ]ν [ἢ] τοῦ ἡλίου περιφορὰ [διὰ ταῦ]τα ἐνοχλή[σει] [ἂν τὸ] πο[σ]α[χῶς]...

* ...of a certain interval being defined; for in this way the mind will more securely grasp the position of the earth – and more consistently with what appears to the senses. The density below, compared to the continuity above, must be understood as such, so that, being excellent in resistance, they possess the appropriate proportionality of not moving the earth. For the revolution of the sun will not trouble us at all due to this, however often...

11.11 "Cosmic Center"

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 11 (column 43)

...δεήσεσθαι. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ἴσον [ἀ]πέχουσιν οὐθαμῆ βρίθην δυνήσεσθαι· ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος φύσεως αὐτῆι ὑπάρ[χ]ει, τὸ [δ]ὴ πανταχόθεν ὁμοί[ως] στελλομένην ἴσον [ἀ]πέχε[ι]ν ἀπὸ τοῦ τρ[οχ]οῦ πανταχόθεν, ὡσπερὶ τοιαύτη[ν] λ[έ]γε[ι] ἐν μέσῳ κείσθ[αι] τοῦ κόσμου ὅπερ οὐκ [ἀ]δύνατον εἶναι καὶ τοιαύ[τ]ην – τοῦτο ἄ[ρα] τὸ τῆς μονῆς αἴ[τιον] [κ]αὶ οὐ τὸ τούτου παπαρασκευαστικόν· τ[ῆ]ν γὰρ ἰσότητα ἢ το[ῦ] ἀέ[ρ]ος στολ[ῆ] πανταχό[θε]ν...

* ...will be necessary. For being equally distant from all directions, it will not be able to exert weight anywhere; for what is inherent in it due to the nature of the air, being equally distanced from the wheel in all directions, as it is said to lie in the center of the cosmos, which is not impossible, such a thing – this is the cause of its stability and not the preparation of it; for the equal distribution of the air everywhere...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 12 (column 44)

...ἦν τοῦτο εἰπεῖν αἴτι[ο]ν εἶναι, τὴν δὴ ἰσότητ[α], ἥπερ αὐτὸ τό, ὅτ[ι] τ[ὸ] μένειν αὐτῆ[ν] ἐν τ[ῶ]ν μέσῳ τοῦ κόσμου αἴτιόν ἐστ[ιν] τοῦ [μέ]νειν καὶ... κα[ὶ] ὄντ[ω]ν τ[οῦ]τωι συ[μφ]ώνων [πο]τέ, τὰς τῶν ἀέρων ὑπερείσεις πεπονηκότας, διὰ τὰς τῶν [συν]ημμέ[νω]ν ἀλλοτριότη[τας]· οἷς ἂν [καὶ] ἀπὸ τύ[χ]ης ὀρθῶς ἐπ[ε]νεχθῶσιν, [ο]ύ[θ]εν δεῖ βελτεῖους τούτων εἶναι...

* ...this would mean to say that the cause is the uniformity itself, rather than the fact that it remains in the center of the cosmos, which is the reason for its staying there, and... and at times agreeing with these, having made the projections of the airs due to the unfamiliarity of the connected parts; even if they are correctly applied by chance, there is no need for them to be better than these...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 13 (column 45)

...πάντα γὰρ τιθέμενα παρ' ἀλλ[ό]τ[ρ]οπον αὐτῶν συνα[φ]ῆς εἶδο[ς] διέφθαρτα[ι] ... μὲν οἷν τα[ύ]τῃ τῆι βίβλω[ι] τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεως εἰρήσθ[ω]. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐχο[μέ]νοις ἔ[τ]ι περὶ τῶν [με]τεώρων τουτωνε[ί] τι προσεκκ[α]ροῦμεν...

* ...for everything arranged contrary to its proper connection is destroyed... Therefore, in this book, let these things be said by us concerning the initial hypothesis. In the following parts, we will further clarify these matters regarding the celestial phenomena...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΑ

Epikouros' Peri Phýseōs, 11

Scholion in Letter to Pythoklēs, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.91

"Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἡλίου τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρον κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τηλικούτον ἐστὶν ἡλίκον φαίνεται" [τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ ια' Περὶ φύσεως: εἰ γὰρ, φησί, τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὸ διάστημα ἀπεβεβλήκει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν χροᾶν. ἄλλο γὰρ τούτῳ συμμετρότερον διάστημα οὐθέν ἐστι.]

* "The size of the sun and the other stars, as seen from our perspective, is as large as they appear." [This is also stated in the 11th book of "On Nature": for if the size had been diminished by the distance, then the color would have been diminished even more, because there is no other distance that corresponds better to this phenomenon.]

[Hicks] "The size of the sun and the remaining stars relatively to us is just as great as it appears." [This he states in the eleventh book *On Nature*. For, says he, if it had diminished in size on account of the distance, it would much more have diminished its brightness; for indeed there is no distance more proportionate to this diminution of size than is the distance at which the brightness begins to diminish.]

Epikouros, Letter to Pythoklēs, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.91

Κατὰ δὲ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἦτοι ^[1] μείζον τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἢ ^[2] μικρῷ ἔλαττον ἢ ^[3] τηλικούτον τυγχάνει. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρὰ ἐξ ἀποστήματος θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρεῖται. καὶ πᾶν δὲ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἔνστημα ῥαδίως διαλυθήσεται, ἐάν τις τοῖς ἐναργήμασι προσέχη, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* βιβλίοις δείκνυμεν.

* But in itself, the size [of the sun and other stars] is **either** ^[1] larger **than what is seen**, ^[2] **slightly** smaller, or ^[3] such a size as **they happen to be**. For in the same way, fires near us, when seen from a distance, are perceived according to our senses. Any argument against this can be easily refuted if one considers the clear evidence, as we demonstrate in the books *On Nature*.

[Hicks] But in itself and actually it may be a little larger or a little smaller, or precisely as great as it is seen to be. For so too fires of which we have experience are seen by sense when we see them at a distance. And every objection brought against this part of the theory will easily be met by anyone who attends to plain facts, as I show in my work *On Nature*.

Book 12

[U82]

12.1 Shapes of Worlds

Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.74

"Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ νομίζειν ἓνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας – ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφόρους αὐτούς" ἐν τῇ ιβ' Περὶ Φύσεως αὐτός φησιν: οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ὠσοειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἀλλοιοσχήμονας ἐτέρους – οὐ μόντοι πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν.

* "Yet also, **the worlds** neither **by necessity** must be thought to have **one shape** –but also **they** [are] **variously shaped**" he says in the 12th *On Nature*: some indeed **spherical**, others **egg-shaped**, and others **of different shapes** – **but not** having **every shape**.

"Furthermore, we must not suppose that the world-systems necessarily have one and the same shape." Rather, in the 12th book *On Nature*, he himself says that the shapes of the world-systems differ, some being spherical, some oval, others again of shapes different from these. They do not, however, take on every shape.

[U83]

Epikouros, Letter to Pythoklēs, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.96

Ἐκλειψις ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ σβένσιν, καθάπερ καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο θεωρεῖται γιγνόμενον: καὶ ἤδη καὶ κατ' ἐπιπροσθέτησιν ἄλλων τινῶν, ἢ γῆς ἢ ἀοράτου τινὸς ἐτέρου τοιούτου. καὶ ὧδε τοὺς οἰκείους ἀλλήλοις τρόπους συνθεωρητέον, καὶ τὰς ἅμα συγκυρήσεις τινῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι.

* An eclipse of the sun and moon can indeed happen also according to extinction, just as among us this is seen happening; and even also by the interposition of some other things, either of the earth or of some other invisible such thing. And thus the proper manners should be considered together, and the simultaneous occurrences of some things that it is not impossible to happen.

[Hicks] An eclipse of the sun or moon may be due to the extinction of their light, just as within our own experience this is observed to happen; and again by interposition of something else--whether it be the earth or some other invisible body like it. And thus we must take in conjunction the explanations which agree with one another, and remember that the concurrence of more than one at the same time may not impossibly happen.

Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Pythoklēs, Diogēnēs Laértios 10.96

Ἐν δὲ τῇ ιβ' Περὶ Φύσεως ταῦτα λέγει καὶ πρὸς ἡλίον ἐκλείπειν σελήνης ἐπισκοτούσης, σελήνην δὲ τοῦ τῆς γῆς σκιάσματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἀναχώρησιν."

* In the 12th book *On Nature* he says these things and additionally "the sun is eclipsed by the moon overshadowing, and the moon by the shadow of the earth, but also according to recession."

[Hicks] He says the same in Book XII of his *De Natura* "and further that the sun is eclipsed when the moon throws her shadow over him, and the moon is eclipsed by the shadow of the earth; or again, eclipse may be due to the moon's withdrawal."

[U84]

12.3 Conceptions of Gods

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.8.225

Κάν τῶι δωδεκάτ[ω]ι Περὶ Φύσεως τοὺς πρώτους φη[σιν ἀ]νθρώπους ἐπὶ ν[οή]ματα κτῶν ἕξω βακίειν ἀφθάρτων φύσεων.

[Obbink] And in the 12th book of *On Nature* he says that the first people [in human history] arrived at conceptions of imperishable external entities.

[U85]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.106 [p. 124.1 Gomperz]

[Anderson] *The rendering of this fragment in Usener (as virtually the same as U88, but attributed to Book 12) has been abandoned by subsequent scholarship*

◇^[=U41] *Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111*

...[Καὶ ἄλ]λη καν [τῶι Περὶ Ὀ]σιότητι[ος, καν τῶι] δωδεκά[τ]ωι καὶ] τρεῖσκα[ιδεκάτ]ωι Περὶ Φύσε[ως, καν τῶι] πρώτ[ω]ι [τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκράτους.

...In other places, such as in his work *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th books *On Nature*, and in the first of his books *On Timokratēs*.

[U86]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.3.60

Εἴ γ' εὐ[σκοποῦσιν] φησιν φύσιν τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν
περιστώτων δοξ[άζειν ἀξείναι] καὶ πολλ[λοῖς ἀ]ιδίοις [θεοῖς κάθα]νάτο[ις εἶναι.]

[Obbink] ...if they inquire accurately, [Epíkouros] says, he thinks that it is possible for their [divine] nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it, and that it is possible even for many eternal and immortal gods to exist.

[U87]

12.5 Madness of Atheists

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.18.514 – 1.19.541

[Π]αρασ[τήσας] ὡς τοῖς μὲν [ὑπὸ τ]ῶν [ἀν]δρῶν αὐ[τῶν γε]γραμμέν[οις ἡ]μ[ᾶς]
προσέχε[ιν, αὐτ]οῖς δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν μ[ανίαν] Ἐπίκουρος ἐμ[έμψα]το τοῖς τὸ [θεῖον]
ἐκ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι]ροῦσιν, ὡς κά[ν τῷ] δωδεκάτω[ι Προ]δίκωι καὶ Δια[γόρῳ]
καὶ Κριτίαι κᾶ[λλοις] μέμφ[εται] φᾶς πα[ρα]κόπτ[ει]ν καὶ μ[αίνεσ]θαι, καὶ
βακχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς [εἴ]κά[ζει, κε]λεύσ[ας μ]ὴ πρᾶγμα ἡμεῖν παρέχειν οὐδ'
ένοχλεῖν.

...[Epíkouros] disposing us to attend to the things written by the men themselves [the kathēgemónes], while on the other hand those who eliminate the divine from existing things, Epíkouros reproached for their complete madness, as in book 12 he reproaches Prodíkos, Diagóras, and Kritías among others, saying that they rave like lunatics, and he likens them to Bacchant revelers, admonishing them not to be an issue or disturb us.

κα[ὶ γὰρ] παραγραμμίζ[ουσι] τὰ τ[ῶν] θεῶν [όνόμα]τα, [κα]θάπερ Ἀν[τισ]θέ[νης]
τὸ κοινό[τατον] ὑποτείνων ἀν[αφέρει] τὰ κατὰ μέρος [τῆι θε]σει καὶ διὰ τι[νος]
ἀπά]της ἔτι πρότ[ερον].

For indeed they explain the names of the gods by changing letters, just as Antisthenes, substituting the most common [conception of the gods], ascribes the particular to imposition [by conventional usage] and even earlier through some act of deceit [e.g., cynically for the purpose of political control].

Prodíkos, Diagóras, and Kritías form a traditional list of atheists.

[U88]

Book 13

Familiarity With God

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.36.1023 – 1.37.1054

Τὸ δὲ περ[αίνεσθαι ὡ]φελίας ἐκ [θεῶν τοῖς] ἀγαθοῖς κα[ὶ βλάβας] τοῖς κακ[οῖς],
κατα]λείπουσι[ν. καὶ τοῖς] μὲν φρον[ίμοις καὶ] δικαίοις τ[ὸ τελει]οῦσθαι
νοη[τέον] καὶ τὰς ὡφ[ελίας καὶ] τὰς βλάβας οὐ κατα]δεεστέρα[ς ἢ καὶ] μείζους
ᾧ[ν ἄνθρω]ποι συνάπ[τουσιν, ο]ὐ κατ' ἀσθέ[νειαν οὐ]δὲ καθάπερ [ἡμεῖν ἐκ] τοῦ
θεοῦ τι[νος δέ]ον κᾶν ἐπα[ναχω]ρήσει τῆς [όνήσεως] αὐτοῦ, καὶ τ[αὐτὰ φ]ασι
σεμνό[τατα].

* But the completion of benefits from the gods to good [men] and harms to bad, [the kathēgemónes] leave behind. And to the wise and just, it must be understood as both fulfilling the benefits and the harms not lesser or even greater than those which men join, not according to weakness nor just as us from the god something needed and in withdrawing of his benefit, and these things [the kathēgemónes] say most revered.

[Obbink] And for the production of benefits from the gods for good people and harms for bad people, they [the kathēgemónes] allow. And for the wise and just it must be conceived that benefits and harms which are no feebler [harms] or even greater [benefits] than people in general suppose are made complete, not out of weakness or because we have need of anything from God, even in return [of] his benefit [here], and these things [the kathēgemónes] say most piously.

Ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ [Περὶ] Θεῶν ποία [τίς ἐστίν] αἰτία ν[εμέσεως] καὶ σωτηρία[ς ἀνθρώ]ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ] κα[τα]λειπτέον ὑπ[ο]γρά[φει] διὰ πλεό[νων]. Ἐν τε τῷ τρε[ισκα]δεκάτῳ, περ[ὶ] τῆς οἰκειότητος ἢ [ν] πρὸς] τινὰς ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει] καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος].]

For in the [book] *Concerning the Gods*, what kind of cause of retribution and salvation to men through the god must be left behind, he describes through many [words]. In the thirteenth [book], regarding the familiarity that god has with certain individuals and [regarding the] alienation.

[Obbink] And in *On Gods* what kind of source of retribution and preservation for humans through the deity must be accepted he outlines in some detail. And in book 13 he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people.

☞ [=U41] *Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111*

...[Καὶ ἄλ]ληι κὰν [τῷ Περὶ Ὀ]σιότητ[ος, κὰν τῷ] δωδεκά[τῳ] καὶ] τρεῖσκα[ιδεκάτῳ] Περὶ Φύσε[ως, κὰν τῷ] πρώτῳ[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκράτους.

...In other places, such as in his work *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th books *On Nature*, and in the first of his books *On Timokrátēs*.

Book 14

14.1 The Goal of Studying

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 3

...καθὸ τὰς μ[ε]ταβάσεις ἐν αὐταῖς ἂν νο[ή]σωμεν διὰ λόγου...

* ...whereby we might understand the changes within them through reasoning...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 24

...[ἀ]γαπητ[ὸν] καὶ τοῦτ[ο], τὸ δὴ πάντα τὸν συνε[χό]μενον [ταῖς] τοιαύταις περιεργ[ε]ίαις ἔχειν οἰονὶ φάρμακον δι' οὗ καταστάσεις ἀπλ[ᾶς] ἔστιν ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσε[ως] θεωρί[αι] ἀπαλλαγῆσθαι τῆς σ[υ]μφύτου ἑαυτα[ῖς] ταραχ[ῆς] ἢ καὶ ὕστερον...

* ...and this too is desirable, that everyone involved in such meticulous studies should have a kind of remedy through which simple conclusions can be freed from their inherent disturbances in the study of nature, which also subsequently...

14.2 Formation of Water

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 6 (column 27)

...πρὸς τ[ο]ῦς ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν [φ]άσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεί[ον] εἶ[ναι] ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσε[ως] ἄ]παντα γίνεται πυ[κνώ]σει καὶ ἀ[ρ]αιώσει παρ[ε]ξαλλα[τ]τούσης τὸν [ἀέ]ρα...

* ...to those claiming that **the nature of water** is formed by the condensation of clouds, and believing this to be a sign that everything comes from a single nature through condensation and rarefaction affecting the air...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 8 (column 29)

...[παρά] τὰς ὁμοίας [φα]ντασ[ί]ας [αὐ]τοὺς παραλο[γί]ζονται...

...despite the similar appearances, they delude themselves...

14.3 Democritus

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 9 (column 30)

...[βελτί]νες ἄνδρες πράτ[του]σιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν προσα[γ]ορευομ[έ]νων φιλοσόφων, οὓς, ναὶ μὰ τό[ν], ἔλπ[ο]μαι, εἰ δεῖ, καὶ Δημόκριτο[ν] ὡς ὀνομάσαι· ἄρ' ἂν ἐ[ν]ιστάιμεν πρ[ὸ]ς...

* ...better men act, but also those who are called philosophers, whom, yes by Zeus, I hope, if necessary, even to name Democritus as such; should we oppose...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 10 (column 31)

...[κατὰ μ]ικρὸν πολλοὺς ὄγκ[ους δε]ξομένης, καὶ ἄλλ[ων συ]γκρίσεων...

* ...gradually accepting many masses, and other combinations...

14.4 Monism

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 11 (column 33)

...[οὐ γὰρ] πα[ρὰ] τούτου π[ύ]κνωσιν ἢ ἀρα[ί]ωσιν τὰ πράγματα γεν[ν]ῶνται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ [σ]χημάτ[ω]ν διαφορὰς τὸ ἰσχυρὸ[ν] τῶ[ν] παραλλαγῶν [ἐκγί]νεται...

* ...for it is not from this that things are generated through condensation or rarefaction, but from the differences in shapes that the strength of the variations arises...

14.5 Platonic Solids

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 1 (column 34)

...[πρὸς τοὺς] ὀρίζοντας σχῆμα π[υρ]ρὸς ἴδιον ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ [ἀ]έρος, ὅτι γελοιοτέραι εἰσὶ τῶν οὐχ ὀριζόντων μὲν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς παραθέσεις ὁμολογησάν[τ]ων ἂν ἢ ἐκουσίως ἢ ἀκου[σί]ως γίνεσθαι τινα σχημά[τ]ων ἴδια εἶδη καθ' ἐκάστην [οὐ]σιώδη ῥηθεῖσαν ἂν σύγκρ[ι]σιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς μὲν [στ]οιχείο[ι]ς ἀμαρτάνουσιν, [ἀ]κόλουθον δὲ τι τούτοις [μ]ᾶλλον, οὕτω λέγοντες, [λέ]γοιεν ἂν, καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὴν [τα]ῖς μείξεσι[ν] παραλλαγῆν· [οἱ] δὲ πρὸς τὴν...

* ...towards those defining a unique form of fire or earth or water or air, that they are more ridiculous than those who do not define them, but instead agree, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, that certain unique types of shapes arise according to each substance mentioned in the composition; for they err in the elements, and it follows more from this, speaking thus, that they would speak even more so about the difference in mixtures; and towards the...

Epikouros is criticizing the theory of elements in Plato's Timaeus.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 2 (column 35)

...πῶς ἂν τις ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέ[ρ]α διανοηθείη ἢ πῦρ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν γῆν στερεὰν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον διανοηθείη τις, μὴ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενοι τέμνουσιν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ στερεὸν ἕκαστον τούτων νοηθήσεται, πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας κατ[ὰ] τὰς τομὰς φαντασίας παρασκευᾷ σχημάτων, καὶ ο[ὐ] τ[ρ]ίγωνα [ο]ὐδὲ πυραμίδας οὐδὲ κύβους οὐδ' ἀλλ' οὐθὲν ὠ[ρ]ισμένον σχῆμα· ο[ὐ]θὲν γ[ὰ]ρ πιθανὸν ἔχοιεν [ἄ]ν λέγειν ὡς μᾶλλον τι τὰ ὁρώμενα ταῦτα [τὰ] τ[έ]τ[τα]ρα [εἴ]δη ἔ[σ]τι νομίζειν κατὰ τὰς τομὰς λαμβάνειν ἢ παντοδαπά.]...

* ...how could one conceive water or air or fire, since one cannot even conceive solid and indivisible earth, let alone claim to divide these? For if each of these is not conceived as solid, many and various shapes are produced during the divisions, not triangles, nor pyramids, nor cubes, nor any defined shape; for they would have nothing convincing to say that it is more reasonable to consider these four visible kinds as being taken in the divisions rather than any other...

14.7 Shape of Fire

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 3 (column 36)

...[συγχωρῶμεν δὲ τό γε νῦν τῷ πυρὶ τὴν πυραμίδα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἐκείνων τῶν] [σ]χημάτω[ν] τοῖ[ς] λοιποῖς στοιχείοις κατὰ τὰ φαινόμεν' αὐτῶν εἶδη ταυτεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐχ[ὶ] μόνον, εἰ ἄρα, ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἂν τοιαυτὴ τις φαντασία σχήματος οἶαν ἐκεῖνος ἀποδίδωσίν ποτε δόξαι γίνεσθαι, οὐδ' αὖ[τ]η αἰεὶ, οὐ δὲ περὶ πᾶσαν φύσιν πυρὸς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν αὐτῆς φλ[ο]γός, κα[ὶ] ταύτην ἐμ ποιᾶ[ν] τ[ι]νι τοῦ [π]εριέ[χοντο]ς καταστάσει· ἐπὶ [δ'] εἶδη ταυτεῖ φερόμενος [έν]ίστε ἔοικε[ν] ἀποδ[ι]δ[οὺς] τῷ πυρὶ σχ[ῆ]μα [διάφορον] κ[αί]...

* ...we grant now to fire the pyramid shape and to the other elements some of those shapes corresponding to their apparent forms; but not only this, if such an image of shape is to be considered to occur for fire as he assigns, this is not always the case, nor for all kinds of fire, but for the flame itself, and this in some specific condition of the surrounding; while moving into these forms, it sometimes appears to assign to fire a different shape and...

14.8 Air Cannot Affect Anything

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 4 (column 37)

...ἐξέφευ[γε] τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος στο[λ]ήν, λεπτομερὲς πα[ν]τελῶς αὐτὸ ὄν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐν ἀθροισμῶι λαμβάνεσθαι συναγωγὴν ἐπιδεχομένωι· οὔτε γὰρ ἐμβρεΐθεια ποσὴ τις στολὴν ἐπιδέχεται οὔτ[ε] λεπτομέρεια, ἀλλὰ συμμετρία τις ποσὴ καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου συντελεστικὴ γί[ν]εται· ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο γελοίως ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας ἀναλελόγισται καὶ οὐκ ἐπισταμένως τάφανές διὰ τοῦ φαινομένου συλλογί[ζ]εσθαι· καὶ ἡ γῆ δὲ π[ά]λιν οὐ[κ] ἐ[κ] τοῦ αὐτ[οῦ] τ[ρό]που δύν[αται]...

* ...it escapes the composition by the air, being completely fine and unable to be gathered by the air into a mass, allowing for aggregation; for neither does any degree of density allow for composition, nor fineness, but a certain proportionality of quantity and this kind completes it. But this too has been absurdly reasoned out from imagination and not skillfully deduced from what is evident through appearance; and the earth, in turn, cannot in the same way...

14.9 Critique of Triangle Theory

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 5 (column 38)

...τα αὐτῶι τρίγωνα ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συμπλέκει σχήματα· εἰ μὲν ἄτομα ὑφείληπτο εἶναι, τί οὐχὶ ἐποίησατό τινα ἀπόδειξιν ὡς ἔστιν ἄτομα [σ]ώματα; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄτομα, τ[ί] ἂν ἐκ τούτων νομίζοι τις συνίστασθαι τὰ λοιπὰ ἃ συμπηγνύει ἐξ ἄλλων ὠνδήποτε; ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὐθὶς που ταῦτα μηκυνθήσεται· νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο [κ]ανὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτ[ι] συνέβαι[ν]ε γελοίως τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦ[τον] ἄμ]α μὲν ὁμοιον εἶ[π]αί πως τᾶ[λλα] καταζημι[οῦ]ν...

* ...the same triangles from which the other shapes are also formed. If he had assumed them to be indivisible things, why did he not provide some proof that bodies are indeed indivisible things? But if they are not atoms, how could one think that the remaining things, which he combines from other components, are constituted from these? Nevertheless, these topics will perhaps be elaborated further; but for now, it is enough to say that it was absurd for this man to claim that they are similar while simultaneously finding fault with the other things...

14.10 "Necessary Word Arrangements"

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 6 (column 39)

...[ὁμοι]ον τ[ο]ῖς πάθεσιν ἔστιν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τεττάρων τούτων στοιχείων γινομένοις ὃ ἀποδίδωσιν σχῆμα, μάλ[ι]στα μὲν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκάτερον, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε ἤδη τὴν ὁμοιομέρειαν τῶι φαινομένωι κεκτημένον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν αὐτοῦ κατεστρέφθω· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰομένους καταζηλοῦν, ὅταν οὐσίαν τις ὀνομάζη, τοὺς ταύταις ταῖς φωναῖς χρωμένους, [καὶ π]άλιν, ὅ[τ]αν λέξεως ἀναγκαίαν τινὰ διάθεσιν ποιήσεται, τοὺς σοφιστεύοντας ἀπὸ τούτων τῶ[ν] μερῶν, μικρὰ βούλομαι διαλεχθῆναι· φασι γ[ὰ]ρ δὴ τοὺς μ[ε]τα[δ]οξάζοντας...

* ...similar to the affections caused by these four elements is the shape he assigns, especially at first, if not, then at least having the resemblance to what appears; but let these things be dealt with by him. As for those who think to emulate when one names a substance, those using such terms, and again, when someone creates a necessary arrangement of words, those sophisticating from these parts, I wish to discuss briefly; for they indeed say that those who change their opinions...

An obscure critique of certain forms of eclecticism in physics. The critique may have been sparked by Plato's combination of Empedoclean and Pythagorean principles in his theory of elements,

14.11 Finite Pluralism

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 7 (column 40)

...[οἰκεῖον εἶ]ναι, τοῦ συνάψαντος τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶι καὶ ἀκόλουθον, ἐκεῖνου δὲ ἀλλότριον, τοῦ κυκῆσαντος μετὰ τῶν οὐκ οἰκείων δογμάτων τότε τι ὀρθὸν δόγμα, κἂν πρότερος ἐπιπεσὼν αὐτῶι τύχη· συμπεφορημένος γὰρ ἔστ[ι]ν οὐχ ὅς ἂν τὸ δι[ε]σπαρμένον δόγμα μεθ' ἐτέρω[ν] ἀλλοτρίων ἑαυτοῦ δογμάτων εἰς [τ]αὐτὸ σὺνάγη, ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν ἀν[ι]σομολ[ογ]οῦμεν' ἀλλ[ή]λοις τινά, [εἶ]τε παρ' α[ὐ]τοῦ εἶτε παρ' ἄ[λλ]ων συντιθῆι· κἂν [τις] τό[δε] μὲν Ἐμπεδοκ[κ]λέους λέ[γ]ηι πρὸς νοῦν, τό[δε] δ' ἄν[ε]υ [νοῦ] τύχηι...

* ...to be appropriate for the one who aligns with what is harmonious and consistent with himself, but foreign to the one who mixes it with doctrines that are not fitting, even if he happens to encounter something right before; for it is not the one who combines a scattered doctrine with other doctrines foreign to himself into the same thing who is consistent, but the one who harmonizes certain things with each other, whether from himself or from others. And if someone says this in agreement with Empedocles, while that happens without reason...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 8 (column 41)

...[συντί]θησιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπαινεῖ ἔξαπίνης τονδεῖ τινα, [εἴ]τα πάλιν τὸ ἀντιδοξάζοντα τούτῳ, οὔτε τοδί τι ἐγκωμιάζει ὃ ὄδε τις λέγει, εἴτα πάλιν τὸ ἀντ[ι]κείμενον τούτῳ ὃ ἄλλος τις λέγει, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐπαινῆι τὸ τοῦδέ τινος ἐπιφορᾶς ὀρθῆς εἶδος, εἴτα πάλιν τὸ τοῦδε, οὐ τὸ ὑπεναντίον τῷ τοῦδε ἐπαινεῖ, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν σύμφωνον ᾖ, καὶ οὕτως [ἐ]πὶ πάντων πράττει· ἀρχὴν δέ, ὡσπερ ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἐκείνων οἶετα[ι] δίκαιοι νομίζουσιν [τι]γὰ, τούτων οὐθέν, ὥστε ο[ὐ]κ ἐπάγετ[αι ποιη]τὰς καὶ σοφ[ι]στὰς καὶ ῥήτο[ρας], οἳ γ[ε] πᾶν [τὸ] τὴν ὀρθὴν ἔχον ἐπιφο[ρὰ]ν...

* ...for neither does he suddenly praise someone and then again praise the one opposing him, nor does he commend something that one person says and then again praise the opposite that another person says, but when he praises one aspect of a correct approach of someone, and then again another aspect of someone else, he does not praise the contrary of the first but what is consistent with it, and thus he acts in all matters; in the beginning, as I was saying, he does not think it right to consider any of those things, so he does not attract poets and sophists and rhetoricians, who do everything that appears correct...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 9 (column 42)

...[τῶν τοῖς προσέ]χουσι θορύβους ἐνθυμηματικούς καὶ ἀποφθε[γ]γματικούς παρασκευα ζόντων· σολοικίζει[ν] τ' ἐν δόξαις τὸ μὲν ὄλ[ον ὁ] μὴθὲν ἀκόλο[υ]θον συναρτῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ] ὁ ἐπιβαλόμενος μὲν [κατὰ του]τον[ί] τινα βαδ[ί]ζει[ν], ἔξαπίν[η]ς δ' ἀ[ρ]χόμε[νος καθ'] ἕτερον, ἕνα καθ' ἕ[ν], ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅς ἂν τῷ μὲν ὄλω[ι τρό]πω...

* ...those who prepare noisy arguments and maxims for those who listen attentively; and who commit solecisms in opinions, generally by not connecting anything consistently. Moreover, the one who sets out to proceed in a certain way, suddenly begins to proceed in another, not one by one, but not the one who in the whole manner...

14.13 Let Them Have Silence

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 10 (column 43)

...αὐτοὺς γὰρ δίκαιον φάσκει[ι]ν σολ[ο]ικίζειν ἢ συμπεφορῆσθαι, λελυμασμένους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τ[ῆ]ς φύσ[ε]ως αὐτῶν ὀρθὸν ἐπ[ι]φορᾶς εἶδος· οἱ δὲ δὴ δι[ὰ] τινος ὀνόματος ἢ ὀνο[μα]σίας ἀδιαφόρ[ου] κοινότητα, τῷ τε λελογισμέ[ν]ωι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι γ[ι]νομένην, τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐκέτι ἐπαισθανόμενο[ι], παντελῶ[ς] ἡσυχίαν [ἐ]χέτωσαν...

* ...for it is right to say that they commit solecisms or are misled, having been corrupted and by chance adopting the correct form of conduct from their nature. But those who, through some name or indifferent designation of commonality, whether calculated or occurring by chance, no longer perceive the difference, let them remain entirely undisturbed...

Epikouros' On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΔ, ΧΧΧΓΗΗΗΗ ἐπὶ Κλ[εάρχ]ου

* Epikouros' *On Nature* Book 14, in the year 301/300 BC, during the archonship of Clearchus.

Epikouros was 40 years old in 301/300 BC.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν (τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ' καὶ ιε' καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ ἐπιτομῇ) σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἔστι συγκρίσεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηται

Again (he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV and XV of the work *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*), of bodies some are combinations, others the elements of which these combinations are made.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 1A (superscriptio)

Ἐ[π]ικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως, ΙΕ ΧΧΧΗΗ ἐπὶ [Η]γεμάχου

* Epikouros' *On Nature* Book 15, in the year 300/299 BC, during the archonship of Hēgémachos.

Epikouros was 41 years old in 301/300 BC.

15.1 Requirements of Philosophy

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 5

...[εἰ] μὲν οὖν τις φιλοσοφῶν... [πρά]γματα ἑαυτῷ παρέχε[ι] ἔστιν ἐξ ἧς εἶρηκα ιδέας· προ[ιόντ]ος δὲ χρόνου εἴπερ τι τῶ[ν] [ἐνδ]εόντ[ω]ν πράττοι...

* ...if indeed someone philosophizes... provides things for himself from the idea I have mentioned; and as time passes, if he should perform any of the necessary actions...

15.2 Infinite Pluralism

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 11

...καθ' ὃ γὰρ [πρ]οσαγορεύεται ὅτι δῆ[λον] [εἶ]ναι κατ' ἐκε[ῖ]νο ἐκ τῶν [π]λείστων τῶν[δ]έ τινων [πε]ποιη[μ]ένη, ἐξ ὁμοιομε[ρειῶν]...

* ...for it is evident that it is named such because it is composed of the most parts of these certain things, made from similar parts...

[Sedley] For [it is claimed that] the respect in which it is spoken of – because it is evident – is the respect according to which it is made out of a majority of such and such things, namely the homoiomerics.

The references to ὁμοιομέρεια, make it likely that his section discussed Anaxagóras.

15.3 Appearances & Combinations

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 12

...φαντασίαν τοια[υτη]γενὶ [ἢ] τοιαυτηνεῖ, πόθεν ῥηθή[σον]ται [ἔ]χειν αἱ συ[γκρί]σεις...

* ...an appearance such as this or that, from where they will be said to have the combinations...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 17

...ἀλλ' ἐπιβλέπει πό[σα ο]ὔτω[ς] ἦδε ἡ κατηγορία περιλα[μ]βά[ν]ει τῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰσ[θ]ήσ[εσιν κ]αὶ...

* ...but observe how much this category includes of the things within the senses and...

15.4 Size and Movement of the Atoms

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 19

...ἐπισπᾶται καὶ τὸ τὰ[ς] ἀτ[ό]μο[υς] μηδὲν ἦττον, μ[ηδ]ὲν ἐλάττου[ς] τὰς τοιάσδε ἢ τοιάσδ[ε] λέγειν εἶναι...

* ...it also involves saying that the atoms are no less, no smaller, to say that these or those are to be...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 20

...ἀτόμων ἐκβολ[ή]ν ποιεῖσθαι· τὸ γὰρ τοι[ούτ]ον ἤδη ἔνδηλον ποι[εῖ] τι ὅ[ν] κᾶν ὑπῆρχεν εἰ...

* ...to produce an expulsion of atoms; for such a thing already makes evident what it would be, even if it were to exist...

15.5 Organization of Study

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 21

...οὕτω[ς] ὑφηγεῖσθαι· ὅπερ τε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς] προ[ε]λιόμεθα, οἰκονομεῖται [ῆ]μῖν...

* ...to guide in this manner; and what we decided from the start is being organized for us...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 22

...αὐτοῖς, ἃ ὀχή[σ]ει καὶ στεγά[σ]ει αὐτά, καὶ [α]ύτ[α] ὑπ' ἐκείνων διασωθήσεται[ι] καθάπερ καὶ αἱ παρ' ἡμε[τέρ]...

* ...for them, which will carry and shelter them, and they will be preserved by those just as those by us...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 23

...ἔοικεν, οὐ ταῖς κατ[ὰ] τὴν σχημάτισιν ποιό[τ]ησι τ[ῶν] συγκρίσεων...

* ...it seems, not by the qualities according to their forms of the combinations...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 24

...πεπραγματευμένους· ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξας διορᾶν ἀρχῶν, ποῖαί εἰσιν ὀρθαὶ ἢ ποῖα οὐκ ὀρθαί...

* ...having been studied; but also to discern opinions, which ones are correct and which ones are not correct...

15.6 Classification Issues

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 25

...[γ]ὰρ κατὰ τὰς ποιότη[η]τα[ς] τὰς μὴ κατὰ μορφ[ήν] ὁμ[οιο]μέρεια...

* ...for according to the qualities not based on form, the homogeneity...

...ἐκάστη ἐπιφορὰ ἐφ' ὃ τι δήποτε γίν[ε]ται, τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ τῆς καταφορᾶς συμπεριλαμβανόμενον, καὶ ἐπ[ειδ]ὴ ταῖς μ[έν] ἐπιφοραῖς...

* ...each application occurs for whatever purpose, that which is included in the discourse from the downward movement, and since with the applications...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 27

...τῆς καταφορᾶς ἐμπ[ερει]λημμένον ἐνδ[ε]ικνύ[σα]σθαῖ [τῶ]ν οὐκ οἰκ[ε]ίων [ἐν τῇ] πρώτῃ ἐπιφορᾷ[ᾶ]...

* ...included in the downward motion, to show those not suitable in the first application...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 28

...τῶν ἡμῖν τρεῖς δόγμασιν· [ἀ]ναγκαῖον [ο]ὐ τοῦτ' ἔστ[ι]ν πράττειν δι[ὰ] πολλὰς] αἰτί...

* ...for our doctrines; it is necessary not to do this for many reasons...

[U90]

[Book 16]

[Book 17]

[Book 18]

[Book 19]

[Book 20]

[Book 21]

[Book 22]

[Book 23]

[Book 24]

Book 25

25.1 Composition of the Soul

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 3a (fr. A 16.1)

...[ἀνθρ]ώπους, ἧ μὲν μᾶ[λλον αἴ]τιον τῶνδέ... λέγομεν... ἧ δὲ κ[αὶ] [ἧττο]ν ἄλλων τινῶν [εἶναι.] ταυτὶ δ' οὐθὲν...

...people, inasmuch as it is more the cause of these... we say... and also less than some others to be. These things in no way...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 2 (fr. A 18)

...[τ]ὸ μέρος συμμε[ταλαμβάνει,] τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς [καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον μέρος] [αὐτ]οῦ συμμεταδ[ίδωσι]...

...the part participates with them, and to the others, it imparts each part of itself...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 419 fr. 7 (fr. A 19)

...τῆ[ν] ψυχὴν καὶ [τ]ὴν λοιπὴν φύσιν [ἀ]ποποιῆσαι τὸ ζῶ[ιον] καὶ τὸ νοουμένην [ἐ]νόητι μηθὲν – ἢ [τὸ] ἕτερον νοεῖν τῆν [ψυχικὴν καὶ τῆν λοιπὴν] φύσιν ἐξ ἧς ἐ[ῖ]ναι εἰρή[καμεν]...

...the soul and the rest of nature, to distinguish the living being and the thinking unity in no way – or to consider the soul and the rest of nature from which we have said they are...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 1 (fr. A 20)

...τῆς [οὕτως] ἀπογεγεννημένης ἐνόητος ἐκ τῶν [κατὰ μέρος. ἐπεὶ [δὲ] [καθ]όλου] δήπουθεν ἐρρήθη πάθη ἢ δι' ἓν μέρος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἄθροον [σῶμα]...

...of the unity thus generated from the individual parts. Since it has been said in general terms that emotions either through a single part or throughout the whole body...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 419 fr. 5 (fr. A 22a)

...οὔτε γὰρ ἓν [τί] [ἦν] ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκ[ὸς] [καὶ] ὡς συμβεβηκ[ε] [ρῆ]τέον εἶναι – οὔτε [εἴτε]ρον ὡς τὸ ἀπό τινος διαστήματος [ἐπεισερχό]μενον...

* ...for neither [was there] one [thing] as the inseparable characteristic and it must be said it exists to what it has inseparably characterized – nor something else as something entering from a certain distance...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 2 (fr. A 37)

...εἶρηκα καὶ ἐπὶ [τοῦ] παντός ἢ [ἐπι]λόγι[σ]ις ἐ[γ]γεννᾶται, τὰς [ἐκ τῶν] κεινήσεων... ὧν προεῖπα ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω αἰτί[αι]ς κερκτημ[έ]νη...

...I have said, and in the whole the reasoning arises, the causes of the motions... which I previously mentioned above, having acquired...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 (fr. B 1)

...λύει τὸ πᾶν ἄθροισμα. τᾶσδε δὲ καὶ παρεσ[π]αρμένους ἐν τισιν ἔμμε[σι]ν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς [πά]θους καθ' ἃς καὶ τὸ κατὰ [τὸ] συμβεβηκὸς καὶ...

...dissolves the entire aggregate. These things indeed, and being scattered in some parts from the soul's affections, through which also the incidental and...

25.2 Desire

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 fr. 2 (fr. B 4)

...τὸ προορώμε[νον] τοιαῦτα πάσχει... ἐπὶ [γὰρ] τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐ πᾶν [κατὰ τὴν] προόρασιν τὸ σύμ[βαῖνον]...

...such things foreseen suffer... for in desire not everything occurs according to the foresight...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 1 (fr. B 7)

...γὰρ μὴ εὐρίσκη[ι, τ]ις τότε τὸ σύμπ[λωμα] πῶς ἀπ[ο]τελεῖται, ὁμῶς [εἰ] πειντεῖ ψυχεῖ... ...ἀλλὰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ λογικ[ὸς] τρόπος περαίνεται...

...for if one does not discover how this separable characteristic is produced, the soul is still persuaded... ...but indeed the rational method is fulfilled...

25.3 Intellectual Comparison

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 3 (fr. B 11)

...ἤττον, τοῖς δ' ὅλως ἐπὶ βρα[χύ] τι καὶ οὐκ ἐντυπῶν πάλιν τινων καὶ πρὸς τὴν διανοητικὴν σύγκρισιν (ὁμοιοσημόνων τοῖς πρὸς τάδε τὰ αἰσθητήρια) παρεμπιπτόντων ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖθεν προοδοποι[η]θηθῆναι τὰ γε δὴ πολὺ λάχουσης μὲν καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν στοιχείων αἰτίας παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀτ[ό]μων διαφορὰν καὶ τῶν προυπαρχόντων πόρων...

...less, but altogether for a short time and not impressing some again and towards the intellectual comparison (similar to those of these sensory perceptions) occurring from the progress made from there, indeed possessing many aspects of the very composition itself through the elements as a cause, in addition to the difference of atoms and the preexisting pores...

...less, but to those altogether briefly and without imprinting again towards the intellectual comparison (similar to these senses) occurring from there to be advanced, indeed many having the composition itself due to the cause of the elements, besides the difference of the atoms and the pre-existing pores...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 4 (fr. B 12)

...ἅμα ποιοῦντες πάντ' ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας κινήσε[ω]ς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν καὶ περικάτω τρέποντες τὸν λόγον...

...simultaneously attributing the cause of everything to the prior motion and reversing the reasoning...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 5 (fr. B 13)

...πράττουσιν τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον οὐθέν, ἅλλα/, καίπερ μιᾶς οὔσης ἐπ' ἐνίων κατὰ τὴν σ[υ]μπλοκὴν τῆς πρ[ά]ξεω[ς]... εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον συνάπτουσα πολλὰ, κα[ὶ] δὲ κα[ὶ] εἰς ἕτερον ἐπ' ἐνίων...

...they produce nothing, but, although there is one action in some through the intertwining of actions... combining many into the same task, and even into another for some...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 corn. 1 (fr. B 14)

...ἄθροισμα καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἀπὸ τῆς γ[ε]νομένης πλ[η]γῆς κατὰ τῆν διανοητικὴν σύγκρι[σιν] οὐκ εὐ[θ]ύς ἐγλειπου[σῶ]ν ἅλλα κατὰ τὸν ἀπολυόμενον τὸ παθητὸν τ[ρ]ό[πο]ν...

...an aggregate, and indeed also of the motions from the impact that occurred, according to the intellectual comparison, not ceasing immediately but in a gradually released passive manner...

25.4 Memory

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 2 (fr. A 38)

...προσεδρε[ῖ]αι ἐκμετροῦντας τ[ρ]όπ[ους] ἐμέμνητο [καὶ] λαμβ[άν]ον τῆ μνή[μ]η ὃ πα[ρ]εῖχε τῶ[ι] φυ[σι]κῶ[ι]...

...measuring the approaches with persistence, he mentioned and took into memory what was provided to the natural...

...[τούτου μν]ήμη{ι} ἢ ἀνάλογος μνήμη κείνησις τὰ μὲν] συνεγενέννητο, εὐθύς, τὰ δ' εὐξήτο, τήν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα καὶ τήν αἰτίαν, ἣ μὲν τῆι πρώτῃ συστάσει τῆ] [ἀτόμων ἄμα καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεννηθέντος, [ἣ δὲ τῆι] [ἐπαυξάμενη, ἣ] [πάντα] δρωμέν, τῶν] [ἀτόμων ἄμα καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀπογεννη]...

...movement through this memory or analogous memory some things were generated immediately, while others grew, having the beginning and the cause, in the first composition of the atoms together with what was generated, and in the augmentation, by which we do all things, of the atoms together with that which was generated...

...[ἀ]ποβαιόντων κατὰ [τ]ὰς συνωσθείσας ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ συνωσθεῖσαι δηλῶνς ὁμοίως. φύσιν γὰρ εἶχον συνωσθεῖσαι τοιαῦτα ἀπογεννῶν καὶ τοιοῦτο[υ] ἔργου] [ἄρ]χεσθαι αἱ αὐ... κατὰ τὸν [ἀ]πὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] [δ]ιαστήματος τρόπον...

...of those resulting from the compressed ones, but also the compressed ones evidently in the same way. For they had the nature of producing such things and initiating such work similarly, according to the manner from the same distance...

25.5 Recognition

...κοινοῦ τινος ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν πλείοσι καὶ διαφόροις ὑπάρχουσιν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτα μνησθένενα καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας...

...to understand something common among many and diverse existing things. For indeed the first things remembered and the sciences..

...ἣ ἄθροισμα τότε τῆ] [ἄ]ν προσαγορεύσαιμ[εν] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἣ ἀτόμους καὶ ἣ ἄθροισμα καὶ μῆ[ι] μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ κατὰκινεῖσθαι λέγονται...

...whereby we might refer to this aggregate as something, but also where it is considered as atoms and as an aggregate, and not only the act of being moved is mentioned...

25.6 Imagination

...τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν καταλειπόντων σὺν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ὅθεν ἕτερα προσδοξαζόντων τὰ μὲν κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεις τινὰς ὅσ' ἀπεριλήπτως [προσδο]ξάζουσι[ν ἢ] καὶ ἀναλόγως ἀπεριλήπτως [προσδο]ξαζ[ν]...

...leaving behind many common things along with the underlying ones, thus imagining other things, some according to the impressions of films as much as they indistinctly imagine or also analogously to indistinctly imagined things...

...ἐξ ὄγκων εἶναι σωματικῶν πεποιημένον, εἶτα τὸ κοινὸν ἑαυτῆς ἐπεθεώρησε πάθος ὡς οὐδὲ διανοηθῆναι ἄλλα δύναται παρέκ[κ] τούτων, ἂν τε σώματα...

...to be composed of physical masses, then it considered its common feeling, being unable to conceive anything else apart from these, whether bodies...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 10 (fr. B 32):

...[έ]αυτῶι κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἑαυτὸν ῥηθήσεται διανοεῖσθαι οἷον ἑνός τινος ταύτη τοῦ νοημένου[ν] οὐδ' ἄλλ' ἢ ἐξέϊπο[ν τό]τε, κα[ὶ] ἑαυτῶι ἑαυτὸ λέγεσθαι διανοεῖσθαι. πάντα γὰρ οὕτω γ' ἄν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναισθητοῦντα ἐτύγχανεν καὶ τούτων ἐπιλογισμὸν... ἐπ[ί]ονον λαβεῖν, οὐχ ὡ[σ]περ [σ]ὺν ἐπαισθήσ[ε]σ[ι]ν...

...by itself according to the similar and indifferent, it will be said to think of itself as if being something singular of this kind of the conceived but also upon itself within others. And as it is said to think of itself in some feeling...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 11 (fr. B 33)

...[ῥη]θήσεται δ[ι]ανοεῖσθαι [ἀ]λλ' ἢ ἐξέϊπο[ν τό]τε, κα[ὶ] ἑαυτῶι ἑαυτὸ λέγεσθαι διανοεῖσθαι. πάντα γὰρ οὕτω γ' ἄν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναισθητοῦντα ἐτύγχανεν καὶ τούτων ἐπιλογισμὸν... ἐπ[ί]ονον λαβεῖν, οὐχ ὡ[σ]περ [σ]ὺν ἐπαισθήσ[ε]σ[ι]ν...

...it will be said to think but as I mentioned then, and to speak to itself to think of itself. For in this way, all things would indeed be perceived by themselves in every manner, and to take account of these with difficulty, not as with perception...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 4.3 (fr. B 35)

...ἐμέμνητο καὶ λαμβάνον τῆι μνήμηι [π]α[ρ]εῖχε τῶι φυσικῶι τέλει τὸ χαρτὸν ἢ τὸ λυπηρὸν, [ὡ]ς π[ά]ν[υ] προκατ[έ]γρα[φ]ον, ἐν δόξαις ἢ/ ἄλλ[ως] ποσὸν [δ]ὲ δῆ...

...remembered and held it in memory, providing to the natural end the pleasant or the painful, as it was entirely predetermined, in beliefs or otherwise, to some extent indeed...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 4.4 (fr. B 36)

...ποτε ἀπεμνημόνευεν ἢ ἀνάλογον τῆι ἀπομνημονεύσει πάθος ἴσχα[νε]ν καὶ ἐνδιέτριβεν ὅθεν ἢ/ συχίει τε καὶ τῶν... καὶ μεγίστους φόβους... ἀξ[ί]οντα ἐπισκεψε...

...sometimes recalled or a corresponding affliction to the memory it held and lingered where it calmed both the greatest fears... under examination...

25.8 Composition of Memory

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37)

...ἀνάλογον ὧν ἔδει μᾶλλον ἐνεγείνεται πρὸς τὸ ὠρισμένον καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐξελέγχον τῆς ἀναφορᾶς γινομένης καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀόριστα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα... αὕτη δ' αὖ πάλιν ἢ τούτου μνήμη ἢ ἀνάλογος μνήμη κινήσις τὰ μὲν συνεγεγέν[η]το εὐθύς, τὰ δ' ἠῦξητο τὴν [ἀρχή]ν ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν. εἴ[μ]εν τῆι πρώτῃ συστάσει τ[ῶ]ν τε ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεννηθέντος, εἴ] ἢ/ δὲ τῆι ἐ[πα]υξομένῃ, ἔ[ξ]ι πάντα δρω[με]ν, τ[ῶ]ν ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ αὐ[τοῦ] τοῦ ἀπογε[γεν]νημένου ἐ[ξ] ἀ[νά]γκ[ης] ἀντίξουν ἐπ' ἐ[ν]ίω[ν] [τοῖς] ἀπ[ο]γενήσασιν...

...corresponding to what should rather occur towards the determined and examining all things when referenced, and not towards the indefinite and needing judgment... and this again the memory of it or the motion analogous to the memory, some things were immediately generated, others grew having the beginning and the cause. Both in the initial composition of the atoms along with what was generated, and in the increase, whereby we do all things, of the atoms along with what was necessarily generated, opposing in some respects those who generated...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 48

...[δ]ια[ν]οητι[κ]ή[ν] [σύγκ]ρισιν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλ[ων] [κρι]τηρίων...

...an intellectual composition or any other criteria...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 55

...[ν]ήσεω]ν ἀπὸ τῆς γεν[ο]μένης πληγῆς κατ[ὰ τήν] διαν[ο]ητικὴν σύ[γκρισιν] [ο]ὐκ εὐθ[ύς ἐγλει]που[σῶν ἀλλὰ] κ[ατὰ τὸν ἀπολυόμε] νο[ν]...

...of the impacts from the strike, according to the intellectual comparison, not immediately dissipating but rather according to the process of resolution...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 68

...τοῦ [π]ρ[άγμα][τ]ος οὗτος [μέλλ]ει μνήμων [ἔσ]εσθαι δοχ...

...this matter will be remembered as acceptable...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 86

...[μ]νήμη ἢ τὸ τῆι [μνή]μηι πάθος ἀνάλο[γον] ὧν ἔδει μᾶλλον [ἐνεγί]γενε[το, π]ρὸς τὸ ὠ[ρισμέ]νον καὶ τὰ πά[ν]τα...

...the memory or the emotion corresponding to it, which should have been more present, towards the specific and all things...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 87

...ἐξελέγχω]ν τῆς ἀ[ν]αφορᾶς γινομ[έ]νη[ς κ]αὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀόρι[σ]τα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα... ἀ[ὔ]τη δ' αὖ πάλι[ν] ἢ τ[ούτου] μνήμη [ἢ ἀνάλογος μνή]μηι κίνησις τὰ μὲν συνε[γ]γε...

...examining the reference being made, not towards the indefinite and requiring judgment... but again, this memory or the corresponding motion of memory...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 94

...τινα ἑτερότη[τ]α τῶν ἀτόμων κ[ατ]ὰ τ[ι]να τρόπον [δι][α]ληθτικόν, [ο]ὐ [τ]ὸν ὡς ἀ[φ' ἐ]τέρου διαστήμ[α]το[ς] ἰσχάνε[ι] τὴν ἐξ [ἑ]αυ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν... εἴτα ἀνα[δί]δωσιν εὐθ[ύς] μ[έ]χ[ρ]ι τῶν πρώτων φύσ[εω]ν [κα]ί...

...a certain variation in the atoms in a specific selective way, not as if deriving from another interval, it derives its cause from within itself... then it immediately returns up to the primary principles of nature and...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 107

...σύστασιν εἰς ἓν τι συμ[πλέ]κοντες, οὐ μὴν [οὔ]τε τῶ[ι] νο[υ]θε[τ]η[τ]ικῶι τρόπῳ καὶ ἐ[πα]νορθωτικῶι οὔτε τῶι ἀπλῶς ἀ[ντι]ποητικῶι χρώμεθα...

...integrating the structure into a unified form, neither by an instructive and corrective manner nor merely by an opposing method...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 109

...τὰ τὸμ φυσικὸν χα[ρακ]τῆρα ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς τ[οιοῦ]τ[ο]ις κ[ενο]ῖς πόροις...

...integrating the structure into a unified form, neither by an instructive and corrective method nor merely by an opposing method...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 16 (fr. B 38)

...[γί]νεσθαι κατὰ τὸν π[ρ]οειρημένον τρόπον καὶ τῶν [α]ύτῶν ἀπεργαστικά εἶναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶνδε καὶ τῶν[δε φ]ύσιν ἔχοντα ἀπεργαστικά [γί]νεσθαι δι' ἑαυτὰ οὐ γίνεται ἀ[πε]ργαστικά, οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτία[ν] τῶν τε ἀτόμων καὶ ἑαυτῶν. οἷς δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μαχόμεθα καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν, μ[ι]σοῦντες κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς] ταραχώδη φύσιν ἔχοντα καθ[ά]περ ἐπὶ τῶν πάντων ζώων. οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν εἰς ἕνια ἔργα τε καὶ μεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἢ τῶν ἀτόμων φύσις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα τὴν πᾶσα[ν ἦ] τὴν πλε[ί]στ[ην] κέ[κτ]η[ται] αἰτίαν τῶνδὲ [τι]νων.

...to occur in the aforementioned manner and to be productive of the same results. Many things, both these and those, having a productive nature, do not become productive by themselves, not for the same reason of the atoms and themselves. To these, we especially object and criticize, hating them because of their inherently turbulent nature, just as in all animals. For the nature of atoms has contributed nothing to certain works, and to the magnitude of works and dispositions, but the very things that have come into being possess the entire or most of the cause of these things.

[Sedley 20B.1-3] But many naturally capable of achieving these and those results fail to achieve them – because of themselves – not because of one and the same responsibility of the atoms and of themselves. And with these we especially do battle, and rebuke them, hating them for a disposition which follows their disordered congenital nature as we do with the whole range of animals. For the nature of their atoms has contributed nothing to some of their behaviour, and degrees of behaviour and character, but it is THEIR DEVELOPMENTS which themselves possess all or most of the responsibility for certain things.

Many people who could succeed in different tasks fail, not because of their atoms, but because of their own choices and actions. We often criticize these people, disliking them for their flawed nature, like we do with certain animals. Their atoms are not responsible for their behavior; their own development and decisions are to blame.

Epikouros responds to the arguments of determinists by asserting the existence and causal power of the self and its volitions, which transcend the basic patterns of atomic motion. He points out that some animals have freewill and therefore are also responsible for their behaviour and worthy of moral criticism.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 (fr. A 43) | (fr. A 44)

ἐκ δ' ἐκ[ε]ίνης [ἔν]ιαί τῶν [ἀ]τόμων κινή[σεις] ταραχώδε[ις] κ[ινο]ῦνται, οὐχὶ δὲ τὰ[ς] ἀτ[όμου]ς... μαχόμεν[οι] πολλοῖς ἅμα τῶν ἀν[θρώ]πων καὶ νουθε[τοῦν]τες, ὃ τῆι τοῦ αὐτοῦ[ῶ] τρό[που] κατ' ἀνάγκην α[ἰ]τι[α]ί ὑπεναντίον ἐστίν.

And from that [source], some of the movements of the atoms are stirred up in a turbulent manner, but not the atoms themselves... fighting with many people at the same time and admonishing, which in the same way is necessarily opposed to the cause.

[Sedley 20B.4] It is as a result of THAT NATURE that some of their atoms move with disordered motions – but it is not on the atoms that all *the responsibility should be placed for their behaviour*.

Although psychological impulses are separable qualities of humans (who are made of atoms) – psychological impulses are not fully determined by the movements of the atoms. Our psychological impulses can cause things to happen separate from just the motion of atoms. Even though our atomic make-up might cause chaotic motions in our minds, it doesn't mean we can't make decisions that override those motions.

25.12 Praise and Blame

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 3 (fr. A 45)

...οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν αἰτίαν, ἀλλ[ὰ] τὴν [τῶν] βελτίστων ἔργων] καὶ διανοημάτων]...

...not due to their own reason, but due to the cause of the finest works and ideas...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 3 (fr. A 46)

...[χειροῦμ]εν καὶ παρο[ξύνειν] ἐπὶ [τ]ὰ καιρι[ώτατα ὡ]ς ἤδη πέπη[γεν ἀπὸ τῆ]ς φύ[σεως τῆ]ς [αὐτῆς κακ]ηθροισμένης ο[ὐχ ἐ]τέρω τ[ινι] τὴν [αἰτία]ν ἀνα[ψ]ούσης [τὴν] πῆξιν [τὴν] ὁμοίαν...

...handling and provoking towards the most opportune things as it has already solidified from the nature of the same accumulation, not attributing the cause to anything else, but to the similar formation...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 3 (fr. A 47)

...γε [φύσιν αἰ]τιᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ το[ῦτ]ον οὐθέν διαφέρ[ει, ἀλ]λ' ἐπὶ ταῦτό φέρομ[εν] ἀμφοῖτερα τὰ ὄνό[μα]τα κ[αὶ τῆ]ν φύσιν κακίζον[τες] ὁμοίω[ς] τοῦτον κ[α]κίζ[ο]μεν ὅταν ...υξωμ[εν] [τ]αύτην [τὴν] [διάλ]εκ[τον]... ἔστι δ' [ὄτ]ε [κατὰ] τὴν πρώτ[η]ν [σύστασι]ν κατὰ σάρ[κ]α...

...indeed, whether we blame nature or this one makes no difference, as we bring both terms to the same point, blaming nature equally, we blame this one whenever we use this language... but sometimes according to the initial formation in the flesh...

Epikouros was not a strict determinist nor a strict reductionist. Epikouros accepted that consciousness (an emergent property) arises from atomic interactions and that this consciousness can influence physical actions through decision making (downwards causation). Our consciousness allows us change our behavior and control what we do.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 3 (fr. A 48) | (fr. A 49)

...ἢ καὶ τοιαυτηνὴν διά[θ]εσιν καὶ κ[εῖ]νησιν ἔχουσιν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τ[ο]ιοῦδε ἀπογεννω[μέν]ου ἐκ τῶν τοιουτωνὴν μ[έ]χρι δὲ τοῦ τοιανδὴ [ψυ]χὴν ἢ τ[οι]ανδὴ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιοῦδ' ἀπ[ογ]εννω[μέν]ου [ἢ] οὐκ ἐπειδὴν προβῆ[ι] γ[ε] τῆ[ι] ἡλικ[ί]αι τοιοῦδ' ἀπογεννω[μέν]ου κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκ[ην] ἀλλ' | ἐξ] τῆ[ι] ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστατικῆ καὶ τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον καὶ μὴ ἦ δυνατόν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπογεγεννη[μέν]ον ποιῆσαι μη[δ]· ἐπὶ] τοῦ παρόντος] μη[δὲν] ἔτε[ρο]ν...

...or also having such a disposition and such a soul generated out of necessity from such elements until such a soul or such a one not out of necessity being generated, or not whenever it advances in age being generated by necessity but from the beginning structurally constituted and having been generated and not being possible but having been generated, to make nothing other upon the present...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 3 (fr. A 49) | (fr. A 50)

...σ[ύ]στασις] ἀπ[η]ργάσατο [μηδ'] ἔν[ια] κ[α]τὰ βρα[χ]ύ τ[ι] [μηδὲ βιαζόμενον] κ[αὶ] | αὐτὴν ἐκεί[νη] πε[ρ]αῖνον. ἂν δὲ κ[αὶ] βα[δί]ζη διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ [ἦ]δη αἰ[τί]αν εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον τῆι ἐξ ἀ[ρχ]ῆς συσ[τά]σει φαύλ[η]ι οὔσ[η]ι, ἔτι μᾶλλον [ένι]οτε κ[α]κίζομεν...

...the composition has achieved nothing for a short time, nor was it forced, bringing itself to completion. And if it now proceeds through its own cause to the same initial composition, being weak, we sometimes criticize it even more...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 3 (fr. A 50) | (fr. A 51 sup.)

...ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐνίοτε [ε κ]ακίζομεν, ἐν νοθετητ[ικ]ῶι μέντοι μᾶλλον τρόπω[ι], καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ [τ]ὰ ἄγρια τῶν ζώων [καθ]αίρομεν μὲν ὁμοίως [α]ὐ[τ]ὰ τὰ ἀπογεγε[νν]ημένα [κ]αὶ τή[ν] σύστασιν εἰς ἓν τι συμπ[λέ]κοντες, οὐ μὴν ο[ὔ]τε τῶι νοθε[τ]ητ[ικ]ῶι τρόπωι καὶ ἐπανορθωτικῶι οὔτε τῶι ἀπλῶς ἀ[ντι]ποι[η]τικῶι χρώμεθα...

...even more often we criticize, but in a more admonishing manner, and not as we would with wild animals, which we correct in the same way, considering both their individual nature and their composition as a whole. However, we do not apply either the admonishing and corrective manner or the simple punitive one...

[Sedley 20] We sometimes vilify it [a self-determining animal] all the more, but more in an admonitory mode – and not in the way in which we exonerate those animals which are while by conflating their developments and their make-up alike into a single thing, and indeed do not use either the admonitory and reformatory mode or the simply retaliatory mode.

While we hold some animals accountable for their behavior, attributing praise or blame based on their development, we do not extend this judgment to wild beasts. Despite resenting all creatures that harm us, we recognize that wild animals act according to their intrinsic nature and are not responsible for their actions.

25.11 Agency

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.3 (fr. B 39)

οὕτως ἐπειδὴν ἀπογεννηθῆ τι λαμβάνον [τι]νὰ [ἐ]τερότη[τα τῶν] ἀτό[μ]ων κατὰ τινὰ τρόπον διαληπτικόν, οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἐτέρου δ[ι]αστήματος, ἰσχάνει[ι] τὴν ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν, εἴτα [ἀν]αδίδ[ωσι] εὐθύς μέχρι τῶν [πρ]ώτω[ν] φύσεων καὶ [κ]αν[όνα π]ᾶσαν αὐτή[ν] ποιεῖ. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρεῖν χειμάζουσιν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτιῶν ἀπόφασιν. καὶ τού[των ἐ]π' αὐτῶν τοῖς [μ]ὲν μᾶλλο[ν τοῖς δ' ἧ]ττον μαχ[όμε]θα καὶ ἐ[πιτιμ]ῶμεν...

Thus, whenever something comes into being and takes on some differentiation of the atoms in a certain dissolutive manner, not as from a different interval, it gains its cause from itself, then immediately transmits it up to the primary natures and makes it the rule entirely. Therefore, those who are unable to divide such things properly torment themselves concerning the determination of causes. And among these, we fight and criticize some more and some less...

[Sedley 20B.5-7] Thus when a development occurs which takes on some distinctness from the atoms in a differential way – not in the way which is like viewing from a different distance – he acquires responsibility which proceeds from himself; then he straightaway transmits this to his primary substances and makes the whole of it into a yardstick. That is why those who cannot correctly make such distinctions confuse themselves about the adjudication of responsibilities.

The "differentiation" that contributes to psychological autonomy is distinct from the underlying atoms in a fundamentally different and transcendent manner. This distinction is more radical than merely changing the perspective, such as viewing from a different distance. The point is that all bodies exhibit certain emergent characteristics beyond their constituent atoms, but the main difference is one of scale, between macroscopic and microscopic analysis (macroscopically, an object may have color and smell, but at the atomic level, there will be no color or smell). However, the "differentiations" that provide autonomy differ from the atoms in a more fundamental way.

Even though the atomic make-up might cause chaotic motions in the mind's atoms, it does not mean that decisions cannot be made to control those motions. In fact, psychological actions can actually affect the atoms in the mind. The motion of our hands can move material in our hands – and the motion of our minds can move the material in our minds.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.4 (fr. B 40)

...κα[ί] οὐ τὴν ἀτομ[ί]αν ἔχουσ[ιν ἀλλ'] οὐ[δ]ὲ παρακαλεῖν ἐπιχειροῦμεν καὶ παροξύνειν ἐπὶ τὰ κ[α]ριώτατα, ὡς ἤδη πέπηγεν ἀ[πὸ τῆς φύσεως τῆς αὐτῆς κακηθρ[οισμέ]γης οὐχ ἑτέρως τινι τῆ[ν] [αἰτίαν] ἀναψού[σης], τὴν πῆξ[ιν] τ[ὴν ὁ]μοίαν τ[ῆ]ι...

...and they do not possess any weakness, but we do not even attempt to encourage and stimulate them towards the most crucial matters, as it has already solidified from the same nature that has been badly compounded, not attributing the cause to anything else, the same congealment as...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 19 (fr. B 41)

...κατηγορουμένης φύσεως καὶ οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς προσαγοευ[ο]μένης... καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν δέ [τ]ι ἐκβιάζεται ἢ πρώτη σύστασις τοῦ ἀπογε[γεννη]μένου, μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέχρι τῶνδ' ἰσχυρῶν τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου ἀλλὰ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ψυχῆν γενέσθαι ἢ καὶ τοσαυτηνὴν διάθεσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἔχουσιν ψυχῆν ἐξ ἀνάγκης [τοιοῦ]δε ἀπογεν[νω]μένου ἐκ [τῶν το]ιούτων, μ[έ]χρι δὲ τ[ο]ῦ τοιαν[δ]ι ψυχῆν [ἢ τοι]αν[δ]ι οὐκ ἐξ [ἀνάγκ]ης τοιοῦ[δ]ε ἀ[πο]γεννωμένου ἢ οὐκ ἐπειδ[ὸ]ν [πρ]οβῆι γε τ[ῆ]ι ἡλικί[ᾳ] τοιοῦδε ἀ[πο]γεννωμένου κατ' [ἀνάγκη]ν [ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ δυνα]μέ[νου]...

...of the criticized nature and not in itself or even when addressed... and even if the initial composition of what is generated is compelled in some way by reason, not necessarily until the generation of something specific, but until the soul is produced or even such a disposition and movement having a soul necessarily of such a generated thing from similar ones, but until such a soul or such a one is not necessarily from such a generated thing or not when it reaches maturity being necessarily from such a generated thing but from itself being able...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 20 (fr. B 42)

...πράττει, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάντ' ἔχον οὐκ [ἐξ]α[ι]ρούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας τὸ ἀπ[ο]γεννημένον ἀλλ' ἔν τι ποιοῦν[τες] αὐ[τ]ὸ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν [ὁμοίως κα]θαίρομεν τὸ δ' οὐ νο[υθε]τοῦμέν γε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατὰ τινος ἔθισμ[ο]ῦς ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως μετακ[ο]σ[μ]οῦμεν... τὸ γὰρ ἐξαιρού μεν[ο]ν τῆς αἰ[τίας] κατ' ἀνάγκ[η]ν...

...it acts, but having all the same elements we are not excluded from the cause of what is generated but treating it as one thing and cleansing the composition similarly, but not admonishing it, many things not even according to certain habits without reason we reform... for the thing being removed from the cause by necessity...

25.13 Self-Development

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 3 (fr. A 51 fin.)

...ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶς ποθ' ἀπ[λ]ῶς τὸ ἀ[πο]γεννημένον ἤδη γείνεσθαι το[ῦ]τα [ἢ] τ[ο]ῖα κα[ί] τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχ[ον]τος κατ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εἰσερέ[ον]τα παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γείνεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς] ἡμετέρας [ἐξ] ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξ[ας]. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὴν φύ[σιν]...

{same as text below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43)

...[ἔκ] τε [τῆς πρ]ώτης ἀρχῆς σπέρμ[ατα ἡμῖν ἀ]γ[ω]γά, τὰ μὲν εἰς τάδ[ε] τὰ δ' εἰς τάδε τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω [ταῦ]τά [ἐ]στιν αἰ[τί]α κα[ί] πρά[ξι]ων [καὶ] διανοήσεων καὶ διαθέ[σεων] καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω. ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ρ]ῶτον ἀπ[λ]ῶς τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἤδη γείνεσθαι, [τ]οῖα ἢ τοῖα, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος κατ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εἰσερέ[ον]τα [παρ'] ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γείνεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς] ἡμετέρας [ἐξ] ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξ[ας], [καὶ] εἰ παρὰ τὴν φύ[σιν]...

.....from the first principle [come] to us the guiding seeds, some towards these things, others towards those things, and others towards both; these always pertain to actions, thoughts, dispositions, and both greater and lesser [things]. So that among us first, simply what is already born becomes such or such, and those from the surrounding by necessity through the channels flowing into us sometimes become and according to our own beliefs...

[Sedley 20C.1] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us and depend upon beliefs of our own making...

Epikouros argues that, because we begin with a wide range of seeds (σπέρματα) for potential character traits, our actual development is not predetermined but can be decided upon from our own thoughts (ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξας).

There are physical influences upon the development of our character – nevertheless we do have the ability to control these physical influences and change our character.

25.14 Choice

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 4 (fr. A 52)

...νου[θετ]εῖν τ' ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχεσθαι καὶ μετα[ρυ]θμίζειν [ὡς ἔχ]οντας καὶ ἐν ἑα[υ]τοῖς [τῆ]ν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῆι [ἐ]ξ ἀρχῆς] μόνον συστάσε[ι κ]αὶ ἐν [τῆι τ]οῦ περιέχοντ[ος] καὶ ἐπει[σιό]ντος κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον [ἀ]νάγκη... εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ τῶι [νο]υθετεῖν καὶ τῶι νουθετεῖσθ[η]ι τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐ[τό]ματον [ἀ]νάγκ[η]ν [π]ρο[σ]τιθ[ε]ίη καὶ τοῦ [πο]θ' ἑαυτῶ[ι] ὑπά[ρχοντος]... ...[συ]νιέναι [μεμφόμενος ἢ ἐπαι][νῶν], ἀλλ' [εἰ μὲ]ν το[ῦ]το πράτ[τοι, τ]ὸ μὲ[ν] ἔργον ἂν εἴη κατα[λεί]πον ὃ [ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ] [τὴν τ]ῆς αἰτίας πρόληψιν]

{same as text below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 22 (fr. B 44)

...εσθήκει ὧν οὐ... [ἀ]πολείπει τὰ πάθη τοῦ γίνε[σθαι, τὸ] νουθε[τ]εῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχε[σθαι] καὶ μεταρυθμίζειν ὡς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῆι ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνον συστάσει καὶ ἐν τῆι τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκ[η]ν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ τῶι νουθετεῖν καὶ τῶι νουθετεῖσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐ[τό]μα[τ]ον ἀνάγκην προστι[θει]ή ἀεὶ τοῦ [τό]θ' ἑαυτῶ[ι] ὑπάρχον[τος], μὴ οὐ[χ]ί πο[τε] δύν[ηται] ταύτ[η] [συ]νιέναι...

...stood, of which not... abandon the passions of becoming, admonishing each other, and fighting and rearranging, as having the cause within themselves, and not only in the initial composition and in what surrounds and enters by automatic necessity. For if one adds to admonishing and being admonished the automatic necessity, always present then within oneself, perhaps never be able to understand in this way...

[Sedley 20C.2-3] <and we can invoke, against the argument that our eventual choice between these alternatives must be physically caused either by our initial make-up or by those environmental influences> by which we never cease to be affected, the fact that we rebuke, oppose and reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and penetrates us. For if someone were to attribute – to the very processes of rebuking and being rebuked – the accidental necessity of whatever happens to be present to oneself at the time, I'm afraid that he can never in this way understand <his own behavior in continuing the debate>

Democritus' reductionist atomism led to both skepticism and mechanistic determinism: his belief that everything could be explained by the interactions of atoms led to the idea that events are predetermined by these interactions, leaving no room for free will – this mechanistic view also fostered skepticism, as it suggested the movements of the atoms alone were real and what we sense was too subjective and inconsistent to be true.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 110

...[μεμ]φόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν. ἀλλ' ἐ[ί] μὲν τοῦτο πράττει, τὸ [αὐτὸ] ἔργ[ο]ν ἂν εἴη [κ]ατα[λεί]πων ὃ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν [ποιεῖ] τὴν τῆς αἰτίας πρό[λη]ψιν, ἐν ᾧ οὐ μὲν τὸ δό[γμα]... μετατεθε[ι]μέν[ος]]...

...either criticizing or praising, but if one were to act in this way, the work would be left behind as we perceive it according to the preconception of responsibility, while the name would be altered...

[Sedley 20C.4] *«He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to»* blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he would be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned creates the preconception of our own responsibility. And in that he would at one point be altering his theory, at another...

[O'Keefe] *«He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to»* blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he would be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned creates the preconception of our own responsibility. And we would understand (ἐν ᾧ οὐ μὲν for ἐννοοῦμεν) that the theory was altered

ἡ τῆς αἰτίας πρόληψις	anticipation of responsibility, sense of guilt
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25.15 Self-Refuting Determinism

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 23 (fr. B 45)

...το[σ]α[ύ]της πλάνης... περικά[τω] γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπετα[ι] καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὡς ἔστι τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ μάχεταί τινι περ[ι] αὐτ[ο]ῦ τούτου ὡς δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀβελτ[ε]ρευομένωι. κἂν εἰς ἄπειρον φῆ πάλιν κατ' ἀ[νά]γκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων ἀεὶ, οὐ[κ] ἐπιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπ[τειν]...

{same as below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 112 | P.Herc. 697 corn. 4 (fr. A 53)

...τοι[αύ]της πλάνης. περικά[τω] γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται, καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὡς ἔστιν τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλούμενα. ἀλλὰ μάχεταί τινι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου ὡς δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἀβελτερευομένωι. κἂν εἰς ἄπειρον φῆ πάλιν κατ' ἀνάγκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων ἀεὶ, οὐκ ἐπιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπ[τειν] τοῦ κα[τὰ] τ[ὸν] τρόπον λελογίσθαι εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπο[ιεῖ] ἀπολήγοι [εἰ]ς ἑαυτὸ[ν], ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἀ[νά]γκην τ[ι]θεῖ, [ο]ὐδ' ἂν...

...such a deception. For such reasoning turns upside down and never can prove that all things are such as those called by necessity. But he fights with someone about this very thing, as being made worse by himself. Even if he says infinitely again by necessity to do this, always from arguments, he does not consider in assigning the cause to himself of reasoning correctly and to the one disputing, of not reasoning correctly. If he did not attribute to himself but attributed to necessity, not even...

[Sedley 20C.5-7] ...such error. For this sort of account is self-refuting, and can never prove that everything is of the kind called 'necessitated' – but he debates this very question on the assumption that his opponent is himself responsible for talking nonsense. And even if he goes on to infinity saying that THIS action of his is in turn necessitated, always appealing to arguments, he is not reasoning it empirically – so long as he goes on imputing to himself the responsibility for having reasoned correctly and to his opponent that for having reasoned incorrectly. But unless he were to stop attributing his action to himself and to pin it on necessity instead, he would not even <be consistent>...

The determinists often defend their actions by claiming they are compelled to behave in a certain way. These determinists might view their attitudes as necessary, but this does not prevent their self-refutation. When challenged about their ongoing arguments, the determinist will use the same defense repeatedly, creating an endless loop of an argument.

Epikouros objects to this infinite regress because it fails to address the core inconsistency: at every step of this regress, the determinist acts as if he is a responsible agent, which contradicts his own thesis that everything, including our beliefs, is mechanically determined. This contradiction highlights the inconsistency in the determinist's argument. Even if the determinist states "I must make this argument and you must deny it" the critique itself implies that the determinist considers that the anti-determinist is responsible for his anti-determinist view. If our characters were fully predetermined by physical influences, having attitudes critical of behavior is self-refuting.

25.16 Words vs. Reality

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 114

...εἰ τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καλούμενον τῷ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὀνόματι προσαγορεύων ὄνομα μόνον μετατίθεται μη δ' ἐπιδίξει ὅτι τοιοῦτό τι ᾧ μοχθηρῆ εἰσι τύποι προειληφότες τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν αἰτιῶν καλοῦμεν, οὔτ' ἰδ[ι]...

...if what is called by us ourselves by the name of necessity addressing [the] name alone transfers nor will he show that such a thing to which evil types are present having **assumed beforehand** what by us ourselves we call cause, nor...

[Sedley 20C.8] <on the other hand> if in using the word 'necessity' of that which which we call our own agency he is merely changing a name, and won't prove that we have a **preconception** of a kind which has faulty delineations when we call our own agency responsible, neither his own <behavior nor that of others will be affected>...

τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὄνομα	the name of necessity, the word 'necessity'
προλαμβάνω	to take beforehand, to preordain, [Sedley] "to have a preconception"

Epikouros argues that determinism is not a meaningful explanation of the world. We all sense of our own agency. When determinists apply the concept (wording) of 'necessity' to human actions: this does not provide any new understanding – it is merely a change in the indication (wording) and not a change in what is being indicated.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 24 (fr. B 46)

...δι' ἀνάγκην καλεῖν πρός ᾧν φατε... ἂν δὲ μή τις [τ]οῦτ[ο ἀ]π[ο]δείξει μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τ]ε συνεργὸν μηδ' ὄρημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ᾧν καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν ἀλλὰ π[ι]ά[ν]θ' ὅσα νῦν δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάζοντες τὴν αἰτία[ν] πῶς προ[θ]ε[σ]τούμεθα πράττε[ιν] κ[α]τ[ὰ] χ[ώ]ραν ἀνάγκην [π]ρο[σ]αγορεῦ[ώ]μεν ὄνομα μόνον ἀμ[ε]ί[ψ]ει...

{same as below}

...γενέσθαι, ἀλλ[ὰ κε]νὸν [καὶ] τὸ δι' ἀνάγκην καλ[εῖ]ν προ[ῶ]ς ὧν φάτε. ἂν δὲ μ[ή] τις τοῦτο ἀποδείξει, μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τι] συνεργὸν μηδ' ὄρημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ὧν καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσ[α] νῦν δι' ἡμῶν αὐ[τῶ]ν ὀνομάζοντες τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι διαβ[ε]βα[ι]οῦμεθα πράττε[ιν] κατὰ χώραν ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει. ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὡσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστὶν ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμομένους παρὰ βίαν τι π[ρ]άττειν. ζητήσῃ δ' ἡ διάνοια εὐρεῖν τὸ ποῖον [ο]ὔν τι δεῖ νομίζ[ει]ν τὸ ἐξ ἡ[μ]ῶν αὐτῶ[ν] π[ρ]ὸς [πρ]αττόμενον [μ]ὴ προθυμ[ου]μένων π[ρ]άττειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλλ[ο] τι οὐθέν) εἰ μὴ φά[ναι τὸ] ποῖον [κατ' ἀνάγκην] ἐσ[τ]ί...

...to become, but it is also empty to call it by necessity in respect to those things which you assert. But if no one will prove this, let him neither have any accomplice of ours nor turn aside any impulse, as calling them by us ourselves to contribute to the cause, but all the things which now, calling them by us ourselves, we affirm that the cause is, are acting in accordance with the necessity, changing only the name. But he will not change any deed of ours, just as when he observes some things which are in accordance with necessity, he is accustomed to turn aside those eager to act against force. And the mind will seek to find what kind of thing, therefore, we must consider that which is somehow done by us ourselves, not done by those eager to act. For it has nothing else to say if not to declare that the kind is by necessity...

[Sedley 20C.9-11] ...but even to call necessitation empty as a result of your claim. If someone won't explain this, and has no AUXILIARY ELEMENT OR IMPULSE IN US which he might dissuade from those actions which we perform, calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – but is giving the name of foolish necessity to all the things which we claim to do calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – he will merely be changing a name. He will not be modifying any of our actions in the way in which, in some cases, the man who sees what sort of actions are necessitated regularly dissuades those who desire to do something in the face of compulsion. And the mind will be inquisitive to learn what sort of action it should then consider that one to be which we perform in some way because of us ourselves but without desiring to. For he has no alternative but to say what sort of action is necessitated, <and what is not>...

Determinists claim humans lack an internal source of self-control. Consequently, determinists cannot expect their arguments to prevent humans from taking any actions.

Epikouros contrasts these determinists with individuals who understand the difference between what is necessary and what is not – individuals who can, therefore, help others avoid struggling against what we cannot do, and focus instead on what we can do.

Since the determinist cannot distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions, the determinist cannot engage in discussions about actions that come from a mix of necessity and choice – such as those done freely to avoid a greater pain.

25.17 Error of Determinism

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 118 | 1056 col. 25 (fr. B 47)

...μάλιστα ἀδιανοήτων. ἂν δὲ τις τοῦτο μὴ παραβιάζεται, μηδ' αὖ ὁ ἐξελέγχει τε ἢ ὁ εἰσφέρει πρᾶγμα ἐκτιθεῖ, φωνὴ μόνον ἀμείβεται, καθάπερ πάλοι θρυλῶ. οἱ δ' αἰτιολογήσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἰκανῶς, καὶ οὐ μό[ν]ον [τ]ῶμ πρὸ αὐτῶν πολὺ διενέγκαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὕστερον πολλαπλ[α]σίως, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοῖς, καίπερ ἐν πολλοῖς μεγάλα κουφίσαντες, εἰς τὸ τ[ῆ]ν ἀνάγκην καὶ ταυτόματ[ο]ν πάντα α[ἰ]τι[ῶ]σθαι.

...especially of things incomprehensible. But if someone does not force this, let him not also examine or introduce any issue that he presents, for he only changes the word, just as I have long been saying. But those who have sufficiently reasoned from the beginning, and have far surpassed not only those before them but also those after them many times over, have eluded themselves, even though they have greatly lightened many things, by attributing everything to necessity and chance.

[Sedley 20C.12-13] ...supremely unthinkable. But unless someone perversely maintains this, or makes it clear what fact he is rebutting or introducing, it is merely a word that is being changed, as I keep repeating. The first men to give a satisfactory account of causes: men, not only much greater than their predecessors, but also many times [greater] than their successors, turned a blind eye to themselves – although in many matters they had alleviated great ills – in order to hold necessity and accident responsible for everything.

[Taylor] <...> Those who gave an adequate account of causes from the beginning, far surpassing not only their predecessors but their successor ways, though they alleviated many great evils, failed to see what they were doing in making necessity and chance the cause of everything. The very thesis which asserts this broke down and involved the man [i.e., Democritus] unawares in a conflict between his actions and his opinion, so that, had he not in his actions forgotten his opinion, he would have been in a continual state of self-induced confusion, succumbing to the most extreme consequences when his opinion prevailed, and full of conflict when it did not, through the opposition of his actions and his opinion.

Epikouros argues that if Democritus had applied his idea of universal necessity to his own actions, it would have led to severe negative outcomes. Consider the "Lazy Argument" (Ἀργὸς Λόγος) which shows the practical absurdity of the determinists' position: since everything is fated, action is unnecessary – for example, since it is either fated that you will recover or fated that you will not recover, consulting a doctor would always be futile.

Epikouros was also well aware of his older contemporary Pyrrho's "agnosticism and suspension of judgement" which led him to lead "a life consistent with this doctrine – going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses."

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 25 (fr. B 47) | 1191 fr. 119/120

ὁ δὴ λόγος αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἐλάνθανεν τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συνκρούοντα. καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνεται, συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ταράττοντα. ἦι δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης κἂν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις π[ε]ρι[π]εῖπτοντα. ἦι δὲ] μὴ ἐκράτει στάσεως ἐμπιπλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δόξης. τούτων οὖν οὕτως ἐχόντων δεῖ κα[ὶ] περὶ οὗ λέγων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ταῦτα παρεκκαθαίρειν ἀφικόμεν ἀποδιδόναι, μ[ὴ] κακ[ὸν τι] τοιοῦτ[ο].

The very reasoning that teaches this was shattered and the man was unaware that his actions conflicted with his reputation. And if some forgetfulness regarding his actions and reputation did not intervene, he would be constantly disturbing himself. In which he prevailed in reputation, even if he fell into the worst situations. But in which he did not prevail, he was filled with turmoil because of the opposition between his actions and his reputation. Therefore, since things are thus, I must also, regarding that which I speak of from the beginning, reach a conclusion to clear these things up, giving back, lest it be something bad of this sort.

[Sedley 20C.14-15] Indeed, the actual account promoting this view came to grief when it left the great man blind to the fact that in his actions he was clashing with his doctrine, and that if it were not that a certain blindness to the doctrine took hold of him while acting he would be constantly perplexing himself; and that wherever the doctrine prevailed he would be falling into desperate calamities, while wherever it did not he would be filled with conflict because of the contradiction between his actions and his doctrine. It is because this is so that the need also arises to explain the matter which I was discussing when I first embarked on this digression, lest some similar evil <befall us>.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 26 (fr. B 48)

...πολλ[λ]άκις δὲ κα[ἰ τ]ὴν α[ύτ]η[ν] ἀμφοτέρα κέκτη[ται μ]ὲν αἰτίαν καὶ μὴ συνεπεσπασμένα τὰ ἕτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων μηδὲ συνεπισπώμενα καὶ βιαζόμενα παρά τε χρόνους πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων συνπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτίας. ὄθεν κ[αὶ τὸ] τ[οῦ] τέλους αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγ[ις]μα εἶχε μ[έ]ν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τὴν αἰτίαν, εἶ[χο]με[ν] δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς...

...often both have the same cause but are not influenced or forced by each other, even though many such things coincide over time, age, and other causes. Therefore, the reason for its end had the cause from the beginning, and we also possessed it...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 121/122

...[πολλά][κι]ς δ[ὲ καὶ τ]ὴν [αύ]τ[ή]ν [ἀ]μ-[φ]ότε[ρα κ]έ[κτ]ηται [μὲν] αἰτί[α]ν καὶ μὴ συνε[πε]σπασμ[έν]α ἕτερ[α] ὑπὸ τ[ῶν] ἐ[τέρων] [μ]ηδὲ συνεπ[ι]σπ[ώ]με[ν]α [καὶ βιαζ]όμ[ε]να παρ[ά] [τε χρόνους πολλὰ τῶν] | τοιούτων συμπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτ[ί]ας... ὄθεν καὶ τὸ τοῦ τ[έ]λους αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγισμα εἶχε μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τὴν αἰτίαν, εἶχομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς... ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐπαίσθησις τοῦ – εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα τίς ὁ κατ[ὴ]ν καὶ τὸ...

...[Many] times also having both the same cause and not being dragged together, some things by others, nor dragged along and forced by them over many times of such things coincide with both age and other causes... Hence, both the conclusion of his end and the beginning had the cause, and we also had it... And it was from us a perception of it – if we do not take, what is the rule and the...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 123

...δ[ὲ] αὐ[τ]ὸ ἐστιμ μὲν ὃ [σ]υνε[ρ]γούσης τῆς φύσεω[ς], ἔστι δ' [ὃ] οὐ συνε[ρ]γούσης, [έ]στ[ι] δ' ὃ κατακ[ο]σμουμένης ὑφ' ἡμῶν... ἔστι δ[ὲ] καὶ αὐτῆς...

...some things occur with the cooperation of nature, some without cooperation, and some are arranged by us... and some are also of themselves...

Understanding the distinction between ⁽¹⁾fundamental causation (causation of whole natures) and ⁽²⁾emergent causation (causation of characteristics) is crucial to understanding responsibility. The "self" responsible for our actions is more than just a bunch of atoms; it is a complex set of emergent characteristics. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to a simple link in the physical chain of cause and effect.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 124

...ἐπαυξόμενον ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπεισιόντα τὰς καθηγεμονίας εἰς τὸ βέλτιον, οὐ μόνον τὰς συνακολουθήσεις λαμβάνοντα...

...not only increasing but also, through the influences entering from the surrounding environment, taking the guidances towards improvement, following the sequences...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 125

...σατο εὐθύς τὸ ἕτερον ἐπινόημα, κατὰ μικρὸν πρῶτον ἐγγιγνόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον, εἶτα [μᾶλ]λομ μᾶλ[λο]ν κατα[νοο]ύμε[ν]ον, τὰ μὲν διὰ [τὴν] φυσικὴν αἰτίαν τῆς [αὐξ]ήσεως καὶ ἀπαλλά[ξε]ως πλαδαρ[ό]τητος, τ[ὰ δὲ]...

...it immediately conceived the other notion, initially developing gradually and then quickly flowing forth, becoming increasingly understood over time, some due to the natural cause of growth and change from sluggishness, and others...

...ων τῶν τε δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ περιέχον, ὥστε ἀποδέδοται κ[αὶ ὁ] παθολ[ο]γικὸς τρόπος κ[αὶ ὁ] αἰτιολογικὸς, ὧν] ἐξ ἀρχῆς π[ρ]οθεμέ[θα. κα]τέχεται γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα ὅσα ποτὲ κατέχεται τῶν [κα]τὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας...

...both those that occur through our actions and those through nature and the surrounding environment, thus both the pathological and the causal methods have been established, as we proposed from the start. For these concepts are already incorporated in all the scientific knowledge...

25.19 Self-Control

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 4 (fr. A 54)

...ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει, ἔργον δ' οὐθὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστίν, ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι πρ[ά]ττειν. ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὐρεῖν τὸ ποῖον οἷον τι δεῖ νομίζε[ιν] τὸ ἐξ [ἡμ]ῶν αὐτῶ[ν] π[ρ]ὸς [πρ]αττόμενον τῇ προθυμ[ί]αι [τοῦ πράτ]τειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλλ[λ'] οὐθὲν πρ[άτ]τειν ἢ φάνα[α]...

...calling it necessity, only changing the name, but in action, it will not alter anything for us, just as for some who observe what kinds of things occur by necessity, it often deters those who are eager to act against compulsion. The mind will seek to determine what kind of thing, then, one should consider that which comes from ourselves as being done with the eagerness to act. For it has no other way to act or speak...

...addressing necessity, only the name will change, but none of our deeds will alter, just as in the case of some who, observing what is done by necessity, have been accustomed to turn away those eager to act against compulsion. The mind will seek to find what kind of thing, then, it is necessary to consider from ourselves how it is done with the eagerness to act. For there is nothing else to do but to say...

Although the atomic composition of the soul determines our natural temperament, we can learn through reason to overcome that temperament. We can control and stabilize the disorderly motions of the atoms that form our soul – so that we cease to suffer from the actions of our mind.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 4 (fr. A 55)

...ἄσθαι. ὁ δὲ λόγος αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἐλάνθανε τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συγκρού[ο]ντα, καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνετο, συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ταραττοντα, ἧ δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης, κἂν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις περιπέιπτοντα, ἧ[ι δὲ] μὴ ἐκρά[τει, σ]τάσ[ε]ως ἐμ[πι]πλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν [ἔ]ρ[γ]ων καὶ τ[ῆ]ς δόξης. τού[τω]ν οὗ[ν] οὐ[τ]ως ἐ[χό]ντων δεῖ κα[ὶ] περὶ [οὔ] λέγων ἐξ [ἀρ]χῆς [εἰς τὸ ταῦτα] π[α]ρεκκαθαί[ρει]ν ἀφικόμη]ν ἀποδιδ[ό]...

...to speak. The very reasoning teaching this was broken and escaped the man's notice, conflicting with his actions against his beliefs, and if some forgetfulness concerning the actions of his belief did not occur, he would constantly disturb himself; where the belief prevailed, even if he was in extreme conditions, but where it did not prevail, he was filled with strife due to the conflict between his actions and his belief. Thus, with things being so, it is necessary, regarding what I have said from the beginning, to clear these things away, I am explaining...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 4 (fr. A 56)

...Καὶ ἡμε[ῖ]ς. ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν: ἐπαίσθησις τοῦ εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα, τίς ὁ κανὼν καὶ τὸ ἐπικρεῖνον πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶ[ν] δοξῶν περαινόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀκολ[ο]υθήσομεν ἀλόγως ταῖς τ[ῶ]ν πολλῶν φοραῖς, οἰχήσεται πάντα, καθ' ἃ διερε[σ]υνώ[με]θά τι, καὶ ὑπεροχή...

...And us: It was from us: a realization of whether we will not grasp what is the rule and the principle governing all that is accomplished through beliefs, but we will irrationally follow the tendencies of the many, everything will be lost, as we examine something, and superiority...

25.20 Investigation

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 corn. 4 (fr. A 57)

...[ἔ]στιν [μὲ]ν ὁ συν προσθεν εἶπα: **διερεύνη[σι]ν**. ἀ[λ]λήλοις γὰρ ταῦτα τὴν αἰ[τί]αν [κ]αὶ χρεῖαν παρείχεται καὶ ἕνα[λλ]ὰ[ξ] ἕκ[α]τερον παρεμπεῖπτον ἔπεσπ[ά]σατο) εὐθύς τὸ ἕτερον ἐπινόημα, κατὰ μικρὸν πρῶτον ἐγγεινόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον, εἶτα μᾶλλ[ο]ν μᾶλλον κατανοούμενον, τὰ μ[έν] διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν αἰτ[ί]αν τῆς ἐπαυ[ξ]ή[σ]εως κα[ὶ] ἀπαλ[λ]άξε]ως πλαδαρότητος, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν γενομένη[ν] καὶ...

...there is, indeed, what I said previously: **investigation**. For these things provided the cause and necessity to each other, and alternately each one immediately drew in the other concept, at first being slightly understood and quickly spreading, then being increasingly comprehended, some due to the natural cause of growth and the dissolution of weakness, and some due to what arises from us and...

...there is, indeed, what I previously said: an investigation. For these things provided each other with cause and need, and alternately each intervened, immediately drawing in the other thought, being embedded little by little at first and quickly flowing out, then more and more being understood, some because of the natural cause of growth and separation of laxity, and others because of what is generated from us and...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 27 (fr. B 49)

...κα[ὶ] νο]ήσεων κα[ὶ] ἐ]πινοημ[ά]των καὶ φαντασμάτων καὶ τῆς αἰωνίας κ[ατ]ὰ ψυχὴν ὀχλή[σ]εως ἢ εὐδαιμονίας ἢ μ[ὴ] αἰωνίας τὴν α[ιτ]ίαν τοῦ θηρεύειν τὴν ἀρχὴν κ[αὶ] κανόνα καὶ κριτήριον [[καὶ]] κατ[ὰ] μικρὸν. ταῦτά τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν επιλογισμὸν τοῦ κριτηρίου ἦγεν κα[ὶ] ἐκ τοῦ κριτηρίου...

...and of thoughts, ideas, and perceptions, and the eternal disturbance or happiness of the soul, or not eternal, the cause of pursuing the beginning, standard, and criterion, little by little. For these things led to the reasoning of the criterion and from the criterion...

*The criterion is both the product and the starting point of empirical reasoning. The establishment of the **τό κριτήριον** as (1) **αἰ αἰσθήσεις**, (2) **αἰ πάθαι**, (3) **αἰ προλήψεις** is an empirical process. Only because we have empirically learned that the senses are reliable do we have a firm basis for making further empirical discoveries.*

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 28 (fr. B 50)

...τάνουσαι καὶ κ[ατ]ὰ τῶν τε δι' ἡμᾶς [κ]α[ὶ] τῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν κα[ὶ] τ[ὸ]ν περὶ ἐξόν. [ὥ]στε ἀποδέδοτα[ι] κα[ὶ] ὁ παθολο]γικὸς τρόπος καὶ ὁ αἰτιολογικός, ὧν ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς] προεθέμεθα. κατέχετ[α] γὰρ ἤ]δη ταῦτα ὅσα ποτε κατέχ[ε]τα[ι] τῶν κατὰ τ[ὰ]ς ἐπ[ισ]τήμ]ας...

... extending and moving, both through us and through nature and the surrounding environment. Thus, both the pathological manner and the etiological [manner], which we proposed from the beginning, have been presented. For these concepts are now as comprehended as they have ever been within the sciences...

*Epikouros informs us in this summary that he has structured his explanation in two approaches: one focusing on feelings – the "logical manner relating to feelings" (**παθολογικός τρόπος**) and the other on causes – the "logical manner relating to causes" (the **αἰτιολογικός τρόπος**).*

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 subscriptio (subscriptio A 59)

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 subscriptio (B)

Ἐπικούρου Περί Φύσεως Κ[Ε]

Epikouros' *On Nature Book 25*

[Book 26]

[Book 27]

Book 28

28.1 The Foundation

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 1 col. 1

...[το]ὔτ[ο εἰ] μὴδ' οὕτως [εἴ] τις ἐ]γνοῶν, ὡς ξ[σ]τι τό τε [σ]ωματικὸν καὶ τὸ
κενὸν...

...even if one does not understand it this way, it is clear that there is both the material and the void...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 fr. E col. 1

...ἰσχυρῶς ἢ] οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς δεδ[ί]χασμεν] τῆμ παραλλαγ[ήν καθ' ἣν] τοῖσ[δε
ἐ]χρώμεθα [τοῖς..] σιν· ὅθεν δὲ τὸ κατ[ονικὸμ] βελτίον ἢ χῆρον
ἀν[ελελογί]σμεθα, πολλαχοῦ [ε]ῖρηται...

...we have either firmly or not firmly established the alteration by which we employ these [methods], from which we have reasoned the rule to be better or worse, as has been mentioned in various contexts...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 fr. H col. 2a

...ἀδιάλυτον· εἰ δὲ μὴ [πάν]τες κατὰ τοῦτο ταύτ[ην] τὴν ιδέαν ἔλαβον, ἀλλ[ά
τι]νες καὶ κατὰ τοῦτου...

...indivisible. However, if not all have adopted this notion in this manner, but some also in this way...

28.2 Clarifying Language

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 6. col. 1

...τως ἐμφαιν[ό]ν[τω]ν ἐπὶ τῆ[ς] ἐμῆς περὶ διαθέσεως λόγ[ου]ς γυμνα[σ]ίας·
οὔ[τω γ]ὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τοῦτο {υτο} ἐνδίκνυ[σ]θαι τὸ δὴ ὄτ[ι] βλέποντες [το]ὺς
ὁμοφώνου[ς ἡμῖν] ὄ[ν]τα[ς] ἀ[ν]τικειμ[έ]ν[ω]ς αἷς ἡμε[ῖ]ς φωναῖς χρ[ώ]μ[ε]θα]
ψευδέ[ς τι ἄ]λλο ὑπ[ο]τίττοντα[ς] [ἀ]νύπ[ο]πτό[ν τε] ἐ[π]' ἐκί[ναι]ς τα[ῖς]
ἐ[ννο]ία[ι]ς, ἀλλὰ μένο[ν]τ[ες]...

...thus manifesting in my arguments concerning the nature of gymnastic practices. For it was essential to demonstrate this, that when observing those who share our views, but opposing the words we use, they attribute some other falsehood, which is unsuspected in these ideas, but remaining...

[Sedley] For it was so necessary to point out that we, by observing that those who speak the same language as us were, in contrast to our own use of words, assigning some unsuspected false connotation in addition to those meanings...

Others wrongly add extra meanings to words.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 4 (fr. 8 Col. 2)

...εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐν οἴῳ τῶν [τε] ἐνταῦθα μετ[άθεσις καὶ] οὐ δογματικῶν φανταστικῶν, τῶν μέντοι οὐ φανταστικῶν καὶ δογμάτων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἕτερά γ' ἂν τινα δηλονότι εἴη ἐκίνοι[ς] εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ προήνευ[κα καὶ] ἐπ' ἄλλ' ἄτ[τα] ἃ φαντ[ασιά]ζοιεν τὰς ἀ[να]γωγὰς...

...existing, and not as a mere relocation here, and not as visible beliefs, but indeed of those that are not visible and doctrinal. Yet, it would certainly be something else for them if I had not put forth and suggested other matters that they might envision, the references...

[Sedley] Nevertheless, it is clear that they would have additional ones, had I not cited appeals which they made to other opinions which they associated with images...

φαντασιάζεσθαι	to be visible	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ to make the state of appearance
ἡ ἀναγωγή	reference	ΑΝΑΓΩΓΗ lead again

28.3 Reassessment

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 1 (fr. 8 col. 4)

...φύσις ἐνταῦθα κατὰ γε [τὴν] δόξ[αν τ]ὴν [αὐτοῦ] τοῦ πρώ[τον οἰο]μένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ πο[τὲ καὶ] ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὐ[τως ο]ὔν καὶ τ[ο]ῦτο [ν]οεῖται [ἐν ἐκ]ίνοις τα[ῖς] λέξ[εσιν] ἃς ἐν [τῶν] περὶ [τῶν] πρώ[των] γινω[σκ]όντων [αὐ]τοὺς γεγράφα[μεν· εἴ]τα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὐ[θις τ]ὸ [β]ιβλίον ἠκριβ[ώ]σαμεν...

...the nature here, according to his own view, thinking initially and sometimes here of the void; thus, this is also understood in those expressions that we wrote in the book about the first ones recognizing themselves. Then, having taken up the book again, we examined it thoroughly...

[Sedley] ...The nature [of the void is] here, according to the opinion of the first man to think of void in terms of immediacy and time and place. Consequently, void too is given this meaning in those expressions which we have written in our work concerning the men who first had knowledge of them. We subsequently resumed that book and made a study of...

28.4 Limits of Altering Names

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 8 col. 5

...[οὐκ ἔξεστι ποιῆσαι πολλῶν] καὶ παντο[ί]ων ὀνομάτων μεταθ[έ]σε[ις]· ὀλίγα γὰρ ἔξ[εστιν τῶν σ]ὺν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἃ πρότερον [ο]ὔτως δι[ο]ρί[ζ]οντες κατὰ τὸν οὐ φανταστικ[ὸν] τρόπον μετεθέμεθα συνιδόντες οὐ [τοια]ῦτα ἕκ τινος ἐπιλογισμ[ο]ῦ· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐμ[πε]ρι[λη]πτικῶν τρόπῳ [ἐ]λεγχ[ο]μένων ἂν...

...one cannot make many and various substitutions of names; for there are few among those alongside the perceptions which we had previously distinguished in such a way, changing them after realizing through reasoning that they were not like this; but most of those being examined in a comprehensive manner...

[Sedley] It is not possible to alter many different kinds of names. It is possible to alter a few of those which entail perception – the one which we previously defined in the non-image-making manner, but which we altered when by some act of empirical reasoning we saw that they were not of this kind. But as for the majority of names which might have been found false by a conceptual process...

ἡ ὀνομάτων μεταθέσεις	transpositions of names <i>calling the same things by new names</i>
(τῶν ὀνομάτων μετατίθεσθαι) σὺν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν	(rearranging of names) [in alignment] with the sensations <i>using empirical reasoning to match the primary connotation of the word with its corresponding object</i>

Redefining often complicates rather than clarifies.

28.5 Confirmatory & Contradictory Evidence

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 col. 1 (fr. 11 col. 2,)

...ἰδιότητος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μὴ σοφῷ διε[φώ]νεις, οὐδέμ παρε[μβάλλων] [τοῦ π]ερί τῶν οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεων κα[ἰ] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεων . ἐτίθεις δ[έ] τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθύς διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως, καὶ τὴν κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῶμ πολ[λῶ]ν ἀπο[σ]ημαίνων, οὐ μόν[ον] τὴν...

...you differed with the wise and unwise about the unique quality, not interposing anything regarding the unverified and contradictory assertions. Yet, you placed certain names immediately through the same wording, pointing out the mistake of the many in their senses, not just the...

[Sedley] In your search for verbal individuality you were in conflict [as much] with the wise man as with the unwise, by including nothing about lack of confirmatory evidence and the presence of counter-evidence. You fixed some of your vocabulary directly with the same language, also representing the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive...

Despite his eventual provisional acceptance of ordinary language as a philosophical medium, Epikouros did not drop his view that it can represent false opinion. Epikouros suggests that Metrodorus' former method of compiling vocabulary, which included choosing names on the basis of ordinary language, led him to represent in it 'the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive' (τὴν κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῶν πολλῶν) Once again here a connection is implied between inaccurate word-usage and failure to identify perceived objects correctly.

Epikouros' conclusion that the philosopher may, for want of a better medium, use ordinary language, is therefore necessarily qualified by the demand which he was already making when he wrote the Letter to Herodotus, that the resulting linguistic inaccuracies and ambiguities should be evaded by always seeing beyond the present conventional meanings of words to the natural first meanings which underlie them, and that error should so far as possible be identified by reference not to language but to the behavior in which falsity manifests itself."

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 2 (fr. 11 col. 4)

...λεγόμενον. οὐκ ἔχει οἷν οὐδέ τοῦτο τ[ὸ] γ χαρα[κ]τῆρα κα[ἰ] ὡς] ἄν τις λανθάν[η] αὐτοῖ[ς] τι ἐναντι[ο]λογῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ...

...mentioned. Thus, it does not have this feature, and as someone might inadvertently argue against them, just as in the instance of...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 col. 1 (fr. 12 col. 3)

...**ναι ἐπὶ πλείω **σου[ν]οι[κει]οῦν** ὧι αὐτοὶ βουλόμε[θα]. εἰ δὲ τότε [τα]ύτό τι διαν[ο]ούμενοι ἐλέγομεν κατὰ [τ]ὴν [ἐ]κκειμένην ἐρμηνίαν τῶι ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ ἀμ[α]ρτία ἐστὶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶμ προλήψεων γιγγ[όμενον καὶ τῶμ φαιν[ομ]ένων διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐ[θ]ισμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, καὶ...**

...matching our intentions. If back then we articulated the same ideas according to the established explanation, since all human error has no other shape than that which occurs through preconceptions and appearances due to the diverse usages of words, and...

[Sedley] If in those days we used to express an opinion equivalent, in the terminology which we then employed, to saying that all human error is exclusively of the form that arises in relation to preconceptions and appearances because of the manifold conventions of language...

In earlier years the attitude to language had been different in the Epicurean school, where they had altered the names of things if they adjudged them on an empirical basis to be false, and that they had regarded the inexactness of common parlance – and the consequent difficulty of identifying perceived objects with the correct name – as the source of all human error.”

This attitude, summed up by the phrase “διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐθισμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, through the multifarious habits of words” probably represents the young Epikouros, still under the influence of the Democritean school which made these very same conventionalist claims - but like Antiphon hopeful of reforming language into a viable tool for the philosopher. By the time of writing Book 28, Epikouros had given up this quest for an entirely accurate philosophical vocabulary.

Language habits shape our understanding and can lead to errors.

28.7 Unclear Evidence

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 12 col. 5

...**ἀδήλους ἡμᾶς εἶναι [πό]τερα ὅλως ἐπελελήσμ[ε]θα ταύτης τῆς δόξης καὶ τ[ὰ ἐν]αντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐλ[άβ]ομεν, ὡσπερ [κ]αὶ ἄλλοι π[ο]λλοὶ ἐμπολλοῖς, ἢ ἐμμενήμεθαμέν, οὐ[δὲ]ν δὲ οὐδέ...**

...uncertain whether we have completely forgotten this belief and adopted opposing views, like many others in various ways, or if we have remembered it, and neither...

[Sedley] that it is unclear whether we completely forgot this opinion and took the standpoint opposed to ourselves, as many others have also done in many cases, or remembered it, but...

28.8 Foundations of Meaning

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 3

...**τούτοις τι [ὡς] λέγεις, Μητροδ[ωρε] – ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία – τῶμ μὲν καθ' ἕκα[σ]τα οὐκ ἄμ φήσαιμ[ι τ]ότε γε συλλογισμόν, ἐ[φ] ὧι ἐσημ[α]ί[ω]ομέν τι, εἰδέναι...**

...regarding these matters, as you say, Metrodorus – but by Zeus – I wouldn't deny each specific instance where we noted something, knowing...

[Sedley] ...but I would not say that in those days you were familiar with reasoning about individual things, which was the basis on which we assigned meanings...

<p>ὁ ἐπιλογισμός consideration</p> <p><i>implying a process of thinking that might be more detailed, methodical, or related to quantifiable assessment.</i></p>	<p>ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action upon reasoning</i></p>
<p>ὁ συλλογισμός inference</p> <p><i>implying a more logical, perhaps deductive process, concerned with arriving at conclusions based on given premises or evidence</i></p>	<p>ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i></p>

Metrodorus demonstrated this error in the traditional use of words.

28.9 Assigning Names

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 col. 2 | P.Herc. 1479 col. 3

...κ[αὶ ἄ]νευ τῆς [τινω]ν ἐσθισμ[ῶν συ]νοικεώ[σεως ἐ]πιφέρω[ν τότε ἔτ]υχες, [μὴ] δῆλομ ποιῶν τὸ πάντα φθόγγον ἐπιφέροντα δοξάζειν τότε τι κα[ὶ] τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτ[ω]ν κα[ὶ] π[ραγμα]τῶν | ἀ]δι[αλη]ψία[ν ὀρ]ῶμ περ[ιν]οῶν. κα[ὶ] γὰρ δ' ἔβλεπον ὅ[τ]ι οὐ ποιήσας διάφορα τά[δε] ἢ τάδε εἶναι λέγειν τάδε [φ]ῆς αἰρεῖσθαι τ[ῶ]ν δ[ὲ] βελ[τί]ον εἶναι ἢ τάδε· ἄλλ' ὀνόμασιν οἷς δήποτε χρώμε[ν]ον οἷον τε φ[ῆ]σας [εἶ]ναι [λέγει]ν τὰ πράγματα, πᾶ[σιν ἐνε]δικνύου ἡμῖν τε τοῖς [τε σοφίας] μετεσχηκόσιμ [μόνον ὅτι οἰ]κειότερόν ἐστ[ι]ν...

...and without the influence of certain habits, you happened to present something back then, making it clear that each utterance that carries an opinion considers this and the indistinctness of names and things. And I noticed that without differentiating these things as being this or that, you chose what is better; but by using any names at all, you demonstrated to us and those who partake in wisdom that it is more relatable...

[Sedley] and you also used in those days to assign [names] without adapting certain conventional usages, in order that you should not make plain the principle that by assigning any name one expresses a particular opinion, and see and reflect upon the indiscriminate treatment of words and objects. And I too used to notice that you did not establish a difference between two sets of words and then say that you chose one set because it was better than choosing the other; instead, by saying that it was possible to use any name at all in speaking of things, you demonstrated to everyone, both to us and to those who have a share of wisdom, merely, that it is more suitable...

In his early days, while Epikouros had been seeking to improve upon the accuracy of ordinary language, Metrodorus had been promoting a typical conventionalist view – not unlike that of Diódōros Cronus which he later came to attack – that a thing can be referred to by any name at all, and that no name is better than any other. In building up a private terminology he had, according to Epikouros, chosen some words on the basis of ordinary language, and 'without adapting certain linguistic conventions.' His object, Epikouros says, had been to hide the fact that in assigning a name one expresses a particular opinion, and to shut his eyes to the 'undiscriminating view (ἀδιαληψίαν) of words and objects.' This latter phrase looks like a reference to the inaccuracy of ordinary language, which it had been Epikouros' hope to counteract.

Every word endorses a specific concept.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 fr. 13 col. 3 inf

...τ' ἔπρατ[τες τότε, νῦ]ν συνορῶ τότε δ' οὐ· καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος δὲ πιεσμούς τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἕκαστα λέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος νῦν συνορῶ τότε δ' οὐ. καὶ...

...what you were doing back then, I now see, but I did not at the time. I now understand the pressures of accurately discussing each part regarding this matter, but I did not at the time. And...

[Sedley] ...[what] you were doing in those days I now see, although I did not at the time. And I also now see, although I did not at the time, the particular difficulties, with regard to this class, of using the correct names for individual things. And [nothing would be consistent with them]...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 fr. 4

...οὐ φουσαιήι ἄν τι πρὸς αὐτὰ ἢ διαπορῆσαι ποικίλως νῦν ἐπιβλέβω, ὡς ἐγώμμαι. ἔπε[ι] καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόμ που, [ὀρθῶς] ταῖς αὐταῖς αἰρέσε[σι] τ[ῶ]μ φωνῶ[ν] κατὰ τὴν διδ[α]σκαλίαν χρήσαιτό τις ἄν, εἴπερ ταῦτα ἡμῖμ βλέπει ἐκ τοῦ α]ύτοῦ γ[ε] ἰδίου ἐ[ῖ]δη, μὴ πολὺ παρηλ[λα] γμέναι[ς] φύσει περι[π]έσοι. [τὸ] δ' ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὰ πρ[ά]γματα [ἡ]λέ[γχε]το εἰ πολὺ...

...I would not be able to establish anything about them or be perplexed in various ways. Now I observe, as I think, since even the so-called point, by correctly using the same choices of words as taught, one would employ if we see these things from the same nature, without encountering greatly altered natures. And because it was not according to the facts, it was proved if very...

[Sedley] (And nothing would be consistent with them...) which instead of ignoring or doubting it, I now think I see vividly. For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we could count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic, in order that he should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes. The fact that there was no factual refutation of some who [was ensnared] by major qualitative changes...

Epikouros seems to say that, on his present view, the philosopher may use words from ordinary language provided that he always keeps in view the distinguishing characteristics from which they draw their meanings, so as to avoid the pitfalls involved in completely changing the class of object referred to.

28.10 Respecting Linguistic Conventions

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 fr. 13 col. 4 inf. | P.Herc. 1479 col. 4 (fr. 13 col. 5 sup.)

...ὐπὸ τε [τοῖς] αὐ[τ]οῖ[ς] τρ[ό]ποις τῶ]μ περιπιπτόντ[ων] το[ύ]τ[οις], πέπεισμαι διαβλέπειν ὡς διηροῦμεν, ὡς σο[φ]ῖ ἐνο]εῖτο, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ τινὲς ἄν ἐγδέξαιντο. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ εὐκαιρόν | ἐστ[ι] ταῦ]τ[α] προφέροντα μηκύνει[ν]· [κ]αὶ μαλ' ὀρθῶς [γε, ῶ] Μητρόδωρε· πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι σε πολλὰ ἄν ἔχειμ προε[ν]έγκα σθαι ἃ ἐθεώρεις γελοίως [π]ῶ[ς] τι[να]ς ἐγδεξαμένουσ καὶ π[ά]ντα] μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὰς λέξεις, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν ἰθισμένων λέξεων ἡμῶν χρωμένων οὐδὲ μετατιθέντων ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶμ φανε[ρ]ῶν . καταγέλαστογ γὰρ [δῆ] τι καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν...

...under the same conditions of those encountering these things, I am convinced I understand as we distinguished, as it was meant for you, and not as some might accept. But perhaps it is not appropriate to prolong these things by discussing them further; and indeed, rightly so, Metrodorus. For I believe you would have much to present that you noticed, how some foolishly accepted certain ideas, and everything else rather than the intended meaning of the words, not deviating from the common language we use nor changing names based on appearances. For indeed, this too is quite laughable...

[Sedley] I am convinced that I see them clearly in the way in which we used to distinguish them, as you took the meaning, and not in the senses in which certain people would understand them. Perhaps, though, you might say that it is inappropriate to lengthen the discussion by citing these cases. Quite so, Metrodorus. For I do not doubt that you could cite many cases, from your own past observations, of certain people taking words in various ridiculous senses, and indeed in every sense in preference to their actual linguistic meanings, whereas our own usage does not flout linguistic convention, nor do we alter names with regard to the objects of perception. For another absurdity is when...

28.11 Guiding Happiness Seekers

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 fr. 13 col. 5 inf. | P.Herc. 1479 col. 5 (fr. 13 col. 6 sup.)

...μεταφορὰς ποι[εῖν φωνῶ]ν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνω[στα] ὑ[πὸ τῶν γν]ωστῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς αὐ[τ]ῶμ πλάνας ἃς λέγ[ο]μεν ἐν το[ῖ]ς Περὶ Ἀμ[φ]ιβολίας ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμμένοις. | ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί τούτων ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διώρισται μέχρι πόσου φροντιστέον αὐτῶν ἃς ποτ' ἂν ἔχωσι καθ' ἡμῶν δόξας, καὶ μέχρι πόσου τε καὶ ἐμ ποιῶμι λόγον οὐδένα ἐκτέον. αἰ[εῖ] δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἔνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους π[οι]εῖν, ἐπειδὴ[π]ερ...

...to use familiar words for the unknown, deriving from the known, but due to their own misconceptions which we discuss in our writings *On Ambiguity*. But truly, what concern do we have with these individuals? For it has been established in many places how far we should consider their opinions against us, and up to what extent and in what manner we should disregard them. Always, however, for the sake of benefits leading to happiness and for constructing arguments, we must act, since...

[Sedley] [not because] others transfer words from the class of that which is knowable to denote that which is unknowable, but because of their own errors, which we point out in our work *On Ambiguity*. But, you might say, why concern ourselves with these people? For we have frequently elsewhere defined to what extent we should heed whatever hostile opinions they hold towards us, and to what extent, and in what sort of circumstances, we should ignore them. We ought always to aim our discussions at the benefit of those who are sturdy disciples in the pursuit of happiness, since life...

We focus on helping those honestly seeking well-being.

28.12 Language Assimilation

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 fr. 13 col. 6 inf. | P.Herc. 1479 col. 6

...καὶ [ἐκί]νο ἔγωγε πολλάκις ἐνεθυμήθην τὸ ὅτι [εἰ, ἐ]μοῦ προφέροντος ἀπορημ[α]τα ἃ τις ἄμ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔ[τρε]πεν, ἀποδιδώη ὁ ἐκ τῶν [λέ]ξεων συνοικε[ιοῦν] ὡς ταυτό συνέβαινε μελετ[ᾶν] ἐπὶ τῆς γραφῆς, πολλο[ῖ]ς ἂν ἴσως δόξειε τότε μὲν ἦτοι κατὰ τὸν | ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον ἢ περιληπτικῶς ἢ φανταστικ[ῶς] ἢ δ[ι]ὰ λόγου δὴ θεωρητικῶς ψευδῆς ὑποτετάχθαι ταῖ[ς] λέξεσ[ιν] ἐκίνας δόξα, ἦτοι κατὰ τὸν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικὸν μὲν οὐδὲ κατὰ μίαν τῶν ἐκκειμένων ἰδεῶν ἐξ ἐ[α]υτοῦ δὲ μόνον **κινητικόν**, νῦν δὲ τῆς ἐρμηνείας[ς] ἐφαρμοττούσης καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἐπαγωγὴ τις ἐκ τῆς διαστολῆς γίννε[σ]θαι εἰς τάληθές . ἀλλ' ὅμως οἱ μηδέποτε μὴ συμ[πλεκ]έτω μηδέ[ν τ]ις πειρώμενος ἐξισοῦσθαι σοι ταύτης τῆς ὑποψίας· ἀλλ' εἰς ὄ[λη]ν [τὴν] ἐπιλό[γι]σιν...

...and I have often thought about this, that if, while presenting problems, someone would turn to us and give a response using familiar words, it would appear as if studying the writing. Many might then think, either critically, inclusively, imaginatively, or theoretically, that a false opinion was presented in those words, either not critically or according to one of the existing ideas moving solely from itself. But now, with the interpretation fitting and some inference from differentiation leading to the truth. Nevertheless, those who never should attempt to match you in this suspicion, but in the entire reasoning...

[Sedley] I also frequently reflected that if, when I raised difficulties which someone might have turned against us, he should claim that what used to be assimilated from ordinary language was the same as used to be practiced in the written work, many might well conclude that in those days false opinion was represented in that language, whether through an empirical process, [ἡ περιληπτικῶς] an image-based process, or a theoretical process, or through a non-empirical process, not following one of our current divisions, but simply arising from an internal movement; but that now, because the means of expression is adapted to additional ends, discrimination provides a lead towards the truth. However, let no one ever try to get even with you by linking with you any trace of this suspicion; but [turn] to the entire faculty of empirical reasoning...

Words need to be based in perception and aided by logic. Epikouros suggested that error arises not from the external data that our senses perceive but from something internal within our own thought processes. Epikouros is careful to locate the cause of error as internal, to eliminate the possibility that something in the external world is to blame. The point made here is that if the "κίνησις" is part of the thought process that leads to error, it is entirely an internal and subjective element, not influenced by external factors

ἡ ἐπαγωγή means "induction" or "inductive reasoning." It is a method of reasoning in philosophy and logic where generalizations are derived from specific instances. In this context, **ἐπαγωγή** refers to the process of moving from particular observations to broader generalizations, a fundamental concept in scientific method and logical reasoning. Inductive reasoning contrasts with deduction, where reasoning proceeds from general principles to specific cases.

28.13 Prepared for Empirical Analysis

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 col. 7 (fr. 13 col. 7 Inf.) | P.Herc. 1479 col. 7 (fr. 13 col. 8 sup.)

...γίγνεσ[θαι ἂν τὸν τοῦτο] δὴ φανερόμ ποιοῦντα [ἡνί]κα [ἡ] ἔπραττέ τις τουτὶ ἢ οὐκ [ἔπρα]ττεν, ἥπερ ἡνίκα οὐκ ἦν ἡ διάληψις ἀναλογισ[ι]κῆ ὡς τῶιδέ τιτι λέγει τοῦτο, τὸ ἐναντίον [έ]δοξάζετο. ἐπὶ γὰρ δὴ τῶν τοιούτω[ν] οἶμαι μόνων ἂν ὑποπεύσαμι τόγ γ' ἀστίομ μή ποτε ἐναντίως ἔμπροσθε ἐδοξάζετο ἢ ὄλως [σοφώ]τερον ὑπελάμβανέ τ[ι ἐκ τ]ῶν ἀ[ν]τικειμ[έ]νων, ἐπεὶ οὐχὶ π[α]ρόν]των ο[ἴ]δα ἐπιβλητικὴν ἔχ[ει] δόξαν ἐν ὧιδήποτε τρόπωι . εἰς τοῦτον [οὔ]ν δὴ φημι τὸν ὄρον ἀπο[β]λεπέ[τω πᾶσα] δόξα ἦ[ι] τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν [έ]τ[ι μ]ὴ προστεθηκότες ἦμεν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν οἶμαι εὐθύ[ς] ἔστι δόξαν καὶ εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἄγειν· ἀλλ' ἰκανόν ἂν δύναμίν τις ἔχειμ μόνον τῆς ἐπ[ι]λογίσεω[ς] φθῆσε[τ]αι ὅταν [ὁ] καιρὸς π[α]ρα[δι]δῶι. [ὁ γ]ὰρ ἀν[ε]πιλογίστως [οὔ]τως πρὸς ταύτην λία[ν τε] τα[πι]νῶι τρόπωι [προσέχων ὁμως ἐ]πιλογ[ί]σασθαι δυνήσεται]...

...and it would indeed become clear whether someone was doing this or not, or when the analogy was not considered similar to what was being said, the opposite was assumed. For only in such cases would I suspect that someone might have previously held a contrary belief or had a completely different understanding from the opposite, as without the present context, I know, it has a critical opinion in whatever manner. Therefore, I say, let every opinion aim at this boundary, to which we have not yet added reasoning; for not every opinion can immediately lead to reasoning, but it would be sufficient for someone to have the power of reasoning when the time allows. For the one who is thus unreasoning, paying attention in such a very humble manner to this, would nevertheless be able to reason...

[Sedley] When it is suggested that a word has changed its meaning, always bear in mind that the man trying to prove this [would have been more persuasive] at a time when someone was either acting, or not acting, in a certain manner, than at a time when the distinction, that by using a certain word he [[means one thing but]] used to hold the opposite opinion, was not analogically reasoned. For it is only, I think, on grounds such as these that I would suspect that the clever fellow held a contradictory opinion before he accepted some opposing belief as being in general wiser; for the opinion which he holds is, I know, by no means empirically based on current evidence. I am saying, then, that every opinion to which we had not yet at that time applied an empirical assessment should be referred to the following rule: it is not possible, in my view, to subject every opinion immediately to an empirical assessment; but it is sufficient that a man will be ready merely to display a capacity for reasoning empirically when the opportunity allows. For someone who examines it with this lack of empirical reasoning, and in an utterly inadequate fashion, will nevertheless be able to assess it empirically

Actions speak louder than words in clarifying beliefs.

28.14 Theoretical vs. Practical Opinions

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 col. 8 (column 8inf)

...κέχηρη[ται] τ[αύτ]ε[ι] τεῖ κ[ι]νή[σει]· καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττ[ον] ὑπὸ τῆμ φυγὴν ἢ αἵρεσιν [κα]τ' αὐτὴν ἀγόμενος τεύξεται τοῦ ὀρθοῦ. ὅσαι δὲ μὴ περὶ πράξεων εἰσὶν τῶν δοξ[ῶ]ν λέγω δὲ τῶν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ μέρους οὔσαι αὗται δὲ ἀλώσσονται, ἅμ [ψευδεῖς] ὥσι καὶ ἦ...

...is utilized in this motion; and no less, whether driven by avoidance or choice, will he achieve the correct result. But as for the opinions that are not about actions, I mean those that are from the theoretical realm and not practical, these too will be discovered, if they are false, and either...

[Sedley] [if it is an opinion that concerns actions, when he has the opportunity to observe someone who proceeds to action on the basis of it; he will see with what result the person] performs this action, and under its guidance he will arrive at the truth just as much in the category of avoidance as in that of choice. As for those opinions which do not concern actions (by which I mean those which are not included among empirical opinions but belong to the theoretical side, these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational

We need practical observation of the consequences of actions. ὁ τοῦ τέλους ἐπιλογισμὸς explains what the 'hedonistic calculus' is, but in just one word, we also have ἡ Συμμέτρησις ("measuring by comparison").

28.15 Actions Expose False Options

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479 col. 8 (column 9sup)

...γισμ[ο]ῦ ἔχως[ι] τὸ διημαρτημέν[ο]ν, ἐν τῷ ἢ ἄλλο τι κατὰ ταύτας λέγεσθαι τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὃ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἢ ἢ ἄν ἅμ πῶρ[ρω]θέμ ποθεν εἰς πράξεως συναφὴν βαδίζωσιν εἰσάγωσιν εἰς τὴν [ἀ]νεπιτήδιον πράξιν. ἂν δὲ μηδὲν τούτων, εὐσυνθεώρητον ἔσται ὡς οὐκ [ε]ἰσι ψ[ε]υδεῖς. διὸ καὶ ραιδίως ἅπαντες κ[α]ταγελῶσ[ι]ν ὅταν τις ὁμ[ολ]ογήσαντός τινος μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ταῦτὸ ἐπίστασθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι προφέρ[η]ι τὸν συγκεκριμένον [πα]τέρα καὶ τὰ [τοι]αῦτα· [τοῦτ]ο γὰρ οὐ...

...having the error, in which they state something else in these theoretical contexts that is not true, or if they proceed from a distant point towards a connection with practice, introducing it into inappropriate practice. But if none of these, it will be easily understood as true. Therefore, everyone easily mocks whenever someone, after admitting something, claims that it is not possible to both know and not know the same thing, presenting the hidden father and similar ideas; for this is not...

[Sedley] ...either because (1) some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, (2) if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action. If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false. For this reason, everybody can easily laugh when somebody gets another to assert that it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and then cites the riddle of the Covered Father, and others of the same kind. For this will not [defeat anybody who]...

An option is false if it leads to disadvantageous actions.

The Covered Father Riddle, also known as "the Megarian Riddle" is often used as an example of a paradoxical situation in philosophical discussions about knowledge and truth. The riddle attempts to force one to admit they both know and do not know something.

This riddle presents a scenario where a father is covered with a blanket and his son is asked to admit that he does not know who is beneath the covering. The paradox arises because if the son says he doesn't know who is under the blanket, it implies that he doesn't know who his father is, which is strange because he should know his own father.

Therefore it is an apparent paradox that the son simultaneously "does not know who" is under the blanket and "does know who" is under the blanket. Really the error is in the language, as the son in fact simultaneously does not know who is under the blanket and also knows who his father is.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 col. 9 (column 9inf) | P.Herc. 1479 col. 9 (column 10sup)

...τῆ[ι ἀγ]νώσει ἐξ [ἀρχῆς] αὐτοῦ ὁμ[ο]λογίαι ὁμως βλέπων ἐφ' ᾧ ὠμολόγε[ι] τοῦτο γελαῖ ἐπ[ί] τῷ[ι] σοφίσματι ὡς οὐ συμπεριλαβὼν ἐν ἐκίνοι τεῖ ἀποκρίσει καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἂν ἐφαρμοσθὲν ἕκ τινος ἐθισμού λέξεως, ὥστε πίπτειν εἰς τὸ λέγειν ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸν ἄπισ[τα]σθαί τε | καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθα[ι], οὐδ' ἀρνηθ[ῆ]ναι τοῦτο, [διὰ] τοῦ τρόπου ο[ὗ] ὁ σοφιστὴς προφέρει. διὸ καὶ π[άν]υ ἀντικειμένως ὁμολογήσας [τ]ις ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ [ο]ὐκ εὐλα[βού]μενος τοῦτο ὡσπερ τιγ[ῆς] τῶν σοφιστῶν οὐκ οἶετ[αι] πραγματικὸν ἔλεγχον λαμβάνειν. καίτοι[ι] γε οὐκ ἐπελελόγιστο ὅτι πλὴν τῶν τοιούτων ᾧν ὁ σοφιστὴς προφέρει ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ ἀγν[οε]ῖν . ἀλλ' ὁμοίον τι ἂν ἔδοξε πεπονθέναι τοῖς μὴ συλλογιζομένοις τὴν διαφορὰν ὡσπερ ἂν τις καὶ καθόλου τοῦ[τ]ο ὠμολο[γη]κέναι...

...to the unknown from the outset of his own admission, yet seeing what he confessed, he laughs at the sophism as not including in that response also what would be applied from some familiar expression, thus falling into saying it is possible to both know and not know the same thing, nor deny this, by the method which the sophist presents. Therefore, someone who has admitted something from the beginning in a very contrary manner and is not cautious about it, like some sophists, does not think he is receiving a genuine refutation. And yet he did not consider that besides those things which the sophist presents, it is impossible to both know and not know the same thing. But something similar might seem to have happened to those who do not reason out the difference, just as if someone had generally admitted this...

[Sedley] [replies that the question is about actions and therefore cannot immediately be decided by mere empty words. By contrast, someone who is forced to contradict] the assertion which he blindly made at the outset nevertheless laughs at the sophism when he sees the conditions under which he was making this assertion, and says that he did not include in his answer the example which could in this way be accommodated to it in consequence of a certain linguistic convention, and that he is thus being tricked into asserting, instead of denying, that it is possible to know and not know the same thing, because of the way the sophist cites the riddle. So a man who at the start made quite the opposite assertion, and does not display the wariness on this score shown by certain of the sophists, does not consider the refutation which he undergoes to be one that concerns actions. His mistake is that he did not work out empirically that apart from the sort of case cited by the sophist it is impossible to know and not know the same thing. However, people not reasoning out the difference might think that he has suffered a fate similar to that of someone who is forced to assert this sophism as being also universally true.

...καθ' ἕναστον, ἀλλ' ἐκίνωι γε τῶι τρόπωι ὧι καθόλου ὁμολογεῖται, οὐκ ἐπιβάλλοντος τοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐφ' ἕναστον τῶμ πραγμάτων, οὐδ' ἐν τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι τὸ ἐπὶ πάντων ὁμολογήσαντος ἢ ἀρνηθέντος. ἔδοξεν οὖν ἂν δὴ | φημι τῶι μὴ [σ]υνορῶντι τὴν διαφορὰν τούτω[ν] ὁμοίον τι ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' οὐ πο[ιεῖ], μα[ρτυ]ρεῖ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτῶι ὅ[ταν τ]ε καθόλου τι ὁμολ[ο]γήσει, [κᾶ]μ μυριάκις μὴ παρ' ἕναστον ἐπιβλητικῶς ἀρνηθεῖ ἐπινεύσει, καὶ ὄταμ μὴ. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ βαδίζει εὐθύς εἰς πρᾶξιν τοιαύτην οἷαν εἰ καὶ καθ' ἕναστον ἐπιβλητικῶς ὁμολογῆκει τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἢ ἡρνητο, ἄμπερ εἴ πραγματικὴ ἢ δόξα, ἔνθα δ' οὐ βαδίζει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρητικῶν, ἔνθα μὲν τι ἄλλοτρίως κατὰ τὸν [ἐ]πιβλητικὸν τρόπον...

...each thing individually, but in that way in which it is universally agreed upon, without the confessor applying it to each specific matter, nor in this way by the one who universally confessed or denied. Therefore, I say it might seem to someone who does not perceive the difference to act similarly. But he does not, for he himself testifies to himself whenever he universally confesses something, even if he denies it individually countless times with nods, and whenever not. For there he immediately proceeds to such an action as if he had confessed each individual thing particularly or denied it, if the belief were practical, there he does not proceed. Similarly, in theoretical matters, where something is different according to the particular method...

[Sedley] *[The difference which they do not see is that the man who expresses a universal opinion does so, possibly by empirical examination of] individual cases, but at any rate in the manner of a universal assertion; whereas our man who concedes the sophism does not empirically examine individual factual cases, and does not make any generally applicable affirmation or denial in the manner of a universal assertion. So, I repeat, anyone blind to this difference might have supposed our man to be acting in a similar way. But this is not how he acts; and he bears witness for himself (a) whenever he makes a universal assertion (even if he should make ten thousand statements of its truth for fear that by empirical examination of an individual case he might admit its falsity), and (b) when he does not. For in case (a) he embarks immediately upon an action such as if he had also accepted empirically that in a particular instance something was or was not of a certain kind; whereas in case (b) he does not. This is if the opinion is of the kind that concerns actions. But so too in the theoretical field, in case (a) he at once goes outside his subject and asserts in empirical terms the truth of some opinion which awaits positive confirmation*

...το[ῖς κ]αθ[ό]λου ἀκολο[υθο]μ[ε]ν [βο]υλόμενός τι ποιεῖν, καὶ ἥι ἄμ ποτε πρᾶξις τις αὐτῶι συνάπτηται, διήμαρτεν, ἔνθα δ' οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐποίησεν. οἷς δὴ δεῖ σημείοις χρώμενον συνορᾶν τὴν διαφορὰν. κᾶν τοῦτο πράττωμεν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν | λόγων, οὐ δυσωπηθησόμεθα τὸ [μ]έρος ὃ προ[ε]ίρηκα. κ[αὶ] ἥι δ' [ἂν] οὕτω [ἦ] τὸ ἡμαρτημένον, [τὰ] γινόμενα δεῖ σ[υ]ναισθάνεσθαι κ[αὶ] πρ[ώ]του, ὡσπερ εἴ τινα εἰς ἐν[ἀ]ργειαν αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν, ἥ[ι] καὶ εὐθύς μὴ ἀθροαί τις διισχυρίσει ἐπ' αὐτὸ πορεύη[τ]αι, ἀλλ' εὐλαβούμε[ε]νος, καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τὸ ψευδὸς ἐμπεριλαμβάνων [τὰ] καθόλου δὲ μὴ δοξ[ά]ζων οὕτω, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἔχωμ [πα]ρ' ἐ[α]υτῶι κανόνα ἐξ οὗ, μέχρ[ι τ]ῆς οἰονί ἐνεργητικῆς ιδέας ἢ ἀναλόγου ταύτηι κειμένης, οὐ βαδιεῖ[τ]αι ἐπὶ τῶμ ψευδῶν. κᾶν οὕτως οὖν δὴ, φημι ἥι τι διημαρτημένον, δεῖ συνορᾶν...

...those who generally follow, intending to accomplish something, and wherever any action of theirs is connected, they err, but where they do nothing of the sort. It is necessary for them to use signs to recognize the difference. And if we do this in all arguments, we will not be swayed from the point I previously mentioned. And where the mistake lies, we must perceive from the beginning what is occurring, as if someone were to come to the clarity of it, and immediately one should not insist strongly on it, but be cautious, including one falsehood after another, not believing generally in this way, but having some rule within oneself from which, up to the point of an active idea or something analogous lying therein, one would not proceed to errors. And thus, I say, if there is some mistake, it is necessary to recognize...

[Sedley] [and which in fact turns out to be false] through a desire to do something in accordance with his generalization, and wherever some action linked with the assertion occurs he acts wrongly; whereas in case (b) he does nothing of this kind. These are the indications which you must heed in order to see the difference. And if we follow the same procedure in examining all utterances, we shall have no cause for shame with regard to the field of study of which I have spoken. And so too wherever there is error of this kind, it is necessary right from the start to observe events, as if to come to some sort of clear picture of it, so that a person can immediately approach it not with a generalization, but with caution – encompassing the falsehood this way and that, and not forming a universal opinion in the manner which I have described, but keeping at his side a yardstick with the help of which, until he forms the so-to-speak activating notion, or one of similar stamp, he will not proceed in the direction of falsehood. And so I say that if there is some error of this kind we must see...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 col. 12 (fr. 13 col. 12 inf.) | P.Herc. 1479 col. 12 (fr. 13 col. 13)

...ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τοιοῦ[το ἡμ]ῶν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀκνήσ[ω σ]οί τε κα[ὶ] τοῖσδε πολλάκις προφέρειν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δέ, τὰ μὴ ἦι τοιαῦτα, δόξαντα δ' ἂν διημαρτῆ[σθ]αί. ἀλλ' οὐ βούλομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προφέρεσθαι αὐτά, μὴ ἀρχὴν ποιησώμεθα μῆκος ἐχόντων ἰκανὸν λόγων. | [ικ]ανῶ[ς] οὖν ἡμῖν ἡδολεσχῆσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ ὑμεῖς [μ]υ[ρι]άκι[ς μνημο]νεύε[ι]μ π[ειρᾶ]σθε τὰ ἐμοί τε καὶ Μητρ[ο]δώρῳ τῷδε ν[εωστὶ εἰ]ρημένα. οἶμαι δ' ὑμῖν ὄ[γδο]ον καὶ εἰκοστὸν εἶδος ἀκ[ρο]άσεως τῆ[ς] ἐξῆς περαιν[ο]μένης τουτὶ ν[ῦ]ν ἡδολε[σ]χῆσθαι...

...and furthermore, this is with us, I will not hesitate to bring it up frequently to you and to these, and also the rest, which are not of such a kind but would seem to be mistaken. However, I do not wish to discuss them at the moment, lest we begin a lengthy discourse. | Let us dwell on this sufficiently for now. And you should repeatedly try to remember what has just been said by me and by Metrodorus. I believe you will find this to be the twenty-eighth type of discussion following what is being addressed now...

[Sedley] Nor shall I hesitate to cite repeatedly, to you and to these others, cases where there is still error of this kind among us; and so too all other cases, which are not of this kind, but which we would nevertheless consider to involve error. For the present, however, I do not wish to cite them, to avoid making a new start in a discussion which has already reached sufficient length. So let the words which we have prattled suffice for the present. And you others, try ten thousand times over to commit to memory what I and Metrodorus here have just said. And now I think I have finished prattling to you this twenty-eighth instalment of our consecutive lecture series.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417 col. 13 (13sup2) | P.Herc. 1417 fr. (title 13inf)

Ἐπ[ικ]ούρου Περί Φύσεως ΚΗ' [ἐκ] τῶν ἀρχαίων... ἐγ[ρ]άφη ἐπὶ Νικίου τοῦ μ[ετ]ὰ Ἀν[τι]φάτην

Epikouros' *On Nature Book 28*, from the early writings... written in the period of Nicias, who followed Antiphátēs.

[Sedley] Epikouros *On Nature Book XXVIII* From the old exemplars written in the archonship of Nicias the successor of Antiphátēs.

Nicias was eponymous archon in 296/295 BC, following Antiphátēs who was eponymous archon 297/296 BC. Therefore, book 28 was probably written in 295 BC, when Epikouros was 45 years old.

But it is possible instead that 295 BC is the date of the republication of this particular edition (and Book 28 was originally written earlier). If it is a republication, it may also have undergone some degree of reediting. Epikouros himself considered some of his early writings to contain mistakes. These early writings were called τὰ ἀρχαῖα and τὰ ἀρχαϊκά. (Philodemus, P.Herc. 339 col. 17, On the Stoics, 11.4-22): "[The Stoics] claim 'just as Epikouros is not considered worthy of reproach for the mistakes mentioned in early writings (ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαϊκοῖς), so Zeno should not be either.'"

[32 Arr.²]; Sedley (1974) "The structure of Epikouros, On Nature', Cronache Ercolanesi 4: 89-92, p. 89, n. 9:

34.1 Assumptions & Suspicions

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 1 (column 3)

...ἀγωγῆς [πα]ραλαβεῖν, ἀλλ' [ὄ]ψιν μὴ π[εῖ]σαι οὐδ' [έ]τοιμοτ[ά]τοις, πᾶ[ν] ἀπολειπ[ό]μ[ενο]ν πρὸς ὑπολ[ή]ψει οὐθὲν ἄ[ν] ποιή[σ]αι φοβερὸν, ἀ[λ]λὰ...

...to accept guidance, but do not be swayed by appearances, nor by those who seem the most prepared. Leaving everything behind for assumptions, nothing would cause fear, but...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 2 (column 5)

...ὑποψίας τοῦ εἶδο[υ]ς ἔχουσιν, καὶ γ[ὰρ] αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάλ[ιν] δὲ μετέπ[ε]σεν ἐπὶ...

...harboring such suspicions, and for this very reason, it once again resulted in..

34.2 Becoming Fearless

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 3 (column 8)

...λάθαι φό[β]ων οὐδέπ[ο]τ' ὡς νομίζων, οὐδ' ὡς κατανεγ[ο]ηκῶς ὅτι ταυτὶ μὲν δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν ἄφοβον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἅττα π[οι]ῶν, [ο]ὔτος εὐφραϊνόμενος ἄλλο οὐτ'...

...to encounter fears never as one who believes, nor as one who understands that these things must be done to become fearless, and while some are acting, this one, being joyful, neither...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 4 (column 9)

...παραδεδομ[έ]νων μύθων κα[ὶ] ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῖς ἔρ[γοι]ς ἢ ἄλλος διαστρέφει ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν ἀντιπτώσεων· αὗται δὲ συντελοῦνται τιμωρίαί τε [οἷ]ς ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸ[ς]...

...of handed-down myths and upon these deeds either another distorts or he himself from the conflicts; these punishments are indeed carried out for those who are above all..

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 6 (column 12)

...ὅθεν ἂν [τ]ύχη καθ' ἓν τι πρ[α]γμ[ά]των κ[α]ὶ οὐχ ἅπαντ[α] ἐπιλογισάμενος τ[ὰ] κατὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τ[οῦ] εἰδ[ώ]λου συναπτο[μέν]ην αὐτῷ [ό]ξυδέ[ρ]κειαν...

...from which, if he happens to consider one aspect among many and not all, using the keen perception associated with the image...

...[τῆς συνκ]ρ[ο]ύσεως· καὶ αὐτόθεν μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἀντικοπῆς καθ' ὃν λέγω τρόπον οὐθὲν [α]ν ἡ δειν[ό]ν· νῦν δὲ ταῦτα...

...of the conflict; and if the opposition occurs in the way I describe, it would not be dreadful; but now these things...

34.3 Formation of Ideas

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 8 (column 14)

...κρατείας [καὶ] πάνθ' ὅλως μία τις κύκησις ὑπ[ῆ]ι ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ μηδ' αἰ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν δόξαι γίνωνται· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς μυθώδεις διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν κ[α]ὶ οὗτος πάλιν [δ]όξας βα[δ]ίζ[ει]...

...of domination and everything is entangled within it, and even prevailing opinions are not formed; because of this cause, towards mythical reasons, this one too proceeds again with opinions...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 9 (column 15)

...οὐ πολλ[ο]ύς [ο]ὔτως ἐκκαθαίρεσθαι· τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς συναπτομένη[ς] ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κινήσεως αἴτιον ἀπογεννᾶ[ν] μὲν καὶ τὰς ἀ[λόγ]ους δεῖν νομίζε[ιν] κατὰ τὰς τῶ[ν] πρα[γμάτ]ων φωνά[ς] αὐ[τὰς] χω[ροῦ]ντας...

...not to exclude many in this way; but the cause arising from our own joined movement should be considered responsible for generating even irrational things, according to the inherent nature of things themselves, fitting into place...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 10 (column 16)

...δ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀθροίσματι ἀ[πὸ] τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος διαλαμβάν[ό]μενον, ὁμοίως μὲν τὸν κάτω τρόπον τῆς φορᾶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς συν[κρ]οῦσεως γιγνό[μενο]ν ἐν τῇ αὐτ[ῇ] ψυχῇ[ι] τε καὶ...

...in this accumulation, being perceived from what is added, in the same way both the lower method of movement and the one arising from the collision, occurring in the same soul and...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 11 (column 18)

...δήποτε ὁδ' [ἐ]γβιάζετ' ἀντιτ[είνων] καὶ μὴ ἀκο[λούθους] συνκατα[τιθέμε]νος, τοῦ ψεύδο[υς] πρ[ο]σαγορεύω αὐτὸν [ἄ]ξιον· ἀδιάφορον [γὰρ] ταῦτα [ἀ]γορεύε[σθ]αι πράγματ[α]...

...whenever he is forced, opposing and not being consistent, joining in agreement, I call him worthy of falsehood; for these things are discussed indifferently...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 12 (column 19)

...ῤῥηθέναι κινητικά· οὐδ' ὀλίγα ταῦτα φήσομεν εἰ αἰ, τὰ πλεῖστα κατ' ἐπίσσοδον ἐκ τοῦ περ[ι]έχον[το]ς, ἄλλα παντὶ τῶ[ι] φα[ν]ταστικῶι παρακ[ο]λουθοῦντα...

...to be described as kinetic; nor would we say these are few, if most, occurring from the surrounding environment, others entirely following the imaginative...

34.4 Symmetries & Proportions of the Pores

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 13 (column 20)

...μένοις ἃ ἀληθῆ[[ι προσ]ἀγορεύομεν· ἐν[νοού]μεθα δ' ὡς οὐδ[ὲν ἄλλ]λ' ἢ φασιν οἱ τὴν φλε[β]οπαλίαν ὀνομάζοντες τῶν ἀρχαίων φυ[σ]ιολόγων τὸ πρᾶ[γμα] ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν...

...things which we call true; and we comprehend that it is nothing more than what the ancient physiologists refer to as phlebotomy ["the beating of the pulse"] regarding the matter we are discussing...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 14 (column 21)

...ἢ καὶ ὅτι[ο]ῦν τὸ ὠμοιωμέ[ν]ον τούτῳ καλέσο[μ]εν ἐνάργειαν μὴ ἐκ τοῦ περιεχοντο[ς] ὄν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῆ[ν] φλεβοπαλίαν· [ἐ]ὰν δὴ καὶ ἀγορε[ύω]σ[ι]ν καὶ...

...or anything resembling this, we will call clarity, not coming from the external surroundings, but in accordance with phlebotomy; if indeed they also proclaim and...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 15 (column 22)

...[π]αρὰ τὰς μ[ε]τα[βάσεις] καὶ τὰς δ[ι]ήξει[ς] τῶν πόρων γίνεσθαι τις συμ[μ]ετρία, καὶ τισιμ μὲν [ε]ύθυς ἐτοίμως δι[α]κειμένοις, τισιν... [ἀ]τα[ρ]άχως...

...through the transitions and passages of the pores, a certain symmetry arises, and for some, it happens readily and smoothly, while for others... without disturbance...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 16 (column 23)

...Ἄ[να]γκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸ[ς] ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται – οὐθὲν ἦττον παρὰ τὰς [ἐξ] ἡμῶ[ν], τ[ις] σ[υ]μμετρία αὐτ[αῖς] γίνε[σθαι]...

* It is necessary for [atoms] to exist with collisions with each other – as it has been said in the first writing – *nonetheless*, from to those [atoms] that come from us, a certain symmetry with them occurs...

...It is necessary for them to exist according to their mutual collisions – as stated in the first writing – no less than through those from us, that some symmetry is formed among them...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 24 (column 24)

...[πυκ]νότης κἄ[ν] μὴ σ[υ]ν[ῆ]ι αἰ [συμ]μετρίαι [τῶν] πόρων ποιοῦσ[ι]ν ὥ[στε] τ[ὰς] περὶ τὰς ἐν[πτῶ]σεις ταῦτα[ς] καὶ αὐταῖς] μετ[α]β[α]σεις ὑ[πάρ]χ[ε]ιν· ὅσα] δὴ καὶ...

...density, and even if the symmetries of the pores do not coincide, they ensure that these impacts and transitions exist among them as well; as much as indeed also...

34.5 Interpreting the Unseen with Reasoning

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 17 (column 25)

...ἂν γὰρ τα[ύ]τό τις συνθεωρῇ καὶ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ[ι] ὄν τρόπον ἐχόμενος ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων διηρμήνευκεν οὐποτε μὲν δόξει πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ φυσικὸν ἄλλας οἰ[κ]ειότερας φω[ν]ὰς ἔχειν...

...for if someone contemplates the same thing and the method of reasoning within the discourse, observing how the reasoning has interpreted *about the unseen*, they will never judge that, towards the natural end, there are other more fitting expressions...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 26 (title subscriptio)

* Tepedino Guerra, A. (1991) *Polieno, frammenti (Naples), Polyaeus fr. 27, pg 91*

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[U91]

Book 35

Benefits from God

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.37.1053

Ἐν τε τῷ τρε[ισκα]δεκάτῳ, περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἢ[ν πρὸς] τινὰς ὁ θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος]. ἐν δὲ τῷ πέ[μπτῳ καὶ] τριακ[οσ]τῷ[ι, φησι], σὺν τῷ τι [ταύ]της τῆς ὠφελ[είας] διασ[α]φεῖν, κ[α]ὶ διό[ι νομι]ζον...

* In the thirteenth [book], regarding the familiarity that god has with certain individuals and alienation. And in the five-and-thirtieth [book 35], he says, explaining along with something of this benefit, on which account even considering...

[Obbink] And in book 13 he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people. And in book 35, in addition to clarifying somewhat this benefit, he says that even on account of thinking...

The right attitude towards the gods benefits people

Uncertain Book Number

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 1639 fr. 4

...μο[ρ]φῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραλλαγ[μ]άτων ἐπὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐλθ[εῖν] ἠθέλησεν, μήπως οὐκ ἐχ[ρ]ῆν γενομένους αὐτοὺς εὐδαίμον[ας] ποιῆσαι. Τότε γὰρ...

...of forms and other variations to reach completion, he wished, lest it would not be appropriate to make them happy once they had been created. For at that time...

Imageless Names are Meaningless

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 362 fr. 3 | P.Herc. 362 subscriptio

...μὲν ἀπὸ τῶνδὲ τινὰς ὡς [β]λαβησομένο[υς] ἢ παραχθησομέν[ο]υς εἴρηται. καὶ καθὸ καὶ ψευδῆ τινα καὶ μὴ ὄντα φαμέν δοξάζειν καὶ κ[α]θόλου οὐ[δ]ὲ λαμβάνειν [οὐ]θέ[ν] φάσμα ἐπινοητικόν, ἀλλὰ ἢ [μόνα] ὄνόμα[τα]. | Ἐπι[κ]ο[ύ]ρου Π[ε]ρὶ Φύσεως...

...indeed, some of these are said to be harmed or disturbed. And as we say that they hold false and nonexistent beliefs and generally do not grasp any imaginative vision, but only names. | Epikouros *On Nature*...

Sexual Reproduction

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 1

...της παρα[λαμ]βανόντων εἰς τὴν τοῦ παρ[ε]κκειμένου παρα[λλά]γματος αἰτίαν καὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν [δ]εχόμε[ν]ον τὸ σπέρμα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρρην τις δύναται πολλὴν ὕλην ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σπ[έρμ]ατος [γ]εννη[τ]ι[κοῦ] ὡς] καὶ αἷ[μ]ατος καὶ χο[λῆς] ἔχου[σιν] πολλοὶ· διὸ καὶ κατα[β]άλλειν...

...receiving into the cause of the adjacent transformation and the place that accepts the seed; for a man can have a lot of substance within himself for producing seed, just as many have blood and bile; hence, also casting down...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 2

...ὀλίγονεμένου τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ἀντικοπτομένου καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σκεδασμὸν λαμβάνοντος· καὶ παρὰ τὸ σχεῖσμα δ' ἂν γένοιτο τ[οῦ] πόρο[υ] τὸ τοιοῦτο· δῆ[λον] γὰρ] ὅ[τι] εὐ[θυ]τενῶς μὲ[ν] κ[ε]ίμε[ν]ος ὁ πόρος τὴν π[ᾶ]σα]ν ἢ τὴν πλε[ίστ]ην δυνή[σεται] καταβ[άλλειν] τ[ὴν] ὕλην κατ' [ἀντι]κρῦ(?) ἀντικοπτομένου [καὶ δ]ιαφερομένου κα[τὰ] τοῦς] κλασμοῦς...

...as the lesser amount diminishes and the greater amount is broken apart, thus leading to dispersion; this phenomenon can also occur due to the structure of the passageway. It is evident that a passageway that is straight will be able to channel all or most of the material directly, while being broken up and varying according to the fractures...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 3

...τὴν [σώ]ματος παντὸς ἀπόκρισιν· εἰς ταυτό δὲ παραλανβάνεσθαι δ[ύ]ν[αται] καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ θηλείᾳ ἀνγεῖον· εἰ γὰρ [σ]τε[ν]ὸν ὀλίγον πέφυκε δέ[ξ]ασθαι, μέγα δὲ πολ[ύ], σύ[ν]μετρον ἐὰν ἔχη τὸ [μ]έγε[θ]ος...

...the reaction of the entire body; similarly, the vessel within the female can also accommodate the same. If it is small, it is naturally able to receive only a little, but if it is large, it can receive a lot, proportional to its size...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 4 sup

...τὴν ἀνάλογον παραλλαγὴν ποιήσουσιν· καὶ ἐξεναντ[ί]ως μὲν [κ]ειμένου πρὸς [πα]ραδοχὴν τὴν παντὸς εὐθέ[του] ἔχον[τ]ος του ἀνα... τὴν θέσιν ἔχον[τ]ος] κατανη[κ]ὺ πρὸς τοῦ[τ'] ἐν[π]οδίζοντος...

...they will make the necessary adjustment; and indeed, when placed in opposition to receiving the full alignment, having the position of descending towards this, it hinders...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 4 inf | col. 5

...τε φυσ[ικὰ] τῆ]ς γυναικὸς πρὸς ἀμφότε[ρ]α δύναται εὐθε[τεῖ]ν κα[ὶ] πάλιν ἐναντ[ι]οῦσθαι· κ[αὶ] γὰρ κατὰ τὸ [εἶ]ναι [τ]όπον [τῷ] ἄ]ρρην καταβαλλόμενος] πρὸς τὰ, ποτὲ μὲν δι' ἡδονῆς τ' εἰ[σφέρ]εσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς [τ]ὸ [μ]ὴ πολὺ μηδὲ πάν[τ]ως· ἀπό ταύτη[ς] τῆς [πα]ρα[λ]λαγῆς [τὴν] διαφορὰν γείνεσθαι] τῶν [μ]εγάλων ἀπο[τε]λεσ[θέν]των σωμάτ[ων]...

...the woman's natural capacities can align with both and also oppose; and indeed, being positioned to receive from the man, sometimes bringing pleasure, sometimes not much or entirely; from this alteration arises the difference in the formation of large bodies...

Summarization

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 998 fragment 11

...Σύντομον δέ τινα καὶ κεφαλαιώδ[η] καὶ ἐπιτομικὸν τῶν διὰ πλε[ι]όνων τε θεωρημένων ὄρον τινα προφέρεται ἐν τῷ Β καὶ Λ. Ῥηθείη γὰρ ἂν, φ[η]σί, ψυχὴ φύσις τις εἶναι ταῖς ὕματι...

...And a brief, concise, and summary conclusion of the matters considered in greater detail is presented in sections B and L. For it might be said, he notes, that the soul is a certain kind of nature with...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 998 fragment 12

...καὶ παρὰ Πολυαίνωι δ' ἐν τῷ περὶ ὄρων τόνδε συν...

...And Polyaeus, in his work on boundaries, also presents this...

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 998 fragment 16

...[α]ὐτὸς οὗτος [δ'] ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδήλου διεξιῶν, ὄντως νομίσα[ς]...

...this very person, while discussing the unknown, truly believed...

[U92]

Examples Over Definitions

* Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, *The Art of Grammar*, [p. 660, 25 Bekk.]

Καὶ Ἐπίκουρος – δὲ αἰὶ ὑπογραφαῖς κεχρημένος – δηλῶν ὅτι τιμιώτεροι οἱ ὄροι, ὄροις ἀντὶ ὑπογραφῶν ἐν τῇ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως πραγματείᾳ [ἐχρήσατο]. διαιρῶν γὰρ τὸ πᾶν εἰς τε ἄτομον καὶ κενὸν ὄροις ἐχρήσατο: λέγων ὅτι ἄτομόν ἐστι σῶμα στερεὸν ἀμέτοχον κενοῦ παρεμπλοκῆς. κενόν ἐστι φύσις ἀναφῆς, τουτέστιν ἀψηλάφητος.

* And Epikouros – although he used **examples all the time** – he shows that definitions are **more valuable**, [because he used] **definitions instead of examples in his work** of his natural philosophy lecture. For he divided **the whole into atom and void**, by using **definitions**: He said that an **atom is a solid body having no share of interposition with the void**. **Void is an intangible nature**, that is, something **untouchable**.

And although Epikouros always made use of general outlines [of the senses of words], he showed that definitions are more worthy of respect by using definitions instead of general outlines in the treatise *On Nature*; for he used definitions when he divided the totality [of existence] into the atomic and the void, saying that "the atomic is a solid body which has no share of void included in it; void is an intangible nature" i.e., not subject to touch.

ἡ ὑπογραφή	example	ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΗ to write under (copy)
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[U93]

Diogenēs Laértios 10.7

Τιμοκράτης... καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα βίβλοις ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* τὰ πλεῖστα ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀντιγράφειν ἐν αὐταῖς ἄλλοις τε καὶ *Ναυσιφάνει*, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ αὐτῇ λέξει φάσκειν οὕτως "Ἄλλ' ἴτωσαν – εἶχε γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ὠδίνων, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος καύχησιν τὴν σοφιστικὴν, καθάπερ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων."

* Timokrátēs [also claims]... in the seven-and-thirtieth book *On Nature*, [Epikouros] says **mostly the same things** and writes back against those others and even Nausiphánēs, and asserts **most things in the such words** as "But let them go on by – for that one, suffering, had **from the mouth the boast that is sophistical**, just as many others **among the captives**."

Timokrátēs [also alleges]... that in his thirty-seven books *On Nature*, Epíkouros uses much repetition and writes largely in sheer opposition to others, especially Nausiphánēs, and here is his own words: "but let them go; for, when laboring with an idea, he too had a sophist's off-hand boastfulness like so many other slaves."

[U94]

Marriage

[=U19] Diogénēs Laértios 10.119

Καὶ μὴδὲ καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν σοφόν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις – καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Φύσεως, κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν.

The wiseman will not marry or sire children, as Epíkouros says in the *Problems* – and in *On Nature*, according to the situation of his life at some point he may marry.

Nor, again, will the Sage marry and rear a family – so Epíkouros says in his *Problems* and in the work *On Nature*. Though occasionally he may marry in accordance with special circumstances in his life.

49. Summary of Objections to the Physicists **Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Ἔρωτος. Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς. Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικούς...

...*On Love. Summary of Objections to the Physicists. Against the Megarians...*

50. Chairédēmos **Χαιρέδημος**

Diogénēs Laértios 10.27...Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανῶν. Χαιρέδημος. Περὶ Θεῶν...

...*On the Criterion, or The Canon. Chairédēmos. On the Gods...*

Letters Ἐπιστολαί

Diogénēs Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένους. Ἐπιστολαί...

...On Kingship. Anaximénēs. Letters...

Diogénēs Laértios 10.30: The physical part includes the entire theory of Nature: it is contained in the thirty-seven books On Nature and, in a summary form, in the letters. The ethical part deals with the facts of choice and aversion: this may be found in the books On Lifecourses, in the letters, and in his treatise On the End-Goal.

Cicero, De Finibus, I.20.65 (Torquatus to Cicero): Epíkouros in a single house, and a small one at that, maintained a whole company of friends, united by the closest sympathy and affection; and this still goes on in the Epicurean school.

Cf. Cicero, Ibid., 2.25, 80-81; Cicero Academica 2.36.115 (Lucullus): ...the Epicureans, so many of whom are friends of my own, so worthy, and so affectionate a set of men.

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment XV: ... and why, when they have stopped, will he {the teacher} move on to {accolades}, and how will he exhibit to these those who have endured his ridicule? In short, a wise man will employ frankness toward his friends the way that Epíkouros and Mētródōros did towards...

[U95]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.14: And in his correspondence he replaces the usual greeting, "I wish you joy" by wishes for welfare and right living, "May you do well" and "Live well." Ibid., 3.60-61 (Plato): ...Lastly, his {Plato's} thirteen Epistles deal with ethics. In these epistles his salutation was "Do well" as that of Epíkouros was "Live well" and that of Cleon: "All joy."

Lucian, A Slip of the Tongue in Salutation, 6, [p. 732 Hemst.]: Epíkouros was a man who certainly enjoyed enjoyment itself, and esteemed pleasure above everything else. Yet, in his most serious letters (which are not very numerous) and in those to his most intimate friends, he starts off with "Live well!"

Cf. Suda, under "Greetings" {Χαίρειν, chi-166} : Cleon headed {his letters} thus, but Plato {preferred} "Do well" and Epíkouros "Live well." {and again at epsilon, 3664 - "Do well"}

Summary of Letters

Herculaneum Papyrus 1044 f. 4 [Gomperz Edition, "Hermes" 5, p. 386]: ... and the summaries of the letters of Epíkouros, of Mētródōros, of Polýainos, of Hermárchos, and of the disciples.

Fragments of Letters Written in Certain Years

Under the Archonship of Charinus {308 - 307 B.C.}

{=> U158}

[U96]

Philódēmos, On Epíkouros, Vol. Herc. 2, VI.107, fragment 2: ... Under Charinus ...

[U97]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Vol. Herc. 2, 3.85: Then, under Charinus, all and poverty is not to changing will be brought.

[U98]

[U99]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.107, [p. 125 Gomperz] {Obbink I.33.929}: {Epíkouros says,} "Even if there should be war, it would not be terrible, if the gods are propitious;" and to Polýainos, that he has "lived and would continue to live a pure life with Matron himself, if the gods are propitious;" and to the same in the archonship of Charinus that "in friendship with these being friends ..."

[U100]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.74-75, [pp. 104-105 Gomperz] {Obbink I.29.840}: And in the archonship of Charinus and in that of Diotimus {286-285 B.C.} he warns against violating the covenant of the sacred festival table.

[U101]

Under the Archonship of Olympiodorus {294-292 B.C.}

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.114

Under the Archonship of Philippus {292-291 B.C.}

- {=> U108}
- {=> U127}
- {=> U156}

Under the Archonship of Diotimus {286-285 B.C.}

- {=> U100}
- {=> U168}

Under the Archonship of Isaeus {285-284 B.C.}

Cf. Philódēmos, On the Philosophers, Vol. Herc. 1, VIII cap. 5, 7

[U102]

Under the Archonship of Euthius {284-283 B.C.}

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.129

Under the Archonship of Pytharatus {271-270 B.C., the year of Epíkouros' Death}

See: U122, U138, U177, & U191

Under Archonships of Questionable History

- {=> U169} Aristonymus {290 - 289 B.C.??}
- {=> U154} Telocles {272 - 271 B.C.??}

[U103]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Vol. Herc. 2, 3.89

Collections Of Letters

1. Letters to Important Persons

Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγάλους

[U104]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.107, [p. 125 Gomperz] {Obbink I.33.944}: And his brother, {Epíkouros' brother Neoklês} an admirer and advanced student of his, says "it is necessary to piously distribute assistance from our money for the gods" writing not to a layman but to Thyrsōn the Colophonian, a man [lesser] than no one in political affairs.

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.3: Diotimus the Stoic, who was hostile to him, assailed him with bitter slanders, adducing fifty scandalous letters as written by Epíkouros; and so too did the author who ascribed to Epíkouros the epistles commonly attributed to Chrysippus

[U105]

Aelius Theon, Preliminary Exercises, Rh. W. 1 [p. 169 Walz] {2,154 Butts}: One must also pay attention to the arrangement of words, by providing instruction about all the ways in which they will avoid faulty arrangement, but especially metrical and rhythmical style, like many of the phrases of the orator Hegesias ..., as well as some of the phrases of Epíkouros, ... {= U131} ... and to those works being circulated as his (but even now, I have yet to find them in his writings): "Tell me now, Polýainos, do you know what has been a great joy to me?" Such passages, therefore, are to be completely condemned, and have a faultiness of arrangement that is quite obvious.

Letters Addressed To Several Persons

3. To Friends Living in Egypt

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Φίλους

[U106]

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? 3, p 1128 F: [= U107]

4. To Friends Living in Asia

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Φίλους

[U107]

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? 3, p 1128 F: On the other hand, if it is to the good that you tender this advice to be unnoticed and unknown... you yourself, Epíkouros, ought not to write your friends in Asia, not to enlist recruits from Egypt, not to cultivate the youth of Lampsacus!

5. To Friends Living in Lampsacus

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ Φίλους

Strabo, Geography, XIII p 589 [Casaubon]: ...and Mētródōros, the comrade of Epíkouros, was from Lampsacus; and Epíkouros himself was in a sense a Lampsacanian, having lived in Lampsacus and having been on intimate terms with the ablest men of that city, Idomeneús and Leonteús and their followers.

[U108]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Vol. Herc. 2, 3.89

[U109]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.110

[U110]

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? 3, p 1129 A: [= U107]

6. Letter to the Philosophers of Mytilene

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους

[U111]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.136: [= U1]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.7: [= U145]

[U113]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.8: Furthermore, Epíkouros himself in his letters says of Nausiphánēs: "This so maddened him that he abused me and called me a didaskalon." {= "pedagogue" a trite, pedantic teacher} Epíkouros used to call Nausiphánēs a pleumonon. {= "jellyfish" imputing obtuseness and insensibility}

[U114]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, I.3: Epíkouros, then, though he had been one of this man's disciples, did his best to deny the fact in order that he might be thought to be a self-taught and original philosopher, and tried hard to blot out the reputation of Nausiphánēs, and became a violent opponent of the Arts and Sciences wherein Nausiphánēs prided himself. Thus, in his Letter to the Philosophers of Mytilene, Epíkouros says, "I quite suppose that 'the bellowers' will fancy that I am even a disciple of 'the jellyfish' having sat under him in the company of some crapulous striplings;" whereby he calls Nausiphánēs a "jellyfish" as being without sense. And again, after proceeding further and abusing the man at length, he hints at his proficiency in Arts and Sciences when he says – "In fact he was a sorry fellow and exercised himself on matters which cannot possibly lead to wisdom" alluding thereby to Arts and Sciences.

Letters Addressed To Single Persons

7. To Athēnaîos

Πρὸς Ἀθηναίου

"Of Athena"

[U115]

Herculaneum Papyrus 176, c. 17 [Gomperz "Hermes" Edition, 5, p. 387]: ... then to Athēnaîos, "When Polýainos came to us, you no continued to demonstrate affection to his paternal namesake, but ... "

8. Against Anaxárhon

Πρὸς Ἀναξάρχον

"Ruler of Kings"

[U116]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 17, p. 1117A: Such is ... the man who, in in the letter to Anaxárhon can pen such words as these: "But I, for my part, summon you to sustained pleasures and not to empty virtues, which fill us with vain expectations that destroy peace of mind."

9. To Apellês

Πρὸς Ἀπελλῆν

[U117]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, XIII p. 588A: First of all, I will recall Epíkouros, who is distinguished for his candor; for, being himself uninitiated in the Mÿsteries of a general education {i.e., professional training}, he congratulated those who went in for philosophy as he had, giving vent to such words as these: "I congratulate you, sir, having gone in for philosophy free from all corruption."

Plutarch, Non Posse, 12, p. 1094D: In admiration and most hearty commendation of a certain Apellês, they write that from childhood he steered clear of mathematical education and kept himself pure.

10. To Apollōnīdēs

Πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην

"Son of Apollo"

[U118]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 73: ...to admonish {him}, since he is suitably disposed, just as Epíkouros made certain reproaches against Apollōnīdēs, in such a way that, even in accusing him of these things, <provided he was truthful, he persuaded others to acknowledge {them} as their own, and may things, even if, being great men, they impugned as having suffered {them} undeservedly and, citing a rather Cynic-like rejoinder... >

11. To Aristóboulos

Πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον

"Best Counsel" Brother of Epíkouros

[U119]

Diogénēs Laértios 7.6 (Zénōn of Citium): And Antigonus (Gonantas) esteemed him {Zénōn the Stoic}, and whenever he came to Athens he would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court. This offer he always declined ... So he sent Persaeus and Philonides the Theban; and Epíkouros in his letter to his brother Aristóboulos mentions them living together with Antigonus.

[U120]

12. To Dōsítheos

Πρὸς Δωσίθειον

"God's Gift"

Plutarch, Non Posse, 20, p. 1101A

(ὄτι) τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμούς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς, μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι "τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ' ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν: ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης – διὸ, πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ, νῆ Δία, λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς καὶ τήκεσθαι" καὶ ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες ὑγροὶ τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἶρηκε καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἥγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Δωσίθειον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Φύρωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολάς διήλθον αὐτοῦ...

To those who remove griefs and tears and sighs over the deaths of friends, and they oppose and say that "the painlessness which is established in impassivity exists because of another greater evil: of harshness or of excessive pride and madness – therefore, to suffer something is better, and to grieve and, by god, to moisten the eyes and to melt into tears" and indeed they seem to be moist ^[tipsy] and friendly, both experiencing and writing such things. For Epíkouros has said these things in many other contexts and also in writing about the death of Hēgēsíanax to Dōsítheos, the father, and Phyrson, the brother of the deceased; for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

...that they disagree with those who would do away with grief and tears and lamentation at the death of friends, and say that "an absence of grief that renders us totally insensible stems from another great evil: hardness or a passion for notoriety so excessive as to be insane, therefore it is better to be moved somewhat and to grieve and to melt into tears" and so with all the maudlin sentiment they feel and put on paper, getting themselves the name of being soft-hearted and affectionate characters. For this is what Epíkouros has said not only in many other passages, but in his letter on the death of Hēgēsíanax to Dōsítheos and Phyrson – the father and brother of the deceased. for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

13. To Hermárchos

Πρὸς Ἑρμάρχον

"Leader guided by Hermes"

[U121]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, XIII p. 588B: Well, did not this same Epíkouros keep Leóntion as his mistress, the woman who had become notorious as a courtesan? Why! Even when she began to be a philosopher, she did not cease her courtesan ways, but consorted with all the Epicureans in the Gardens, and even before the very eyes of Epíkouros; wherefore he, poor devil, was really worried about her, as he makes clear in his Letters to Hermárchos.

[U122]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.30.96: Let me repeat the dying words of Epíkouros, to prove to you that the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: "Epíkouros to Hermárchos, greeting. I write these words" he says, "on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity." Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. "Yet all my sufferings" he continues, "are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Mētródōros."

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.31.88: Well, do you think him afraid of death or pain? He calls the day of his death happy and in the sufferings of acute pains he represses those very pains by the living remembrance of the truths he has discovered, and this he does not in a spirit that makes it seem to babble about the moment.

Ibid., V.9.26: What better than his remark that "fortune has but little weight with the wise?" {Principal Doctrine 16} But is this said by one who, after saying that not only is pain the chief evil but the only evil as well, can bear all over his body the crushing burden of acutest pain at the moment he utters his loudest boasts against fortune?

Ibid., 2.19.45: Let us then pass him over as saying absolutely nothing and compel him to admit that means of relief from pain are not to be sought from one who has pronounced pain to be the greatest of all evils, however resolutely the same person may show a touch of bravery in an attack of colic or a difficulty in passing water.

Ibid., V.26.74: He has in no way provided for himself those healing aids to the endurance of pain ... but says that he finds peace in the recollection of past pleasures...

14. (To a Hetera)

Diogénēs Laértios 10.6: It is also said that Epíkouros had written to many other Heterai, especially Leóntion.

15. To Eurýlochos

Πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον

"Far-Reaching Defender"

[U123]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.13: Apollodorus in his Chronology tells us us that our philosopher was a pupil of Nausiphánēs and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurýlochos, Epíkouros himself denies it and says that he was self-taught.

16. To Hēródotos

Πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον

"Given by Hera"

[U124]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.5: It is said that Epíkouros also extolled Idomeneús, Hēródotos, and Timokrátēs, who had published his cryptic doctrines, and flattered them for that very reason.

17. To Themísta

Πρὸς Θεμιστᾶν

"Order-keeper" "Of Themis"

Diogénēs Laértios 10.25: And then there is Leonteús of Lampsacus and his wife Themísta, to whom Epíkouros wrote letters.

[U125]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.5: Then again to Themísta, the wife of Leonteús: "I am quite ready, if you do not come to see me, to spin thrice on my own axis and be propelled to any place that you, including Themísta, agree upon."

[U126]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.5: And, as Theodorus says in the fourth book of his work, Against Epíkouros, in another letter to Themísta he thinks he preaches to her.

[U127]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.111: To Themísta, during the Archonship of Phillipus. {292-291 B.C.}

18. To Idomeneús

Πρὸς Ἰδομενέα

"Strength of Ida"

Diogénēs Laértios 10.25: And Epíkouros wrote letters to Kōlótēs and Idomeneús, who were also natives of Lampsacus.

[U128]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.5: [= U124]

[U129]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 72: (therefore even Epíkouros writes to Idomeneús that he prays to live up to this point). And he will point out how many came to ruin badly, bereft of everything because of such a disposition to converse with frankness with certain people, and <he will assent> to all that we, having applied, <transfer>...

[U130]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 18, p. 1117D: But if, Kōlótēs, you had met with expressions of Socrates' such as Epíkouros pens in a letter to Idomeneús: "So send us for the care of our sacred body an offering of first-fruits on behalf of yourself and your children – so I am inspired to put it;" to what more unmannerly terms could you have resorted? {Traditionally, first-fruits were offered to a god – support for Epíkouros' bodily needs is so depicted.}

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VII p. 279F: It was in fact, for the sake of the belly and the pleasures of the flesh in general that this man flattered Idomeneús and Mētródōros. ... Epíkouros, in fact, was the teacher of these men.

[U131]

Aelius Theon, Preliminary Exercises, 2, I [p. 169 Walz] {2,154 Butts}: ... faulty arrangement, but especially metrical and rhythmical style, like many of the phrases of the orator Hegesias ... as well as some of the phrases of Epíkouros, such as where he writes to Idomeneús: "Oh you who have from youth have regarded all my impressions as pleasurable."

[U132]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 21.3: It is your own studies that will make you shine and will render you eminent. Allow me to mention the case of Epíkouros. He was writing to Idomeneús and trying to withdraw him from a showy existence to a sure and steadfast renown. Idomeneús was at that time a minister of state who exercised a rigorous authority and had important affairs in hand. "If you are affected by glory, my letters will make you more famous than all those things which you cherish and which make you cherished." Did Epíkouros speak falsely? Who would have known of Idomeneús, had not the philosopher thus engraved his name in those letters of his? All the grandees and satraps, even the king himself, who was petitioned for the title which Idomeneús sought, are sunk in deep oblivion.

[U133]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 22.5: You understand by this time that you must withdraw yourself from those showy and depraved pursuits; but you still wish to know how this may be accomplished. ... Read the letter of Epíkouros which bears on this matter; it is addressed to Idomeneús. The writer asks him to hasten as fast as he can, and beat a retreat before some stronger influence comes between and takes from him the liberty to withdraw. But he also adds that one should attempt nothing except at the time when it can be attempted suitably and seasonably. Then, when the long-sought occasion comes, let him be up and doing. Epíkouros forbids us to doze when we are not in too great a hurry before the time, nor lag when the time arrives.

[U134]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 34, p. 1127D: Again, in a letter to Idomeneús, I believe – he calls upon him "not to live in servitude to laws and men's opinions, as long as they refrain from making trouble in the form of a blow administered by your neighbor." Ibid.: ... they recommend contempt for law if it is not backed by the fear of a blow or punishment.

[U135]

Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 3.17.24: Again from Epíkouros: "If you wish to make Pythoklēs rich, do not give him more money, but diminish his desire."

Cf. Ibid., 23 [Arsenius, Paroemiogr. Gotting. t. 2 p. 382, 11]: The precept of Epíkouros... & Ibid. XVII.37: Epíkouros, when asked how one can enrich oneself, responded: "Not by accumulating extraneous goods, but rather by trimming one's needs."

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 21.7: In order that Idomeneús may not be introduced free of charge into my letter, he shall make up the indebtedness from his own account. It was to him that Epíkouros addressed his well-known saying, urging him to make Pythoklēs rich, but not rich in the vulgar and equivocal way. "If you wish to make Pythoklēs rich" said he, "do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires."

[U136]

Photius I of Constantinople, Lexicon, p 473, 1, under "Pythia and Delia" [= Suda {pi-3128}, 2.2; p. 555, 10 Bernh.; Apostolius Proverbs, XV 9 Arsen.]: They say that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, having created the Pythia and the Delia {festivals} in Delos at the same time, sent an embassy to the oracle of the god {Apollo} to ask whether he was performing the details of the sacrifice in accordance with what was ordained: the Pythia answered: "these things are your Pythia and Delia" – she intended to make clear that this was the end, for after a short time it happened that he was killed. Epíkouros in one of his letters to Idomeneús refers to these things.

[U137]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125,9: And to Idomeneús, then: to this

[U138]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.22: At the point of death, he also wrote the following letter to Idomeneús: "On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them. But the cheerfulness of my mind, which arises from the remembrance of our past conversations, counterbalances all these afflictions. I am asking you to care for the children of Mētródōros, in a manner befitting the devotion you have given to me and to philosophy since you were a youth." [cf. U122]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66.47: There are other things which, though he would prefer that they not happen, he nevertheless praises and approves, for example the kind of resignation, in times of ill-health and serious suffering, to which I alluded a moment ago, and which Epíkouros displayed on the last and most blessed day of his life. For he {Epíkouros} tells us that he had to endure excruciating agony from a diseased bladder and from an ulcerated stomach – so acute that it permitted no increase of pain; "and yet" he says, "that day was none the less happy." And no man can spend such a day in happiness unless he possesses the Supreme Good. ... We cannot say that the good which has rounded out a happy life, the good for which Epíkouros rendered thanks in the last words he uttered, is not equal to the greatest.

Ibid., 92.25: Does it not seem just as incredible that any man in the midst of extreme suffering should say, "I am happy."? And yet this utterance was heard in the very factory of pleasure, when Epíkouros said: "Today and one other day have been the happiest of all!" although in the one case he was tortured by strangury, and in the other by the incurable pain of an ulcerated stomach.

Cicero, Letters to Friends, VII.26,1: {To Marcus Fadius Gallus, ca. 57 B.C.} I have a shrinking horror of all diseases, especially of that in regard to which the Stoics put a sinister interpretation upon your great Epíkouros' admission that he was troubled with strangury and gastritis; for they attributed the latter to gluttony, and the former to a still baser kind of self-indulgence.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 5, p. 1089E: If reason could avert them {maladies of the body}, reasonable men would never be afflicted with strangury, dysentery, consumption, and the dropsy, with some of which Epíkouros himself had to contend, Polýainos with others, while others were fatal to Neoklēs and Agathobulus {a botched reference to "Neoklēs and Aristóbuolos" – brothers of Epíkouros}.

Ibid., 18, p. 1099D: For one thing, not one of us would believe Epíkouros when he says that while he was dying in the greatest pain and bodily afflictions he found compensation in being escorted on his journey by the recollection of the pleasures he had once enjoyed.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, I.23.21: So what is it, Epíkouros ... {= Arrian @ U34} ... that wrote as it was dying: "We are spending what is our last and at the same time a happy day... "?

19. To Kráteros

Πρὸς Κράτερον

"Powerful"

[U139]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125: And to the same Kráteros, he writes to be at Míthrēs.

20. To Kōlótēs

Πρὸς Κωλώτην

[U140]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 9: ... in general such and such of their (sc. the students') errors and what Epíkouros learns from Leóntion he will {hypothetically} ascribe to Kōlótēs. Since the wise man will also sometimes transfer to himself an intemperate error, {saying} that it occurred in his youth...

[U141]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 17, p. 1117B: Kōlōtēs himself, for another, while hearing a lecture of Epíkouros on natural philosophy, suddenly cast himself down before him and embraced his knees; and this is what Epíkouros himself writes about it in a tone of solemn pride: "You, as one revering my remarks on that occasion, were seized with a desire, not accounted for by my lecture, to embrace me by clasping my knees and lay hold of me to the whole extent of the contact that is customarily established in revering and supplicating certain personages. You therefore caused me" he says, "to consecrate you in return and demonstrate my reverence." My word! We can pardon those who say that they would pay any price to see a painting of that scene, one kneeling at the feet of the other and embracing his knees while the other returns the supplication and worship. Yet that act of homage, though skillfully contrived by Kōlōtēs, bore no proper fruit: he was not proclaimed a Sage. Epíkouros merely says: "Go about as one immortal in my eyes, and think of me as immortal too."

Ibid., 19, p. 1117F: Now since Kōlōtēs was no Sage, not even after that demonstration of reverence...

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 18, p. 1100A: Epíkouros said... that except for himself and his pupils, no one had ever been a Sage, but even wrote that as he was lecturing on natural philosophy, Kōlōtēs embraced his knees in an act of adoration.

Ibid., 19, p. 1100C: For he, who made so much of Neoklēs' testimony and Kōlōtēs act of adoration ...

[U142]

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.74, 11 [p. 104 Gomperz] {Obbink I.29.820}: Now it would be absurd to relate in addition that they thought it right to make use of oaths and epithets of the gods, since their philosophical writing is filled with them. But it is proper to say that he advised them to retain asseverations made by means of these and similar expressions, and above all to preserve those made by Zeus himself in the open manner, and not writing "by twin shoots!" {i.e., swearing oaths without stating by whom} or merely "it must be so." Moreover to Kōlōtēs he took pains with regard to all forms of oaths and speaking about the gods.

21. To Leóntion

Πρὸς Λεόντιον

"Little Lion"

Diogénēs Laértios 10.6: {cited above} It is also said that Epíkouros had written to many other Heterai, especially Leóntion. {cf. Cicero, above}

Alciphron, *Letters (Letters of Courtesans)*, 2.2 (Leóntion depicted writing to Lamia): How that Epíkouros tries to manage me, scolding me for everything, suspicious of everything, writing me well-sealed letters, chasing me out of his school garden! (3): He wants to be a Socrates and to talk on and on and to feign ignorance, and he regards his Pythoklēs as an Alcibiades and counts on making me his Xanthippe. And the end will be that I shall leave for some destination or other and flee from land to land rather than put up with his interminable letters.

[U143]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.5: In his letters, he wrote to Leóntion, "Oh Lord Paeon {a reference to Apollo's role as god of healing}, my dear little Leóntion, to what tumultuous applause we were inspired as we read your letter." {= Suda, under κροτοθορύβου ("loud applause") kappa-2480}

Plutarch, *On Listening to Lectures*, 15, p. 45F: For Epíkouros expresses himself gracelessly when he says of his friends' letters that they give rise to hullabaloo.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 17, p. 1117A: But what epithet do they deserve – with your "roars" of ecstasy and "cries of thanksgiving" and tumultuous "bursts of applause" and "reverential demonstrations" and the whole apparatus of adoration that you people resort to in supplicating and hymning the man who summons you to sustained and frequent pleasures?

[U144]

Philódēmos, *On Frank Criticism*, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 9: [= U140]

[U145]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.7: Timokrátēs alleges... that his {Epíkouros'} bodily health was pitiful, so much so that for many years he was unable to rise from his chair; and that he spent a whole mina daily on his table, as he himself says in his letter to Leóntion and in that to the philosophers of Mytilene.

22. To Mētródōros

Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον

"Mother's Gift"

[U146]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.3.7: You have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Sage – who stands alone, so far as I am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I do not suppose that Mētródōros himself claimed to be a Sage, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epíkouros.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 18, p. 1100A: Indeed, was he not himself so impatient for renown that ... he said that except for himself and his pupils no one had ever been a Sage ... ?

[U147]

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, V p. 279F: = [= U130]

23. To Mithras

Πρὸς Μίθρην

[Cf. U102, U194]

[U148]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.4: They accuse Epíkouros of flattering Mithras, the minister of Lysimachus, bestowing upon him, in his letters, Apollo's titles of Paeon and Lord.

[U149]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125

[U150]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125

[U151]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.127

24. To Mÿs

Πρὸς Μῦν

"Mouse"

{These four fragments are no longer accepted as having any references to Mÿs}

[U152]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment VI: he will be frank with the one who has erred and even with him who responds with bitterness. Therefore, Epíkouros too, when Leonteús, because of Pythoklêś, did not admit belief in gods, reproached Pythoklêś in moderation, and wrote to him {i.e., Leonteús, though Usener renders "Mÿs"} the so-called "famous letter" taking his point of departure from Pythoklêś...

[U153]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.111

[U154]

[U155]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.120 [p. 135 Gomperz]

25. To Polýainos

Πρὸς Πολύαινον

"Much Praised"

[U156]

Herculaneum Papyrus 176, c. 10 [Gomperz "Zeitschrift" Edition (1866), p. 694]

[U157]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.75, 25 [p. 105 Gomperz] {Obbink I.30.865}: Moreover, in his letter to Polýainos he says that one should join in the celebration of the festival of the Anthesteria. For one must remember the gods ... of many ...

[U158]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 18.9: The great hedonist teacher Epíkouros used to observe certain periods during which he would be niggardly in satisfying his hunger, with the object of seeing to what extent, if at all, one thereby fell short of attaining full and complete pleasure, and whether it was worth going to much trouble to make the deficit good. At least so he says in the letter he wrote to Polýainos in the archonship of Charinus {308 - 307 B.C.}. He boasts in it indeed that he is managing to feed himself for less than a half-penny, whereas Mētródōros, not yet having made such good progress, needs a whole half-penny!

[Cf. Diogenes Laértios, U181]

[U159]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Vol. Herc. 2, 3.85

[U160]

Philódēmos, Scholion Zēnōn, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2 fr. 49: [= U170]

26. To Pythoklês

Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα

"Pythian Fame" "Glory of Apollo"

[U161]

Plutarch, Against Kōlôtēs, 29, p. 1124C: The young are made flighty and headstrong by the one who writes of Pythoklês, not yet eighteen, that in all of Greece there is no one more gifted and that his powers of expression are a prodigy, who writes that he himself is moved to pray as the women do – that all that superiority of talent may not bring down on the young man's head the jealousy and resentment of heaven.

[U162]

Alciphron, Letters (Letters of Courtesans), 2.2,3: (cf. above) ... he regards his Pythoklês as an Alcibiades ...

[U163]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.6: {Epíkouros writes} in his letter to Pythoklês: "Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all culture."

Plutarch, On Listening to Lectures, c.1, p. 15D: Shall we ... force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course clear of it?

Plutarch, Non Posse, 12, p. 1094D: Yet these men divert and alter the course of these pleasures, so great and numerous – that never as it were, go dry – and cut off their disciples from the taste; instead they tell some to "hoist all sail" to escape from them.

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XII.2.24: In the first place, Epíkouros banishes us from his presence without more ado, since he bids all his followers to fly from learning in the swiftest ship that they can find.

[U164]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 12, p. 1094D: Pythoklê̄s is urgently implored by all, men and women alike, in the person of Epíkouros, not to set his heart on "the so-called education of free men."

[U165]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.5: And to the beautiful Pythoklê̄s he {Epíkouros} writes: "I shall sit down and await your lovely and godlike appearance."

27. To Timokrátēs

Πρὸς Τιμοκράτη

"Power of Honor"

[U166]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.5: [= U124]

28. To Thyrsōn

Πρὸς Θυρσῶνα

"Thyrus Bearer" "Bacchic Wand"

[U167]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 20, p. 1101B: [= U120]

[U168]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.122

[U169]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.109, 3 [p. 127 Gomperz] {Obbink I.28.785}: ... of some things better than by effectively preserving one's conceptions of the gods during certain times. And not only did he teach these things but also by his very deeds he is found to have taken part in all the traditional festivals and sacrifices. In the archonship of Aristonymus {289-288 B.C.}, for instance, writing to Thyrsōn about a countryman of his, Theodotus, he says that he shared in all the festivals, and that while he was joining in celebrating the festival of the Choes and the urban Mÿsteries and the other festivals...

29. To Carmides

Πρὸς Χαρμίδην

"Grace"

[U170]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 49: ... that Hērakleídēs {Usener renders "Carmides"} is praised because, deeming the censures for the things that would be revealed to be less {important} than their benefit, he disclosed to Epíkouros his errors. Polýainos too was such a man, who indeed, when Apollōnídēs was remiss, would go to Epíkouros...

Letters Addressed To Uncertain Persons

30. Letter on Vocations

[U171]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 354B: I am aware that Epíkouros, the ardent devotee of truth, has said of him {Aristotle}, in his letter On Vocations, that after he had devoured his inheritance he entered the army, and on meeting with poor success in the campaign he betook himself to drug-selling. Afterwards, Epíkouros says, Plato opened his school, and Aristotle went so far as to hazard himself there, and attended the lectures, being no dullard, and gradually assumed the contemplative habit. I am aware, too, that Epíkouros is the only one that has said these things against him, and not Ebulides as well; nor has Cephisodorus, even, ventured to say that kind of thing against the Stageirite, although both he and Ebulides have published tracts against the man.

Diogénēs Laértios 10.8: Epíkouros called ... Aristotle a reckless spender, who, after devouring his patrimony, took to soldiering and selling drugs.

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 2 p. 791A: How is it possible, according to what Epíkouros claims in his letter On Vocations, that he {Aristotle} squandered his patrimony during his youth; dedicated himself afterwards to military life; then, because things went badly, occupied himself selling drugs, and finally, when Plato opened his school to the public, he participated there?

[U172]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 354C: In the same letter Epíkouros says also that Protagoras the sophist, from being a porter and wood-carrier, became the private secretary of Democritus. For the latter, struck by something peculiar in the way in which Protagoras piled wood, gave him his first start by adopting him into his household. He then taught reading and writing in some remote village, and from this branched out into the sophist's profession.

Diogénēs Laértios 10.8: Epíkouros called ... Protagoras a basket-carrier (phormophóron) and the scribe of Democritus and a village schoolmaster.

Diogenes Laértios, Lives of Philosophers, IX.53 (Protagoras): He also invented the shoulder-pad on which porters carry their burdens ... for he himself had been a porter, says Epíkouros somewhere.

[U173]

Uncertain Author, in Cramer Anec. Paris., 2 p. 171, 31: In the work entitled The Large Lecture, {Megalo Logo}, Protagoras says: "Teaching requires some natural ability and some practice; and one must begin to learn this skill during one's youth." Yet, this ought not to be said if he himself began teaching later, as Epíkouros mentions about Protagoras.

31. Letter on Stilpo

[U174]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 9.18: For just as other things have for us an inherent attractiveness, though the Sage may love his friends dearly, often comparing them with himself, and putting them ahead of himself, yet all the good will be limited to his own being, and he will speak the words which were spoken by the very Stilpo, after his country was captured and his children and his wife lost, as he emerged from the general desolation alone and yet happy, spoke as follows to Dēmétrios (known as "Poliorcetes" {Sacker of Cities} because of the destruction {poliorkeîn} he brought upon them) in answer to the question whether he had lost anything: "I have all my goods with me!" ... This saying of Stilpo makes common ground with Stoicism; the Stoic also can carry his goods unimpaired through cities that have been burned to ashes; for he is self-sufficient. Such are the bounds which he sets to his own happiness. But you must not think that our school alone can utter noble words; Epíkouros himself, the reviler of Stilpo, used similar language... {more below @ U474}

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 9.1: You desire to know whether Epíkouros is right when, in one of his letters, he rebukes those who hold that the Sage is self-sufficient and for that reason does not stand in need of friendships. This is the objection raised by Epíkouros against Stilpo and those {Cynics and/or Stoics} who believe that the chief good is a mind devoid of feeling {impatiens}.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 9.8: Let us now return to the question. The wise man, I say, self-sufficient though he be, nevertheless desires friends if only for the purpose of practicing friendships, in order that his noble qualities may not lie dormant. Not, however, for the purpose mentioned by Epíkouros in the letter quoted above: "That there may be someone to sit by him when he is ill, to come to his rescue when he is hard up or thrown into chains" but so that on the contrary he may have someone by whose sickbed he himself may sit or whom he may himself release when that person is held prisoner by hostile hands.

32. Letter to a Child

[U176]

Herculaneum Papyrus 176, c. 10 [Gomperz "Hermes" Edition, 5, p. 386]

33. Letter From His Last Days

[U177]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, l.128 (31 Diano): As I write this, it is the seventh day that I have been unable to urinate and have had pains of the kind which lead to death. So, if anything should happen, take care of Mētródōros' children for our or five years, spending no more on them than you now spend on me in a year.

Epíkouros' Remarks On Private Problems

[U178]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 20, p. 1100A: Epíkouros admitted that some pleasures come from glory. Indeed, was he not himself so impatient for renown... that he even wrote that as he was lecturing on on natural philosophy, Kōlótēs embraced his knees in an act of adoration, and that his own brother Neoklēs declared from childhood that there had never been born and was not now anyone wiser than Epíkouros, and that their mother got in herself atoms of such a kind that by their conjunction must produce a Sage?

Ibid., 19, p. 1100C: For he, who made so much of Neoklēs' testimony and Kōlótēs' act of adoration and took such satisfaction in them would never convince any man alive that if he had been applauded by the assembled Greeks at Olympia, he would not have lost his head and raised a shout of jubilation.

Plutarch, *On Brotherly Love*, 16, p. 487D: In the case of Epíkouros also, his brothers' respect for him was clearly great because of the goodwill and solicitude he had for them, inspired as they were with admiration both for his other attainments and especially for his philosophy. For even if they were mistaken in their opinion (they were convinced and constantly declared from their earliest childhood that there was no one wiser than Epíkouros), we may well admire both the man who inspired this devotion and also those who felt it.

Cf. Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 26, 2 p. 779A: How many atoms, in fact, and of what type, had shed from Epíkouros' father to he himself, when Epíkouros was seeded? And, once immersed in the womb of his mother, how did they assemble, what form did they assume, what figure; how did they move, how did they develop?

[U179]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.2: He himself says that he began his devotion to philosophy at fourteen years of age.

[U180]

Philódēmos, *Vol. Herc.* 2, l.116: .. of the difference relating to the good, for which reasons Epíkouros proclaimed himself the supreme monarch, or at least considered himself residing principally with Athena, where they live [in envy?] of the philosophers.

[U181]

Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XVII.24: From Epíkouros: "I revel in the pleasure of my humble body, employing water and bread, and I spit upon the pleasures of extravagance, not for their own sake, but because of the difficulties which follow from them."

Diogénēs Laértios 10.11: In his correspondence he himself mentions that he was content with plain bread and water.

Cf. Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 21.10: Go to his Garden some time and read the motto carved there: "Dear Guest, here you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure." The caretaker of that abode, a friendly host, will be ready for you; he will welcome you with barley-meal, and serve you water also in abundance, with these words: "Have you not been well entertained? This garden does not whet your appetite; but quenches it. Nor does it make you more thirsty with every drink; it slakes the thirst with a natural cure – a cure that requires no fee. It is with this type of pleasure that I have grown old."

[U182]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.11: In his correspondence ... {= U181} ... And again: "Send me a little pot of cheese, that, when I like I may fare sumptuously."

[U183]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 15, p. 1097C: One cannot ignore the man's absurd inconsistency: he treads under foot and belittles the actions of Themistocles and Miltiades and yet writes this to his friends about himself: "The way in which you have provided for me in the matter of sending the grain was godlike and magnificent, and you have given tokens of your regard form me that reach to high heaven." So if someone had taken that corn ration of his bread-stuff from our philosopher's letter, the expressions of gratitude would have conveyed the impression that it was written in thanksgiving for the freedom or deliverance of the whole Greek nation or of the Athenian state.

[U184]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.127: "The only contribution I require is that which ... ordered the disciples to send me, even if they are among the Hyperboreans. I wish to receive from each of you two hundred and twenty drachmae a year and no more." And in another letter: "Ctesippus brought me the annual tribute, which was sent on behalf of your father and you yourself."

[U185]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.118: After having given a sheep to a young boy from an enclosed pen: "Take care of the toy that I have gifted to you."

[U186]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1097E: But for one ... to be proud ... {U190} ... recalling Neoklēs' last words, by the curious pleasure that is mingled with tears – no one would call this the "mental joy" or "delight" of men in their sound minds.

[U187]

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (Maxims of Epíkouros): "I never desired to please the rabble. What pleased them, I did not learn; and what I knew was far removed from their understanding."

Cf. Maximus the Abbot, Gnomologion, 6, [p.172 Tig.; t. 2 pp. 549- Combef.]: (Author not given; the Laurentianus and Borbonicus codices report, "from Epíkouros.")

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 29.10: Here I shall pay what I owe you. "I have never wished to cater to the crowd; for what I know, they do not approve, and what they approve, I do not know." "Who said this?" you ask, as if you were ignorant of whom I am pressing into service; it is Epíkouros. But this same watchword rings in your ears from every sect: Peripatetic, Academic, Stoic, Cynic. For who that is pleased by virtue can please the crowd?

Cf. Tertullian, Apologetics, 38: But we disapprove of what pleases you, and what is ours does not please you. But the Epicureans rightly recognized something honest within pleasure, namely: peace of mind.

[U188]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 79.15: There is Epíkouros, for example; mark how greatly he is admired, not only by the more cultured, but also by this ignorant rabble. This man, however, was unknown to Athens itself, near which he had hidden himself away. And so, when he had already survived by many years his friend Mētródōros, he added in a letter these last words, proclaiming with thankful appreciation the friendship that had existed between them: "So greatly blessed were Mētródōros and I that it has been no harm to us to be unknown, and almost unheard of, in this well-known land of Greece."

[U189]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 6, p. 1090E: ... the reflux of the sea that came near to engulfing Epíkouros on his voyage to Lampsacus, as he writes?

[U190]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1097E: But for one to go out of his way to work up an excitement about small comforts, like sailors celebrating a feast of Aphrodite, and to be proud because when suffering from dropsy he invited friends to a number of feasts and in spite of the disease did not refuse to take liquid ... {U186} ... no one would call this the "mental joy" or "delight" of men in their sound minds.

[U191]

Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, IX.41: "During my illness" Epíkouros says himself, "my lectures were not about the sufferings of my body, nor did I talk to my visitors about such matters. All my time was spent contemplating natural philosophy, reasoning on its most important points, particular this: how my mind, though partaking a natural and unavoidable sympathy with the present indisposition of my body, might nevertheless keep itself free from disturbance, and in constant possession of its own proper happiness." He adds, "With regard to my body, I did not permit the physicians to altogether do with me what they would, as if I expected great results from them, or as if I thought it a matter of such great consequence, to recover my health by their methods. For my present condition, I thought, was tolerable, and still allowed me great content."

Regarding Epíkouros' Disciples

[U192]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 52.3: Epíkouros remarks that certain men have worked their way to the truth without anyone's assistance, carving out their own passage. And he gives special praise to these, for their impulse has come from within, and they have forged to the front by themselves. Again, he says, there are others who need outside help, who will not proceed unless someone leads the way, but who will follow faithfully. Of these, he says, Mētródōros was one; this type of man is also excellent, but belongs to the second grade. We ourselves are not of that first class, either; we shall be well-regarded if we are admitted into the second. Nor need you despise a man who can gain salvation only with the assistance of another; the will to be saved means a great deal, too. You will find still another class of man – and a class not to be despised – who can be forced and driven into righteousness, who do not need a guide as much as they require someone to encourage and, as it were, to force them along. This is the third variety. If you ask me for a man of this pattern also, Epíkouros tells us that Hermárchos was such. And of the two last-named classes, he is more ready to congratulate the one, but he feels more respect for the other; for although both have reached the same goal, it is a greater credit to have brought about the same result with the more difficult material upon which to work.

[U193]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 22, p. 1103A: {noted above} Mētródōros, Polýainos, and Aristóbuolos were sources of "confidence" and "joy" to Epíkouros; indeed he continually cared for them when they were ill and mourned them when they died.

[U194]

Plutarch, *Against Kólôtēs*, 33, p. 1126E: Yet when Mētródōros went down to the Piraeus, a distance of some forty stades, {~ 5 miles} to help one Míthrēs, a Syrian, a royal officer who had been arrested, letters went out to everyone, men and women alike, with Epíkouros' solemn glorification of that journey.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 22, p. 1097B (Theon Speaking): Thus a short while ago we heard our friend here {Plutarch} describe the expressions Epíkouros gave vent to and the letters he sent to his friends as he extolled and magnified Mētródōros, telling how nobly and manfully he went from town to the coast {from Athens to Piraeus} to help Míthrēs the Syrian, although Mētródōros accomplished nothing on that occasion.

[U195]

Philódēmos, *Treatises*, Vol. Herc. 2, I.119,4: Because not even Eudemus was proficient enough in philosophy, according to something even Mÿs tells us...

[U196]

Philódēmos, *Treatises*, Vol. Herc. 2, I.129: Epíkouros says: "We call 'vain pursuits' the types of life that do not tend towards happiness." And again: "For the gods, it would seem worthwhile for the entire conduct of life, of a free way of life, not to be subject to laws." Indeed, now he adds the things relative to such a one, for those reasons that we have shown, and also those relating to Míthrēs.

[U197]

Philódēmos, *Treatises*, Vol. Herc. 2, I.113: ... to Timokrátēs us, all these things that are in fashion, as you know, are intended to help even you, not just through awareness, but also through their usage, until you gain the full assistance that one gets from philosophy, and of which and benevolent to the people politician ... of the populace...

[U198]

Diogénēs Laértios 7.5 (Zénōn of Citium): He {Zénōn} used to lecture, pacing up and down the Stoa Poikile {Painted Porch}, which is also called the colonnade or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. ... Here then, people came henceforth to hear Zénōn, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zénōnnians. So it is stated by Epíkouros in his letters.

Sayings

[U199]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 8.7: I am still culling through the pages of Epíkouros. I read today, in his works, the following maxim: "To win real freedom, you must be the slave of Philosophy." The man who submits and surrenders himself to her is not kept waiting; he is emancipated on the spot. For the very service of Philosophy is freedom. It is likely that you will ask me why I quote so many of Epíkouros' noble words instead of words taken from our own {Stoic} school. But is there any reason why you should regard them as sayings of Epíkouros and not common property?

[U200]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 30, [p. 209, 7 Nauck]: Do not think it unnatural that when the flesh cries out for anything, the soul should cry out too. The cry of the flesh is, "Let me not hunger, or thirst, or shiver" and it's hard for the soul to restrain these desires. And while it is difficult for the soul to prevent these things, it is dangerous to neglect nature which daily proclaims self-sufficiency to the soul via the flesh which is intimately bonded to it.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 4.10: Let me share with you a saying which pleased me today. It, too, is culled from another man's Garden: "Poverty, brought into conformity with the law of nature, is great wealth." Do you know what limits that law of nature ordains for us? Merely to avert hunger, thirst, and cold.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2 21, p. 178.41: Epíkouros, who held that happiness consists in not being hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold...

Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.35.102: Time would fail me should I wish to carry on about the cause of poverty; for the matter is evident and nature herself teaches us daily how few and how small her needs are, and how cheaply satisfied.

[U201]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 16.7: There is also this saying of Epíkouros: "If you shape your life according to nature, you will never be poor; if you do so according to opinion, you will never be rich." For nature's wants are small; the demands of opinion are boundless.

[U202]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 27, [p. 207, 31 Nauck]: So he who follows nature and not groundless opinions is in all things self-sufficient. For every possession is wealth when it comes to satisfying nature, while even the greatest wealth is poverty when it comes to the unlimited desires.

[U203]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 29, p. 209, 1: But insofar as you are in want, it is through forgetfulness of your nature that you feel the want. For thereby you cause to yourself vain fears and desires.

[U204]

Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVI.28: From Epíkouros: "We are born once and there can be no second birth. For all eternity we shall no longer be. But you, although you are not master of tomorrow, are postponing your happiness. We waste away our lives in delaying, and each of us dies without having enjoyed leisure." {= Vatican Saying 14}

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 27, p. 1104E: ... those who say that "We are born once; there is no second birth; we must forever be no more." Indeed by discounting the present moment as a minute fraction, or rather as nothing at all, in comparison with all time, men let it pass fruitlessly. {Source may be a letter to Idomeneús – cf. U133 & Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.38 (U491)}

Ibid., 30, p. 1106F: "There is no second birth; we must forever be no more" Epíkouros says.

Cf. Arsenius, *Paroemiogr. Gotting.*, 2 p341, 25: This noble thought is from Epíkouros.

[U205]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 26.8: Epíkouros will oblige me, with the following saying: "Rehearse death" or, the idea may come across to us rather more satisfactorily if put in this form: "It is a very good thing to familiarize oneself with death." ... "Rehearse death" – to say this is to tell a person to rehearse his freedom. A person who has learned how to die has unlearned how to be a slave.

Cf. Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, 1.51: Most people, even though they have many possessions, make endless efforts because they think they will lack enough. We are satisfied with available, simple things if we keep in mind that all the wealth in the world is not strong enough to give the soul a worthy release from disturbance, but the trouble of the flesh is removed by very moderate, ordinary things which are very easy to get. And if even things on this level fall short, that does not disturb the person who rehearses death.

[U206]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 20.9: Although you may look askance, Epíkouros will once again be glad to settle my indebtedness: "Believe me, your words will be more imposing if you sleep on a cot and wear rags. For in that case you will not be merely saying them; you will be demonstrating their truth." I, at any rate, listen in a different spirit to the utterances of our friend Dēmétrios, after I have seen him reclining without even a cloak to cover him, and, more than this, without rugs to lie upon. He is not only a teacher of the truth, but a witness to the truth.

[U207]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 29, p. 209, 1: "It is better for you to have confidence {about the future} while lying on a cheap bed than to be disturbed while possessing a golden couch and an extravagant table."

[U208]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 7.11: Here is a nice expression by Epíkouros, written to one of the partners of his studies: "I write this not for the many, but for you; each of us is enough of an audience for the other." Lay these words to hear, Lucilius, that you may scorn the pleasure which comes from the applause of the majority. Many men praise you; but have you any reason for being pleased with yourself, if you are a person whom the many can understand?

[U209]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 25.6: When this aim has been accomplished, and you begin to hold yourself in some esteem, I shall gradually allow you to do what Epíkouros, in another passage, suggests: "The time when you should most of all withdraw into yourself is when you are forced to be in a crowd."

[U210]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 11.8: My letter calls for a conclusion. Here's one for you, on that will serve you in good stead, too, which I'd like you to take to heart. "We need to set our affections on some good man and keep him constantly before our eyes, so that we may live as if he were watching us and do everything as if he saw what we were doing." This, my dear Lucilius, is Epíkouros' advice, and in giving it he has given us a guardian and a moral tutor – and not without reason either: misdeeds are greatly diminished if a witness is always standing near intending doers.

[U211]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 25.5: I must insert in this letter some more of his sayings: "Do everything as if Epíkouros were watching you."

[U212]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.126 [29 Diano]: ... bringing your letter and the reasoning which you had carried out concerning men who could see neither the analogy which obtains between the phenomena and the unseen {realities} nor the consistency which exists between the senses and the senses {realities} and again the counterfactuals, which also might be, in truth, the only ...

[U213]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 28, p. 1105D: If then, "the memory of a dead friend is pleasant on every count" as Epíkouros said, we need no more to make us see the great delight that they renounce when, although they suppose that they can receive and capture the apparitions and likenesses of dead companions {in dreams?} – images that have neither mind nor feeling – they do not think they will ever again meet those friends themselves, or ever again see a dear father or dear mother or perhaps a gentle wife, and have not even the hope of such company.

Cf. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 63.7: Thinking of departed friends is to me something sweet and mellow.

[U214]

Maximus the Abbot (aka "Maximus the Confessor"), Sayings, c. 8 [p. 196 Ribittiana]: "Do not avoid conferring small favors: for then you will likewise seem to be open to conferring great things."

[U215]

Maximus the Abbot (aka "Maximus the Confessor"), Sayings, 66 [p. 259 Ribittiana]: "If your enemy makes a request to you, do not scorn his request; but keep on your guard; for he is like a dog."

[U216]

Philódēmos, On Vices and Virtues, 1.IX Vol. Herc. 1, 3 c.27.20 [= Oxon. I.104; p. 64,5 Goettl.]: Now if someone reproaches us because we write about economy, that would be enough for us, together with Epíkouros and Mētródōros, who give advice and exhortations on household management in a particularly accurate way, albeit with minimal details.

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.16: (Reproduced elsewhere)

Aelian, fr. 39, p. 201,1 [= Suda, under Epíkouros, {epsilon-2405}; p. 418, 12 (Bernh.)]: Epíkouros was so enslaved by pleasure that, towards the end, he wrote in his will to offer a sacrifice to his father, to his mother, and to his brothers once a year, and to the above-mentioned Mētródōros and Polýainos, but to he himself, the Sage, two times – preferring even here, in his depravity, the largest portion. And this gourmand and glutton stipulated that stone tables would be set up at the tomb as votive offerings.

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? 3, p 1129A: Oh Epíkouros, don't leave instructions about funeral ceremonies. For what else is the meaning of the feasts? Of the meetings of your friends and the fair? {referring to the provisions for the annual celebration of Epíkouros' birthday and monthly gatherings of Epicureans}

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Fragments From Uncertain Sources

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1. Prologues to Philosophy

§ 1.1 On Wisdom & the Sage

[U219]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists*, (*Against the Dogmatists*, V) 169: For they {the Dogmatists} promise to present us with an "art of life" and because of this Epíkouros declared that "philosophy is an activity secures the happy life by arguments and discussions."

[U220]

Sacred and Profane Parallels, A 14, 156 [p. 761 Gaisf.]: From Epíkouros: "It is not the pretended but the real pursuit of philosophy that is needed; for we do not need the appearance of good health but to enjoy it in truth." {= Vatican Sayings 54}

[U221]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 31, [p. 209, 23 Nauck]: Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. For just as there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy either, if it does not expel the suffering of the mind.

[U222]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 19, p. 1117F: It is one of Epíkouros' tenets that none but the Sage is unalterably convinced of anything.

[U222a]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.117: Moreover {Epíkouros says}, he who has become wise never resumes the opposite habit, nor even pretends to, if he can help it.

[U223]

Cicero, *Academica*, 2.14.45 (Lucullus): What we have termed "perspicuity" {clarity of reasoning} is cogent enough to identify things as they are. But nevertheless, so that we may abide by things that are perspicuous more firmly and consistently, we require some further exercise of method or of attention to save ourselves from being thrown off – by trickery and ill-conceived arguments – from positions that are clear in themselves. For Epíkouros who desired to come to the relief of the errors that appear to upset our power of knowing the truth, and who said that the separation of opinion from perspicuous truth was the function of the wise man, carried matters no further, for he entirely failed to do away with the error connected with mere opinion.

[U224]

Monastic Florilegium, 195: Epíkouros also deemed opinion the "hallowed epidemic."

[U225]

Aetius, *Doxography*, IV.9.19 [p. 398.11 Diels] (Parallel A.27.39 p.767 [Gaisf.]): Epíkouros says that a Sage can only be recognized by another Sage.

[U226]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, I.15 [p. 130.37 Sylb]: Epíkouros, however, supposes that only the Greeks are qualified to practice philosophy.

§ 1.2 On the Arts

[U227]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, I.1: The case against the Mathematici – professors of Arts and Sciences – has been set forth in a general way, it would seem, both by Epíkouros and by the School of Pyrrho ... Epíkouros took the ground that the subjects taught are of no help in perfecting wisdom; and he did this, as some speculate, because he saw in it a way of covering up his own lack of culture (for in many matters Epíkouros stands convicted of ignorance, and even in ordinary conversation, his speech was not correct). Another reason may have been his hostility towards Plato and Aristotle and their like who were men of wide learning.

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.4.12: Your school {Epicureanism} argues decisively that there is no need for the aspirant to philosophy to study literature at all.

Cf., *Ibid.*, 1.21, 71-72 (Torquatus to Cicero): You are disposed to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astrology, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspond so fruitful, the art of living? No! Epíkouros was not uneducated: the real philistines are those who ask us to go on studying till old age the subjects that we are supposed to be ashamed of not learning in childhood.

[U227a]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.25.4: For what else is it to deny wisdom to men than to take away from their minds the true and divine light? But if the nature of man is capable of wisdom, it is necessary that workmen and rustics and women and all who have human form be taught, that they might be wise, and that a people of sages be raised up from every tongue and condition and sex and age. 25.7: So the Stoics realized this, for they said that slaves and women ought to engage in philosophy; Epíkouros, also, who summoned even the illiterate to philosophy. ... 25.8: Indeed, they tried to do what truth exacted, but it was not possible to get beyond the words, first, because there is need of many arts to be able to arrive at philosophy. ... 25.12: For this reason, Tullius {i.e., Cicero} says that philosophy "shrinks from the crowd." {*Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.2.4} Still, Epíkouros will accept the untutored. How, therefore, will they understand those things which are said about the beginnings of things, perplexing and involved things which even educated men scarcely grasp? In matters involved with obscurity, then, and spread over by the variety of abilities and colored with the exquisite oratory of eloquent men, what place is there for the inexperienced and unlearned? Finally, they never taught any women to be philosophers except one, from all memory: Themísta.

[U227b]

Scholias on Dionysius Thrax, p 649, 26: This is how the Epicureans define craft: a craft is a method which effects what is advantageous for human life. "Effects" is used in the sense of "produces."

scholium to Dionysius Thrax, the grammarian, report the following view

(fr. 227b Us.): "the Epicureans define 'technē' as follows: a technē is a method

producing what is beneficial for life" (οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι οὕτως ὀρίζονται τὴν

τέχνην· τέχνη ἐστὶ μέθοδος ἐνεργοῦσα τῷ βίῳ τὸ συμφέρον). A similar statement appears in the second century ce Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr.

12 col. II.8–11 Smith):28 "for needs and experiences over the course of time produced all of them [sc. the technai]" (πάσας [sc. τὰς τέχνας] γὰρ ἐγέννησαν αἱ

χρεῖαι καὶ περιπτώσεις μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου)

[U228]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 2, p. 1086F-: Hērakleídēs then, a student of literature, is repaying his debt to Epíkouros for such favors of theirs "as rabble of poets" and "Homer's idiocies" and the verity of abuse that Mētródōros has in so many writings heaped upon the poet.

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, V.14, p. 257.52: Homer, while representing the gods as subject to human passions, appears to know the Divine Being, whom Epíkouros does not so revere.

[U229]

Heraclitus Ponticus, *Allegories of Homer*, 4:

Ibid. 75:

Proclus Lycaeus, *Commentary on Plato's "Republic"* [p. 382 Bas.]:

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 11, p. 1093C: They even banish the pleasures that come from mathematics!

Saint Augustine, *On the Utility of Faith*, c. 6, 13, t. VIII [p. 53F Venice edition, 1719]:

Cicero *Academica* 2.33.106 (Lucullus): Polýainos is said to have been a great mathematician; after he had accepted the view of Epíkouros and come to believe that all geometry is false, {surely he did not forget even the knowledge that he possessed?}

Proclus Lycaeus, *Commentary on Euclid*, [p. 55 Bas.; 199.9 Friedl.]: There are those, however, who are only predisposed to knock down the principles of geometry, like the Epicureans.

[U229b]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Musicians* (*Against the Professors*, VI) 27: Moreover, if Plato welcomed music, we should not therefore assert that music contributes to happiness, since others who are not inferior to him in trustworthiness – such as Epíkouros – have denied this contention, and declared on the contrary that music is unbeneficial – "Wine-loving, idle, having no regard for wealth." {Euripides, fr. 184 Nauck}.

[U230]

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On the Composition of Words*, 24, p. 188: The dictum that "writing presents no difficulties to those who do not aim at a constantly changing standard" which Epíkouros himself propounded, was intended as a talisman to ward off the charge of extreme sloth and stupidity. {c.f. above}

§ 1.3 On Philosophers

[U231]

Cicero, *Brutus*, 85.292 (Atticus speaking): I grant that that irony, which they say was found in Socrates ... is a fine and clever way of speaking... Thus Socrates in the pages of Plato praises to the skies Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and the rest, while representing himself as without knowledge of anything and a mere ignoramus. This somehow fits his character, and I cannot agree with Epíkouros who censures it.

[U232]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.13: Both Epíkouros and Hermárchos deny the very existence of Leucippus the philosopher, though some say, including Apollodorus the Epicurean, that he was the teacher of Democritus.

[U233]

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.26.72 ^(Cotta) The fact is that you people merely repeat by rote the idle fancies that Epíkouros uttered when half asleep; for, as we read in his writings, he boasted that he had never had a master. ... He could have studied under Xenocrátēs ... and there are some who think he did. But he himself denied it, and he should know! He does say that he heard the lectures of a certain Pamphilus, a student of Plato, when he was living in Sámos. He lived there as a young man with his father and brothers, his father Neoklês having settled there as an immigrant farmer. But when he could not make a decent living from his small-holding, I believe he kept a school. Epíkouros however had a supreme contempt for Pamphilus as a follower of Plato, and in this he showed his usual anxiety never to learn anything from anyone. Look how he behaved towards Nausiphánēs, a disciple of Democritus. He does not deny that he heard him lecture, but heaps all manner of abuse upon him. What, after all, is there in his own philosophy which does not come from Democritus? Even if he introduced some variations – such as the swerve in the motion of the atoms which I mentioned just now – still for the most part his theory is identical – atoms, void, images, the infinity of space, the numberless universes, their birth and death, and so on through practically the whole field of natural philosophy.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 18, p. 1100A: Was not Epíkouros himself in such a fury of tense and palpitating passion for renown that he ... disowned his teachers?

[U234]

Cicero, De Finibus, I.6.17: Here {regarding physics}, in the first place, he is entirely second-hand. His doctrines are those of Democritus, with a very few modifications. And as for the latter, where he attempts to improve upon his original, in my opinion he only succeeds in making things worse. ... 21: Thus where Epíkouros alters the doctrines of Democritus, he alters them for the worse; while for those ideas which he adopts, the credit belongs entirely to Democritus. ... For my own part I reject these doctrines altogether; but still I could wish that Democritus, whom every one else applauds, had not been vilified by Epíkouros who took him as his sole guide.

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 3, p. 1108E: He begins with Democritus, who thus receives for his teaching a handsome and appropriate fee. And this although Epíkouros long proclaimed himself a Democritean, as is attested among others by Leonteús, one of Epíkouros' most devoted pupils, who writes to Lycophron that Democritus was honored by Epíkouros for having reached the correct approach to knowledge before him, and that indeed his whole system was called Democritean because Democritus had first his upon the first principles of natural philosophy.

[U235]

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.33.93 ^(Cotta) Was it on the basis of dreams that Epíkouros and Mētródōros and Hermárchos attacked Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, and that little harlot Leóntion dared to write criticisms of Theóphrastos? ... You Epicureans are touchy yourselves. ... But Epíkouros himself made the most libelous attacks on Aristotle and violently abused Phaedo, the disciple of Socrates. He heaped whole volumes of invective on Timokrátēs, the brother of his own colleague Mētródōros, because of some petty disagreement on a philosophical point. He even showed no gratitude to Democritus, his own forerunner, and had no use for his own teacher Nausiphánēs, from whom he had learnt nothing in any case.

[U236]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.8: Epíkouros used to call Nausiphánēs a pleumonon {="jellyfish" imputing obtuseness and insensibility}, an illiterate, a fraud, and a whore.

[U237]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1086E: Zeuxippus said: "Hērakleídēs has gone off charging us with undue vehemence in our attack on the unoffending Epíkouros and Mētródōros." Here, Theon declared: "And you didn't reply that by their standard Kōlótēs looks like a paragon of measured speech? For they made a collection of the most disgraceful terms to be found anywhere 'charlatanism' {bomolochiás} 'buffoonery' {lekythismoús} 'bragging' {alazoneías} 'prostitution' {hetaireséis} 'assassin' {androphonías} 'loudmouth' {barystonoús} 'hero of many of a misadventure' {polyphthórous} 'nincompoop' {baryegkepháloús} – and showered it on Aristotle {U71}, Socrates {U231}, Pythagoras, Protagoras {U172 - U173}, Theóphrastos, Hērakleídēs {U16}, Hipparchia – indeed, what eminent name have they spared?

Cf. Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 29, p. 1124C: The sophists and braggarts then, are those those who in their disputes with eminent men write with such shameless arrogance.

[U238]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.8: Plato's school he called the "flatterers of Dionysius." Plato himself he called "golden." ... Heraclitus a "muddler" Democritus he called "Lerocritus" {the gossip-monger}, Antídōros "Sannidorus" {a fawning gift-bearer}, the Cynics "enemies of Greece" the Dialecticians "despoilers" and he called Pyrrho "ignorant" and a "bore."

[U239]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 26, p. 1121E: The fame of Arcesilaus, the best loved among the philosophers of the time, would appear to have annoyed Epíkouros mightily. Thus he {Kōlótēs} says although this philosopher said nothing new, he gave the illiterate the impression and belief that he did. Our critic of course is widely read himself and writes with a beguiling charm.

[U240]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.12: Among the early philosophers, says Diocles, his favorite was Anaxagóras, although he occasionally disagreed with him, and Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates.

[U241]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.23: The goodness of Mētródōros was proved in all ways, as Epíkouros testifies in his prefaces {of some of his books}.

2. Canonics

[U242]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 89.11: The Epicureans held that there are two parts of philosophy: physics and ethics – they got rid of logic. Then, since they were forced by the very facts to distinguish what was ambiguous and to refute falsities lying hidden under the appearance of truth, they themselves also introduced that topic which they call "on judgment and the criterion" {i.e., canonics}; it is logic by another name, but they think that it is an accessory part of physics.

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.30: The usual arrangement, however, is to join canonics with physics; the former they call the science which deals with the standard and first principles, or the elementary part of philosophy...

Saint Augustine, Against Cresconius, I.13.16 t. IX [p. 397E Venice edition, 1719]:

[U243]

Cicero, De Finibus, I.19.63 (Torquatus to Cicero): Logic, on which your {Platonic} school lays such stress, he held to be of no effect either as a guide to conduct or as an aid to thought. Natural Philosophy he deemed all-important. This science explains to us the meaning of terms, the nature of predication, and the law of consistency and contradiction; secondly, a thorough knowledge of the facts of nature relieves us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of death, and shields us against the disturbing effects of ignorance, which is often in itself a cause of terrifying apprehensions; lastly, to learn what nature's real requirements are improves the moral character also. Besides, it is only by firmly grasping a well-established scientific system, observing the Rule or Canon that has fallen as it were from heaven so that all men may know it—only by making that Canon the test of all our judgments, that we can hope always to stand fast in our belief unshaken by the eloquence of any man. On the other hand, without a full understanding of the world of nature it is impossible to maintain the truth of our sense-perceptions. Further, every mental presentations has its origin in sensation: so that no certain knowledge will be possible, unless all sensations are true, as the theory of Epíkouros teaches that they are. Those who deny the validity of sensation and say that nothing can be perceived, having excluded the evidence of the senses, are unable even to expound their own argument. Besides, by abolishing knowledge and science they abolish all possibility of rational life and action. Thus Natural Philosophy supplies courage to face the fear of death; resolution to resist the terrors of religion; peace of mind, for it removes all ignorance of the Mysterries of nature; self-control, for it explains the nature of the desires and distinguishes their different kinds; and, as I showed just now, the Canon or Criterion of Knowledge, which Epíkouros also established, gives a method of discerning truth from falsehood.

Cicero, De Finibus, I.7.22: Turn next to the second division of philosophy, the department of Method and of Dialectic, which its termed Logikē. Of the whole armor of Logic your founder, as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition; he has no doctrine of Division or Partition; he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation; once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed. {lacuna} He lays the very greatest stress upon that which, as he declares, Nature herself decrees and sanctions, that is: the feelings of pleasure and pain. These he maintains lie at the root of every act of choice and of avoidance.

[U244]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2).9: Epíkouros said that all sensibles were true and real. For there is no difference between saying that something is true and that it is real. And that is why, in giving a formalization of the true and the false, he says, "that which is such as it is said to be, is true" and "that which is not such as it is said to be, is false."

§ 2.1 On the Standards of Judgment

[U245]

Cicero Academica 2.46.142 (Lucullus): Epíkouros places the standard of judgment entirely in the senses and in notions of objects and in pleasure.

Diogenes Laërtios, *Lives of Philosophers*, IX.106 (Pyrrho): An apparent fact serves as the Skeptic's criterion, as indeed Aenesidemus says, and so does Epíkouros.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, I (Against the Dogmatists, I) 203: Epíkouros says that there are two things which are linked to each other, presentation and opinion, and that of these presentation (which he also calls 'clear fact') is always true. For just as the primary feelings, i.e., pleasure and pain, come to be from certain productive factors and in accordance with productive factors themselves (for example, pleasure comes to be from pleasant things and pain from painful things, and what causes pleasure can never fail to be pleasant, nor can what produces pain not be painful; but rather, it is necessary that what gives pleasure should be pleasant and that what gives pain should, in its nature, be painful), likewise, in the case of presentations, which are feelings within us, what causes each of them is presented in every respect and unqualifiedly, and since it is presented it cannot help but exist in truth just as it is presented [...lacuna...] that it is productive of presentation. And one must reason similarly for the individual senses. For what is visible not only is presented as visible but also is such as it is presented; and what is audible is not only presented as audible, but also is like that in truth; and similarly for the rest. Therefore, it turns out that all presentations are true. And reasonably so. For if, the Epicureans say, a presentation is true if it comes from an existing object and in accordance with the existing object, and if every presentation arises from the object presented and in accordance with the presented object itself, then necessarily every presentation is true.

Some people are deceived by the difference among impressions seeming to reach us from the same sense-object, for example a visible object, such that the object appears to be of a different color or shape, or altered in some other way. For they have supposed that, when impressions differ and conflict in this way, one of them must be true and the opposing one false. This is simple-minded, and characteristic of those who are blind to the real nature of things. Let us make our case for visible things. For it is not the whole solid body that is seen – to take the example of visible things – but the color of the solid body. And of color, some is right on the solid body, as in the case of things seen from close up or from a moderate distance, but some is outside the solid body and is objectively located in the space adjacent to it, as in the case of things seen from a great distance. This color is altered in the intervening space, and takes on a peculiar shape. But the impression which it imparts corresponds to what is its own true objective state. Thus just as what we actually hear is not the sound inside the beaten gong, or inside the mouth of the man shouting, but the sound which is reaching our senses, and just as no one says that the man who hears a faint sound from a distance hears is falsely just because on approaching he registers it as louder, so too I would not say that the vision is deceived just because from a great distance it sees the tower as small and round but from near-to as larger and square. Rather I would say that it is telling the truth. Because when the sense-object appears to it small and of that shape it really is small and of that shape, the edges of the images getting eroded as a result of their travel through the air. And when it appears big and of another shape instead, it likewise is big and of another shape instead. But the two are already different from each other: for it is left for distorted opinion to suppose that the object of impression seen from near and the one seen from far off are one and the same. The peculiar function for sensation is to apprehend only that which is present to it and moves it, such as color, not to make the distinction that the object here is a different one from the object there. Hence for this reason all impressions are true. Opinions, on the other hand, are not all true but admit of some difference. Some of them are true, some false, since they are judgments which we make on the basis of our impressions, and we judge some things correctly, but some incorrectly, either by adding and appending something to our impressions or by subtracting something from them, and in general falsifying irrational sensation.

According to Epikouros, some opinions are true, some false. True opinions are those which are attested by and not contested by clear facts, while false opinions are those which are contested and not attested by clear facts. Attestation is perception through a self-evident impression, that the object of opinion is such as it once was thought to be—for example, if Plato is approaching from far off, I form the conjectural opinion, owing to the distance, that it is Plato. But then he has come close, there is further testimony that he is Plato, now that the distance is reduced, and it is attested by the self-evidence itself. Non-contestation is the conformity between a non-evident thing which is the object of speculation, and the opinion about what is apparent—for example, Epikouros, in saying that void exists, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident fact of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not be motion either, since the moving body would lack a place to pass into as a consequence of everything being full and solid. Therefore, the non-evident thing believed is not contradicted by that which is evident, since there is motion. Contestation, on the other hand, is opposed to non-contestation, for it is the elimination of that which is apparent by the positing of the non-evident thing—for example, the Stoic says that void does not exist, something non-evident; but once this denial is put forward, then that which is evident, namely motion, ought to be co-eliminated with it. For if void does not exist, then motion does not occur either, according to the method already demonstrated. Non-attestation, likewise, is opposed to attestation, for it is confirmation through self-evidence of the fact that the object of opinion is not such as it was believed to be—for example, if someone is approaching from far off, we conjecture, owing to the distance, that he is Plato. But when the distance is reduced, we recognize through self-evidence that it is not Plato. This sort of thing turns out to be non-attestation.

So attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something's being true, while non-attestation and contestation are the criterion of its being false. And self-evidence is the foundation and basis of all [four] of these.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2) 9*: Epikouros said that all sensibles were true and real. For there is no difference between saying that something is true and that it is real. And that is why, in giving a formalization of the true and the false, he says, "that which is such as it is said to be, is true" and "that which is not such as it is said to be, is false." [= U244] ... And he says that sensation, being perceptive of the objects presented to it and neither subtracting nor adding nor transposing (being devoid of reason), constantly reports truly and grasps the existent object as it really is by nature. And whereas all the sensibles are true, the opinables differ: some of them are true, others false – as we showed before.

Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians, I (Against the Dogmatists, I).369*: Some of the natural philosophers, like Democritus, have abolished all phenomena, and others, like Epikouros and Protagoras, have established all, {while still others, like the Stoics and Peripatetics, have abolished some and established others.}

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2).185*: Epikouros declared that all sensibles really exist such as they appear and present themselves in sensation, as sense never lies, {though we think that it lies}.

Ibid., 355: Epikouros declared that every sensible thing has stable existence.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"* [p. 428.20 Bon.]: Some tend to call sense perceptions essences, and maintain that nothing else exists but sense-perceptions themselves, as for example ... and even the Epicureans.

Olympiodorus the Younger, *Commentary on Plato's "Phaedo"* [p. 80.1 Finckh.]: Those who maintain that the sensations precisely relate the truth ... Protagoras, Epikouros.

Cicero *Academica 2.26.82 (Lucullus)*: Enough of this simpleton, who thinks that the senses never lie.

Tertullian, *On the Soul, 17*: The Epicureans, again, show still greater consistency by maintaining that all the senses are equally true in their testimony, and always so – only in a different way. It is not our organs of sensation that are at fault, but our opinion. The senses only experience sensation, they do not exercise opinion; it is the soul that opines. They separated opinion from the senses, and sensation from the soul. Well, but whence comes opinion, if not from the senses? Indeed, unless the eye had descried a round shape in that tower, it could have had no idea that it possessed roundness. Again, from where does sensation arise if not from the soul?

Saint Augustine, City of God, VIII.7: {Regarding the Platonists teachings on Logic} ... far be it from me to think of comparing with them those who have placed the criterion of truth in the bodily senses and decreed that all learning should be measured by such unreliable and deceptive standards. I mean the Epicureans and others like them...

Saint Augustine, Letter to Dioscorus, 118.29 t. 2 [p. 336E Venice Edition 1719]: Therefore, when the Epicureans said that the bodily senses were never deceived, while the Stoics granted that they were sometimes deceived, although, both placed the test of acquiring truth in the senses, would anyone listen to the Platonists over the opposition of these two?

Ioannes Siculus, Commentary on Hermogenes' "Rhetoric" VI [p. 88.24 Walz.]: The teachings of many that consider sensation an infallible criterion of knowledge or of some knowledge, impose the same errors: for example, even Epíkouros...

[U248]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.9.5 [p. 396 Diels] (Parallel A.27.27): Epíkouros says that every sense-perception and every presentation is true, but of opinions, some are true and some are false.

[U249]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.8.2 [p. 394 Diels] (Plutarch IV.8, Parallel A.27.9) (Epíkouros): Perception is to some degree integrating, being a faculty, while to perceive is an act. So that, on your part, perception is spoken of in two senses: perception as a faculty on the one hand, and to perceive as an act on the other hand.

[U250]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 4-, p. 1109A: But whatever we think of that {how Kōlótēs interprets Democritus}, whoever held that nothing is any more of one description than of another {no more this than that} is following an Epicurean doctrine, that all the impressions reaching us through the senses are true. For if one of two persons says that the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet? Again, you may observe that in one and the same bath some consider the water as too hot, others as too cold, the first asking for the addition of cold water, the others of hot. There is a story that a Spartan lady came to visit Beronice, wife of Deiotarus. No sooner did they come near each other than each turned away, the one (we are told) sickened by the perfume, the other by the butter. So if one sense-perception is no more true than another, we must suppose that the water is no more cold than hot, and that perfume or butter is no more sweet-smelling than ill-smelling; for he who asserts that the object itself is what appears one thing to one person and another to another has unwittingly said that it is both things at once.

As for the old story of the "right size" and "perfect fit" of the passages in the sense organs, and on the other hand the multiple mixture of the "seeds" that they say are found dispersed in all tastes, odors, and colors, so as to give rise in different persons to different perceptions of quality, do not these theories actually compel objects in their view to be "no more this than that?" For when people take sensation to be deceptive because they see that the same objects have opposite effects on those resorting to it, these thinkers offer the reassuring explanation that since just about everything is mixed and compounded with everything else, and since different substances are naturally adapted to fit different passages, the consequence is that everyone does not come into contact with and apprehend the same quality, and again the object perceived does not affect everyone in the same way with every part. What happens instead is that different sets of persons encounter only those components to which their sense organs are perfectly adjusted, and they are therefore wrong when they fall to disputing whether the object is good or bad or white or not white, imagining that they are confirming their own perceptions by denying one another's. The truth of the matter is that no sense-perception should be challenged, as all involve a contact with something real, each of them taking from the multiple mixture as from a fountain what agrees with and suits itself; and we should make no assertions about the whole when our contact is with parts, nor fancy that all persons should be affected in the same way, when different persons are affected by different qualities and properties in the object.

It is time to consider the question: who are more chargeable with imposing on objects the doctrine that "nothing is more this than that" than those who assert that every perceivable object is a blend of qualities of every description, "mixed like the must entangled in the filter" {fragment of a lost tragedy}, and who confess that their standards would go glimmering and the criterion of truth quite disappear if they permitted any sense-object whatsoever to be purely one thing and did not leave every one of them a plurality?

[U251]

Cicero *Academica* 2.25.79 (Lucullus): His own senses, he says {in contrast with the Stoics}, are truthful! If so, you always have an authority, and one to risk his all in defense of the cause! For Epíkouros brings the issue to this point, that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.25.70 ^(Cotta) Epíkouros was afraid that if any of our sense-perceptions were false, then none of them could be true: and so he asserted that all our senses were always "the messengers of truth."

Cicero *Academica* 2.32.101 (Lucullus): A single first principle of Epíkouros combined with another belonging to your school results in the abolition of perception and comprehension, without our uttering a word. What is the principle of Epíkouros? "If any sense-presentation is false, nothing can be perceived." What is yours? "There are false sense-presentations." What follows? Without any word of mine, logical inference itself declares that "nothing can be perceived."

Cicero *Academica* 2.26.83 (Lucullus): There are four points of argument intended to prove that there is nothing that can be known, perceived or comprehended. ... The first of these arguments is that there is such a thing as a false presentation; ... the first is not granted by Epíkouros.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 428, p. 1124B: If it is possible to withhold judgment about these sensations, it is not impossible to withhold it about others as well, as least on the principles of your school, who set one act or image of sensation on exactly the same footing as another.

Ibid., 1123D: By putting all in the the same boat, their theory does more to estrange us from established beliefs than to convince us that the grotesques {fanciful or fantastic human and animal forms} are real.

[U252]

Cicero *Academica* 2.7.19 (Lucullus): Nor is it necessary to delay at this point while I answer about the case of the bent oar {c.f. Lucretius, IV.436-} or the pigeon's neck {c.f. Lucretius, 2.801-}, for I am not one to assert that every object seen is really such as it appears to be. Let Epíkouros see to that, and a number of other matters.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 25, p. 1121A: So it is with Kōlōtēs: the reasoning that he accepts with satisfaction when he finds it in the writings of Epíkouros he neither understands nor recognizes when it is used by others. For the school that asserts that when a round image impinges on us, or in another case a bent one, the important is truly received by the sense, but refuses to allow us to go further and affirm that the tower is round or that the oar is bent, maintains the truth of its experiences and sense impressions, but will not admit that external objects correspond; and as surely as that other school must speak of "being horsed" and "walled" but not of a horse or wall, so this school of theirs is under the necessity of saying that the eye is rounded or be-angled, and not that the oar is bent or the tower round, for it is the image producing the effect in the eye that is bent, whereas the oar is not bent from which the image proceeded. Thus, since the effect produced on the senses differs from the external object, belief must stick to the effect or be exposed as false if it proceeds to add "it is" to "it appears." That vociferous and indignant protest of theirs in defense of sensation, that it does not assert the external object to be warm, the truth being merely that the effect produced in sensation has been of this kind – is it not the same as the statement about taste? Why does it not assert, if the external object is sweet, that there has merely occurred in the taste an effect and movement of this kind? A man says "I receive an impression of humanity, but I do not perceive whether a man is there." Who put him in the way of such a notion? Was it not the school who asserts that they receive an impression of curvature, but that their sight does not go beyond to pronounce that the thing is curved or yet that it is round' there has merely occurred in it an appearance and impression of rotundity?

"Exactly" someone will say, "but for my part I shall go up to the tower and I shall feel the oar, and thereupon I shall pronounce the oar straight and the tower angular; but this other fellow even at close quarters will only grant he has this 'view' and that there is this 'appearance,' but will grant nothing more." Exactly, my good friend, since he is a better hand than you at noticing and holding to the consequences of his doctrine – that every sensation is equally trustworthy when it testifies on its own behalf, but none when it testifies on behalf of anything else, but all are on the same footing. And here is an end to your tenet that all sensations are true and none untrustworthy or false – if you think it proper for one set of them to proceed to make assertions about external objects, whereas you refused to truth the others in anything beyond the experience itself. For if they are on the same footing of trustworthiness whether they come close or are at a distance, it is only fair to confer on all the power of adding the judgment "it is" or else to deny it to the former as well. Whereas if there is a difference in the effect produced on the observer when he stands at a distance and when he is close at hand, it is false to say that no impression and no sensation has in its stamp of reality a better warrant of truth than another. So too the "testimony in confirmation" and "testimony in rebuttal" of which they speak has no bearing on the sensation but only on our opinion of it; so if they tell us to be guided by this testimony when we make statements about external objects, they appoint opinion to pass the verdict "it is" and sense to undergo the experience "it seems" and thus transfer the decision from what is unfailingly true to what is often wrong.

[U253]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, 2) 63-: Epíkouros said that all sensibles are true, and that every impression is the product of something existing and like the thing which moves the sense. He also said that those who contend that some impressions are true but others false are wrong, because they cannot distinguish opinion from self-evidence. At least in the case of Orestes, when he seemed to see the Furies, his sensation, being moved by the images, was true, in that the images objectively existed; but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid bodies, held a false opinion. "And besides" he says, "the persons mentioned above when introducing a difference in the presentations, are not capable of confirming the view that some of them are true, others false. For neither by means of an apparent thing will they prove such a statement, since it is apparent things that are in question, nor yet by something non-evident, since something non-evident must be proven by means of something apparent."

[U254]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 28, p. 1123B: These {images from the furies} and many of another artificial variety, resembling the Empedoclean monsters that they deride, "with lurching ox-feet, random arms" and "Ox-creatures, fronted like a man" – what phantom or prodigy do they omit? All of these they assemble from dreams and delirium and say that none is an optical illusion or false or unsubstantial, but all are true impressions, bodies and shapes that reach us from the surrounding air. That being the case, is there anything in the world about which it is impossible to suspend judgment, when such things as these can be accepted as real? Things that no artful joiner, puppet-maker, or painter ever ventured to combine of our entertainment into a likeness to deceive the eye, these they seriously suppose to exist, or rather they assert that, if these did not exist, there would be an end of all assurance and certainty and judgment about truth.

§ 2.3 On Representations & Words

[U255]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, 2.4 [p. 157.44 Sylb.; p. 121 Stählin]: Indeed, Epíkouros, who more than anyone prefers pleasure to truth, supposes that a preconception {prolepsis} is the basis of the intellect's conviction; he defines a preconception as an application of the intellect to something clear and to the clear conception of the thing, and holds that no one can either investigate or puzzle over, nor even hold an opinion or even refute someone, without a preconception.

Diogénēs Laértios 10.33: By preconception they mean a sort of "apprehension" or a "right opinion" or "notion" or universal idea stored in the mind – that is, a recollection of an external object often presented. For example: "this thing is human" – and no sooner than the word "human" is uttered that we imagine a human shape by an act of preconception, in which the senses take the lead. Thus the object primarily denoted by the very term is then plain and clear. And we should never have started an investigation, unless we had known what it was that we were in search of. For example: "The object standing way over there is a horse or a cow." Before making this judgment we must at some time or another have known by preconception the shape of a horse or a cow. We should not have given anything a name, if we had not first learnt its form by way of preconception.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.16.43 (Velleius speaking): What race of men or nation is there which does not have some untaught apprehension of the gods? Such an innate idea Epíkouros calls prolepsis, that is to say, a certain form of knowledge which is inborn in the mind and without which there can be no other knowledge, not rational thought or argument. The force and value of this doctrine we can see from his own inspired work on *The Canon*. {= Cicero @ U34}

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.17.44 (Velleius speaking): We must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a "preconception" as I called it, or "prior notion" of the gods. For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epíkouros himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense which no one had ever used before.

Plutarch, by way of Olympiodorus the Younger, *Commentary on Plato's "Phaedo"* [p. 125.10 Finckh.]: The Epicureans, then, accuse us of seeking and rediscovering the prolepses. If these, as they say, correspond to real objects, then to seek them is useless; if, on the other hand, they don't correspond, how can we seek an explanation regarding preconceptions that we haven't we been able to think of already?

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 1.57: According to the wise Epíkouros, it is not possible to investigate or even to be puzzled without preconceptions.

[U256]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, I.9.30 (Torquatus to Cicero): Hence Epíkouros refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.

[U257]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.2.6: {Epíkouros} is always harping on the necessity of carefully sifting out the meaning underlying the terms we employ...

Diogénēs Laértios 10.31: They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries, physicists should be content to employ ordinary terms for things.

[U258]

Erotianus, *Glossary of Hippocrates*, Preface, [p. 34, 10 Klein]: For if we are going to explain the words known to everybody, we would have to expound either all or some. But to expound all is impossible, whereas to expound some is pointless. For we will explain them either through familiar locutions or through unfamiliar. But unfamiliar words seem unsuited to the task, the accepted principle being to explain less known things by means of better known things; and familiar words, by being on a par with them, will be unfamiliar for illuminating language, as Epíkouros says. For the informativeness of language is characteristically ruined when it is bewitched by an account, as if by a homeopathic drug.

[U259]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, 2).258: We see that there are some who have denied the real existence of "expressions" and these not only men of other schools, such as the Epicureans, {but even Stoics like Basilides...}

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 22, p. 1119F: What school is more at fault in its views about language than yours {Epicureanism}, which makes a clean sweep of the whole category of meanings, which impart to discourse its substantial reality, and leave us with nothing but vocables and facts, when you say that the intermediate objects of discourse, the things signified, which are the means of learning, teaching, preconceptions, conceptions, desires, and assent, do not exist all?

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, 2).13: The disciples of Epíkouros and Strato the physicist, who admit only two things – the thing signifying and the thing existing – appear ... to ascribe truth or falsity to the mere word.

§ 2.4 On the Passions

[U260]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.34: They assert that there are two kinds of feelings, pleasure and pain, which arise in every living thing. The one is appealing and the other vexing to one's nature; in consideration of these, choices and avoidances are made.

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 21 p. 768D: Some say that as the principle and criterion of choosing and avoiding we have pleasure and pain: at least the Epicureans now still say something of this kind ... For my part then I am so far from saying that feeling is the principle and canon of things good and evil, that I think a criterion is needed for feeling itself.

[U261]

Aetius, *Doxography*, IV.9.11, [p. 397 Diels] (*Parallel A.27.52*): For Epíkouros, pleasure and pain are a part of sensations.

§ 2.5 On Signs

[U262]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, 2).177: Epíkouros and the leaders of his school have stated that the sign is sensible, while the Stoics state that it is intelligible.

[U263]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 29, p. 1124B: ...these people are deluded who regard what is seen as evidence of things unseen although they observe that appearances are so untrustworthy and ambiguous.

§ 2.6 On Disputation

[U264]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.1.3: In philosophical investigation, a methodical and systematic discourse must always begin by formulating a preamble ... so that the parties to the debate may be agreed as to what the subject is about which they are debating. This rule is laid down by Plato in *Phaedrus*, and it was approved by Epíkouros, who realized that it ought to be followed in every discussion.

[U265]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.34: They assert that there are two kinds of inquiry: one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words.

Pseudo-Plutarch, Miscellanies, Fragment 8 from Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, I.8.24B, Greek Doxography, [p. 581, 19 Diels.]: Epíkouros asserts that nothing new happens in the universe when compared to the infinite time already passed.

§ 3.1 On the Atoms

Aetius, Doxography, I.3.18, pp. 285-86D (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 10, 14; Plutarch I.3.25): Epíkouros, the son of Neoklês and an Athenian, philosophized in the manner of Democritus and said that the principles {i.e., elementary constituents} of existing things are bodies inferable by reason, which do not participate in the void and are uncreated and indestructible – since they can neither be broken nor be compounded out of parts, nor be altered in their qualities. They can be inferred by reason ... {lacuna here} ... They move in the void and through the void. And the void itself is infinite, and so are the bodies. Bodies have these three properties: shape, size, weight. Democritus said that there were two – size and shape – but Epíkouros added weight to these as a third. For, he says, it is necessary that the bodies move by the blow of [an object with] weight, otherwise they will not move. The shapes of the atoms are innumerable, but not infinite. For there are none which are hooked or trident-shaped or ring-shaped; for these shapes are easily broken and the atoms are impervious. They have their own shapes which can be contemplated by reason. The atom {a-tomos} is so-called not because it is smallest, but because it cannot be divided, since it is impervious and does not participate in void.

Achilles, Introduction, 3, [p.125A Pet.]: Epíkouros of Athens maintained that the principles {i.e., elementary constituents} of all things are comprised in extremely tiny bodies, knowable by the intellect, and he named them "atoms" or other words, minimums, because of their smallness, or because they are indestructible and cannot be divided.

Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies, I) 22, [p. 572.3 Diels.]: Epíkouros says that the atoms are the most minute bodies; it is not possible to ascribe them a center nor a point nor any subdivision: and because of this he called them atoms.

Simplicius of Cilicia Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-1" preface, fr. 216r [925.12 Konstan]: Others, who had given up on [the idea of] cutting to infinity on the grounds that we cannot [in fact] cut to infinity and thereby confirm the endlessness of cutting, used to say that bodies consist of indivisibles and are divided into indivisibles. Leucippus and Democritus, however, believed not only in imperviousness as the reason why primary bodies are not divided, but also in smallness and partlessness, while Epíkouros later did not hold that they were partless, but said that they were atomic {i.e., uncuttable} by virtue of imperviousness alone. Aristotle refuted the view of Leucippus and Democritus in many places, and it is because of these refutations in objection to partlessness, no doubt, that Epíkouros, coming afterwards but sympathetic to the view of Leucippus and Democritus concerning primary bodies, kept them impervious but took away their partlessness, since it was on this account that they were challenged by Aristotle.

Plutarch, Against Kōlôtēs, 13, p. 1114A: For Epíkouros, the number of bodies is infinite and every single object in the world of sense is generated from them. Observe right here the sort of first principles you people {Epicureans} adopt to account for generation: infinity and the void – the void incapable of action, incapable of acted upon, bodiless; the infinite disordered, irrational, incapable of formulations, disrupting and confounding itself because of a multiplicity that defies control or limitation.

Pseudo-Plutarch, *On the Opinions of the Philosophers*, I.3, 27, [p. 286A 4 Diels] [preceding fragment 275]: The forms of the atoms are certainly incalculable, but not infinite. Indeed, none are hook-shaped, trident-shaped, or ring-shaped: these shapes break easily, but the atoms are in fact impenetrable and have, instead, their own shapes, intuitable by reason.

§ 3.2 On the Void

[U271]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.20.2, p. 318, 1D (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 18, 2): Epikouros says that void, place, and space differ only in name.

Addendum

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, IV).2: Therefore we must understand that, according to Epikouros, one part of that nature which is termed intangible is called the void, one part place, and another part space – the names varying according to the different ways of looking at it since the same substance when empty of all body is called void, when occupied by a body is named place, and when bodies roam through it becomes space. But generically it is called "intangible substance" in Epikouros' school, since it lacks resistance.

[U272]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, 2).329: Epikouros, for instance, opines that he has put forward a very strong argument for the existence of void, namely this: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." But if the premises of this proof had been agreed to by all, it would necessarily have had a conclusion also following from them and admitted by all. Instead, some have objected to it (i.e., the deduction of the conclusions from the premises) not because it does not follow from them, but because they are false and not admitted.

Ibid., 314: Hence also they {the Dogmatists} describe it thus: "A proof is an argument which by means of agreed premises reveals by way of deduction a non-evident conclusion." For example: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." For the existence of void is non-evident, and also it appears to be revealed by way of deduction by means of the true premises: "If motion exists, void exists" and "but motion exists."

[U273]

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-5 (to the end)"* (p. 213A 10) [fr. 140u Ald.; p. 379B Brand.]:

Cf. [fr. 144u]:

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-4"* (p. 211B 7) [fr. 133r]:

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-4" (p. 211B 14), [fr. 38u Ald.; p. 268.23 Speng.]: It remains for us to demonstrate also that place is not extension. An extension is what is conceived of as between the limits of the container, e.g., what is within the hollow surface of the pot. Now this belief is traditional, and associated with those who posit the void, yet later both Chrysippus' crowd and Epíkouros were nonetheless adherents. Some imposed the doctrine on Plato too. It relies on a plausible explanation, yet one that is quite false: namely, since we reach a conception of place in general from the mutual replacement of bodies (i.e., from different bodies continually coming to be in the same place at different times), they took place to be the intervening extension, which they believed remained the same when it received the bodies that were replacing one another, while being separated from each of these incoming bodies. Vessels above all egged them on to this inference. For since water and air enter the vessel at different times while the hollow surface within the clay remains the same (i.e. circumscribed by unique limits), they inferred the existence of the extension within the hollow surface, which resembled the surface of the vessel in remaining the same (i.e., separated from the bodies) as it received the bodies in succession. But this is invalid. If the vessel could at any time be devoid of body, then perhaps this so-called "extension" would be detected per se. But, as it is, fluid flows out and air simultaneously enters to replace it, and that leads them astray. For since every body is accompanied by an extension, they transfer the extension belonging to bodies to place, without reasoning that an extension is always in place just because a body always is too, as completely covered bronze vessels reveal: for [in their case] there would be no efflux of fluid unless the air acquired a space for its influx. What dupes them is that the vessels' hollow surface also always remains rigid; but if there were an implosion when the fluid was extracted, as there is in the case of wine-skins, they would not be similarly deluded.

[U274]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-6" (p. 213A 32), [fr. 40u Ald.; p. 284.2 Speng.]: The void can be posited in two ways: either as disseminated in bodies, as Democritus and Leucippus claim, and many others, including Epíkouros later (they all make the 'interlacing' of the void the cause of bodily division, since according to them what is truly continuous is undivided); or else as separate (i.e., gross), per se, surrounding the cosmos, as some early thinkers were the first to believe, and later Zénōn of Citium and his followers. We, then, must examine what those involved with the void claim.

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-6" (p. 213A 32), [fr. 151u-]:

§ 3.3 On Bodies & their Attributes

[U275]

Aetius, Doxography, I.12.5, p. 311D (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 14, 1; Plutarch I.12.3): Epíkouros maintains that the primary and simple bodies are imperceptible, and also that compounds formed by them all have weight.

Pseudo-Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, I.3.26, p. 285, 11D: Bodies have these three attributes: shape, size, and weight. Democritus guessed two of them, size and shape. Epíkouros, for his part, added weight to these; it is necessary, he argues, that bodies be moved by the blow of their weights, for otherwise they would not move

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, IV) 240: When Epíkouros asserts that we conceive body by means of a combination of size and shape and resistance and weight, he is forcing us to form a conception of existent body out of non-existents.

Ibid., 257: ... this too Epíkouros acknowledged, when he said that "body is conceived by means of a combination of form and magnitude and resistance and weight."

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists (Against the Dogmatists, V) 226: For whether body is, as Epíkouros asserts, a combination of size and form and solidity...

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 8, p. 1110F: I can affirm that this view {that denying the reality of emergent properties contradict the senses} is as inseparable from Epíkouros' as shape and weight are by their own assertion inseparable from the atom.

[U276]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary of Aristotle's "De Caelo" (On the Heavens), Gamma-1 (p. 299A 25); [254B 27 Karst.; 510A 30 Brand.]: The followers of Democritus, and, later, Epíkouros, say that all atoms of the same nature have weight. However, because some are heavier, they sink down and in doing so they push the lighter ones up. Hence, they say, some are light and others are heavy.

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary of Aristotle's "De Caelo" (On the Heavens), Alpha-8 (p. 277B 1); [121A 18E 31 Karst.; 486A 4 Brand.]: Elementary bodies move either as a result of their own nature, or are moved by something else, or are squeezed out by one another. And he [Aristotle] shows that they do not move under the force of mutual extrusion either as follows. This opinion was held after him by both Strato of Lampsacus, and Epíkouros, who thought that every object possessed weight and moved towards the middle, and that lighter ones settled out above the heavier ones by being forcibly squeezed out upwards by them, so that if the earth were removed, water would move to the center, and if the water [were removed] the air, and if the air [were removed] the fire.

Cf. [p. 111B 25 Karst.; 486A 12 Brand.]: Those who treat as an indication that everything moves naturally towards the middle the fact that when earth is removed water moves downwards, and when water [is removed] the air [does so too], do not know that the reciprocal motion is the cause of this. For when the denser things are transferred into the place of the rare, the rarer take the place of the denser, propelled downwards because there can be no void, and because body cannot pass through body. But one must realize that it was not just Strato and Epíkouros who held that all bodies were heavy and moved naturally downwards, unnaturally upwards, but Plato too knows that this opinion is held, and disputes it, thinking that 'downwards' and 'upwards' are not properly applied to the world, and refusing to accept that things are called heavy in virtue of their downward motion.


[U277]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-2" (p. 232A 23-), fr. 219r,v [938.18 Konstan]: Unless every magnitude were divisible, it would not always be possible for a slower object to move a lesser distance in equal time than a quicker one. For slower and quicker objects cover the atomic and indivisible distance in the same time, since if one took more time, it would cover in the equal time a distance less than the indivisible distance. And that is why the Epicureans too think all bodies move at equal speed through indivisible distances, so that they can avoid having their atomic quantities be divided – and thus no longer atomic.

[U278]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-1" (p. 232A 1-17), [fr. 52u Ald.; p. 370.4 Speng.]:

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-1" fr. 218,u 3 [934.18 Konstan]: He {Aristotle} adds yet another absurdity that follows upon this hypothesis, [namely] that something has moved that was not previously moving, for example, that something has walked that did not previously walk. For it is posited that O moves [with] the motion DEF over the magnitude ABC, but it moves neither over A (for it has moved over it), nor over B, nor likewise, over C. It will consequently, have moved [with] the whole motion without previously moving [with] it.



That this obstacle which he {Aristotle} has formulated is itself not entirely beyond belief is shown by the fact that despite his having formulated it and produced his solution, the Epicureans, who came along later, said that this is precisely how motion does occur. For they say that motion, magnitude and time have part-less constituents, and that over the whole magnitude composed of part-less constituents the moving object moves, but at each of the part-less magnitudes contained in it, it does not move but has moved; for if it were laid down that the object moving over the whole magnitude moves over these too, they would turn out to be divisible.

[U279]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-8" (p. 216A 17) fr. 159u:

[U280]

Aetius, Doxography, I.12.5, [p. 311A 10 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 14, 1; Plutarch I.12.3): Atoms sometimes move straight down, sometimes swerve, and those which move upwards do so by collision and rebound.

Aetius, Doxography, I.23.4, [p. 319 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 19, 1; Plutarch I.23.1): Epíkouros said there are two types of the motion: the straight and the swerve.

§ 3.5 On the Atomic Swerve

[U281]

Cicero, De Finibus, I.6.18: Epíkouros for his part, where he follows Democritus, does not generally blunder. ... I now come to the lapses peculiar to Epíkouros. He believes that these same indivisible solid bodies are borne by their own weight perpendicularly downward, which he holds is the natural motion of all bodies; but thereupon this clever fellow, being met with the difficulty that if they all traveled downwards in a straight line, and, as I said, perpendicularly, no one atom would ever be able to overtake any other atom, accordingly introduced an idea of his own invention: he said that the atom makes a very tiny swerve—the smallest divergence possible; and thus produces entanglements and combinations and cohesion of atoms with atoms, which result in the creation of the world, and all its parts, and of all that in them is. Now not only is this whole affair a piece of childish fancy, but it does not even achieve the result that its author desires. The swerving is itself an arbitrary fiction; for Epíkouros says the atoms swerve without cause—yet this is the capital offense in a natural philosopher, to speak of something taking place uncaused. Then also he gratuitously deprives the atoms of what he himself declared to be the natural motion of all heavy bodies, namely, movement in a straight line downwards, and yet he does not attain the object for the sake of which this fiction was devised. For, if all the atoms swerve, none will ever come to cohere together; or if some swerve while others travel in a straight line, but their own natural tendency, in the first place this will be tantamount to assigning to the atoms their different spheres of action, some to travel straight and some sideways; while secondly (and this is a weak point with Democritus also) this riotous hurly-burly of atoms could not possibly result in the ordered beauty of the world we know.

Cicero, On Fate, 10.22: Epíkouros, however, thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom; and so a certain third movement arises, part from weight and collision, when the atom swerves by a very small distance – this he calls a "minimum." That this swerve comes about without a cause he is compelled to admit, if not by his words, by the facts themselves. For it is not the case that an atom swerves when struck by another; for how can one be struck by another if individual bodies are carried downwards by their weight in straight lines, as Epíkouros supposes? For if one is never struck from its course by another, it follows that none even touches another; and from this it results that, even if there is an atom and it swerves, it does so without cause. Epíkouros introduce this theory because he was afraid that, if the atom was always carried along by its weight in a natural and way, we would have no freedom, since our mind would be moved in the way in which it was constrained by the movement of the atoms. Democritus, the inventor of the atoms, preferred to accept this, that all things come about through fate, rather than to remove the natural movements of individual bodies from them.

Ibid. 20.46: This is how the case ought to be argued; one ought not to seek help from atoms that swerve and deviate from their path. "The atom swerves" he says. First why? For the atoms will have one force to move them from Democritus, the force of an impulse which he calls a blow, and from you, Epikouros, the force of weight and heaviness. So what new cause is there in nature to make the atom serve? Or do they draw lots among themselves which will swerve and which not? Or why do they swerve by a minimum interval and not by a larger one, or why do they swerve by one minimum and not by two or three? This is wishful thinking, not argument. For you do not say that the atom is moved from its position and swerves through an impulse from outside, nor that in that void through which the atom travels there was any cause for its not traveling in a straight line; nor has there been any change in the atom itself as a result of which it might not preserve the motion natural to its weight. So, although [Epikouros] has not brought forward any cause which might cause that serve of his, nevertheless he thinks he has a point to make when he says the sort of thing which the minds of all reject and repudiate.

Ibid. 9.18: There is no reason for Epikouros to tremble before fate, seek help from the atoms and turn them aside from their path, and for him to commit himself at one and the same time to two things that cannot be proved: first that something should happen without a cause, from which it will follow that something comes from nothing, which neither he himself nor any natural philosopher accepts; and second that, when two indivisible bodies travel through the void, one moves in a straight line and the other swerves aside.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.25.69 ^(Cotta) Epikouros saw that if those atoms of his were always falling downwards by their own weight, their motion would be fixed and predetermined, and there would be no room for free will in the world. So casting about for a way to avoid this determinism, which Democritus had apparently overlooked, he said that the atoms, as they fell, just swerved a little!

Plutarch, *On The Birth? of the Soul in Plato's "Timaeus"* 6, p. 1015C: The fact is that they [the Stoics] do not concede to Epikouros that the atom can swerve the tiniest bit, on the grounds that he introduces a causeless motion coming from nonexistence...

Saint Augustine, *Against the Academicians*, 3.10.23 t. I [p. 284E Venice Edition, 1719]: How shall we decide the controversy between Democritus and earlier physicists about whether there is one world or innumerable worlds, when Democritus and his heir Epikouros were unable to remain in agreement? Once that voluptuary Epikouros allows atoms, as though they were his little handmaids – that is, the little bodies he gladly embraces in the dark – not to stay on their courses but to swerve freely here and there into the paths of others, he has also dissipated his entire patrimony through such quarrels.

§ 3.6 On Aggregation and Dissolution

Varro, *On Latin Language*, VI.39, p. 219: Democritus, Epikouros, and still others who have deemed the original elements to be unlimited in number, though they do not tell us where the elements came from but only of what sort they are, still perform a great service: they show us the things of the world which consist of these elements.

[U282]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 16, p. 1116C: But I should like to ask the very man {Kōlōtēs} who brings this indictment {against Plato} if his school does not see this distinction in their own system, whereby some objects are enduring and unchanging in their being, just as atoms too in their doctrine are forever the same because they are too hard to be affected, while all aggregates of atoms are subject to flux and change and come into being and pass of of it, as innumerable images leave them in a constant stream, and innumerable others, it is inferred, flow in from the surroundings and replenish the mass, which is varied by this interaction and altered in its composition, since in fact even the atoms in the interior of the aggregate can never cease moving or vibrating against one another, as the Epicureans say themselves.

[U283]

Ibid., 10, p. 1112A: {The Epicureans} assume that there is neither generation of the non-existent nor destruction of the existent, but that generation is a name given to the conjunction of certain existents with one another and death a name given to their separation.

[U284]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary of Aristotle's "De Caelo, Alpha-7" (On the Heavens) [p. 275B 29 Karst.; 484A 23 Brand.]: Aristotle then demonstrated that the number of types of elementary bodies were not infinite, as Leucippus and Democritus and their followers (who lived before him) supposed and Epíkouros (who lived after him). These men indeed maintained that the principles {i.e., elements} were unlimited in number, and they also thought that they were atomic and indivisible and impervious, because they were dense and did not enclose any empty space; for they said that division takes place where there is some void within bodies, and also that these atoms, being separated from each other in the unlimited void and differing in shape and size and position and ordering, move in the void and that they catch up with each other and collide and that some rebound to any chance place while others get entangled with each other, in accordance with the symmetry of their shapes and sizes and positions and orderings; and in this way it comes about that the origin of compounds is produced.

[U285]

Galen, On the Preparation of Simple Medicines, I.14 t. XI [p. 405 K.]: ... always remembering how space is said to be empty by those who maintain that its essence is unique. But space is not empty in the sense in which it seems to Epíkouros and to Asclepiades, but rather it is full of air, sparsely populated with bodies everywhere.

Galen, Comment on the 6th book of "Epidemics" by Hippocrates, IV 10 t. XVII 2 [p 162 K.]: The statement that there might empty spaces, in water or in the air, corresponds to the opinion of Epíkouros and of Asclepiades in regards to the elements.

[U286]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 10, p. 1112B: {The Epicureans}, who herd together unyielding and unresponsive atoms, produce nothing out of them – only an uninterrupted series of collisions among the atoms themselves. For the entanglement that prevents dissolution produces rather an intensification of the collisions, so that generation is by their account neither mixture nor cohesion, but confusion and conflict. On the other hand, if the atoms after an instant of collision rebound for while from the impact, and for a while draw near when the blow is spent, the time that they are separated from one another, without contact or proximity, is more than twice as long, so that nothing, not even an inanimate body, is produced out of them; while perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best of will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality and which on meeting are not thereby affected or changed.

Ibid., 9, p. 1111E: Whereas an atom, taken alone, is destitute and bare of any generative power, and when it collides with another it is so hard and resistant that a shock ensues, but it neither suffers nor causes any further effect. Rather the atoms receive and inflict blows for all time, and so far are they from being that they cannot even produce out of themselves a collective plurality or the unity of a heap in their constant shaking and scattering.

[U287]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.22: {Regarding atoms:} Why then, do we not feel nor perceive them? Because, he says, they have neither color, nor heat, nor odor. They are free of taste also, and moisture, and they are so minute that they cannot be cut and divided. Thus, the necessity of consequent things led him to wild ravings because he had undertaken falsehood in the beginning. For where or whence are those little bodies? Why did nobody save that one Leucippus dream them up, by whom Democritus was instructed, he who left the inheritance of foolishness to Epikouros? If these little bodies are indeed solid, as they say, certainly they can come under the eyes. If the nature of all of them is the same, how do they effect various things? They come together, he tells us, in varied order and position just as letters do: although they are few, yet variously arranged, they bring about innumerable words. But letters have various forms. So do these have commencements themselves, he says, for there are rough ones, there are hooked ones, there are smooth ones. Therefore, they can be cut and divided if there is in them something which projects. But if they are smooth and in need of hooks or projections, they cannot cohere. They must be hooked bodies, then, for a concatenation of them to take place. But since they are said to be so minute, that they are able to be severed by no sharp blade, how do they have hooks or corners? It is necessary for them, since they exist, to be torn apart. Then, by what pact, by what agreement do they come together among themselves, that something may be formed of them? If they lack sense, they are not able to come together with such order, for it is not possible for anything but reason to bring about anything rational. With how many proofs is this vanity able to be refuted!

§ 3.7 On Qualities

[U288]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 10, p. 1111A: Democritus is not to be censured not for admitting the consequences that flow from his principles, but for setting up principles that lead to these consequences. For he should not have posited immutable first elements; having posited them, he should have looked further and see that the generation of any quality becomes impossible. But to see the absurdity and deny it is the purest effrontery. Epikouros {as reported by Kōlōtēs} acts with the purest effrontery when he claims to lay down the same first principles, but nevertheless does not say that "color is by convention" and thus the qualities sweet, bitter, etc. If "does not say" means "does not admit" it is so, he is following his familiar practice... 1111C: There was no necessity to assume, or rather filch from Democritus, the premise that the primary elements of all things are atoms. But once you have laid down the doctrine and made a fine showing with its initial plausibility, you must drain the disagreeable conclusions along with it, or else show how bodies without quality have given rise to qualities of every kind by the mere fact of coming together. Take for the example the quality called hot. How do you account for it? From where has it come and how has it been imposed on the atoms, which neither brought heat with them nor became hot by their conjunction? For the former implies the possession of quality, the latter the natural capacity to be affected, neither of which, say you, can rightly belong to atoms by reason of their indestructibility.

Galen, *On the Art of Medicine*, [7, t. I p. 246 K.]: {Galen, *Selected Works*, P.N. Singer ca. page 325}

Cf. Galen, *On the Elements According to Hippocrates*, [I.2, t. I p. 416 K.; 2.6 De Lacy]: It could be said that all things are one in form and power, as Epikouros and Democritus and their followers say about atoms.

Ibid., [p. 418 K.; 2.16 De Lacy]: All the atoms, then, being small bodies, are without qualities, and the void is a kind of place in which these bodies, being carried downward, all of them for all time, somehow become entwined with each other or strike each other and rebound; and in such assemblages they cause separations and recombinations with each other; and from this (interaction) they produce, besides all other compounds, our bodies, their affections, and their sensations. But (these philosophers) postulate that the first bodies are unaffected, some of them, like Epikouros, holding that they are unbreakable because of hardness, some, like Diódoros and Leucippus, that they are indivisible because of their small size; and [they hold that] these bodies cannot undergo any of those alterations in whose existence all men, taught by their senses confidently believe; for example, they say that none of the primary bodies grows warm or cold, and similarly none becomes dry or wet, and much less would they become black or white or admit to any other change whatsoever in any quality.

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary of Aristotle's "Categories" 8, p. 8B 25, quat. Kappa, [fr. 8u Venice Edition; fr. 56u 10 Bas.; 216.31 Fleet]: In objection to Democritus and Epíkouros, the question can be put: why on earth do they grant certain differentiae to atoms such as shape, weight, solidity, corporeality, edges, size, and motion, while asserting that they possess neither color nor sweetness nor life, and that the logoi of other such things do not pre-exist? For it is absurd, since there is a common account {logos} of the havables, not to classy like with like; it is even more absurd to make the most primary powers secondary, such as life, intellect, nature, reason {logos} and the like. It is equally impossible for these to be produced out of the conjunction [of atoms]; for according to Democritus, color and suchlike are by convention, and only atoms and void exist in truth. But once a person has done away with realities, he will have nothing to put in their place, and he who admits the causeless will have no ground to stand on. For why should the person starting from no definite cause prefer these to the contraries? So it is better to have recourse to the hypothesis which produces the havables from being had, in the way that the Academics defined 'hivable' by representing it as 'that which can be had' {hektón}, not accepting the definition on the basis of its etymology.

Ibid. 14, p. 15A 30, quat. Phi, [fr. 8u Venice Edition; fr. 56u 10 Bas.]: The followers of Democritus, and subsequently those of Epíkouros, in hypothesizing atoms to be unaffected and unqualified by other qualities apart from the shapes [of the atoms] and the way they are composed {tên poian autôn sunthesin}, say that other qualities – whether simple, such as temperatures {thermotêtes} and textures {leioêtes}, or those in respect of colors and tastes – supervene. And if these latter things [consist] in the way atoms are composed, alteration too will consist in change in respect of them {i.e., the atoms}. But the way they {i.e., the atoms} are composed, and their transposition and order, derive from nowhere else than from their motion and spatial movement, so that alteration is the same thing as their motion, or at least is a concomitant of this and is something belonging to this.

[U289]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Questions, I.13 [p. 52 Spengl.]: {R.W. Sharples}

§ 3.8 On Mixture

[U290]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, On Mixture, fr. 140u (214.28-215.8): Epíkouros wanted to avoid what Democritus supposed happened for those who say that blending occurs by means of a juxtaposition of the components of the blend. He himself said that blending occurs by means of the juxtaposition of certain bodies – not of bodies which were themselves preserved as compounds, but rather of bodies that were broken down into elementary atoms which formed particular compounds, e.g., wine, water, honey, etc. He then says that the mixture is created by a certain kind of reciprocal compounding by component elements. It is these which produce the new mixture – not water and the wine, but the atoms which made up the water, as one might designate them, are combined together with those which made up the wine by a destruction and generation of the compound bodies. For the breakdown of each into its elements is a form of destruction, and the compounding produced from the elements themselves is ‹a sort of genesis›.

§ 3.9 On Change

[U291]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, IV) 42: Some of the natural philosophers, amongst them Epíkouros, have declared that the motion of change is a particular form of transitional motion; for the composite object which changes in quality changes owing to the local and transitional motion of the rationally perceived bodies which compose it. Thus, in order that a thing may become bitter from sweet, or black from white, the particles which must be arranged in a new order and take up different positions; that this could not be brought about in any other way than by the transitional motion of the molecules. And again, in order that a thing may become soft from hard or hard from soft, the parts whereof it is composed must move in place; for it is made soft by their expansion, but made hard by their coalescence and condensation. And owing to this the motion of change is, generically, nothing else than transitional motion.

[U292]

Galen, On the Elements According to Hippocrates, [l.9, t. 1 p. 483 K.]: ... the {qualitative} change of bodies, as it happens, isn't aggregation and dispersal, as the disciples of Epíkouros and Democritus think.

§ 3.10 On Magnetism

[U293]

Galen, On Natural Faculties, l.14, t. 2 [p. 45 K.]: Now Epíkouros, despite the fact that he employs in his Physics elements similar to those of Asclepiades, still allows that iron is attracted by the lodestone, and chaff by amber. He even tries to give the cause of the phenomenon. His view is that the atoms which flow from the stone are related in shape to those flowing from the iron, and so they become easily interlocked with one another; thus it is that, after colliding with each of the two compact masses (the stone and the iron) they then rebound into the middle and so become entangled with each other, and draw the iron after them. So far, then, as his hypotheses regarding causation go, he is perfectly unconvincing; nevertheless, he does grant that there is an attraction. Further, he says that it is on similar principles that there occur in the bodies of animals the dispersal of nutrient and the discharge of waste matter, as also the actions of cathartic drugs.

Asclepiades, however, who viewed with suspicion the incredible character of the cause mentioned, and who saw no other credible cause on the basis of his supposed elements, shamelessly found his way out by stating that nothing is in any way attracted by anything else. Now, if he was dissatisfied with what Epíkouros said, and had nothing better to say himself, he ought to have refrained from making hypotheses, and should have said that Nature is a constructive artist and that the substance of things is always tending towards unity and also towards alteration because its own parts act upon and are acted upon by one another. For, if he had assumed this, it would not have been difficult to allow that this constructive nature has powers which attract appropriate and expel alien matter. For in no other way could she be constructive, preservative of the animal, and eliminative of its diseases, unless it be allowed that she conserves what is appropriate and discharges what is foreign.

But in this matter, too, Asclepiades realized the logical sequence of the principles he had assumed; he showed no scruples, however, in opposing plain fact; he joins issue in this matter also, not merely with all physicians, but with everyone else, and maintains that there is no such thing as a crisis, or a critical day, and that nature does absolutely nothing for the preservation of the animal. For his constant aim is to follow out logical consequences and to upset obvious fact, in this respect being opposed to Epíkouros; for the latter always affirmed the observed fact, although he gives an ineffective explanation of it, saying that these small corpuscles belonging to the lodestone rebound, and become entangled with other similar particles of the iron, and that then, by means of this entanglement (which cannot be seen anywhere) such a heavy substance as iron is attracted. I fail to understand how anybody could believe this. Even if we admit this, the same principle will not explain the fact that, when the iron has another piece brought in contact with it, this becomes attached to it.

For what are we to say? That, indeed, some of the particles that flow from the lodestone collide with the iron and then rebound back, and that it is by these that the iron becomes suspended? That others penetrate into it, and rapidly pass through it by way of its empty channels? That these then collide with the second piece of iron and are not able to penetrate it although they penetrated the first piece? And that they then course back to the first piece and produce entanglements like the former ones?

The hypothesis here becomes clearly refuted by its absurdity. As a matter of fact, I have seen five writing-stylets of iron attached to one another in a line, only the first one being in contact with the lodestone, and the power being transmitted through it to the others. Moreover, it cannot be said that if you bring a second stylet into contact with the lower end of the first, it becomes held, attached, and suspended, whereas, if you apply it to any other part of the side it does not become attached. For the power of the lodestone is distributed in all directions; it merely needs to be in contact with the first stylet at any point; from this stylet again the power flows, as quick as thought, all through the second, and from that again to the third. Now, if you imagine a small lodestone hanging in a house, and in contact with it all round a large number of pieces of iron, from them again others, from these others, and so on, all these pieces of iron must surely become filled with the corpuscles which emanate from the stone; therefore, this first little stone is likely to become dissipated by disintegrating into these emanations. Further, even if there be no iron in contact with it, it still disperses into the air, particularly if this be also warm.

"Yes" says Epikouros, "but these corpuscles must be looked on as exceedingly small, so that some of them are a ten-thousandth part of the size of the very small particles carried in the air." Then do you venture to say that so great a weight of iron can be suspended by such small bodies? If each of them is a ten-thousandth part as large as the dust particles which are borne in the atmosphere, how big must we suppose the hook-like extremities by which they interlock with each other to be? For of course this is quite the smallest portion of the whole particle.

Then, again, when a small body becomes entangled with another small body, or when a body in motion becomes entangled with another also in motion, they do not rebound at once. For, further, there will of course be others which break in upon them from above, from below, from front and rear, from right to left, and which shake and agitate them and never let them rest. Moreover, we would be forced to suppose that each of these small bodies has a large number of these hook-like extremities. For by one it attaches itself to its neighbors, by another – the topmost one – to the lodestone, and by the bottom one to the iron. For if it were attached to the stone above and not interlocked with the iron below, this would be of no use. Thus, the upper part of the superior extremity must hang from the lodestone and the iron must be attached to the lower end of the inferior extremity; and, since they interlock with each other by their sides as well, they must, of course, have hooks there too. Keep in mind also, above everything, what small bodies these are which possess all these different kinds of outgrowths. Moreover, remember how, in order that the second piece of iron may become attached to the first, the third to the second, and to that the fourth, these absurd little particle must both penetrate the passages in the first piece of iron and at the same time rebound from the piece coming next in the series, although this second peeve is naturally in every way similar to the first.

Such a hypothesis, once again, is certainly not lacking in audacity; in fact, to tell the truth, it is far more shameless than the previous ones; according to it, when five similar pieces of iron are arranged in a line, the particles of the lodestone which easily traverse the first piece of iron rebound from the second, and do not pass readily through it in the same way. Indeed, it is nonsense, whichever alternative is adopted. For, if they do rebound, how then do they pass through into the third piece? And if they do not rebound, how does the second piece become suspended to the first? For Epikouros himself regarded the rebound as the active agent in the attraction.

But, as I have said, one is driven to talk nonsense whenever one gets into discussion with such men. Having, therefore, given a concise and summary statement of the matter, I wish to be done with it. For if one diligently familiarizes oneself with the writings of Asclepiades, one will see clearly their logical dependence on his first principles, but also their disagreement with observed facts. Thus, Epikouros, in his desire to adhere to the facts, cuts an awkward figure by aspiring to show that these agree with his principles.

... 15.59: How, then, do they {kidneys} exert this attraction {pulling waste from the blood}. If, as Epikouros thinks, all attraction takes place by virtue of the rebounds and entanglements of the atoms, it would be certainly better to maintain that the kidneys have no attractive action at all; for his theory, when examined, would be found as it stands to be much more ridiculous even than the theory of the lodestone, mentioned a little while ago.

[U294]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, IV).219: According to the account of Dēmétrios of Laconia, Epíkouros says that time is a concurrence of concurrences, one which accompanies days, nights, hours, the presence and absence of feelings, motions and rests. For all of these are incidental properties of certain things, and since time accompanies them all it would be reasonable to call it a concurrence of concurrences.

[*ibid.*, 238-247, = *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 3.137, Cf. U79]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.22.5, p. 318, 19 [Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 8, 45): In regards to the essence of time, Epíkouros defines it a concurrence <of concurrences>, that being what accompanies motion.

§ 3.11 On the Universe & its World-Systems

[U295]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.18.3, p. 316 4 [Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 18, 1; Plutarch I.18.1): Lucretius, Democritus, Dēmétrios, Mētródōros, Epíkouros – they consider the atoms to be infinite in number, while the void is infinite in size.

[U296]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 13, p. 1114A: Epíkouros, who says that "the universe" is infinite, uncreated and imperishable, and subject neither to increase nor diminution, speaks of the universe as if it were a unity.

[U297]

Cicero, *On Divination*, 2.50.103: You see how Epíkouros proceeds from admitted premises to the proposition to be established. But this you Stoic logicians do not do; for you not only do not assume premises which everybody concedes, but you even assume premises which, if granted, do not tend in the least to establish what you wish to prove. For you start with this assumption: "If there are gods, they are kindly disposed towards men." Now, who will grant you that? Not Epíkouros! He says that the gods are concerned at all – for themselves or for anybody else.

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Gamma-4"* (p. 203B 20), fr. 197u: There is fourth point which is hard to deal with: the fact that everything which is limited seems to be limited by something. For if everything which is limited is limited by something which is external to itself, then that external thing by which it is limited is itself either unlimited or limited. And if it is unlimited, then we immediately have the result that the unlimited exists. And if it is limited, like the earth for example, then this too is limited by something else, and so on without limit. And if it goes on without limit, the unlimited exists. For one will never get one's hands on the final limit, if indeed this too is limited by something else. The Epicureans, according to Alexander, relied on this argument above all else when they said that the universe was infinite, because everything which is limited by something has outside it something which is limited {and so on and so on}. Aristotle mentions that this argument is quite old.

Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisia, *Questions*, 3.12, [p. 200.20 Spengl.; 10.104,20-23 Sharples]: If the being limited of what is limited consisted in being considered [as] up against something else, then our opponents would have a point when they claim that outside every limited thing there has to be something up against which it is seen to be limited – if it is in this that being {einai}, for what is limited, consists.

[U298]

Themistius, *Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Gamma-8"* (p. 208A 11), [fr. 36r Ald.], [p. 251.1 Speng.]:

[U299]

Plutarch, *On the Obsolescence of Oracles*, 28, p. 425D: For, if we take the expressions below and above as referring, not to the world, but outside of it, we shall become involved in the same difficulties as Epíkouros, who would have all his atoms move to places under our feet, as if either the void had feet, or infinity granted us to conceive of below and above within itself.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 8, p. 1111B: {Epíkouros} says that while he posits an infinite universe, he does not eliminate "up" and "down."

Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions, 44, p. 1054B: It is frequently asserted by Chrysippus that outside the world there is infinite void and that what is infinite has no beginning, middle, or end; and this the Stoics use especially to annihilate the downward motion which Epíkouros says the atom has of itself, their contention being that in an infinite void, there is no difference by which to distinguish one part as being up and the other as down.

[U300]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklês, Diogénês Laértios 10.88: "A world-system is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating..." and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, the dissolution of which will bring about the ruin of everything within...

[U301]

Galen, On the Diagnosis and Cure of Soul's Errors, 7, t. V [p. 102 K., Singer]: The Stoic says that there is no void in the world, but that there is empty space outside it. The Epicurean grants both these types of void, but differs from the [Stoics] in another respect. He does not admit that there is only one world, as does the Stoic, who in this respect agrees perfectly with the Peripatetics. But just as he maintains that the void is infinite in size, so also does he say that there are in it an infinite number of world-systems.

Aetius, Doxography, 2.1.3, [p. 327 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 22, 3; Plutarch 2.1.1): Democritus and Epíkouros maintain that there are infinite worlds in the infinite <universe>, in every direction.

Achilles, Introduction, 8, [p.131 E Pet.]: Some assert that there exists something externally, as indeed Epíkouros, who supposes that there are infinite world-systems in the infinite void. 5 p. 130B: Epíkouros and his master [sic] Mētródōros believe in the existence of many world-systems.

Servius, Commentary on Virgil's "Aenids" I.330 at "Under which skies:" ... according to the Epicureans, who would have it that there exist more skies, as Cicero does in his Hortensius.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.24.67 (Cotta to Velleius): Where is this "truth" of yours to be found? Among the innumerable world-systems, born and dying through every instant of time?

Cicero, De Finibus, I.6.21: The very conception of infinite space, apeiria as they term it, is entirely derived from Democritus; and again the countless numbers of world-systems that come into existence and pass out of existence every day.

Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 23, 2 p. 773A: The atoms comprise an infinity of world-systems. [Cf. 26.14 p. 781A]

Hermias, Derision of the Pagan Philosophers, 18, [p. 656, 7 Diels]: Epíkouros jumps up and tells me "You actually have counted only one world-system, my friend. But there are many world-systems – in fact, they are infinite." [Cf. Commentary on Lucan, Civil War, VI.696]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Questions, 3.12, [p. 199, 20 Spengl.; 10.104,4-8 Sharples]: That there is a plurality of unlimited things according to those who say that the principles {i.e., elements} are unlimited is clear also from what follows. They say that the world-systems, too, are unlimited [in number]. If each of these too is composed out of unlimited principles, it is necessary for the unlimited things to be unlimited an unlimited number of times over.

[U301a]

Aetius, Doxography, 2.1.8, [p. 329B 3 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 22, 3): Epíkouros asserts that the spaces between world-systems are unequal.

[U302]

Aetius, Doxography, 2.2.3, [p. 329A 5 Diels] (Plutarch 2.2): Epíkouros affirms that, on the one hand, it is possible that world-systems might be spherically shaped, and on the other hand, that it is also possible they may be characterized by other configurations.

[U303]

Aetius, Doxography, 2.7.3, [p. 336 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 22, 2; Plutarch 2.7.2): Epíkouros maintains that the edges of some world-systems may be thin, others thick, and that of these, some move and others remain stationary.

[U304]

Philo, On the Indestructibility of the Cosmos, 3, [p. 2222, 2 Bern.]: Democritus, Epíkouros, and a numerous company of Stoic philosophers believe in a birth and destruction of the world, though not in the same way. The ones who believe in the existence of an infinity of world-systems attribute their births in terms of reciprocal impacts and entanglement of atoms, and their deaths to crashing atoms and to collisions from that which it was formed out of.

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), VII.1, p. 220.5: They don't agree with the Stoics and Epicureans, who assert that the world was born and will perish.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, VII.1.10: Epíkouros then, on the authority of Democritus, was truly versed on this point. He said that [the world] had begun at one time and would come to extinction at some time. However, he was not able to render any account either for what causes or at what time this such great work would be dissolved.

Ibid., 2.10.24: But if the world can perish entirely, since it perishes in parts, it is clear that at some time it began. Fragility thus exposes the end of the world just as it shows its beginning. And if these things are true, Aristotle will not be able to defend the point he held, namely, that the world itself had no beginning. If Plato and Aristotle, who thought that the world will always be, although they are eloquent, the same Epíkouros will force the same point from them, however unwilling, since it follows that it also has an end.

[U305]

Aetius, Doxography, 2.4.10, [p. 331.24 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 20, 1; Plutarch 2.4.2): Epíkouros says that the world {continuously} destroys itself in very many ways: for it can be destroyed in the manner of an animal, in the manner of plant, and in lots of other ways.

[U306]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Theta-1" (p. 250b 18), fr. 257u:

[U307]

St. Jerome, Commentary on "Ecclesiastes" c. 1, t. 3 [p. 391D Vall.]: We do not believe that signs and portents and many unusual facts, which happen in the world by divine will, have already happened in past generations, such as Epíkouros would have it, asserting that through innumerable temporal cycles, the same things happen, in the same places, by means of the same agents.

[U308]

Aetius (Plutarch), *On the Opinions of the Philosophers*, I.4, [p. 289 Diels]: So the world was compounded and endowed with its bent {i.e., rounded} shape in the following manner: Because atomic bodies, which move without guidance and in a haphazard manner, were constantly moving at the greatest of speeds, many bodies happened to be assembled together in the same place, and thereby had variety of shapes and sizes (and weights). As they assembled in the same place, the larger and heavier bodies tended to move toward the bottom and settled; but the small, round, smooth, and slippery ones were pushed out in the concourse of atoms and so moved into the celestial regions. So when the force of the blows [of atomic collisions] stopped raising them up, and the blows no longer carried them into the celestial regions, they were still prevented from falling down because they were squeezed into places that could accommodate them. Now these were situated all around, and most of the bodies were bent around to these places. By becoming entangled with each other during the bending, they generated the sky. Retaining the same nature and being varied, as was said, the atoms which were pushed out to the celestial regions produced the nature of the heavenly bodies. The majority of the bodies which were evaporated upwards struck the air and compressed it. And the air, being made wind-like during its movement and gathering together the heavenly bodies, drove them around with itself and by this twisting produced their present circular movement in the celestial regions. And then the earth was produced from the bodies which settled at the bottom, while those which were raised upwards produced the sky, fire, and air. Since a great deal of matter was still contained in the earth and this was packed densely by the blows of the atomic bodies and by those from the rays of the heavenly bodies, the earth's entire configuration, which was made up of small particles, was squeezed together and so produced the nature of fluids. And since this nature was disposed to flow, it moved down into the hollow places and those able to receive it and contain it; either that, or the water all by itself hollowed out the existing places by settling there. So the most important parts of the world were produced in this way.

§ 3.12 On Planets

[U309]

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, V.26, [p. 438 Diels]: The Stoics and the Epicureans do not consider the planets to be living beings (some are actually characterized as being irascible and lustful – others as rational), but instead the planets move, in a certain sense, automatically, without mental guidance.

§ 3.13 On Man

[U310]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, I (Against the Dogmatists, I).267: Epíkouros and his followers supposed that the conception of Man could be conveyed by indication, saying that "Man is this sort of a shape combined with vitality." But they did not notice that if the thing indicated is Man, the thing not so indicated is not Man.

Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 2.25: Epíkouros says that Man is "This sort of shape combined with vitality." According to him, then, since a man is revealed by direct perception, he that is not perceived as such is not a man.

§ 3.14 On the Soul

[U311]

Scholion on Epíkouros, *Letter to Hēródotos*, Diogénēs Laértios 10.66: He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms – far more so than those of fire; part of it is irrational and scattered throughout the body, while the rational part resides in the chest, where we feel it in our fears and our joy.

[U312]

Aetius, *Doxography*, IV.4.6, [p. 390 Diels] (Plutarch IV.4.3) (Democritus): Democritus and Epíkouros say that the soul has two parts, one which is rational and situated in the chest, and the other which is non-rational and spread throughout the entire body.

Ibid., IV 5.5, p. 391 [Diels] (Plutarch IV.5.2): Parmenides and Epíkouros maintain that the seat of consciousness – the rational part of the soul – occupies the entire chest.

Tertullian, On the Soul, 15: You must not suppose that the sovereign faculty ... is found enclosed in the breast, as Epíkouros thinks.

[U313]

Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 2, VII.17 col. XXII- :

[U314]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 20, p. 1118D: Kōlótēs, however finds the question absurd {Socrates' inquiries into "what is a man?"}. Why then does he not deride his master too, who did this very thing as often as he wrote or spoke about the constitution of the soul and the "initiation of the aggregate." For if (as they themselves hold) the combination of the two parts, a body of a certain description and a soul, is man, then one who seeks to discover the nature of the soul is seeking to discover the nature of man, starting from the more important source. And that the soul is hard to apprehend by reason and cannot be discerned by sense let us not learn from Socrates, "the sophist and charlatan" but from these sages, who get as far as those powers of the soul that affect the flesh, by which it imparts warmth and softness and firmness to the body, when they manufacture its substance by the combining their own varieties of heat, gas and air, but quite before they reach the seat of power. For its ability to judge, remember, love, and hate – in short, its thinking and reasoning faculty – is added to these, they say from a quality "that has no name." This talk of the thing "that has no name" is, we know, a confession of an embarrassed ignorance – what they cannot make out they assert that they cannot name. But let this too "be excused" as they say.

[U315]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.3.11, p. 388 [Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 41 p. 798; Plutarch IV.3.4): Epíkouros said that the soul is a blend of four things: one of which is fire-like, one air-like, one wind-like, while the fourth is something which lacks a name. (This last he made the one which accounts for sensation.) The wind, he said, produces movement in us, the air produces rest, the hot one produces the evident heat of the body, and the unnamed one produces sensation in us. For sensation is found in none of the named elements

Macrobius, Commentary on the "Dream of Scipio" I.14.20: Epíkouros called the soul a being commixed with fire, air, and breath.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, On the Soul, I.8 f. 127u: ... and the Epicureans: indeed, according to them, the soul is a compound of more varied bodies. [Cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 3.231]

§ 3.15 On Temperaments

[U316]

Lucretius transitions from discussing temporary moods to the enduring traits of individuals. He shows some of the effects that result depending on which of the three named elements of the soul exists in the greatest proportion:

[1] Thermal Element	● τό Θερμόν, τό Πυρώδες	Calor, Vapor
[2] Pneumatic Element	● τό Πνευματικόν	Ventus, Aura
[1 & 2] Aerial Mix	● τό Ἀερώδες	Aer
[3] Nameless Element	τό Ἄκατονόμαστον	Nominis Expires

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things:

3.294 **sed cālīdī Plūs est illīs quībus ácria Corda
īrācúndaque Mēns fácil^e effervéscit in īrā:
quō géner^e in prīmīs Vīs est violénta leónum,
péctora Quī frémītū rumpunt – plērúmque geméntēs
nec cáper^e īrārūm flúctūs in péctore possunt.**

More **heat** exists **in those whose violent** Heart
and **irascible** Mind easily boil over **in anger**:
of which kind in first place is the **violent** Force of lions,
Who puff out **their chest with roaring** – generally they
cannot contain **the growling waves of anger** in their chest.

3.299 **āt ventōsa magis cervōrum frīgida Mēns est
et gelidās citius per viscera concitat aurās –
quae tremulum faciunt membrīs existere mōtum**

but the cold Mind of deer is more full of breath
and quickly stirs cold currents through its organs –
which causes a trembling movement to arise in the limbs.

3.302 **āt Nātūrā boum placidō magis āere vivit
(nec nimis irāi Fāx umquam subdita percit
fūmida – suffūdēns caecae cāliginis umbram)
nec gelidīs torpet tēlīs prefixa pavōris:
interutrāsque sita est cervōs saevōsque leōnēs.**

But the Nature of cattle lives more in calm air,
(nor is the smoky Torch of anger, arousing too much, ever applied –
pouring forth the shadow of blind darkness)
nor does it become numb, pierced by the cold darts of fear:
as she is situated between the deer and the fierce lions.

3.307 **sic hominum Genus est: quamvis Doctrīna politōs
cōstituatur pariter quōsdam – tamen illa relinquit
nātūrae cuiusque animi vestīgia pīma.**

the Species of humans is like this: however much Education
can dispose each to be similarly polite – yet it leaves
the first traces of each man's nature in the mind.

3.310 **nec rādicitus ēvellī mala posse putandumst:
quīn, proclivius, hīc irās dēcurrat ad ācrīs –
ille metū citius paulō temptētur – at ille
tertius accipiat quaedam clēmentius aequō.**

nor must it be thought that faults can be pulled out from the roots:
but that this Man, more inclined, may run down into fierce angers –
that man may be tempted by fear a little more quickly – but a
third man may receive certain things more gently than is fair.

3.314 **inquē alīs rēbus multīs diffēre necessest
nātūrās hominum variās mōrēsque sequācīs –
quōrum ēgō nunc nequeō caecās expōnere causās,
nec reperire figurārum tōt nōmina quōt sunt
principīs – undē haec oritur Variāntia rērum.**

and so in many other ways, it is necessary to differentiate
various naures of man and the behaviors that follow –
which I cannot now set out the obscure causes,
nor can I find so many names of the forms as there are
in the atoms – from which these Differences in things emerge.

3.319 **illud in hīs rēbus videō firmāre potesse:
usque adeō nātūrārum vestīgia linquī
parvola quae nequeat Ratiō depellere nōbīs –
ut: Nihil impediat dignam dīs dēgere vītam.**

I see it possible to confirm this in these matters:
to such an extent that the traces of natures are left
very small which Reason cannot drive away for us –
so that: Nothing may impede leading a life worthy for the gods.

§ 3.16 On Sensation

[U317]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.8.10, [p. 395 Diels] (Parallel A27, 18;
Plutarch IV.8.5): Leucippus, Democritus, and Epíkouros say that sense-perception
and thought occur when images approach from the outside. For we apply neither
[sense-perception nor thought] to anything in the absence of an image striking from
the outside.

Cicero, De Finibus, I.6.21: Those ideas which he {Epíkouros} adopts, the credit
belongs entirely to Democritus – {e.g.,} the atoms, the void, the images, or as they
call them, eidola, whose impact is the cause not only of vision but also of thought.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.38.108 (Cotta to Velleius): You are trying to foist these images of yours not only on our eyes but on our minds as well.

Ibid., I.38.107: Suppose that there are such images constantly impinging on our minds...

Saint Augustine, *Letter to Dioscorus*, 118.27 t. 2 [p. 340D Venice Edition 1719] (cf., *ibid.*, 31 p. 342A): Let them say, then, in which class they would include the images which, as they think, stream from solid substances, without themselves being at all solid, and by their impact on the eyes cause us to see; on the mind, to think. They could not possibly be perceived if they are themselves substances.

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, IV.23.2, [p. 414 Diels]: Epíkouros maintained that both emotions and sensation take place in the parts of the body susceptible to being affected, while the sovereign faculty is unaffected.

§ 3.17 On Vision

[U318]

Aetius, *Doxography*, IV.13.1, [p. 403 Diels] (Parallel O14, 1; Plutarch IV.13): Leucippus, Democritus, and Epíkouros maintain that visual perception takes place by the entrance of images [into the eyes].

Meletius, in Cramer, *Oxoniensian Anecdote*, 3 p. 71, 7: There is much disagreement among philosophers regarding [the act of seeing]: the Epicureans profess that images from apparent objects come to impact the eyes and produce vision.

[U319]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "On the Sensations"* 2 p. 438A 5- [p. 51,3 Thur.]: Democritus himself, and before him Leucippus, and after him the Epicureans, think that certain images, which are of the same shape as the objects from which they flow, flow from them and strike the eyes of those who are seeing and that this is how seeing occurs. As a proof of this he offers the fact that there is always in the pupil of those who are seeing a reflection and image of what is seen, and this is exactly what the act of seeing is. [Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisia, *On the Soul*, 2.13]

Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, VII 7 t. V [p. 643 K.; p. 643,3 Müll.; VII.7.21 De Lacy]: Therefore Epíkouros' view – although both views are mistaken – is much better than that of the Stoics. For the latter do not bring anything of the visual object up to the visual power, but Epíkouros declared that he did so. Aristotle is much superior to <Epíkouros>; he does not posit a corporeal image but a quality from the visual object to the eyes through an alteration of the surround air. [*ibid.* p. 643 K.; p. 643,3 Müll.]

Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, V.16.3: Epíkouros believes that there is a constant flow from all bodies of images from those bodies themselves, and that these impinge upon the eyes, and hence the sensation of seeing arises.

Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, VII 14.3: The nature of vision has been brilliantly investigated by Epíkouros, and his views on the subject should not, in my opinion, be rejected, especially since the theories of Democritus agree with them—for in this as in everything else those two philosophers are of the same mind. Epíkouros, then, holds that from all bodies images flow in a continuous stream and that the sloughed-off particles, cohering to form an empty shape, are forever carried abroad, without the slightest intermission, to find lodgment in our eyes, thus reaching the seat which nature has appointed for them as the seat of the appropriate sense. Such is the explanation given by that famous man.

§ 3.18 On Mirrors

[U320]

Aetius, *Doxography*, IV.14.2, [p. 405 Diels] (Parallel O14, 14; Plutarch): Leucippus, Democritus, and Epíkouros assert that what we see in mirrors is formed by opposition of images moving away from us and upon the mirror will be reflected backwards.

Appuleius, *Apology or On Magic*, 15: What is the reason why, not even for these motives, that the philosopher, and only him, should not look into the mirror? Indeed sometimes it is proper ... to consider also the criterion of the resemblance itself, it, as Epíkouros affirms, certain images moving away from us, like husks that emanate from bodies in a continuous flux, once they have bumped against something smooth and solid, are reflected backwards upon impact, and reproduced in reverse, corresponding in the opposite way.

§ 3.19 On Hearing

[U321]

Aetius, *Doxography*, IV.19.2, [p. 408 Diels]: Epíkouros maintains that the voice is a flow sent out from those who make utterances or produce sounds or noises. This flow is broken up into particles of the same shape. ("Of the same shape" means that the round are like the round and the angular and the triangular are like those of those types.) And when these strike the organs of hearing, the perception of voice is produced.

[U322]

Scholias on Dionysius Thrax, British Museum codex, in Cramer, *Oxoniansian Anecdote*, IV p. 317, 8: Epíkouros, Democritus, and the Stoics say that voice is a body. For everything which can act or be acted upon is a body. For example, iron: it is acted upon by fire and it acts on men or wood. So if voice can act and be acted upon, it is a body. But it acts, since we enjoy hearing a voice or a lyre; and it is acted upon, as when we are speaking and the wind blows, which makes it harder to hear our voice.

Grammaticus the Byzantine, Paris codex, 2555 BAG p. 1168: Democritus, Epíkouros, and the Stoics said that the voice must be a body, since everything that has activity and reactivity – that is: anything able to act and be acted upon – is a body.

[U323]

Plutarch, *Table Talk*, VIII 3.1 p. 720E: The fact which needed explanation, continued Ammonius, was rather that voices are more sonorous at night and preserve not only their volume but the precise articulation. ... 2. p. 720F: Boëthus then said that when he was still young and occupied with academic pursuits, he had been accustomed to using postulates and adopting unproved assumptions, after the manner of geometry, but that he would now employ some of the demonstrated doctrines of Epíkouros. "Existing things move about in the non-existent. There is a great deal of void interspersed and mingled with the atoms of air. Now when air is dispersed and has scope and motility because of its loose structure, the empty spaces left between the particles are small and narrow and the atoms, being scattered, fill a good deal of space, but when it is compressed and the atoms are crowded into a small space, and are forced close together, they leave plenty of space outside and make the intervals large. This is what happens at night, under the influence of cold. For warmth loosens and separates and dissolves concentrations, which is why bodies when boiling or softening or melting take up more room, while on the other hand the particles in freezing and cooling bodies join together more compactly and leave vacuums – spaces from which they have withdrawn – in the vessels which hold them. A sound which approaches and strikes a large number of particles collected in a mass is either silenced completely or undergoes serious convulsions and many collisions and delays. But in an empty stretch, devoid of atoms, it travels a smooth, continuous, and unimpeded path to the organ of hearing, preserving, by its velocity, not only the sense of the message but its fine detail. Surely you have noticed that empty vessels when struck are more responsive and send the sound a long way, and often the sound goes round and round and there is much communication of it; but a vessel filled either with solid matter or with some liquid becomes completely mute and soundless, since the sound has no way or passage by which to go through. Of physical bodies themselves, gold and stone, because of their compactness, are weak-voiced and dull-sounding, and quickly extinguish sounds within them, but bronze is melodious and vocal, because it has much empty space within its structure and is light and fine in its spatial mass, not constricted by crowding particles, but containing an abundance of flimsy, yielding substance. This gives easy passage to other motions and especially to sound, receiving it hospitably and speeding it on its journey, until someone, like a highway-robber, seizes and detains and blindfolds it. There it comes to a halt, ceasing to move on because of the obstruction. This is in my opinion what makes the night sonorous and the day less so. Daytime, by its warmth, and the expansion of the air, makes the intervals between the atoms small, so long as no one objects to my basic assumptions.

[Cf. *Ibid.*, c. 3 p. 721F]: There was no need to trouble the night with contraction and increased tension of its air, so as to leave passages and vacuums elsewhere, as through the air were a hindrance to sound or destroyed its substance. Air is itself the substance and body and power of sound. Apart from these points, turbulent nights, for example cloudy or stormy ones, ought to be in your theory more sonorous than nights that are clear and uniform in composition, because then the atoms are forced together in one place, and leave the place they are driven from empty of matter. It is also very obvious that a cold day would be more sonorous than a hot summer night. But neither are true.

§ 3.20 On Taste

[U324]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlótēs*, 25, p. 1121B: {That ... protest of theirs in defense of sensation, that it does not assert the external object to be warm, the truth being merely that the effect produce in sensation has been of this kind – } is it not the same as the statement about taste? It does not assert that the external object is sweet – there has merely occurred in the taste an effect and movement of this kind.

§ 3.21 On Sleep & Dreams

[U325]

Tertullian, *On the Soul*, 43: The Epicureans maintain that sound is a diminution of vital spirit.

[U326]

Plutarch, *Table Talk*, VIII 10.1 p. 734D: [regarding] the common notion about dreams – that they are especially likely to be unreliable or false in the autumn months ... I don't know ... how it came to be ... §2 p. 734F: Favorinus ... on this occasion advanced an old argument of Democritus. Taking it down all blackened with smoke, as it were, he set about cleaning and polishing it. He used for a foundation the familiar argument found in Democritus that ghostly films penetrate the body through the pores and that when they emerge they make us see things in our sleep. These films that come to us emanate from everything – from utensils, clothing, plants, and especially from animals, because of their restlessness and their warmth. The films have not only the impressed physical likeness in contour of an animal – so far Epíkouros agrees with Democritus, though he drops the subject at this stage – but they gather and convey by attraction ghostly copies of each man's mental impulses, designs, moral qualities, and emotions.

[U327]

Commentary on Lucan, *Pharsalia (The Civil War)*, 2.380, p. 75.13: Epíkouros asserts that flowing atoms penetrate our minds from the images of objects, and that during the sleep there appears either actions that we have done or those we are about to do.

[U328]

Tertullian, *On the Soul*, 46: Epíkouros, who used to liberate the divinity from every occupation, and eliminate the order of things, and dispersed them into passivity ... [more]

Cicero, *On Divination*, I.30.62: Shall we listen to Epíkouros rather than Plato {regarding dreams}?

Ibid., I.44, 99: Sisenna ... later, influenced to doubt by some petty Epicurean, goes on inconsistently to maintain that dreams are not worthy of belief.

Petronius, *Satyricon*, 104 [Eumolpus speaking]: Exactly. And this {coincidence of similar dreams by two different people} shows you why we consider Epíkouros almost superhuman. As you many remember, he very wittily disposes of such coincidences as mere silly superstitions.

[Cassius, by way of Plutarch, *Life of Cassius*, 37: {Referring to other doctrines as if they might be Epicurean...} And they explain the transpiration of dreams during periods of sleep – transpirations that are due to the imaginative faculty, which from minor beginnings, gives rise to varied emotions and images. This faculty, on the other hand, is always set in motion by nature and its motion is a representation or a concept.]

[U329]

Aetius, *Doxography*, V.3.5, [p. 417 Diels]: Epíkouros asserts that seminal fluid is a small detachment from the body and soul.

[U330]

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, V.5.1, [p. 418 Diels]: Pythagoras, Epíkouros, and Democritus all say that the female also secretes seminal fluid. It comes from testicles, flipped around in the opposite sense; it must thereby also have an impetus for union.

[U331]

Censorinus, *On the Natal Day*, 5.4: Even on this question there is uncertainty among the various scholars: if the child is born only by the semen of the father..., or also by that of the mother as well, which ... is the opinion of Epíkouros.

[U332]

Ibid., 6.2: The Stoics assert that the fetus forms itself in its entirety in a single moment. ... There are also those who think that it arrives by the work of Nature itself, like Aristotle and Epíkouros.

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, V.16.1, [p. 426 Diels]: Democritus and Epíkouros say that the embryo in the womb partially nourishes itself through the mouth, ...etc...

[U333]

§ 3.23 On the Origin of Human Beings

Censorinus, *On the Natal Day*, IV.9: Democritus of Abdera first held that men were created from water and mud. And Epíkouros' view is not much different, for he believed that when the mud became warm, first there grew wombs of some kind or another which clung to the earth by roots, and these begat infants and provided a natural supply of milky fluid for them, under the guidance of nature. When these [infants] had been brought up in this manner and reached maturity, they then propagated the human race.

§ 3.31 On Religion

[U384]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 8, p. 1092B: Since, however, the aim of their theology is to have no fear of God, but instead to be rid of our anxieties, I should think that this condition is more securely in the possession of creatures that have no faintest notion of God than of those who have been taught to think of him as injuring no one.

Ibid., 1091F: It does not follow that if pain, fear of the supernatural and terror about the hereafter are evil, escape from them is godlike and bliss beyond compare.

[U385]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XV 5 p. 800A: {And as to our deriving any benefit from them while they remain in heaven,} ... in this way, even according to Epíkouros, men get help from the gods, "They say, for instance, that the better emanations from them become the causes of great blessings to those who partake of them..."

[U386]

Philódēmos, *On Piety*, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.76.1 [p. 106 Gomperz] {Obbink I.27.754}: ... he says that as being both the greatest thing, and that which as it were excels in sovereignty, it possesses everything: for every wise man holds pure and holy beliefs about the divine and has understood that this nature is great and august. And it is particularly at festivals that he, progressing to an understand of it, through having its name the whole time on his lips, embraces with conviction more seriously

Philódēmos, On Music, Vol. Herc. 1, I c.4,6: Now, these very important things may still be said at the present: that the divine does not need any honor; for us, nevertheless, it's natural to honor it, above all, with pious convictions, even through the rites of national tradition, each according to his proper part.

Philódēmos, On the Life of the Gods, Vol. Herc. 1, VI col. 1: ... to the gods, and he admires their nature and their condition and tries to approach them and, so to speak, yearns to touch them and to be together with them; and he calls Sages "friends of the gods" and the gods "friends of Sages."

[U387]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.108.9 [p. 126 Gomperz] {Obbink I.31.880}: Again, he says, "let us sacrifice to the gods piously and well, as is appropriate, and let us do everything well according to the laws. But let us do so not disturbing them at all with our opinions on the topic of those who are best and most majestic; again, we say that it is even right to do this on the basis of the opinion which I was discussing. For in this way, by Zeus, it is possible for a mortal nature to live like Zeus, as it appears."

[U388]

Gnomoligion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (Maxims of Epíkouros): [=Maximus the Abbot, Gnomologion, 14, p.180 Turic; t. 2 p. 579 Combef.]: From Epíkouros: "If the gods listened to the prayers of men, all men would quickly have perished: for they are always praying for evil against one another."

[U389]

Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 26, 2 p. 779A: And moreover he {Epíkouros} inserts in his own books countless oaths and adjurations addressed to those who are nothing to us, swearing continually "No, by Zeus" and "Yes, by Zeus" and adjuring his readers and opponents in argument "in the name of the gods" having, I suppose, no fear himself of perjury nor trying to frighten them, but uttering this as an empty, and false, and idle, and unmeaning appendage to his speeches, just as he might hawk and spit, and turn his face, and wave his hand. Such an unintelligible and empty piece of acting on his part was his mentioning the name of the gods.

[U390]

Origen, Against Celsus, VII.66, [p. 386 Hoesch.]: And the charge of folly applies not only to those who offer prayers to images, but also to such as pretend to do so in compliance with the example of the multitude: and to this class belong the Peripatetic philosophers and the followers of Epíkouros and Democritus. For there is no falsehood or pretense in the soul which is possessed with true piety towards God

[U391]

Diogenes Laértios, Lives of Philosophers, 2.97 (Aristippus): Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, it is said, Epíkouros borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.

Origen, Against Celsus, VIII.45, [p. 419 Hoesch.]: For why may not our accounts be true, and those of Celsus fables and fictions? At least, these latter were not believed by the Greek philosophical schools, such as the followers of Democritus, Epíkouros, and Aristotle...

Cf. Ibid., I.43, p. 33: We shall therefore say, in the first place, that if he who disbelieves the appearance of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove had been described as an Epicurean, or a follower of Democritus, or a Peripatetic, the statement would have been in keeping with the character of such an objector.

[U392]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 22, p. 1119D: What is grave, Kōlótēs, is not to refuse to call a man good or some horsemen innumerable – it is to refuse to call or believe a god a god. This is what you and your company do, who will not admit that Zeus is "Author of the Race" Demeter "Giver of Laws" or Poseidon "Guardian of Growth." It is this disjoining of one word from another that works harm and fills your lives with godless negligence and recklessness, when you tear away from the gods the appellations attached to them and by that single act annihilate all sacrifices, Mÿsteries, processions and festivals.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.32: Grateful men indeed and reverential. Why, if nothing else, at least they eat bread every day, and yet have the audacity to say, "We do not know if there is a Demeter, or a Kore, or a Pluto;" not mention that, although they enjoy night and day, the changes of the year and the stars and the sea and the earth and the cooperation of men, they are not moved in the least by any one of these things, but look merely for a chance to belch out their trivial "problem" and after thus exercising their stomach to go off to the bath.

[U393]

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, I.8 [p. 307 Diels]: In regards to demons and to heroes... Epíkouros doesn't admit anything about any of this.

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.10 p. 800A: We seek a providence that has an interest for us, and in such that man has no share who has admitted that neither demons, nor heroes, nor any souls at all can live on hereafter.

[U394]

Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles, 19 p. 420B: As for the scoffing and sneers of the Epicureans which they dare to employ against Providence also, calling it nothing but a myth {cf. U369}, we need have no fear. We, on the other hand, say that their "Infinity" is a myth, which among so many worlds has not one that is directed by divine reason, but will have them all produced by spontaneous generation and concretion. If there is need for laughter in philosophy, we should laugh at those spirits, dumb, blind, and soulless, which they shepherd for boundless cycles of years, and which make their returning appearance everywhere, some floating away from the bodies of persons still living, others from bodies long ago burned or decayed, whereby these philosophers drag witlessness and obscurity into the study of natural phenomena; but if anyone asserts that such demigods exists, not only for physical reasons, but also for logical reasons, and that they have the power of self-preservation and continued life for a long time, then these philosophers feel much aggrieved.

§ 3.24 On Linguistics

[U334]

Origen, Against Celsus, I.24, [p. 18 Hoesch.]: As to this, one should also say that a deep and arcane debate about the nature of names emerged. Are names conventional, as Aristotle thinks? ... Or are names natural, as Epíkouros teaches – in a manner different from that of the Stoics – such that the first men burst forth with particular sounds which were then applied to things?

[U335]

Proclus Lycaeus, Commentary on Plato's "Cratylus" 16 [p. 6 Boiss.]: Pythagoras and Epíkouros shared the view of Cratylus... 17 [p. 8]: Epíkouros thought that names were natural in [one] sense, as being a primary function of nature, such as voice and vision and seeing and hearing, in the same way naming is natural. So that names too are natural in the sense of functions of nature. But Cratylus says that names are natural in [another] sense; that is why he says that each thing has its own proper name, since it was given specifically by the first name-givers in a craftsman-like fashion based on an understanding of the thing. Epíkouros, however, said that these men did not give names based on an understanding of things, but because they were moved in a natural fashion, like those who cough and sneeze and bellow and bark and lament.

§ 3.25 On Death

[U336]

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, IV.7.4, [p. 393 Diels]: Democritus and Epíkouros said that the soul is mortal and perishes with the body.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.33: What of the fact that that argument is completely false, since souls do not perish? "Reflect again on the truth" [Epikouros] says, "for it is necessary that that which is born with the body, perish with the body." Cf. Ibid., VII.12.1: Now let us refute the arguments of those who set forth contrary opinions. Lucretius worked them into his third book. "Since the soul is born with the body" he said, "It must perish with the body." {Cf. Lucretius, 3.417, 3.634, & 3.746} Ibid., VII.13.7: Thus, the opinion of Democritus and Epikouros and Dicaearchus about the dissolution of the soul is false then. [Ibid., VII.8.8: {...those who opposed [Plato, Pythagoras, & Pherecydes] held no less influence: Dicaearchus, at first; then Democritus; finally, Epikouros}]

St. Augustine (attributed), Exegesis of the Psalm, 73.25, t. IV [p. 781 Venice Edition]:

St. Augustine, Sermon, 348, t. V p. 1344 A: And, once this life is spent, they do not believe that there might be another one in the hereafter.

[U337]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, I (Against the Dogmatists, 3).72: [Souls] persist as they are in themselves, and are not, as Epikouros said, "dispersed like smoke when released from their bodies."

Cf. Iamblichus, by way of Stobaeus, Anthology, Physics, 41.43, [p. 924 H.]:

[U338]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.31.100: He {Epikouros} repeatedly argued at length, and also stated briefly and plainly in the work I have just mentioned {The Principal Doctrines}, that death does not affect us at all...

[U339]

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (Maxims of Epikouros): It is possible to provide security against other afflictions, but as far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls. {= Vatican Saying 31}

[Cf. Maximus the Abbot, Gnomologion, 36, [p.194 Turic.; t. 2 p. 827 Combef.]

[U340]

Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies, I) 22.5 [p. 572.14 Diels.]: He {Epikouros} concluded that the souls of men are dissolved along with their bodies, just as also they were produced along with them; these, in fact, are blood, and when this has gone forth or been altered, the entire man perishes. In keeping with this tenet, it follows that there are neither trials in Hades, nor tribunals of justice; so that whatsoever any one may commit in this life, that, provided he may escape detection, he is altogether beyond any liability of trial.

[U341]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 24.18: I am not so foolish as to go through at this juncture the arguments which Epikouros harps upon, and say that the errors of the world below are idle – that Ixion does not whirl round on his wheel, that Sisyphus does not shoulder his stone uphill, that a man's entrails cannot be restored and devoured everyday; no one is so childish as to fear Cerberus, or the shadows, or the ghostly garb of those who are held together by nothing but their bare bones.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.42: Epikouros says ... the punishments of hell do not have to be feared, because souls die after death; nor is there any hell at all.

Ibid., VII.7.13: Zēnōn, the Stoic, taught that there was a hell, and that the abodes of the virtuous were separated from the wicked, and that the former inhabited quiet and delightful regions, while the latter paid their penalty in dark places and horrible caverns of mud. The prophets made the same thing clear to us. Therefore, Epikouros was in error who thought that this was a figment of the poet's imagination, and took those punishments of hell to be those which are borne in this life.

§ 3.26 On Celestial Phenomena

[Tertullian, On the Pagan Nations, 2.4: Epikouros, however, who had said, "What is above us is nothing to us" wished notwithstanding to have a peep at the sky, and found the sun to be a foot in diameter.]

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, V.20.2, [p. 432 Diels]: Democritus and Epíkouros do not believe that celestial bodies are living beings.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 27, p. 1123A: Who is it that upsets accepted beliefs and comes in conflict with the plainest facts? It is those who reject... {divination, providence, and} that the sun and moon are living beings, to whom sacrifice and prayer and reverence is offered up by all mankind.

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, XII 6, t. IV [p. 21 K.]: Even our Creator, though knowing perfectly the ingratitude of such men as these, has yet created them. The sun makes the seasons of the year and perfects the fruits without paying any heed, I suppose, to Diagoras, Anaxagóras, Epíkouros, or the others blaspheming against it. No beneficent being bears malice over anything, but naturally aides and adorns all.

St. Augustine, *City of God*, XVIII 41: At Athens did there not flourish both the Epicureans, who asserted that human affairs are of no concern to the gods, and the Stoics, who, coming to the opposite conclusion, argued that these are guided and supported by the gods, who are our helpers and protectors? I wonder therefore why Anaxagóras was tried for saying that the sun is a blazing stone and denying that it is a god at all, while in the same city Epíkouros lived in glory and in safety, though he not only believed neither in the divinity of the sun nor in that of any other luminary, but also maintained that neither Jupiter nor any other god dwells in the universe at all for men's prayers and supplications to reach him.

[U343]

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, 2.20, 14, [p. 350 Diels] (Stobaeus, *Anthology*, *Physics*, 25.3; Plutarch, 2.20,5): Epíkouros maintains that the sun is a compact amassment of earth, similar in aspect to pumice-stone, spongy because of its pores, and ignited by fire.

Cf. Achilles, *Introduction*, 19, [p.138D Pet.]: Epíkouros asserts that it [the sun] is similar in a way to pumice-stone, and that from fire and through certain pores, it emanates its light.

[U344]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.22.6, [p. 352 Diels] (Plutarch 2.22): Anaximénēs believes that the sun might be large and flat as a petal, Heraclitus that it might be similar to a bowl-shaped container, and very bent; the Stoics that it might be spherical, like the world and celestial bodies; Epíkouros, that it might be able to assume any given shape.

[U345]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.21.5, [p. 352,1 Diels] (Plutarch 2.21.2; Stobaeus, *Anthology*, *Physics*, 25.3): Epíkouros maintains that the sun is more or less as large as it appears.

[U346]

Servius, *Commentary on Virgil's "Georgics"* I.247: At the expression "intempesta silet" ... The Epicureans maintain that the sun does not proceed around the other hemisphere, but according to them sparkles always gather together in the east, and the disc of the sun is formed.

Servius, *Commentary on Virgil's "Aenids"* IV.584: "With new light" ... according to the Epicureans, who foolishly believe that the sun is composed of atoms, and that it is born together with the day, and together with the day perishes.

[U347]

Junius Philargirius, *Commentary on Virgil's "Georgics"* 2.478 [p.248 Orsini] ("Various eclipses"): Epíkouros maintains that, regarding the phenomenon in which the sun seems to diminish, one should not attribute a single cause, but rather various hypotheses: it may be proposed, in fact, that it extinguishes itself, or that it ventures further out, or that some other body hides it.

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics, Alpha-33" (p. 89 A 38), [fr. 9u Ald.]: Therefore it is not possible, for the same belief, that it can be opinion and knowledge for the same person simultaneously, for he would then assume that the same thing can and cannot also be something else at the same time. But it happens that a man can have a certain belief as his opinion, while for another man, it is knowledge. For Epíkouros, in particular, it was indeed an opinion that the sun is eclipsed when the moon, in its course, passes under it; but in fact he believed it possible for things to be otherwise; for Hipparchus, by contrast, it was knowledge.

[U348]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Diogénēs Laértios 10.74 p. 26.9: Elsewhere he says that the earth is supported on air.

[U349]

Aetius, Doxography, 3.4.5, [p. 371 Diels] (Parallel N 6.5 p. 691 Gf.; Plutarch, 3.4.2): Epíkouros says that all these things {i.e., clouds, rain, etc.} can be explained with the atomic theory. Hail and rain, in particular, are rounded off because they are so-shaped from their long fall.

[U350]

Aetius, Doxography, 3.15.11 (Plutarch, 3 15.9): As for earthquakes, Epíkouros says that it is possible that the earth is moved by being violently thrust upwards when struck by the air from below, which is humid and dense; it's also possible that it happens because the earth is cavernous underground, and thus jolted by the wind, which bursts into its cavities, which are like caverns, and diffused into their interiors.

[U351]

Seneca, Natural Questions, VI.20.1: Now we come to those writers who have stated as a cause of earthquakes either all the elements I mentioned or several of them. Democritus thinks several. For he says that an earthquake is produced sometimes by moving air, sometimes by water, sometimes by both. (5) Epíkouros says that all these things can be causes and he tries several other causes. Also he criticizes those who insist that some single one of them is the cause, since it is difficult to promise anything certain about theories which are based on conjecture. Therefore, as he says, water can cause an earthquake if it washes away and erodes some parts of the earth. When these parts are weakened they cease to be able to sustain what they supported when they were intact. The pressure of moving air can cause earthquakes; for perhaps the air inside the earth is agitated by other air entering, perhaps the earth receives a shock when some part of it suddenly falls and from this the earth takes on movement. Perhaps a warm quantity of moving air is changed to fire and like lightning is carried along with great destruction to things that stand in its way. Perhaps some blast pushes the swampy and stagnant waters and consequently either the blow shakes the earth or the agitation of the air increases by its very motion and, stirring itself up, travels all the way from the depths to the surface of the earth. At any rate, Epíkouros is satisfied that air is the main cause of earthquakes.

§ 3.27 On the Gods

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.52:

The man who gets the better of all this
by words and without weapons, will not such a one {Epíkouros}
deserve to be reckoned among deities?

[U352]

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.16.43 - 20.56 (Velleius' monologue): {Translated elsewhere}

Ibid., 34.95 ^(Cotta) You say that there are both male and female gods – well, you can see as well as I can what is going to follow from that!

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VII.3.5: A man who denies that god is a "spirit diffused through all the parts of the world" {a Stoic definition} would not be saying that it is mistaken to call the world divine, as Epíkouros would, for he gave God human form and a place in the spaces between worlds.

Saint Augustine, Letter to Dioscorus, 118.27 t. 2 [p. 340B Venice Edition 1719]: How much better for me not even to have heard the name of Democritus than to reflect with sorrow that someone was considered great in his own times who thought that the gods were images which were emitted from solid substances, although they themselves were not solid, and that they, by circling around this way and that, of their own motion, and by sliding into the minds of men, make them think the image is a divine force, while the substance from which the image was given off was deemed excellent in proportion to its solidity! Therefore, his theory wavered, as they say, and varied, so that sometimes, he said that a certain substance from which the images streamed was god, yet, that substance cannot be conceived except through the images which it emits and gives off, that is, those which come from that substance, which he somehow thinks is corporeal and eternal and therefore divine, while the images are carried long by a constant emanation like mist, and they come and enter into ours so that we can think they are a god or gods. Those philosophers hold that there is no other cause for any thought of ours except these images which, when we think, come from those substances and enter into our minds. ... 28: However, Democritus is said to differ from Epikouros in his natural philosophy, in that he thinks there is a certain living and breathing force present at the coming together of atoms, by which force, I believe, he says "the images are endowed with divinity" – not the images of all things, but those of gods – and "that the elements from which the mind is compounded" exist in the universe, and to these he attributes divinity, and that these are "animate images which are wont to exercise a beneficent or harmful influence over us." But Epikouros postulated nothing as the beginning of the world but atoms, that is, certain particles of matter so minute that they cannot be divided or perceived by either sight or touch, and by the chance meeting of these particles he says that innumerable worlds, and living beings, and the principle of life itself were produced, as well as the gods whom endows with human form, and locates, not in any world, but beyond and between the worlds. He refuses absolutely to consider anything but material substances, but, in order to be able to think even about these, he says that images are given off by the very things which he supposes to be formed by the atoms, that they enter the mind, and that they are finer than the other images which appear to the eyes – for he says that this is the cause of our sight – but that they are "vast images of such a size as to envelop and enfold the entire world."

[U353]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, I (Against the Dogmatists, 3).25: Epikouros thinks that men have derived the conception of god from presentations [received] while asleep. For he says, since large manlike images strike them while they sleep, they supposed that some such manlike gods also existed in reality

§ 3.28 On the Nature & Form of the Gods

[U354]

Tertullian, Apologetics, 47: Some are sure that he [God] is incorporeal, others that he has a body – i.e., the Platonists and the Stoics respectively. Others say he consists of atoms, others of numbers – as do the Epikouros and the Pythagoreans respectively.

[Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 10.28: Let us concede to them, however, that the things which are earthly are made from atoms. Are the things which are heavenly also? They say that the gods are incorrupt, eternal, happy, and to them alone they give immunity, such that they may not be seen to be formed by the assembly of atoms. For if the gods also had come from these, they would also be able to be dissipated, any time the seeds break apart and return to their natural state. Therefore, if there is something which atoms have not brought about, why do we not understand that this is the case with other things, too? My question is, before those beginning-bodies had generated the world, why did not the gods build a dwelling for themselves? Surely, unless the atoms had come together and made heaven, the gods would still be hanging in the empty void.]

[U355]

Scholion on Epikouros, Principal Doctrines 1, Diogenēs Laértios 10.139: Elsewhere he says that the gods are discernible as mental impressions, some being unique, while others look similar, owing to the continuous flow of similar images to the same place, culminating in human form.

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.7.34, [p. 306 Diels] (Plutarch, I.7.15; Stobaeus, *Anthology*, *Physics*, 2.29): Epíkouros thinks the gods resemble humans, and can be contemplated by reason as a result of the fineness of the nature of their images.

[U356]

Philódēmos, *On the Life of the Gods*, Vol. Herc. 1, VI c. 13: It must also be said that the gods speak, and that they entertain themselves with one another. Indeed, we would no longer believe that the gods are happy and incorruptible, if they did not speak and did not communicate with one another. On the contrary, they would be similar to mute men. In effect, just as we use our voice...

Cf. c. 14: ... and since for virtuous men, conversation with their equals is a source of inexpressible pleasure. And, by Zeus, it is necessary to uphold that they have a language like Greek, or not far from it, and we know that those who have become gods only used the Greek language.

[U357]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, I (Against the Dogmatists, 3).178: Thus, to define God as speechless is perfectly absurd and in conflict with our general conceptions. But if he is gifted with speech, he employs speech and has organs of speech, such as lungs and windpipe, tongue and mouth. But this is absurd and borders on the mythology of Epíkouros.

[U358]

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.10.23 (Velleius speaking): As for those who say that the world itself is a conscious intelligence, they have not grasped the nature of consciousness, or understood in what shape it can be manifest. ... I am astonished by the stupidity of those who say that the world itself is a conscious and immortal being, divinely blest, and then say that it is a sphere, because Plato thought this to be the most beautiful of all shapes – I for one find more beauty in the shape of a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a pyramid. What mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning around with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room can there be in such an existence for stability of mind and for happiness – I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of the god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of the god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively.

Ibid., 2.17.46 (Balbus speaking): Epíkouros may make a joke of this if he likes, although humor was never his strong point – an Athenian without the "Attic salt!" He may say that he can make no sense of a "spherical and revolving god." But he will never move me from the one view which even he himself accepts: he agrees that gods exist, because there must be some supreme being which is superior to all else.

Cf. Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 1, VI c. 21: ... that which the other philosophers ascribe to [a god]. They must surely know that [a god] does not have a spherical bodily form, nor a tendency towards arguments, anger, or pettiness, but rather has a bodily form that approaches the sublime, and a disposition that disregards all that is impure, being entirely devoted to true blessedness and incorruptibility.

[U359]

Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions" (*Refutation of all Heresies*, I) 22.3 [p. 572.5 Diels.]: Acknowledging the Deity to be eternal and incorruptible, he says that God has providential care for nothing, and that there is no such thing at all as providence or fate, but that all things are made by chance. For that the Deity reposed in the intermundane spaces, (as they) are thus styled by him; for outside the world he determined that there is a certain habitation of God, denominated "the intermundane spaces" and that the Deity surrendered himself to pleasure, and took his ease in the midst of supreme happiness; and that neither has he any concerns of business, nor does he devote his attention to them.

Lactantius, *On the Anger of God*, 17.1: "God" says Epíkouros, "cares for nothing." Therefore, He has no power – for it is necessary that he who has power exercise care – or if He has power and does not use it, what is the reason of negligence so great that, I will not say our race, but even the world itself, is vile and worthless to Him? "On this account" he says, "He is incorrupt and blessed, because He is always quiet." To whom, then, has the administration of such great affairs yielded, if these things which we see controlled by the highest plan are neglected by God? Or how is he who lives and feels able in any way to be quiet? For quiet is a quality of either sleep or death.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.12.15: Epíkouros calls a god happy and incorrupt because he is everlasting. Beatitude ought to be perfect so that there be nothing which can vex or lessen or change it, nor can anything be considered blessed unless through its being incorrupt. And nothing is incorrupt save what is immortal.

[U361]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XV 5.9 p. 800A: In Epíkouros' view, providence disappears; the gods according to him pay most attention to the preservation of their own good.

Uncertain Epicurean Author, by way of Pseudo-Plutarch, *On the Opinions of the Philosophers*, I I.7.7 p. 300: "Both [Anaxagóras and Plato] share this error, because they portrayed a god as being concerned for human affairs and as making the cosmos for the sake of man. For a blessed and indestructible being, overflowing with good things and free of any share of what is bad, is completely preoccupied with the continuance of his won happiness and indestructibility and so is not concerned with human affairs. For he would be wretched, like a workman or builder, if he undertook burdens and felt concern for the creation of the cosmos."

[U362]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XV 5.11 p. 800B: But therein Epíkouros, in my judgment, seems to have acted more modestly {than Aristotle}: for as if he had not hope of the gods being able to abstain from the care of mankind if they came in contact with them, he transferred them, as it were, to a foreign country, and settled them somewhere outside the world, excusing them from the charge of inhumanity by the removal, and by their separation from all things.

[U363]

Plutarch, *Life of Pyrrhus*, 20.3: ... they [the Epicureans] removed the Deity as far as possible from feelings of kindness or anger or concern for us, into a life that knew no care and was filled with ease and comfort.

Lactantius, *On the Anger of God*, 2.7: Certain individuals say that [God] neither is pleased nor angered by anything, but that, free from care and in repose, He enjoys the good of His own immortality.

Cf. Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 2.1093:

I appeal to the holy hearts of the gods,
which in tranquil peace pass untroubled days and a life serene.

Ibid., V.82:

Those who have been correctly taught
that the gods lead a life without care...

Horace, *Satire*, 1.5.101:

I've learned that the gods exist carefree,
And, if a miracle does happen in Nature,
That petulant gods have nothing to do
With dispatching it down from the heavenly rooftop

Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 27, 1 p. 781A: To work, to administer, to do good and to show forethought, and all such actions are burdensome perhaps to the idle and foolish, and to the feeble and wicked, among whom Epíkouros enrolled himself by entertaining such thoughts of the gods.

Tertullian, Apologetics, 47: The Epicureans picture him [God] as idle and unemployed, a nobody (so to say) in regards to human affairs.

Salvianus, On the Governence of God, 1.5, p.3, 17: Among the Epicureans... who, just as they connect pleasure with virtue, so too they connect God with disinterest and laziness.

[U364]

Seneca, On Benefits, IV.4.1: "True; therefore God does not bestow benefits, but, free from care and unmindful of us, He turns away from our world and either does something else, or else does nothing, which Epíkouros thought the greatest possible happiness, and He is not affected either by benefits or by injuries." The man who says this surely cannot hear the voices of those who pray... IV.4.19: You, Epíkouros, ended by making God unarmed; you stripped him of all weapons, of all power, and, lest anyone should fear him, you banished him from the world. There is no reason why you should fear this being, cut off as he is, and separated from the sight and touch of mortals by a vast and impassable wall; he has no power either of rewarding or of injuring us; he dwells alone half-way between our heaven and that of another world, without the society either of animals, of men, or of matter, avoiding the crash of worlds as they fall in ruins above and around him, but neither hearing our prayers nor interested in us. Yet you wish to seem to worship this being just as a father, with a mind, I suppose, full of gratitude; or, if you do not wish to seem grateful, why should you worship him, since you have received no benefit from him, but have been put together entirely at random and by chance by those atoms and mites of yours? "I worship him" you answer, "because of his glorious majesty and his unique nature."

Ibid., VII.31.3: Some blame [the gods] for neglecting us, some with their injustice towards us; others place them outside of their own world, in sloth and indifference, without light, and without any functions;

Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 27, 8 p. 782C: As for the gods of whom their poets sing as "Givers of good things" {Homer, Od. viii. 325} these philosophers with mocking reverence say, The gods are neither givers nor partakers of any good things. In what way then do they show evidence of the existence of gods, if they neither see them present and doing something, as those who in admiration of the sun and moon and stars said that they were called gods (θεοός) because of their running (θεειν), nor assign to them any work of creation or arrangement, that they might call them gods from setting (θεϊναι), that is making (for in this respect in truth the Creator and Artificer of the universe alone is God), nor exhibit any administration, or judgment, or favor of theirs towards mankind, that we should owe them fear or honor, and therefore worship them? Or did Epíkouros peep out from the world, and pass beyond the compass of the heavens, or go out through some secret gates known only to himself, and behold the gods dwelling in the void, and deem them and their abundant luxury blessed? And did he thence become a devotee of pleasure, and an admirer of their life in the void, and so exhort all who are to be made like unto those gods to participate in this blessing, [etc.]

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 25.59 (Attributing these words to Piso): "What, Caesar, is the strong attraction that these thanksgivings of such frequency and such long duration as have been decreed to you possess? The world is under a deep delusion concerning them, the gods care naught for them; for they, as our godlike Epíkouros has said, feel neither kindness nor wrath towards any."

[U365]

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 4.1: What follows is of the school of Epíkouros. He teaches that just as there is no anger in God, so there is not even kindness. For since Epíkouros thought that to do evil or do harm was foreign to God (an action which is generally spring from the emotion of anger), he also took from Him beneficence because he saw it to be a consequence that, if God possessed anger, He would have kindness also. "From this" he says, "he is blessed and incorrupt, because he cares for nothing, and he neither has any concern himself, nor does he show it for another."

[U366]

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 4.11: Accordingly, then, if there is neither anger nor kindness in [God], surely there is neither fear nor joy nor grief nor compassion. For there is one plan for all the affections, one connected movement, which cannot be in God. But if there is no affection in God, because whatever is affected is a weakness, therefore, neither is there any care of anything nor any providence in Him. The argument of [Epíkouros] extends only this far. He was silent about the other things which follow, namely, that there is no care in Him nor providence, and, therefore, that there is not any reflection nor any sense in Him, by which it comes about that He does not exist at all. So when he had descended step by step, he stopped on the last step because he then saw the precipice. But what advantage is it to have kept silent and to have concealed the danger? Necessity forced him to fall even against his will.

Ibid, 15.5: Since, therefore, there are good and evil things in human affairs ... it is of necessity that God is moved with reference to each. He is moved to kindness when He sees just things done, and to wrath when He beholds the unjust. But Epíkouros is in opposition to us and he says: "If there is in God movement of joy unto kindness and of hatred unto wrath, then he must have both fear, and inclination, and desire, and the other affections which belong to human feebleness." But it is not necessary that he who is angry should also fear, or that he who rejoices should grieve. ... The affection of fear is a matter in man – not in God.

Ibid, 16.6: So the arguments are found to be empty ... of those who think that there is no movement of the mind in God. Because there are some affections which do not happen to be found in God, like desire, fear, avarice, grief, and envy, they have said that He is utterly free from all affection. He is free of these because they are affections of vices; but, those which are of virtue (that is, anger toward the evil, love toward the good, compassion for the afflicted) since they are becoming to His divine power.

§ 3.30 On the Care & Governance of the World

[U367]

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.8.18 - 9.23 (Velleius' monologue): {Translated elsewhere}

[U368]

Lucian, The Double Indictment, 2: Epíkouros certainly spoke the truth when he said that we {gods} do not provide for things on earth.

Lucian, Icaromenippus, 2: The Epicureans are really quite insolent, and they attack us without restraint, affirming that we {gods} don't concern ourselves with human affairs, nor do we control events whatsoever.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, On Fate, 31, [p.100 Or.]: The so-called "absence of {divine} providence" by those in Epíkouros' circle...

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, I.12.1: Concerning gods, there are some who say that the divine does not even exist while others, that it does exist but is inactive and indifferent, and takes forethought for nothing; ...

Ibid, 2.20.23: "Consider the contrary assertion: The gods not exist, and even if they do, they pay no attention to men, nor have we any fellowship with them, and hence this piety and sanctity which the multitude talk about is a lie told by 'impostors and sophists,' or, I swear, by lawmakers to frighten and restrain evildoers."

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.9 p. 800A: [= U361]

Ibid, 13 p. 800A: He {Epíkouros} deprived the gods of their activity towards us, from which alone a just confidence in their existence was likely to be derived.

Ibid, XV 5.3 p. 799A: He who puts aside this divine nature, and cuts off the soul's hope of hereafter, and destroys reverence before superior Beings in the present life, what communion has he with Plato? Or how could he exhort men to what Plato desires, and confirm his sayings? For on the contrary he surely would appear as the helper and ally of those who wish to do injustice. For every one who is human and constrained by human desires, if he despise the gods and think they are nothing to him, inasmuch as in life he dwells far away from them, and after death exists no more, will come prepared to gratify his lusts.

Ibid, 5.6 p. 799A: ... guaranteeing the impunity on the part of the gods.

Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks, 5, [p. 20.8 Sylb.]: Epíkouros alone I will banish from memory, and willingly at that. For he, preeminent in impiety, thinks that God has no care for the world.

Plotinus, Dissertations, (Aeneids, 2.9), 15: Epíkouros, who rejects providence...

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, I.2.1: I do not think it so necessary to maintain a principle from what question which seems to be primary by nature, whether it is providence which takes care of all things, or whether they have been made and are carried on fortuitously. The author of this opinion is Democritus; its establisher, Epíkouros. Ibid., 2.8.48: The world was made by Divine Providence. ... this was held as an acknowledged and indubitable fact by those first seven wise men up to Socrates and Plato even, until the mad Epíkouros arose many ages after, and dared to deny that which is most evident, with a zeal and desire of inventing new beliefs, so that he might set up a system under his own name.

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 9.4: Later, however, Epíkouros said that there was a god, indeed, because it was necessary that there be in the world something outstanding, and distinguished, and blessed, but still he held that there was no providence; and, as a result of this, the world itself he regarded as fashioned neither by any plan nor by design nor by art, but that the nature of things had conglobated by certain minute and inseparable seeds.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 27, p. 1123A: Who is it that upsets accepted beliefs and comes in conflict with the plainest facts? It is those who reject divination and deny that there exists divine providence.

Ibid., 30, p 1124E: When, therefore, will our life be that of a beast, savage and without fellowship? When the laws are swept away, but the arguments that summon us to a life of pleasure are left standing; when the providence of heaven is not believed in ...

Ibid., 8, p 1111B: Thus he does away with providence, but says he has left us with piety.

Plutarch, Against the Stoics, 32, p. 1075E: The Stoics themselves make no end of fuss crying woe and shame upon Epíkouros for violating the preconception of the gods because he does away with providence, for they say that god is preconceived and conceived to be not only immortal and blessed but also humane and protective and beneficent.

[U369]

Origen, Against Celsus, I.13, [p. 12 Hoesch.]: ... the Epicureans, who charge as superstitious those who advocate Providence and put God in lordship of everything. [Ibid., I.8 p. 8 (I.10 p. 10; 3 75 p. 161; V.61 p. 279)]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 21, p. 1101C: {The Epicureans} malign Providence as if she were some foul witch to frighten children with or an unrelenting Fury of punishment hanging over our heads.

[U370]

Lactantius, Divine Institutions, 3.17.8: Epikouros saw that adversities were always befalling the good: poverty, labors, exiles, and loss of dear ones; that the evil on the contrary were happy, were gaining in wealth, and were given honors. He saw that innocence was not safe, that crimes were committed with impunity; he saw that death raged without concern for morals, without any order or regard for years, but that some reached old age, while others were snatched away in childhood; some still robust reach the end, but others are cut off by untimely deaths in the first flower of adolescence; and in wars the better ones are conquered and die. It was especially disturbing, however, that religious men were among the first to be afflicted with the more serious evils, but upon those who either neglected the gods entirely or who did not piously revere them, either lesser disadvantages came or none at all. Often, also, the very temples were struck with lightning. {Cf. Lucretius, 2.1101} ... 17.16: When, therefore, Epikouros thought on these matters, as if influenced by the iniquity of those things, for so it seemed to one not knowing the cause and reason, he believed that there was no providence. When he had persuaded himself of this theory, he even undertook that it should be defended. Thus he cast himself into inextricable errors. For if there is no providence, how was the world made so orderly, by its arrangement? "There is no arrangement" he says, "for many things have been done differently from the way they should have been." {Cf. Lucretius, 2.180 & V.195} And a godlike man discovered what he should reprehend. If there were time to refute each single thing, I would show easily that this man was neither wise nor sane. Likewise, if there is no providence, how are bodies of animals so ordered that each of the members disposed in a marvelous arrangement preserves its own functions? He says: "The plan of providence has done nothing in the procreating of animals. Neither were the eyes made for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the tongue for speaking, nor the feet for walking, since these were in existence before there was seeing, hearing, speaking, and walking. So these things were not produced for use, but the use came from them. {Cf. Lucretius IV.822} If there is no providence, why do the rains fall, grains rise, trees flower? He says that "those are not for the sake of living things, since they are of no profit to providence, but all things must happen of their own accord." Whence, therefore, are they born, or how do all things which happen come to be? He says that it is not the work of providence. "There are seeds flying about through the void, and when these have massed together at random among themselves, all things are born and grow."

[U371]

Lactantius, Divine Institutions, VI.1.5.3: Therefore, just as God did not make the world for Himself, because He does not need its advantages; but because of man who uses it, so He made man on account of Himself. "What usefulness for god is there, that he should make man for himself?" asks Epikouros. {Cf. Lucretius, V.165} Surely, it was so that he might understand His works; that he might be able to admire with his senses and declare with his voice the providence of His arrangement, the plan of His accomplishment, and the virtue of His completion of the work. The summation of all these acts is that he worships God. 5.7: "What then" he says, "does the worship on the part of man confer upon a god who is blessed and in need of nothing? If he had so much regard for man that he made the world on account of him, that he equipped him with wisdom, that he made him master of living things, and that he loved him as a son, why did he make him mortal and frail? Why did he put him whom he loved up against all evils, when man should have been both happy, as though joined and near to god, and everlasting, as he is himself, for the worshiping and contemplation of whom he was made?"

Cf. Ibid., VII.3.13: The Stoics say that the world was made for the sake of men. I hear this argument. But Epikouros does not know the men themselves, or why, or who made them.

[U372]

Lactantius, *The Works of God*, 2.10: Wherefore, I often marvel at the folly of those philosophers in the wake of Epikouros who condemn the works of nature that they may show that the world is formed and governed by no providence. They assign the origin of things to inseparable and solid bodies from the chance combinations of which all things come to be and have arisen. I pass by the things pertaining to the world itself with which they find fault; in this they are mad, even to the point of ridicule. I take up now that which pertains to the subject which we have at hand. 3.1: They complain that man is born more weak and frail than other animals. For as soon as the others come forth from the womb, they are able at once to stand erect and move about with delight, and they are at once able to endure the air because they have come forth into the light fortified by natural protections. Man, on the other hand, they claim, is cast forth naked and unarmed as from a shipwreck and is hurled upon the miseries of this life. He is able neither to move himself from the place where he has been put forth, nor to seek the nourishment of milk, nor to bear the brunt of weather. So they say that nature is not the mother of the human race, but a stepmother. She has been very liberal with the dumb beasts, but she has produced man in such a way – needy and weak – and in want of all aid he can do nothing else but indicate his condition by wailing and weeping, that is "as one for whom there remains in life only the passage of evils." {Lucretius, V.227} ... 3.6: "But the training of man" they say, "consists of great struggle." 4.1: Then too, people complain that man is subjected to sickness and untimely death. They are incensed, in fact, that they have not been born gods. "Not at all" they will say, "but from this we demonstrate that man was not made with any providence, and it should have been otherwise." ... 4.3: They, mind you, would have no man die except when he has completed a hundred years of life. ... 4.12: Our opponents do not see the reason of the outcomes, because they erred once in the very keypoints of this discussion. For when divine providence was excluded from human affairs, it necessarily followed that all things came into being of their own accord. From this stage, they hit upon those impacts and chance comings together of minute seeds, because they saw no origin of things. And when they had cast themselves into these straits, then, sheer necessity forced them to think that souls were born with their bodies and were also extinguished with them. They had taken it for granted that nothing was done by a divine mind. And this very point they could not prove in any other way than by showing that there were some things in which the determination of Providence seemed to limp. They found fault, therefore, with those things in which Providence marvelously, even exceptionally, expressed in divinity, namely, those things I have referred to concerning sicknesses and untimely death, although they should have considered, when they were assuming these things, what would be a necessary consequence.

[U373]

Lactantius, *The Works of God*, 6.7: Epikouros, therefore, saw in the bodies of animals the skill of a divine plan, but, in order to accomplish what he had rashly taken upon himself before, he added another piece of nonsense in accordance with the former. He said that eyes of the body were not created for seeing or the ears for hearing or the feet for walking, since these parts were formed before there was any use of seeing and hearing and walking, but that the functions of all of these came about from them after they were produced. {Cf. Lucretius IV.822} ... What did you say, Epikouros? That the eyes were not made to see? Why, then, do they see? "Afterwards" he says, "their use appeared." For the purpose of seeing, therefore, they were produced, inasmuch as they cannot do anything else by see.

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, I.21, t. 3 [p. 74 K.]: At this point it is proper for us not to pass over the statements of certain men who embrace the doctrines of Epikouros, the philosopher, and Asclepiades, the physician, and who disagree with me on these matters. ... These men do not believe that it is because the tendons are thick that they are powerful, or because they are slender that their actions are weak, but think that actions are what they are as the necessary result of their usefulness in life, and that the size of the tendons depends on how much they are moved; that is, tendons that are exercised in all likelihood thrive and grow thick, whereas those that lie idle get no nourishment and waste away. Hence they say that Nature did not form the tendons as they are because it was better for the tendons of powerful actions to be strong and thick, and those of more feeble actions to be thin and weak – for if so, apes would not have fingers like ours – but as I said, before, they claim that parts which are exercised necessarily become thick because they are well nourished, and parts that lie idle are poorly nourished and become thin.

[U374]

Lactantius, *On the Anger of God*, 13.19: You see, then, that we need wisdom much more on account of evils. Unless these had been set before us, we would not be rational animals. And if this reasoning is true, then that argument of Epíkouros is refuted. "God" he says, "either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants to and cannot, then he is weak – and this does not apply to god. If he can but does not want to, then he is spiteful – which is equally foreign to god's nature. If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful, and so not a god. If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fitting for a god, where then do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them?" I know that most of the philosophers who defend [divine] providence are commonly shaken by this argument and against their wills are almost driven to admit that god does not care, which is exactly what Epíkouros is looking for. But when the reasoning has been examined, we easily bring this formidable argument to dissolution. ... unless we first recognize evil, we shall not be able to recognize the good. But Epíkouros did not see this, nor anyone else, that if evils are taken away, wisdom is equally removed; nor do any vestiges of virtue remain in man, the nature of which consists in sustaining and overcoming the bitterness of evils.

[U375]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.29.5 [p. 326.3 Diels]: Epíkouros says that all things happen by necessity, by choice, and/or by chance.

[U376]

Cicero *Academica* 2.30.97 (Lucullus): They will not get Epíkouros, who despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic, to admit the validity of a proposition of the form "Hermárchos will either be alive tomorrow or not alive" while dialecticians demand that every disjunctive proposition of the form "either x or not-x" is not only valid but even necessary, See how on his guard the man is whom your friends think slow; for "If" he says, "I admit either of the two to be necessary, it will follow that Hermárchos must either be alive tomorrow or not alive; but as a matter of fact in the nature of things no such necessity exists." Therefore let the dialecticians, that is, Antiochus and the Stoics, do battle with this philosopher, for he overthrows the whole of dialectic.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.25.70 ^(Cotta) Epíkouros did the same sort of thing in his argument with the logicians. It is an axiom of the traditional logic that in every disjunctive proposition of the form "X either is ... or is not ..." one of the alternatives must be true. He was afraid that if he admitted anything of this sort, then in a proposition such as "Tomorrow Epíkouros will either be alive or he will not be alive" one or the other of the statements would be a necessary truth: so to avoid this he denied that there was any logical necessity at all in a disjunction proposition, which is too stupid for words!

Cicero, *On Fate*, 10.21: Now here, first of all, if it were my desire to agree with Epíkouros and deny that every proposition is either true or false, I would rather accept that blow than agree that all things come about through fate; for the former opinion gives some scope for discussion, but the latter is intolerable. So Chrysippus strains every sinew in order to convince us that every proposition is either true or false. Epíkouros is afraid that, if he concedes this, he will have to concede that whatever comes about does so through fate; for if either the assertion or the denial is true from eternity, it will also be certain – and if certain, also necessary. [cf. *Ibid.*, 9.19]

[U377]

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Beta-8"* p. 198b 29: In cases where everything happened as though it were for the sake of some goal, these creatures were preserved because, although they were formed by chance, they were formed as suitable compounds; but in other cases [the creature] perished and still do perish, as Empedocles refers to "ox-like creatures with human faces." ; [fr. 84u Ald.; p. 372.9 Diels]: The ancient natural philosophers who said that material necessity determines the cause of things which come to be, seem to hold this opinion, and among later thinkers so do the Epicureans. Their error, as Alexander says, comes from thinking that everything which comes to be for the sake of a goal comes to be by intention and calculation, and observing that things which come about by nature do not come to be in this way.

[U378]

Plutarch, *On the Contradictions of the Stoics*, 32, p 1050C: And Epíkouros, for his part, twists about and exercises his ingenuity in conniving to free and liberate voluntary action from the necessity of eternal motion, in order not to leave vice immune to blame.

[U379]

Cicero, *On Fate*, 10.22: Epíkouros, however, thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom;

Ibid., 23: Epíkouros introduced this theory because he was afraid that, if the atom was always carried along by its weight in a natural and necessary way, we would have no freedom, since our mind would be moved in the way in which it was constrained by the movement of the atoms. ... More acutely, Carneades taught that the Epicureans could have maintained their position without this fictitious swerve. For, seeing that [Epíkouros] taught that there could be some voluntary movement of the mind, it would have been better to defend that than to introduce the swerve, especially as they cannot find a cause for it. ... For in having admitted that there was no movement without a cause, they would not be admitting that all things that came about did so through antecedent causes. For (they could have said), there are no external and antecedent causes of our will.

[U380]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.29.6 [p. 326 Diels] (Plutarch, I.29.2; Stobaeus Anthology, Physics 7.9): Epíkouros says that chance is a cause which is uncertain with respect to persons, times, and places.

[U381]

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, VI.14 [p. 571- K.]: I would not wish to tell how Nature corrected this fault {the relative isolation of some muscles from the nervous system} by inventing a clever device unless I first permitted the disciples of Asclepiades and Epíkouros to search out the way in which they would have conferred nerves on these muscles if they were placed in the role of the Creator of animals; for I am in the habit of doing this sometimes and of granting them as many days or even months as they wish for deliberation. One cannot do so, however, when writing a book and cannot compare the wisdom of these gentlemen with Nature's lack of skill or show how the Nature rebuke as being unskillful is so much more ingenious than they are with all their cleverness that they are unable to conceive of the skill with which she works. Hence, I find it necessary to tell now about the devices Nature has employed in order to give the muscles in question their share of nerves and motion.

Galen, *On the Construction of the Embryo*, 6 t. IV [p. 688 K., Singer]: It will certainly not be admitted that the substance of this 'Nature' {of the cause and formation of the embryo} – whether that is something incorporeal or corporeal – reaches this peak of intelligence by people who declare that they cannot believe it in any way possible that this entity functions in such skilful manner in the construction of the embryo. But we, on hearing this assertion from Epíkouros and from those who maintain that everything happens without design, do not stand convinced of it.

[U382]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.3- [p. 329 Diels] (Plutarch, 2.3; Stobaeus Anthology, Physics 21.3): All the other philosophers considered that the world is alive and governed by providence. Leucippus, Democritus, and Epíkouros, by contrast, say that neither is so; rather, it is made up of atoms, by nature and without reason.

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, XI.8 t. 3, [p. 873 K.]: Moreover, would not one also marvel that the teeth are bound to the phatnia with strong ligaments {the periosteum}, especially at the roots where the nerves are inserted, and marvel the more if this is the work of chance, not skill? But the thing a person would marvel at most of all is the ordered disposition of the teeth – something that, even granting all the aforesaid good fortune of the Epicurean atoms and the particles of Asclepiades, he would not allow, balking and saying that it was the work of a just Governor and not of fortunate motion.

Ibid., p. 874: Nevertheless, let us grant even this to the most fortunate atoms, which those men say move without reason, but which are in more danger of doing everything according to reason than are Epíkouros and Asclepiades.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, VII.3.23: Let them make the case, if they can, either why [the world] was made in the beginning or should afterwards be destroyed. Since Epíkouros, or Democritus, was not able to show this, he said that it was begun of its own accord, seeds coming together here and there. And when these were again loosened, separation and dissolution would follow. Therefore, he corrupted what he had rightly seen, and completely overturned the whole plan by his ignorance of the plan; and he reduced the world and all things which go on in it to the likeness of a certain very empty dream since no plan subsists in human affairs.

[U383]

Flavius Claudius Julianus (Julian the Emperor), *Orations*, V, "Hymn to the Mother of the Gods" [p. 162A Pet.; 210.6 Hertlein]: We assert that matter exists and also form, embodied in matter. But if no cause be assigned prior to these two, we should be introducing, unconsciously, the Epicurean doctrine. For if there be nothing of higher order than these two principles, then spontaneous motion and chance brought them together.

Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 24, 1 p. 773D: How are we to bear with them {the atomists} when they assert that the wise and therefore beautiful works of creation are accidental coincidences?

Proclus Lycaeus, *Commentary on Plato's "Timeas"* p. 80 midway: This axiom {of Aristotle, that each 'particular' is generated by a certain cause}, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures, to be the work of chance.

Ibid., p. 81 below: Some doubt, however, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged that there is a Demiurge {i.e., a creator} of the world who pursues a plan: for they say there is not a Demiurge of it who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. Any many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion; particularly the Epicureans, who entirely deny that there is Demiurge and, even generally, a cause of all things.

Ibid., p. 82.5: Every body, as [Aristotle] says, has limited power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epíkouros says it is?

Cf., p. 108.33: It is intelligence, in fact, which is creator and god – not chance, as certain others maintain.

Ibid., p. 19.14: The atoms of Epíkouros, when encountering each other, succeed in forming a tidy universe more easily than a bunch of names and words, all mixed together, would happen to form coherent speech! {Cf., Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 2.37.93; Plutarch, *The Oracles at Delphi*, 11 p. 399E}

§ 3.32 On Divination

[U395]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.135: Elsewhere he rejects divination entirely, such as in the Small Summary.

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, V.1.2 [p. 415 Diels]: Xenophanes and Epíkouros dismissed the art of divination.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 2.65.162: Prediction of future events is a favorite target for the wit of Epíkouros.

Cicero, *On Divination*, I.3.5: All the rest, except for Epíkouros, who spoke nonsense about the nature of the gods, endorsed divination.

Ibid., 2.17.40: Hence, while [Epíkouros] takes a roundabout way to destroy the gods, he does not hesitate to take a short road to destroy divination. [cf. Ibid., I.39.87; 49.109; 2.17.39; 23.51]

Scholion on Aeschylus, *Prometheus*, 624: Epicureanism is the doctrine that abolishes divination; indeed, they say "Given that destiny rules all, you <predicting a disgrace> have procured pain ahead of time; predicting instead something positive, you have wiped out the pleasure of its realization. On the other hand, they also say "That which must happen, will still happen."

Origen, *Against Celsus*, VII.3, [p. 343 Hoesch.]: In regard to the oracles here enumerated, we reply that it would be possible for us to gather from the writings of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school not a few things to overthrow the authority of the Pythian and the other oracles. From Epíkouros also, and his followers, we could quote passages to show that even among the Greeks themselves there were some who utterly discredited the oracles which were recognized and admired throughout the whole of Greece.

Cf. Lucian, *Alexander the Oracle Monger*, 17: It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epíkouros or a Mētródōros, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

Ibid., 25: Well, it was war to the knife between [Alexander] and Epíkouros, and no wonder. What fitter enemy for a charlatan who patronized miracles and hated truth, than the thinker who had grasped the nature of things and was in solitary possession of that truth? ... The unmitigated Epíkouros, as he used to call him, could not but be hateful to him, treating all such pretensions as absurd and puerile.

Ibid., 61: My object, dear [Celsus], ... has been ... to strike a blow for Epíkouros, that great man whose holiness and divinity of nature were not shams, who alone had and imparted true insight into the good, and who brought deliverance to all that consorted with him.

Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, VI.9:

For when he saw that whatever men's needs demanded,
so far as may be, to keep their lives in safety,
was there at hand already for their use,
that men had all they could want in the way of wealth
and honor and praise, and pride in successful children;
Yet, at home each was perpetually disquieted
and the mind was enslaved by all its bitter complaints;
He understood that the trouble was in the container
and because of some flaw in it, everything would go bad
no matter how many excellent things were put into it:
Partly because there were holes and things flowed through them
and there was no possibility of filling it up,
And partly because what did get in was spoiled,
so to speak, by the nauseous taste there was inside.

The truth was what he used to purify hearts with
and he set a limit to fear as to desire;
He explained what it is that all of us really want
and showed us the way along a little path
which makes it possible for us to go straight there.

Cf. Horace, *Epistles*, I.2.54:

Jars left contaminated will carry their taint to any contents whatsoever.
Spurn all delights; any joy that is purchased with pain will be harmful.
Greed is forever unsatisfied – vow to keep definite limits.

Cicero, *De Finibus*, I.9.29 - 19.62, (Torquatus to Cicero): (Translated elsewhere)

§ 4.1 On the Chief Good & Evil

Saint Augustine, *Against the Academicians*, 3.7.16, t. I, p. 281B [p. 53F Venice edition, 1719]: {Attributed to Cicero} "If Zénōn or Chrysippus were asked who the wise man is, he'll reply that the wise man is the one whom he himself has described. In return, Epíkouros or another adversary will deny this and maintain instead that the wise man is the one most skilled at catching pleasures. And so the fight is on! The whole Porch is in an uproar! Zénōn is shouting that man is naturally apt for nothing but virtue, which attracts mind to itself by its own grandeur without offering any extrinsic advantage and rewarded as a kind of enticement; Epíkouros' 'pleasure' is common only among brute animals, and to push man – and the wise man! – into an association with them is abominable. Epíkouros, like Bacchus, has called together a drunken mob from his Gardens to aid him against this onslaught! The mob is searching for someone to tear to pieces with their long fingernails and savage fangs in their Bacchic fury. Elevating the name of pleasure as agreeableness and calm, with popular support, Epíkouros passionately insists that without pleasure nobody could seem happy."

[Cf. Saint Augustine, *Sermon*, 150.5-, t. V p. 713-]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.10.31: For the origin of the Chief Good, he {Epíkouros} goes back, I understand, to the birth of living things. As soon as an animal is born, it delights in pleasure and seeks it as a good, but shuns pain as an evil. Creatures as yet uncorrupted are according to him the best judges of Good and Evil... 33: For proof of this, however, Epíkouros cannot have gone to children nor yet to animals, which according to him hold a mirror up to nature; he could hardly say that natural instinct guides the young to desire the pleasure of freedom from pain. This cannot excite sexual desire; the 'static' condition of feeling no pain exerts no driving-power, supplies no impulse to the will (so that Hieronymus also is wrong here); it is the positive sensation of pleasure and delight that furnishes a motive. Accordingly Epíkouros' standing argument to prove that pleasure is naturally desired is that infants and animals are attracted by the 'kinetic' sort of pleasure, not the 'static' kind which consists merely in freedom from pain.

Cf. *Ibid.*, 13.109: Let us leave pleasures to the lower animals, to whose evidence on this question of the Chief Good your school is fond of appealing.

Cicero, *Academica*, I.2.6: Even this department of ethics, and the subject of moral choice and avoidance, that school handles quite simply, for it frankly identifies the good of man with the good of beasts, but what a vast amount of what minute precision the teachers of our school display is not unknown to you.

Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 3.194: Hence, the Epicureans suppose themselves to have proved that pleasure is naturally choice-worthy; for animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists*, (*Against the Dogmatists*, XI) 96: Some of those who belong to the school of Epíkouros, in answer to these objections {that folly is not evil by nature, and so forth}, are wont to argue that the animal avoids pain and pursues pleasure naturally and without teaching. Thus when it is born, and is not as yet a slave to opinions, it cries and screams as soon as it is smitten by first puff of chilly air. But if it naturally has an inclination for pleasure and a disinclination for toil, it naturally avoids pain and chooses pleasure.

Cf., Maximus of Tyre, *Dissertations*, 3.2- [p. 30- Reiske]

Varro, *On Philosophy*, by way of Saint Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.1: "There are four things that men naturally seek, without a master and without the support of any instruction, without effort and without any art of living ... naturally, they seek pleasure, which is an agreeable activity of physical perception, or repose, the state in which the individual suffers no bodily discomfort, or both of these (which Epíkouros calls by the single name of pleasure), or taking everything together, the primary wants of nature..."

Cf. Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, V.5, t. V [p. 460 K.; 438.16 Muell.; V.5.8 De Lacy] : Epíkouros saw only the kinship {oikeíosis} felt by the worst part of the soul.

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, 2.20, p. 177.23: For the feeling of pleasure is not at all a necessity, but the accompaniment of certain natural needs – hunger, thirst, cold, sexual union. Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.15.17; 2.11.33 {Cf. U200}

Cicero, *De Finibus*, V.25.74: Even the devotees to pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, *On the Soul*, 2.19 f. 154r: The Epicureans held that what is first congenial to us, without qualification, is pleasure. But they say that as we get older, this pleasure articulates itself in many ways.

[U399]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.1.3: Epíkouros himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous.

Ibid., 2.12.36: {Epíkouros} ... says that the verdict of the senses themselves decides pleasure to be good and pain evil.

[U400]

Cicero *Academica* 2.46.140 (Lucullus): Hear on the opposite side those who say that they do not even understand what the word "virtue" means, unless indeed we choose to give the name "moral" to what looks well with the mob: that the source of all things good is in the body – this is nature's canon and rule and injunction, to stray away from which will result in a man's never having an object to follow in life.

Cicero, *Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso*, 28.68: You have of course heard it said that Epicurean philosophers assess the desirability of anything by its capacity to give pleasure.

[U401]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.6.15: Aristippus the Socratic had no hesitation in pronouncing pain to be the chief evil; next Epíkouros lent himself quite obediently to the support of this spineless, unmanly view.

Ibid., V.9.26: ...after saying that pain is not only the chief evil, but the only evil as well... [Cf. Ibid., 2.12.28; 19.44-45; V.10.31]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.33: Why, rather, do you not consider that pain might not be an evil? Because [Epíkouros] says it is the greatest of all evils.

Ibid., 3.17.5: {Epíkouros says} to the impatient and delicate that pain is the greatest of all evils; to the strong, that the Sage is blessed even in torments.

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.195: ... and pain, according to them, is a natural evil.

[U402]

Lucian, The Double Indictment, 21 (Epíkouros portrayed as speaking): "{Suppose that Dionysius, the Apostate} ran away to Pleasure of his own free will, cutting the meshes of [Stoic] logic as if they were bonds, because he had the spirit of a human being, not of a dolt, and thought pain painful, as indeed it is, and pleasure pleasant..."

Stoa: Do you consider pain bad?

Epíkouros: Yes.

Stoa: And pleasure good?

Epíkouros: Certainly so!

[U403]

Plotinus, Dissertations, 30 (Aeneids, 2.9), 15: For there are two schools of thought about attaining the [ethical] end. One which puts forward the pleasure of the body as the end, and another which chooses nobility and virtue ... Epíkouros, who abolishes providence, exhorts to pursue all that remains: pleasure and its enjoyment.

Cf. Scholion on Lucian, The Double Indictment, 20 [t. IV p. 209 lac.]: The Epicureans, being atheists, used to only honor pleasure.

[U404]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics" p. 9:

Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, IV.4, t. V [p. 388 K.; p. 359.14 Muell.; De Lacy IV.4.29]: ...thus the belief that pleasure is a good, as Epíkouros would have it, is a mistaken and false teaching.

[U405]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B: So I think you are not "removing the springtime from their year" as the saying goes, but depriving these men of life, if you are not going to leave them the possibility of living pleasurably.

[U406]

Antiochus of Ascalon, by way of Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 2.21 p. 178.46: Epíkouros also says that the removal of pain is pleasure; and says that that is to be preferred, which first attracts from itself to itself, being, that is, wholly in motion.

[U407]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: Two kinds of happiness are conceivable: one being the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be increased; the other subject to increases or decreases of pleasures.

St. Augustine, Confessions, VI.16: I argued in those days with my friends Alypius and Nebridius concerning the limits of good and evil. Determining, in my judgment, that Epíkouros should have won the garland, had I not verily believed that there remained a life for the soul after the body was dead, and the fruits of our deservings, which Epíkouros would not believe. And so I put the question: suppose we were to be immortal, and were to live in perpetual enjoyment of bodily pleasures, and that without fear of losing – why should we not then be fully happy, and wherefore should we seek for any other thing?

§ 4.2 On Kinetic Pleasure

[U408]

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, I.20.17: If Epíkouros should come and say that the good ought to be in the flesh, again the explanation becomes lengthy, and you must be told what is the principal faculty within us, and what our substantial versus what our essential nature is. Since it is not probable that the good of a snail lies in its shell, is it then probable that the good of man lies in his flesh? But take your own case, Epíkouros; what more masterful faculty do you yourself possess? What is that thing within you which takes counsel, which examines into all things individually, and which, after examining the flesh itself, decides that it is the principal matter?

Cf. Ibid., 2.23.20: Therefore, since the faculty of choice is so great, and has been set over everything else, let it come before us and say that the flesh is of all things the most excellent.

[U409]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546F: And Epíkouros says, "The principle and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; even wisdom and culture must be referred to this."

Ibid., VII p. 280A: The master of these men, indeed, was Epíkouros, who loudly proclaimed... ["The principle" etc., cited above].

Mētródōros, Letter to his Brother Timokrátēs, fr. 13 [p. 51 Duen.], by way of Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1098D: {We are not called to save the nation or get crowned by it for wisdom; what is called for, my dear Timokrátēs, is to eat and to drink wine, gratifying the belly without harming it.} ... It made me both happy and confident to have learned from Epíkouros how to gratify the belly properly. ... {The belly, Timokrátēs, my man of wisdom, is the region that contains the highest end.}

Cf. Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 30, p. 1125A: For it is the men who look with contempt on all these things as old wives' tales, and think that our good is to be found in the belly and the other passages by which pleasure makes her entry...

Ibid., 2, p. 1108C: ...by those who keep shouting that the good is to be found in the belly...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 17, p. 1098D: Indeed these people, you might say, describing a circle with the belly as center and radius, circumscribe within it the whole area of pleasure...

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.66: It is his habit in all his discussions to attach higher value to the pleasures of the belly than to the delights of the eye and the ear.

Cf. Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B: "Oho!" I said laughing. "It looks as if you are going to hop on their belly and make them run for their flesh when you take pleasure away..."

Cf. Hegesippus, by way of Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VII p. 279D (Com. IV p. 481)

[U410]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 9, p. 1092D: As for the melting away of the mind that occurs in the expectation or on the occasion of pleasure of the flesh, this when moderate has nothing about it that is great or appreciable, and when extreme is not only unfounded and unstable but strikes us coarse and immodest.

Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, IV.2, t. V [p. 367 K.; p. 337.6 Muell.]: {De Lacy ca. pg. 250}

[U411]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 27, p. 1122E: No teacher is needed. By themselves, these glorious smooth and agreeable movements of the flesh (as they themselves assert) call to action even one who stoutly denies and refuses to acknowledge that he unbends and turns soft in response to them.

Cf. Plutarch, Old Men in Public Affairs, 5 p. 786C: In view of these examples, do we not perceive how great are the pleasures the virtues provide, for those who practice them ... and that also without tickling or enervating them as do the smooth and gentle motions made on the body? Those have a frantic, unsteady titillation mixed with convulsive throbbing...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 22, p. 1087E: ... you will find that area which experiences a 'smooth and gentle motion' ...

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept? 4, p. 1129B: If I intend to ... "spit on noble action" and place the good in the "flesh" and in "titillations" – these rites require darkness, these require night, and for these let us have concealment and oblivion.

Cf. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 92.6: The second kind of pleasure is simply animalistic. We are but adding the irrational to the rational, the dishonorable to the honorable. A pleasant physical sensation affects this life of ours; why therefore, do you hesitate to say that all is well with a man just because all is well with his appetite? And do you rate, I will not say among heroes, but among men, the person whose Supreme Good is a matter of flavors and colors and sounds? {cf. U67}

[U413]

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546E: {Aristippus and his followers were not alone} in welcoming kinetic pleasure ... Epíkouros and his followers did the same. And not to enter on account of his "tempests" and his "transportations" all of which Epíkouros cites many times, also the "titillations" and "stimulations" ...

Cf. Plutarch, Non Posse, 5, p. 1090B: {the future, like the weather, is always uncertain} so the mind that has stowed the ultimate good in a body that is in a stable condition and in expectations for the body cannot continue to the end without fear and the prospect of tempestuous weather.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, 3.48, t. I [p. 115 Mang.]: Indeed, he who finds himself on the way of the moral progress is not in a position to reject every pleasure, but it will still be a wonderful thing that he succeeds rejecting the pleasures of the belly, that is those [??] which the lovers of the pleasure say that the means of increasing the chief pleasure is owed to the skill of cooks and [??].

[U414]

Cleomedes, Lectures on Astronomy, 2.1 [p. 112 Bak.] {p. 492 Bowen and Todd}: On top of everything else his mode of expression is also elaborately corrupt. ... [he] speaks of "sacred ululations" and "titillations of the body" and "debaucheries" and other such dreadful horrors. {c.f. above}

Ibid., [p. 113 Bak.] {p. 516 Bowen and Todd}: So will you not be off, "most brazen and shameless soul" routed from Philosophy, to Leóntion, Philainis, and the other whores, and to your "sacred ululations" with Mindyrides, Sardanapalus and all your boon companions?

[U415]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.21.68 (Cicero to Torquatus): When one argues with your friends, one has to listen to a great deal about even the grosser forms of pleasure! Epíkouros is always harping upon them!

§ 4.3 On Katastematic Pleasure

[U416]

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato's "Philebus" [p. 274 Stallb.]: Epíkouros, referring to natural pleasure, says that it is katastematic.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, 3.54, t. I [p. 118 Mang.]: ... to those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

[U417]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 3, p. 1088C: Epíkouros has imposed a limit on pleasures that applies to all of them alike: the removal of all pain. For he believes that our nature adds to pleasure only up to the point where pain is abolished and does not allow it any further increase in magnitude (although the pleasure, when the state of painlessness is reached, admits of certain unessential variations). But to proceed to this point, accompanied by desire, is our stint of pleasure, and the journey is indeed short and quick. Hence it is that becoming aware of the poverty here they transfer their final good from the body, as from an unproductive piece of land, to the soul, persuaded that there they will find pastures and meadows lush with pleasures.

Ibid., 4 (1088D) (Zeuxippus speaking): Why, do you not hold that that gentlemen do well to begin with the body, where pleasure first appears, and then pass to the soul as having more stability and bringing everything to perfection within itself?

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 31, p. 1107B: It is a space like this, with pleasures so ample, pleasures of such magnitude that the surgery of Epíkouros cuts out of our lives. Not content with removing all hope of help from Heaven and all bestowal of grace, as we said, he kills the love of learning in our soul and the love of honor in our heart, and thus constructs our nature and casts it down into a narrow space indeed and not a clean one either, where the mind delights in nothing but the flesh, as if human nature had no higher good than escape from evil.

[U419]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.20.47: Epíkouros also says that pleasure does not increase when pain has been removed, and that the highest pleasure is the absence of pain.

Ibid., (47): He says that the highest pleasure is freedom from pain.

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.9.28: He asserts that nothing can enhance the pleasure of freedom from pain.

Cf. Ibid., 2.13.41 (Cicero to Torquatus): Hieronymus' Chief Good is the same as that occasionally, or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves: freedom from pain.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 7, p. 1091B: Oh the great pleasure and blessed state this company {the Epicureans} enjoy, as they revel in suffering no hardship or anxiety or pain! Is this not a thing to make them proud and use the language they do, when they style themselves "imperishable" and "equal to the gods" and from excess and preeminence of blessings explode in their pleasure into wild cries of rapture and ecstasy because they alone, scorning all other blessings, have discovered one as great as it is godlike, to wit, not to suffer an ill?

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.8.10: To think that the highest good is the absence of pain is surely not characteristic of the Peripatetics or Stoics but of the bedridden philosophers. For who would not understand that this is the point discussed by the sick and those placed in some state of pain? What is so ridiculous as to consider that which a physician can give, as the highest good?

[U420]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 33, p. 1123A: Do you {Epicureans} not, in defiance of the experience of all mankind, affirm the absence of any mean between pain and pleasure when you say that it is a pleasure to feel no pain, in other words: that not to be acted upon is to be acted upon?

[U421]

Olympiodorus the Younger, *Commentary on Plato's "Philebus"* [p. 275 Stallb.]: ... since Epíkouros does not believe that pain is mixed with pleasure, nor indeed the bad with the good.

[U422]

Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XVII 35 (after fragment 181): "We need pleasure when we are in pain because of its absence; but when we are not in this condition, and are in a stable state of sense-perception, then there is no need for pleasure. For it is not the needs of nature which produce injustice from without, but the desire based on groundless opinions."

[U423]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their "thing delighted" – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. ... Epíkouros too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: "That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good."

Ibid., 8, p. 1091E: Thus Epíkouros, and Mētródōros too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.

[U424]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 5, p. 1090A: My judgment is that ... they ought to refrain from taking the position that the "stable condition of the flesh" is the source of all delight, ...

[U425]

Epictetus, fragment 52, by way of Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, IV.50:

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.6.16: Thus, just as the sea is understood to be calm when not even the lightest breath of air ruffles its waves, so too a peaceful condition of the soul is discernible when there is no disturbance of strength enough to be able to ruffle it.

[U426]

Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions, 2, p. 1033C: ...that tranquility (ῥουχία) which is commended by Epíkouros and Hieronymus.

Cf. Plutarch, Table Talk, 3.6.4, p. 655C: {All men, my friend, do not possess} ... Epíkouros' leisure and equanimity ... {which has been provided in everlasting abundance by reason and philosophy} ... [Cf. Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power, 3, p. 778D]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 68.10: "Is it retirement, oh Seneca, that you are recommending to me? You will soon be falling back upon the maxims of Epíkouros!"

Tertullian, On Shows, 28: Some philosophers have given the name of pleasure to quietude and tranquility; in it they rejoice, take their ease in it – yes, glory in it.

Horace, Odes, 2.16, 1-:

Peace – can purple buy it, Grosphus? Nay,
Nor gold, nor jewel.

No pomp, no lictor clears the way
Amid rabble-routs of troublous feelings,
Nor quells the cares that sport and play
Round gilded ceilings.

[U427]

Baton the Comic, (t. IV p. 502 Meineke), by way of Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 3 p. 103C; VII p. 279A: "Epíkouros, anyhow, says that pleasure is the highest Good; everybody knows that. You cannot have it any other way. By living well, of course, everyone lives happily."

[U428]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.120: {Among Epicurean Sages, they hold that} health is in some cases regarded as a good – for others: something indifferent.

Saint Augustine, City of God, V.20: {The Epicureans say that Pleasure demands Temperance}... lest some harmful consequence of overindulgence should interfere with health – which Epicureans place largely in the health of the body – and seriously hinder Pleasure.

§ 4.4 On Peace of Mind

[U429]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 4, p. 1088E: But when you hear their loud protest that the soul is so constituted as to find joy and tranquility in nothing in the world but pleasures of the body either present or anticipated, and that this is its good, do they not appear to you to be using the soul as a decanter of the body, and to imagine that by decanting pleasure, like wine, from a worthless and leaky vessel and leaving it to age in its new container, they are turning it into something more respectable and precious?

Ibid., 14 p. 1096C: They place the contemplative part of the soul right inside body and use the appetites of the flesh as leaden weights to hold it down. In this they are no better than stable hands or shepherds who serve their charges with hay or straw or grass of one kind or the other as the proper food for them to crop and chew. Do they not in similar fashion play swineherd to the soul, feeding it only on this swill of the bodily pleasures, permitting it to delight only in the hope or experience or recollection of some carnal thing, and forbidding it to take or seek from itself any pleasure or gratification of its own?

[U430]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.30.98: You {Epíkouros}, have always maintained that no one feels either pleasure or pain except on account of the body. ... your doctrine is that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately referable to the body..

Cf. Ibid., 2.33.107: The dictum of your school: all mental pleasures and pains alike are based on pleasures and pains of the body.

Cf. Ibid., 2.32.106: {Cicero disputes that} mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body.

Arrian, *Discourses on Epictetus*, 3.7.7-: For what, then, are we going to feel this pleasure of the soul? If it is for the good of the soul itself, then the essence of the good has already been discovered. For it is impossible, if one thing be good, to justify taking delight in something else; ... But you Epicureans ought to deny this, if you are in your right mind – otherwise you will be saying something inconsistent with both Epíkouros and the rest of your doctrines. The only thing left for you to say is that pleasure of soul is pleasure in the things of the body, and then they become matters of prime importance, and the true nature of the good.

[U431]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 5, p. 1089D: Now first observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body, compelled, since pleasure is not retained in the mind but leaks and slips away, to attach it to its source, shoring up "the pleasure of the body with the delight of the soul" as Epíkouros puts it, but in the end passing once more by anticipation from the delight to the pleasure.

[U432]

Alciphron, *Letters*, 3.55.8 (Autocletus to Hetoemaristus {"Gatecrasher" to "Prompt-to-breakfast"}): Zénōncrates the Epicurean took the harp-girls in his arms, gazing upon them from half-closed eyes with a languishing and melting look, and saying that this was "tranquility of the flesh" and "the full intensity of pleasure."

(Cf. Epíkouros, *Principal Doctrine* 9)

[U433]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 2, p. 1087B: those people who shout, "We ever hold the table dear instead" {Homer, *Odyssey*, VIII 246, 248} and "every agreeable stirring of the flesh that is transmitted upward to give some pleasure and delight to the mind."

[U434]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 66.45: We find mentioned in the works of Epíkouros two goods, of which his Supreme Good, or blessedness, is composed, namely, a body free from pain and a soul free from disturbance. These goods, if they are complete, do not increase; for how can that which is complete increase? The body is, let us suppose, free from pain; what increase can there be to this absence of pain? The soul is composed and calm; what increase can there be to this tranquility? Just as fair weather, purified into the purest brilliancy, does not admit of a still greater degree of clearness, so too, when a man takes care of his body and of his soul, weaving the texture of his good from both, his condition is perfect, and he has found the consummation of his prayers, if there is no commotion in his soul or pain in his body. Whatever delights fall to his lot over and above these two things do not increase his Supreme Good; they merely season it, so to speak, and add spice to it. For the absolute good of man's nature is satisfied with peace in the body and peace in the soul.

Cf. Uncertain Epicurean Author, *Vol. Herc.* 2, X.75 c. VIII: He who keeps goods and evils within natural limits, has already made his escape from every trouble of the soul.

Seneca, *On Benefits*, 3.4.1: Here I must do Epíkouros the justice to say that he constantly complains of our ingratitude for past benefits, because we cannot bring back again, or count among our present pleasures, those good things which we have received long ago, although no pleasures can be more undeniable than those which cannot be taken from us.

[U436]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 18, p. 1099D: {Now suppose that, as they say} the recollection of past blessings is the greatest factor in a pleasant life.

Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.32.106 (at the beginning)

[Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 4, p. 1089C: It is also quite unlikely that persons of moderation and temperance should dwell on such thoughts {the memory of pleasures} and on the sort of thing with which Carneades taunted Epíkouros – as if from an official journal of statistics how about "how often I had a meeting with Hedeia or Leóntion" or "Where I drank Thasian wine" or "what twentieth of the month I had the most sumptuous dinner."]

[U437]

St. Jerome, *Commentary on Isaiah*, 11, 38, t. IV [p. 473E Vall.]: For this reason, Epíkouros' opinion is foolish: he asserts that the ills of the present are mitigated by the memory of blessings of the past.

Ibid., 18, 65, p. 788C: ... for those who find themselves in a state of anxiety cannot in any way rejoice in their souls from past pleasures – regardless of Epíkouros' erroneous theory.

Saint Augustine, *Sermon*, 348.3 t. V [p. 1344A Venice Edition 1719]:

[U438]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.32.104: And again, what is the sense of the maxim that the Sage will not let past blessings fade from memory, and that it is a duty to forget past misfortunes?

[U439]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.34.95: The whole teaching of [Epíkouros] about pleasure is that pleasure is, he thinks, always to be wished and sought for in and for itself because it is pleasure, and that on the same principle pain is always to be avoided for the simple reason that it is pain, and so the wise man will employ a system of counter-balancing which enables him both to avoid pleasure, should it be likely to ensure greater pain, and submit to pain where it ensures greater pleasure; and all pleasurable things, although judged of by the bodily senses, are notwithstanding transmitted on again to the soul; and for this reason while the body feels delight for the time that it has the sensation of present pleasure, it is the soul which has both the realization of present pleasure conjointly with the body and anticipates coming pleasure, and does not suffer past pleasure to slip away: thus the wise man will always have a perpetual continuation of pleasures, as the expectation of pleasures hoped for is combined with the recollection of pleasures already realized.

§ 4.5 On Proper Measurement of Pleasure and Pain

[U440]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.20.46: Someone will say: "So? Do you think that Epíkouros meant that sort of thing – that his views were licentious?" I certainly do not. For I see that many of his utterances breathe an austere and many a noble spirit. Consequently, as I have often said, the question at issue is his intelligence, not his morality. However much he may scorn the pleasures he has just approved, yet I shall remember what it was that he thinks the highest good.

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.10.30: The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure... at one moment he so disparages it that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius!

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.33.94: On this point, the disciples of Epíkouros enter upon a long argument. Those pleasures belonging to the kinds that they despise, they thoroughly belittle. Yet all the same, they look out for a plentiful supply of them. For obscene pleasures (about which they linger at length) are, as they say, easy to satisfy, common, and within reach of all. Should nature call for them, the standard of value (which they think should not be birth, position or rank, but beauty, age, physical constitution) is by no means difficult to abstain from, even when health or duty or reputation are not at stake. In general this kind of pleasure is desirable – but is never of benefit.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.40.113 ^(Cotta) Perhaps you will say that all these pleasures are merely trifling "titillations of the senses" in Epíkouros' words. If so, you must be joking, Our friend Philo would never concede that the Epicureans despised the pleasures of luxury and sensuality. He used to quote from memory many sayings of Epíkouros, in the exact words of the written texts.

[U441]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, IV.12.29: Regarding pleasure, Epíkouros himself says that the smallest pleasures are often eclipsed and forgotten.

[Galen wrote two books "On the obscure pleasure of Epíkouros" (c. 17 t. XIX) [p. 48 K.]]

[U442]

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 21.3 p. 769A: It is better to endure these particular pains, so that we might experience greater pleasures; and it is advantageous to refrain from these particular pleasures so that we might not suffer from more burdensome pains.

Seneca, *On Leisure (to Serenus)*, 7.3: Thus, even this pleasure-loving sect is itself committed to action – and why not? Since Epíkouros himself declares that he will at times withdraw from pleasure, will even seek pain if he foresees that he will either regret that pleasure, or will be able to substitute a lesser pain for one that is greater.

[U443]

Maximus of Tyre, *Dissertations*, 3.3 [p. 32 Reiske; 32.3 Trapp]: "Is Pleasure really worthless? In that case, it would not come naturally, nor be the most venerable of all the forces that promote our survival. As for the well-worn reproaches that sophists bring against it – Sarandapallus' luxury, and the extravagance of the Medes, and Ionian decadence, and Sicilian gourmandizing, and Subaritic dances and Corinthian courtesans – all this, and anything yet more elaborate, is not the work of Pleasure, but of artifice and calculation, as men have used their recently acquired abundance of technical resources to break Pleasure's laws. Just as nobody abuses Reason and says that it does not possess natural beauty, even if someone diverts its application to an end that is not naturally noble, so you should not abuse Pleasure either, rather than those who put it to bad uses. Of these two elements in the human soul, Pleasure and Reason, Pleasure when mixed with Reason removes none of Reason's power to compel, but adds pleasures, increases their tendency to moderation by making them easier to come by, while removing the element of compulsiveness from what is naturally pleasant.

[U444]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.13.28: Epíkouros holds that the distress which the idea of evil produces is a natural effect, in the sense that anyone who contemplates some considerable evil at once feels distress, should he imagine that it has befallen him.

Ibid., 3.15.32: Epikouros supposes that all men must necessarily feel distress if they think themselves encompassed by evils, whether previously foreseen and anticipated, or long established. For according to him, evils are not lessened by duration nor lightened by previous consideration, and besides, he thinks it folly to dwell upon an evil which has still to come or maybe will not come at all; all evil, he says, is hateful enough when it has come, but the man who is always thinking a mishap may come is making that evil perpetual. But if it is not destined to come at all, he is needlessly the victim of a wretchedness he has brought upon himself; thus he is always tortured either by undergoing or by reflecting on the evil. 33: Alleviation of distress, however, Epikouros finds in two directions, namely in calling the soul away from reflecting upon vexation and in a "recall" to the consideration of pleasures. For he thinks the soul able to obey reason and follow its guidance. Reason therefore (in his view) forbids attention to vexations, withdraws the soul from morose reflections, blunts its keenness in dwelling upon wretchedness and, sounding a retreat from such thoughts, eagerly urges it on again to discover a variety of pleasures and engage in them with all the powers of the mind; and according to this philosopher the wise man's life is packed with the recollection of past and the prospect of future pleasures. This view we have stated in our usual style, the Epicureans state it in theirs. But let us look at their meaning – let us ignore their style.

[U445]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 29, [p. 208.25 Nauck]: "Let us neither censure the flesh as a cause of great evils nor attribute our distress to external circumstances." Rather, let us seek their causes in the soul, and by breaking away from every vain yearning and hope for fleeting fancies, let us become totally in control of ourselves.

[U446]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.19.44: Epikouros steps forward – in no sense an ill-meaning person, but rather a gentleman of the best intentions. He gives advice to the extent of his ability. "Ignore pain" he admonishes. Who says this? The same thinker who pronounces pain the highest evil. This is not quite consistent. Let us listen. "If pain is at its highest" says he, "it must be short." ... "By at the highest I mean that which has nothing higher; by short I mean that which has nothing shorter. I scorn a degree of pain from which a brief space of time will deliver me almost before it has come."

Cicero, On Duties, 3.33.117: However many passages there are in which Epikouros speaks with proper courage in regards to pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but what is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.

Tertullian, Apologetics, 45: So indeed Epikouros renders every pain and torment a little less frightening, declaring that a moderate pain is trifling, while a severe one is not long-lasting.

Cf. Zénōn the Epicurean (Zénōn of Sidon), by way of Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.17.38: "Blessed is he who has the enjoyment of present pleasure and the assurance that he would have enjoyment either throughout life or for a great part of life without the intervention of pain, or should pain come, that it would be short-lived if extreme, but if prolonged it would still allow more that was pleasant than evil."

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 78.7: Illness involves considerable physical torments. These are made bearable by their intermittency. For when pain is at its most severe the very intensity finds means of ending it. Nobody can be in acute pain and feel it for long. Nature in her unlimited kindness to us has so arranged things as to make pain either bearable or brief.

[U447]

Plutarch, On How to Study Poetry, c. 14, p. 36B: Upon the words of Aeschylus, "Fear not! Great stress of pain is not for long" we ought to remark that this is the oft-repeated and much admired statement originating with Epikouros, namely, "great pains shortly expend their force, and long-continued pains have no magnitude."

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII.33: Of pain: "When unbearable, it destroys us, when lasting, it is bearable"

Ibid., 64: With most pains, however, call to your rescue even Epikouros, when he says that a pain is "never unbearable or interminable" so that that you remember its limitations and add nothing to it by imagination.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 23, p. 1103D: This is in fact the Epicurean argument for perilous disease and excruciating pain: you hope for some kind of treatment from the gods for all your piety? You are deluded – "what is blessed and imperishable is neither vulnerable to feelings of anger nor indebtedness." {Principal Doctrine 1} You conceive of something after this life better than what you found in it? You are deceived – "for what is dissipated has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us." {Principal Doctrine 2} So why, poor fellow, do you tell me to eat and rejoice? Why else but because for you, who are laboring in the storm, shipwreck imminent: "excessive pain leads straight to death."

[U449]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 66.47: I can show you at this moment in the writings of Epíkouros a graded list of goods just like that of our own school. For there are some things, he declares, which he prefers should fall to his lot, such as bodily rest free from all inconvenience, and relaxation of the soul as it takes delight in the contemplation of its own goods. And there are other things which, though he would prefer that they did not happen, he nevertheless praises and approves – for example, the kind of resignation, in times of ill-health and serious suffering, to which I alluded a moment ago, and which Epíkouros displayed on his famous "last and most blessed day" of his life. {cf. U138} ... We therefore find mentioned, even by Epíkouros, those goods which one would prefer not to experience; which, however, because circumstances have decided thus, must be welcomed and approved and placed on a level with the highest goods.

§ 4.6 Against the School of Aristippus

Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 18.31 p. 763D: Now Aristippus was a companion of Socrates, and was the founder of the so-called Cyrenaic sect, from which Epíkouros has taken occasion for his exposition of man's proper {ethical} end.

Cf. *ibid.*, 20.13, p. 768C; Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 4, p. 1089A: The Cyrenaics ... who have drunk from the same jug as Epíkouros...

[U450]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.136 (see U2); *ibid.*, 2.87 (Aristippus): {The Cyrenaics say} that bodily pleasure is the End-Goal, according to Panaetius in his work *On the Philosophical Schools*, and not the static pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of 'freedom from discomfort' which Epíkouros accepts and maintains to be the end.

Ibid., 2.89 (Aristippus): The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epíkouros, seems to them {the Cyrenaics} not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one is, as it were, asleep.

Antiochus of Ascalon, by way of Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 2.21 p. 178.43: For of those that are ruled by pleasure are the Cyrenaics and Epíkouros; for these expressly said that to live pleasantly was the chief end, and that pleasure was the only perfect good. Epíkouros also says that the removal of pain is pleasure.

[U451]

Antiochus of Ascalon, by way of Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 2.21 p. 179.36: These Cyrenaics reject Epíkouros' definition of pleasure, i.e., the removal of pain, calling that the condition of a corpse; because we rejoice not only on account of pleasures, but companionships and distinctions; while Epíkouros thinks that all joy of the soul arises from previous sensations of the flesh.

Diogenes Laértios, *Lives of Philosophers*, 2.89 (Aristippus): {The Cyrenaics assert that} not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity.

[U452]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.137: {Epíkouros} further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains; at all events evil-doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epíkouros holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body.

Ibid., 2.90 (Aristippus): {The Cyrenaics} insist that bodily pleasures are afar better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.7.7: Epíkouros thinks that the highest good is in the pleasure of the mind. Aristippus holds that it is in the pleasure of the body.

Ibid., 8.5: That man was not wise, then, who believed that pleasure of the mind was the highest good, since whether that is security or joy, it is common to all.

[U453]

Diogenes Laértios, *Lives of Philosophers*, 2.89 (Aristippus): {The Cyrenaics} do not admit that pleasure can be derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epíkouros. And because of this they assert that movements affecting the mind are exhausted in the course of time.

§ 4.7 On the Limits of Desires

[U454]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.9.27: For my own part, I cannot cordially approve – I merely tolerate – a philosopher who talks of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to be kept with bounds? 28: This classification of the desires is then a subject on which Epíkouros is found of enlarging. Not that I find fault with him for that – we expect so great and famous a philosopher to maintain his dogmas boldly.

[U455]

Seneca, *Moral Dialogs*, VII, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 13.4: He who follows pleasure is seen to be weakly, broken, losing his manliness, and on the sure path to baseness unless someone shall establish for him some distinction between pleasures, so that he may know which of them lie within the bounds of natural desire, and which of them sweep headlong onward and are unbounded, being all the more insatiable the more they are satisfied.

[U456]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.33.93: You are, I take it, aware that Epíkouros has distinguished different kinds of desire, not perhaps with too much exactness, but nevertheless in a way that is of service. In part, they are, he says natural and necessary, in part natural and not necessary, in part neither one nor the other; scarcely anything is required to satisfy the necessary pleasures, for the stores of nature are available; and the second kind of desires is, he thinks, neither hard to satisfy nor indeed hard to go without; the third kind he thought should be utterly rejected, because they were completely meaningless and so far from counting as necessary, had no relation to nature either.

Scholion on Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 3.13, p. 1118b 8 [fr. 48v Ald.]:

Plutarch, *Beasts are Rational*, c. 6 p. 989B: Temperance, then, is a curtailment and an ordering of the desires that eliminate those that are extraneous or superfluous and discipline in modest and timely fashion those that are necessary. You can, of course, observe countless differences in the desires ... and the desire to eat and drink is at once natural and necessary, while the pleasures of love, which, though they find their origin in nature, yet may be forgone and discarded without much inconvenience, have been called natural but unnecessary. But there are desires of another kind, neither necessary nor natural, that are imported in a deluge from without as a result of your inane illusions and because you lack true culture. So great is their multitude that the natural desires are, every one of them, all but overwhelmed, as though an alien rabble were overpowering the native citizenry. But beasts have souls completely inaccessible and closed to these adventitious passions and live their lives as free from empty illusions as though they dwelt far from the sea. They fall short in the matter of delicate and luxurious living, but solidly protect their sobriety and the better regulation of their desires since those that dwell within them are neither numerous nor alien.

Cf. Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, I.49: But otherwise, insofar as one has fallen into extravagance, they say that one has a desire that is not necessary and does not arise by necessity from something that causes pain, but from something which causes distress or discomfort only by being absent, or else from delight, or wholly from empty and misleading beliefs; and such a desire does not refer back to any natural lack or to something which by its absence ruins our constitution. Ordinary foods suffice to provide what nature necessarily requires, and because they are simple and small in quantity, they are easy to get. Hence, {Porphyry's own inference:} a meat-eater needs inanimate foods as well, but someone satisfied with inanimate food needs half as much, and that easy to get and needing small expense to prepare.

[U457]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 31, [p. 209, 21 Nauck]: The love of true philosophy dissolves every anxious and painful longing.

[U458]

Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, 1.54: From causes like these, and from analogous causes, there arises an insatiable desire for longevity, wealth, money and fame, because people think that with these they will, given a longer time, increase their sum of good, and because they fear the terror of death as something without limit. The pleasure experienced from luxury comes nowhere near the pleasure experienced from self-sufficiency; it is very pleasant to think just how little one needs. Take away luxury, take away sexual excitement and the desire for external recognition, and what further need is there for inert wealth, which is useful to us for nothing but only weighs us down? This is the way to be filled full, and the pleasure from this kind of satiety is unmixed. We must also make the body unaccustomed, so far as is possible, to the pleasures of excess, but accustomed to the fulfillment which comes from satisfying hunger; we must eat in order to get through everything, and must take as our limit not the unlimited, but the necessary. Thus it too, by self-sufficiency and assimilation to the divine, can obtain the good that is possible for it. Thus it will be genuinely rich, measuring its wealth by the natural limit, not by empty beliefs. Thus it will not be suspended on hopes of the greatest pleasure, without being sure of getting it; for that pleasure causes maximum disruption. But it will be self-sufficient in what is present and in what has already happened, and will not be tormented by the thought of not remaining for longer.

[U459]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.34.97: Similar reasoning [cf. U439] is applied to food, and the costly splendor of banquets is belittled, because they say nature is contented with little effort. For who does not see that need is the seasoning for all such things? [cf. Horace, *Satires*, 2.2.70-88] 99: And yet, if nature should feel the need of something yet more savory, what a quantity of things are provided by earth and trees in ready abundance and of excellent savor! Add dryness which follows upon restraint in diet, add unimpaired health; contrast with this, sweating, belching men stuffed with food like fattened oxen – then you will understand that those who are in hottest pursuit of pleasure are furthest from catching it, and that the pleasantness of food lies in appetite, not in repletion. [Cf. Epikouros, *Letter to Menoecus*, 132; Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.8.22] 35.102: Time would fail me should I wish to maintain the cause of poverty; for the matter is evident and nature herself teaches us daily how few, how small her needs, are, how cheaply satisfied.

Ibid., V.9.26: He praises pain living – that is indeed worthy of a philosopher, but only in the mouth of Socrates or Antisthenes, not of the man who can say that pleasure is the supreme good. 3.20.49: He prefers plain to a rich diet.

Cf. Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XVII.43:

[U460]

Seneca, *Moral Dialogs*, VII, *To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life*, 13.1: Personally I hold the opinion – I shall express it though the members of our school may protest – that the teachings of Epikouros are upright and holy and, if you consider them closely, austere; for his famous doctrine of pleasure is reduced to small and narrow proportions, and the rule that we Stoics lay down for virtue, this same rule he lays down for pleasure – he bids that it obey Nature. But it takes a very little luxury to satisfy Nature! What then is the case? ... And so I shall not say, as do most of our school, that the school of Epikouros is an academy of vice, but this is what I say – it has a bad name, is of ill-repute, and yet undeservedly.

Ibid., 12.4: Those who have plunged into pleasures ... they hide their debauchery in the lap of philosophy and flock to the place where they may hear the praise of pleasure and they do not consider how sober and abstemious the "pleasure" of Epíkouros really is – so by Hercules, I think it is – but they fly to a mere name seeking some justification and screen for their lusts.

[U461]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.50-: So when using philosophy one must consider food too, insofar as that school's attentive concern allows; and when something is removed by that school because it will not authorize complete assurance, it should not be added to the provision of wealth and foods. Philosophy, then, should be used to handle such matters, and it will immediately turn out that pursuing a minimal, simple and light diet is far better; for least disturbance comes from least. Preparing food brings many impediments in its wake, from the weighing down of the body, from the trouble of preparation, from disrupting the sustained activity of reason about the most important principles, or from some other cause. So preparation immediately becomes unprofitable, and cannot compensate for the disturbances it entails.

[U462]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.51: Pain caused by hunger is much milder than pain caused by eating to excess, unless someone deludes himself with empty beliefs.

[U463]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.51: Diversity in one's diet not only fails to relieve the troubles of the soul, it will not even increase pleasure in the flesh. For pleasure has limits, which is the point at which removal of pain is achieved.

[U464]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.51-: Meat-eating does not remove any trouble from our nature, or any want which, if not satisfied, leads to pain. The gratification it provides is violent, and is quickly mixed with the opposite. For it contributes not to the maintenance of life but to the variation of pleasures: it resembles sex or drinking imported wines, and our nature can survive without these. The things without which nature could not survive are small in every way and can be got easily, with justice and liberal-mindedness, tranquility and the utmost ease. Moreover, meat does not contribute to health either, but rather impedes it. Health is maintained by the same things through which it is acquired; and it is acquired by a very light and fleshless diet, so that must be how it is sustained.

[U465]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.53: Epíkouros rightly surmised that we should beware of food which we want to enjoy and which we pursue, but find disagreeable once we get it. All rich, heavy food is like this, and when people are carried away by wanting it, they land in expense, illness, glut, or worry. For this reason we should guard against excess even of simple things, and in all cases we must examine what happens as a result of enjoyment or possession, how big a thing it is, and whether it relieves any trouble of body or soul. Otherwise, in every case, tension, such as life engenders, will arise from gratification. We must not go beyond the bounds, but keep within the boundary and measure that applies to such things.

[U466]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.48-: For most of the Epicureans, starting with their leader, appear to be satisfied with barley-bread and fruit, and they have filled treatises with arguments that nature needs little and that its requirements are adequately met by simple, available food. Riches in accordance with nature, they say, are limited and easy to get; riches in accordance with empty beliefs are unlimited and hard to get [= Principle Doctrine 15]. Disturbance caused to the body by want is well and sufficiently removed by things which are easy to get, which have the simple nature of fluid and dry.

St. Jerome, *Against Jovinianus*, 2.11 t. 2 [p. 340C Vall.]: Epíkouros, the defender of pleasure, in all his books speaks of nothing but vegetables and fruits; and he says that we ought to live on cheap food because the preparation of sumptuous banquets of flesh involves great care and suffering, and greater pains attend the search for such delicacies than pleasures the consumption of them. Our bodies need only something to eat and drink. Where there is bread and water, and the like, nature is satisfied. Whatever more there may be does not go to meet the wants of life, but are ministers to vicious pleasure. Eating and drinking does not quench the longing for luxuries, but appeases hunger and thirst. Persons who feed on flesh want also gratifications not found in flesh. But they who adopt a simple diet do not look for flesh. Further, we cannot devote ourselves to wisdom if our thoughts are running on a well-laden table, the supply of which requires an excess of work and anxiety. The wants of nature are soon satisfied: cold and hunger can be banished with simple food and clothing.

[U467]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.5: One who is too stingy learns [from Epíkouros] that life can be endured on water and barley.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 16, p. 1097D: Now the point that even for the pleasures of the body our nature requires costly provision, and that the most pleasant enjoyment is not to be found in barley-cake and lentil soup, but that the appetite of the sensualist demands succulent viands and Thasian wine and perfumes ... and not only this, but young and attractive women ... this point let us waive.

[U468]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.28.90: "Come" you will say, "these are trivial objections. The Sage is endowed with Nature's own riches, and these as Epíkouros has shown, are easy to obtain" {cf. Principal Doctrine 16}

Ibid., 2.28.91: He said that natural wealth is easily won, because nature is satisfied with little.

[U469]

Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XVII.23: "Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy unnecessary."

[U470]

Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, 1.51: The hope of lacking nothing must be with the philosopher throughout his life. Things which are easy to get safeguard this hope sufficiently; expensive things make it a vain hope. That is why most people, even though they have many possessions, make endless efforts because they think they will lack enough. We are satisfied with available, simple things if we keep in mind that all the wealth in the world is not strong enough to give the soul a worthy release from disturbance, but the trouble of the flesh is removed by very moderate, ordinary things which are very easy to get. And if even things on this level fall short, that does not disturb the person who rehearses death. {c.f. U205}

[U471]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 27, [p. 208, 2 Nauck]: It is rare to find a man who is <poor> with regard to the goal set by nature and rich with regard to groundless opinions. For no imprudent man is satisfied by what he has, but rather is distressed by what he does not have. So just as people with a fever are always thirsty and desire the most unsuitable things because of the malignancy of their <diseases>, so too those whose souls are in a bad condition always feel that they are totally impoverished and enmeshed in all sorts of desire as a result of their gluttony.

Athēnaïos, by way of Diogénēs Laértios 10.12:

Oh men, you labor for pernicious ends;
And out of eager avarice, begin
Quarrels and wars. And yet the wealth of nature
Fixes a narrow limit for desires,
Though empty judgment is insatiable.
This lesson the wise child of Neoklēs
Had learnt by ear, instructed by the Muses,
Or at the sacred shrine of Delphi's God.

Plutarch, *On the Desire for Wealth*, 4 p. 524F: ... since for men of sense natural wealth does have a limit and boundary, which is drawn around it by utility as by a compass.

Byzantine Gnomologion [Wachsmuth, *Studien zu den griechischen Florilgien*, p. 197 n 189]: Wealth in accordance with nature reaches fulfillment with bread, water and ordinary shelter for the body; excess wealth, in accordance with the cravings of the soul, brings this also: afflictions of desire without end.

Juvenal, *Satires*, 14.316: Yet if any should ask of me what measure of fortune is enough, I will tell him: as much as thirst, cold and hunger demand; as much as sufficed you, Epíkouros, in your little garden; as much as in earlier days was to be found in the house of Socrates.

Horace, *Epistles*, I.12.3:

Cease your complaints: no one ever is poor if his needs are supplied, and
Once all is well with your stomach, your chest, and your feet, there is nothing
More that the treasure of kings could possibly add to your riches.

[U472]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.32.89: Nay, with how little is Epíkouros himself contented! No one has said more about plain living. For take the things which make men desire money to provide the means for love, for ambition, for their daily expenditure – as he is far removed from all such things, why should he feel much need of money or rather why should he trouble about it at all?

Ibid., V.31.89: Do you think that Epíkouros and the rest of the philosophers are not adequately prepared to meet all others things that are considered evil? What man is not sorely afraid of poverty? And yet not a single philosopher is so.

Horace, *Epistles*, I.10.32:

Flee grand things. A life can be lived in a poor man's
Cottage surpassing the lives of a king or a king's friends

[U473]

Aelian, *Various Histories*, IV.13 (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XVII.30): Epíkouros, of the burgh of Gargettus, had shouted, saying: "Nothing satisfies the man who is not satisfied with a little."

Cf. Horace, *Epistles*, I.2.46: He who happens to have enough does not desire anything else.

[U474]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 9.20: Epíkouros himself, the reviler of Stilpo, used similar language. Put it down to my credit, though I have already wiped out my debt for the present day. He says "Whoever does not regard what he has as most ample wealth, is unhappy, even if he was master of the entire world." Or, if the following seems better-worded to you (for we must try to render meaning and not the mere words): "A man may rule the world and still be unhappy, if he does not feel that he is supremely happy."

[U475]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 2.5: My thought for today is something which I found in Epíkouros (yes, I actually make a practice of going over to the enemy's camp – by way of reconnaissance, not as a deserter!). "A cheerful poverty" he says, "is an honorable state." But if it is cheerful it is not poverty at all. It is not the man who has too little who is poor, but the one who hankers after more.

Cf. Horace, *Odes*, 2.16.13 (below)

[U476]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, VI.2, p. 266.38: Further, as Euripides wrote: "For the temperate, enough is sufficient" {Fenicie, 554}, Epíkouros expressly says, "Sufficiency is the greatest riches of all." {cf. U202}

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 28, [p. 208, 19 Nauck]: Self-sufficiency is the greatest of all wealth.

Saint Augustine, *On the Utility of Faith*, 4, 10, t. VIII [p. 52A Venice edition, 1719]:

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 4.10: But I must end my letter. Let me share with you the saying which pleased me today. It too is culled from another man's Garden: "Poverty, brought into conformity with the law of nature, is great wealth." Do you know what limits that law of nature ordains for us? Merely to avert hunger, thirst, and cold. ... Nature's needs are easily provided and ready at hand. It is the superfluous things for which men sweat...

Ibid., 27.9: But let me pay off my debt and say farewell: "Real wealth is poverty adjusted to the law of Nature." Epíkouros has this saying in various ways and contexts; but it can never be repeated too often, since it can never be learned too well.

Cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1117:

But if anyone were to conduct his life by reason,
he would find great riches in living a peaceful life
and being contented, one is never short of a little.

Horace, Odes, 2.16.13: "On little one lives well."

Horace, Epistles, I.10.39:

Fearful of poverty rather than fearful of riches, he must forfeit
Liberty, and in his greed must forever be serving a master.

Horace, Satires, 2.2.1: "Values of simple and frugal existence, good friends, is my subject."

[U478]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 28, [p. 208, 15 Nauck]: Most men fear frugality in their lifestyle and through their fear are led to actions most likely to produce fear.

[U479]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 28, [p. 208, 17 Nauck]: Many men when they have acquired riches have not found the escape from their problems but have only exchanged them for greater problems.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 17.11: I cannot say farewell without paying a price. But what of it? I shall borrow from Epíkouros: "The acquisition of riches has been for many, not an end, but a change, of troubles."

[U480]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 29, [p. 209, 5 Nauck]: By means of occupations worthy of a beast, abundance of riches is heaped up, but a miserable life results.

[U481]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 28, [p. 208, 23 Nauck]: "Therefore they {the philosophers} exhort us to practice not how we must provide for some necessity, but how we will remain secure when it is not provided."

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.50: What one must do, the Epicureans say, is not to gather together the necessities of life and add philosophy as an accessory, but to provide for genuine assurance of soul and then deal with daily needs. We entrust our concerns to a bad manager if we assess and provide what nature needs without the help of philosophy.

[U482]

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.15: {deriding Epicureanism} Now wealth is a good, and when it comes to pleasures is, so to speak, the thing most productive of them. Why should you not acquire it?

[U483]

Hermias, Commentary on Plato's "Phaedrus" p. 76: Some, in fact, consider love to be absolutely bad, defining it as an intense craving for carnal pleasure, united with frenzy and disquietude.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics" p. 75 (= Suda under "eros" {?-?}, [p. 535, 14 Bernh.]):

Cf. Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, *The Art of Grammar*, [p. 667, 13 Bekk.]: The Epicureans define love as an intense craving for carnal pleasures.

[U484]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 18.14: It's time I started wrapping up this letter. "Not till you've settled your account" you say. Well, I'll refer you to Epíkouros for payment: "Anger carried to excess begets madness." How true this is you're bound to know, since you have had not only slaves, but also enemies.

Cf. Horace, *Epistles*, I.2.62:

Rage is but madness in shorter duration; your temper must either
Bend to your will or bend you, so control it with chain or with bridle.

Apollonius, by way of Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XX.49: The flower of hot-temperedness is folly.

§ 4.8 On Rational Living

[U485]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 29, [p. 208.30 Nauck]: Unhappiness comes either through fear or through vain and unbridled desire: but if a man curbs these, he can win for himself the blessedness of wisdom.

[U486]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 31, [p. 209.19 Nauck]: "Pain does not consist in lacking the goods of the masses, but rather in enduring the unprofitable suffering that comes from empty false opinions."

[U487]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 12.10: What could be more splendid than the following saying which I'm entrusting to this letter of mine for delivery to you: "To live under constraint is a misfortune, but there is no constraint to live under constraint." Of course not, when on every side there are plenty of short and easy roads to freedom there for the taking... You protest: "It was Epíkouros who said that! What business have you got with someone else's property?" Whatever is true is my property. And I shall persist in inflicting Epíkouros on you, in order to bring it home to people who take an oath of allegiance to someone and never afterward consider what is being said but only who said it, that the things of greatest merit are common property.

Cf. Maximus of Tyre, *Dissertations*, 3.10 [p. 45 Reiske]: What, then, is more painful than necessity?

[U488]

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115 (Maxims of Epíkouros): The crude soul is puffed up by prosperity and cast down by misfortune.

[U489]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 30, [p. 209.12 Nauck]: "Nature also teaches us to regard the outcomes of fortune of little account and to know how to face misfortune when we are favored by fortune, but not to consider the favors of fortune important when we experience misfortune. And Nature teaches us to accept, unperturbed, the good outcomes of fortune, while standing prepared in the face of the seeming evils which come from fate. For all that the masses regard as good is a fleeting fancy, but wisdom and knowledge have nothing in common with fortune."

Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.3.8 [U604]: Shall we allow this man ... to be forgetful of himself and be disdainful of fortune at the moment when all that he holds good and evil is at fortune's disposal?

[U490]

Plutarch, *On Peace of Mind*, 16 p. 474C: "He who has least need of tomorrow" as Epíkouros says, "most gladly rises to greet tomorrow."

Cf. Horace, *Epistles*, I.4.13:

Believe that each day which breaks is your last,
Then you will find your delight in another one's rising unhopèd for.

[U491]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 15.10: ... a striking maxim that comes from Greece – here it is: "The life of folly is empty of gratitude and full of anxiety – it is focused wholly on the future." "Who said that?" you ask. The same man as before. {Epíkouros}

Cf. Horace, Epistles, 1.18.110: "I do not dangle in air like a leaf with my hopes all uncertain."

Horace, Odes, 2.16.25:

If the present moment contents you, never
Mind the future, temper unpleasant things with
Quiet smiles...

Ibid., 1.11.8:

Even as we now talk.
Harvest this day, {"Carpe Diem"}
discount tomorrow's gains.

Horace, Odes, 2.16.17:

Why, in life's brief span,
Do we bravely fight for man things?

Ibid., 1.4.15:

Briefness of lifespan forbids us
To open a long-range hope's investment.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.38: [Epíkouros says, in effect:] "Let us serve pleasure, then, in whatever way we can, for in a short time we will be nothing whatsoever. Let us suffer no day, therefore, no point of time to flow by for us without pleasure, lest, since we ourselves are at sometime to perish, the very fact that we live may perish." Although he does not say this in so many words, however, he teaches this is fact.

[U492]

Uncertain Author, Vol. Herc. 2, X.74 col. VI: Among mortal men, there is no one who can escape death. And indeed, seeing that everyone, as Epíkouros says, from the very moment of birth remain for a certain time ...

[U493]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 23.9: Now is the time for me to pay my debt. I can give you a saying of your friend Epíkouros and thus clear this letter of its obligation: "It is bothersome always to be beginning life." Or another, which will perhaps express the meaning better: "They live unwell – those who are always beginning to live." You are right in asking why – the saying certainly stands in need of commentary. It is because the life of such persons is always incomplete.

[U494]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 13.16: But now, to close my letter, Have only to stamp the usual seal upon it, in other words, to commit thereto some noble message to be delivered to you: "The fool, with all his other faults, has this also: he is always getting ready to live." Consider what this maxim means ... and you will understand how revolting is the fickleness of men who lay down every day new foundations of life, and begin to build up fresh hopes even at the brink of the grave. ... I should not name the author of this motto, except that it is somewhat unknown and is not one of those popular sayings of Epíkouros which I have myself to praise and to appropriate.

[U495]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 22.13: ... and lo, here is [a maxim] that occurs to my mind; I do not know whether its truth or its nobility of utterance is the greater. "Spoken by whom?" you ask. By Epíkouros; for I am still appropriating other men's belongings. The words are: "Everyone goes out of life just as if he had but lately entered it." Take anyone off his guard, young, old, or middle-aged; you will find that all are equally afraid of death, and equally ignorant of life. No one has anything finished, because we have kept putting off into the future all our undertakings. No thought in the quotation given above pleases me more than that it taunts old men with being infants. "No one" he says, "leaves this world in a different manner from one who has just been born." That is not true; for we are worse when we die than when we were born; but this our fault, and not that of Nature.

Cf. Pseudo-Plato, Axiochus, p. 365D: Indeed Axiochus, you confound lack of sensation with sensations in an irrational way. You invent and say incoherent things, without thinking that, in the meanwhile, you cause yourself suffering by the lack of sensibility, and you cause yourself sorrow by the despoilment and privation of pleasures, as if you were dying to live another life, and would not change your condition of total insensibility – the same as it was before your birth. How, then, since the time of the rule of Dracon and Cleisthenes have you not suffered a single evil?

Plutarch, A Letter to Apollonius, 15 p. 109E: Those who have died return to the same state in which they were before birth; therefore, as nothing was either good or evil for us before birth, even so will it be with us after death. And just as all events before our lifetime were nothing to us, even so will all events subsequent to our lifetime be nothing to us. ... For the condition after the end of life is the same as that before birth.

[U496]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 24.22: Epíkouros criticizes those who crave, as much as those who shrink from death: "It is absurd" he says, "to run towards death because you are tired of life, when it is your manner of life that has made you run towards death."

[U497]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 24.23: To these thoughts {= U496 & U498} you may add a third, of the same stamp: "Men are so thoughtless, nay, so mad, that some, through fear of death, force themselves to die."

Cf. Plutarch, A Letter to Apollonius, 15 p. 110A: As a matter of fact, many people, because of their utter fatuity and their false opinion regarding death, die in their effort to keep from dying.

[U498]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 24.23: Epíkouros says ... in another passage: "What is so absurd as to seek death, when it is through fear of death that you have robbed your life of peace?"

[U499]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.40.117: Let everything be piled up on one single man so that he loses together sight and hearing, suffers too the most acute bodily pains – these, in the first place, commonly finish off a man just by themselves. But if, maybe, they are indefinitely prolonged and torture him nevertheless, more violently than he sees reason for enduring, what reason have we, gracious heaven, for continuing to suffer? For there is haven close at hand, since death is at the same time an eternal refuge where nothing is felt. ... 41.118: For my part, I think that in life we should observe the rule which is followed at Greek banquets – "Let him either drink" it says, "or go!" And rightly, for either he should enjoy the pleasure of tippling along with the others or get away early, so that a sober man may not be a victim to the violence of those who are heated with wine. Thus by running away one can escape the assaults of fortune which one cannot face. This is the same advice as Epíkouros gives and Hieronymus repeats it in as many words.

[U500]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 23, p. 1103E: ... this most sage and divine doctrine: that the end of the soul's troubles is to be destroyed and perish and be nothing.

Ibid., 23, p. 1103C: Those who do not experience this {good fortune as divine providence} amputate the greatest pleasure of prosperity, while in misfortune they leave themselves no source of help. They can see but one haven of refuge in adversity: dissolution, and the loss of all sensation.

Ibid., 27, p. 1105A: For the doctrine that goes "what is dissipated has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us" {Principal Doctrine 2} does not remove the terror of death, but rather confirms it by adding what amounts to a proof. For this is the very thing our nature dreads: "May all of you be turned to earth and water" {Homer, Iliad, IX 408-409} i.e., the dissolution of the soul into what has neither thought nor feeling. Epíkouros, by making the dissolution a scattering into emptiness and atoms, does still more to root out our hope of preservation.

Ibid., 29, p. 1106B: To those, on the other hand, who hold that life comes in the end to insentience and dissolution...

Ibid., 29, p. 1106C: So the doctrine of Epíkouros promises the wretch no very happy relief from adversity, only the extinction and dissolution of his soul. But from the prudent and wise and those who abound in all good things it takes away all cheer by altering their condition from blissful living to not living or being at all.

Saint Augustine, Letter 104 Letter to Nectarius, 3, t. 2 [p. 290C Venice edition, 1719]: What I have read in your literature is more like this: that the life itself which we enjoy is brief, yet you think and you maintain it as a common saying that there can be eternal loss in this life. It is true that some of your authors consider death as the end of all misfortune, but not all of them; it is chiefly the opinion of the Epicureans and those who think the soul is mortal.

[U501]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 30, p. 1106D: Nevertheless, they assert that when the foreboding of incessant evils to which no period is appointed is dispelled, they are left with a benefit that is in the highest degree assured and pleasant – the thought of release – and that is done by Epíkouros' doctrine when it terminates the fear of death with the dissolution of the soul.

[U502]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 30, p. 1107A: And if, as Epíkouros imagines, for most people the process of dying is painful, the fear of death is quite beyond any comfort, since death ushers us through misery to loss of every good.

[U503]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 30.14: He {Aufidius Bassus, an elderly friend} often said, in accordance with the counsels of Epíkouros: "I hope, first of all, that there is no pain at the moment when a man breaths his last; but if there is, one will find an element of comfort in its very shortness. For no great pain lasts long. And at all events, a man will find relief at the very time when should and body are being torn asunder, even though the process be accompanied by excruciating pain, in the thought that after this pain is over he can feel no more pain. I am sure, however, that an old man's soul is on his very lips, and that only a little force is necessary to disengage it from the body. A fire which has seized upon a substance that sustains it needs water to quench it, or sometimes, the destruction of the building itself; but the fire which lacks sustaining fuel dies away of its own accord." ... 16: Bassus kept saying: "It is due to our own fault that we feel this torture, because we shrink from dying only when we believe that our end is near at hand." But who is not near death? It is ready for us in all places and at all times. "Let us consider" he went on to say, "when some agency of death seems imminent, how much nearer are other varieties of dying, which are not feared by us." A man is threatened with death by an enemy, but this form of death is anticipated by an attack of indigestion.

§ 4.9 On the Virtues

[U504]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.138: {Epíkouros maintains that} we choose the virtues too for the sake of pleasure and not for their own sake, as we take medicine for the sake of health. So too in the twentieth book of his Epilecta says Diogenes, who also calls education 'recreation.'

Seneca, Moral Dialogs, VII, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 9.1: "But even you" <Epíkouros> retorted, "cultivate virtue for no other reason than because you hope for some pleasure from it." But, in the first place, even though virtue is sure to bestow pleasure, it is not for this reason that virtue is sought; for it is not this, but something more than this that she bestows, nor does she labor for this, but her labor, while directed toward something else, achieves this also.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics" p. 12 {Van Ophusijsen 19.8}: There is then, among philosophical opinions, first, those which are shared by all who are wise ... that the virtues are goods; or by the majority of them, such as that virtue is choiceworthy for its own sake – even if Epíkouros disagrees – and that happiness comes into being by virtue.

[U505]

Maximus of Tyre, Dissertations, 3.5 [p. 34 Reiske; 32.5 Trapp]: Since our task is to compare Virtue with Pleasure, I will not abuse Virtue, but I will say this much: if you deprive Virtue of what is pleasant in it, you will also deprive it of its practicability. No good thing is made the object of choice in the absence of Pleasure; the man who labors virtuously labors willingly because of his affection for Pleasure, present or anticipated. Just as in financial transactions no one willingly exchanges a talent for a drachma, unless "Zeus has stolen his wits" {Iliad, 6.234}, but such exchanges, however evenly balanced, must benefit the giver in a manner consistent with the interest of the receiver; just so in our dealings with hard work, no one labors for love of labor (what could be less desirable, after all), but instead bargains his present labors against what a more urbane commentator might call "the Good" but a more veracious one would call Pleasure – because even if you say 'the Good,' you mean Pleasure; goodness would hardly be goodness were it not also supremely pleasurable. 6: I believe this whole argument can be turned around: these very considerations suffice to prove that Pleasure is more worthy of choice than all other things, since for its sake men are prepared to accept death and injuries and labors and countless other vexations.

Ibid., 3.10 [p. 44 Reiske; 32.10 Trapp]: At the cost of trivial pains, you have paved the way for great pleasures.

[U506]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.138: Epíkouros describes virtue as indispensable for pleasure – the one thing without which pleasure cannot exist. Everything else (food, for instance) are separable – not indispensable to pleasure.

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.49: Epíkouros says a pleasurable life is impossible unless accompanied by virtue.

Seneca, Moral Dialogs, VII, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 6.3: And so they say that it is not possible to separate pleasure from virtue, and they profess that no one can live virtuously without also living pleasantly, nor pleasantly without also living virtuously.

Ibid., 9.4: Why do you recommend pleasure to me? It is the good of man that I am searching for, not that of his belly, which is more insatiable than the belly of domestic or wild beasts. "You are misrepresenting what I say" you retort, "for I admit that no man can live pleasantly without at the same time living virtuously as well, and this is patently impossible for dumb beasts and for those who measure their good by mere food. Distinctly, I say, and openly I testify that the life that I call pleasant is impossible without the addition of virtue."

Ibid., 12.3: Let them cease, therefore, to join irreconcilable things and to link pleasure with virtue – a vicious procedure which flatters the worst class of men. The man who has plunged into pleasures, in the midst of his constant belching and drunkenness, because he knows that he is living with pleasure, believes that he is living with virtue as well; for he hears first that pleasure cannot be separated from virtue, then dubs his vices wisdom, and parades what ought to be concealed.

[U507]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.48: Epíkouros has disconnected the highest good from virtue. "Yes, he but often praises virtue."

[U508]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 85.18: Epíkouros also asserts that one who possesses virtue is happy, but that virtue of itself is not sufficient for a happy life, because the pleasure that results from virtue, and not virtue itself, makes one happy.

[U509]

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.21, [p. 178.51 Sylb.]: Epíkouros indeed, and the Cyrenaics, say that pleasure is the first duty; for it is for the sake of pleasure, they say, that virtue was introduced, and produced pleasure.

[U510]

Cicero, On Divination, I.39.87: ... [Epíkouros'] view that there is no such thing as disinterested virtue.

[U511]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, IV.26.73: Epíkouros, who ... makes a mockery of our notions of virtuous and depraved and says we are preoccupied with words and uttering sounds empty of meaning...

Ibid., IV.26.73: The [Epicurean] philosophers hold the view that virtue in and by itself is quite ineffective. Everything that we say is honorable and praiseworthy, they say is mere emptiness – tricked out in a sounding phrase that has no meaning. Nevertheless they think that the Sage is always happy.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.15.48: [= U69]

Ibid., 2.16.51 (Cicero to Torquatus): When you informed us that Epíkouros proclaims "It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly" [= Principal Doctrine 5], your words derived potency from the grandeur of the things that they denoted. You drew yourself up to your full height, and kept stopping and fixing us with your gaze, as if solemnly stating that Epíkouros does occasionally commend morality and justice. Were those names never mentioned by philosophers, we should have no use for philosophy; how well they sounded on your lips!

Cicero, Laelius, or An Essay on Friendship, 23.86: Even virtue itself is regarded with contempt by many, and is said to be mere pretense and display.

Porphyrio, Commentary on Horace's "Epistles" I.17.41: Either virtue is a mere empty name... Epíkouros said that virtue is a vain and empty name, as he linked all actions to how well they consummate pleasure.

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), IX.563: The Epicureans say that virtue is devoid of substance and is an empty name and that because of this, no one can become wise conforming to the precepts of the Stoics, but can only make promises.

Lucian, The Double Indictment, 21 (Epíkouros {portrayed as defending the cause of Dionysius the Apostate}): "... hating the tedium of life with her {i.e., Stoicism), and considering as nonsense that happiness which, she says, accompanies pain..."

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.25: "Learn now how righteousness is nothing, how reverence is folly, how a father is nothing, how a son is nothing."

Himerius, Speeches, by way of Photius I, library codex 243, p. 356A 13: All virtue is lost, by the reasoning and the doctrine of Epíkouros; stop the courts, due process, the rewarding of good people and the punishment of the bad.

[U512]

Aetius, Doxography, XII p. 547A: And in his work On the End-Goal, he says again: "{=U70}" And in other passages, he says "I spit upon the honorable and those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure."

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 30, p. 1124E: ... and when men take for sages those who "spit on excellence, unless pleasure attends it." [c.f. 1124E @ U368]

Plutarch, Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept?, 4, p. 1129B: ... to live together with Leóntion and "spit on noble action" and place the good in the "flesh" and in "titillations."

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 2, p. 1108C: ... those who keep shouting that the good is to be found in the belly and that they would not give a copper coin with a hole in it for all the virtues in bulk apart from pleasure.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 13, p. 1095F: Do they not confess that they are waging war without truce or negotiation on all that is beautiful, so long as it is not pleasurable as well? What holy and pure thing do they welcome and cherish?

[U513]

Arrian, *Discourses on Epictetus*, 2.22.21: So then, this will be in my interest: to keep my good faith, my self-respect, my forbearance, my abstinence, and my cooperation, and to maintain my relations with other men. But if I put what is mine in one scale, and what is honorable in the other, then the statement of Epíkouros assumes strength, in which he declares that "the honorable is either nothing at all, or at best only what people hold in esteem."

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.15.48 [= U69]; *ibid.*, 49: Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what moral worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure – unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude.

Idem., *Cicero Academica* 2.46.140 (Lucullus): [= U400]

[U514]

Cicero, *On Duties*, 3.33.117: If I should listen to him, I should find that in many passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control; but "the water will not run" as they say. For how can he commend self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? ... And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, these philosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for enduring pain. They even bring temperance in – not every easily, to be sure, but still as best they can; for they hold that the height of pleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters, or rather I should say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, anymore than friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are cultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.12.37: ... the Virtues, which Reason would have in charge of all things, but you considered as the handmaids and subordinates of the pleasures.

Cf. Seneca, *Moral Dialogs*, VII, *To Gallio*, or *On the Blessed Life*, 13.5: To hand over virtue, the loftiest of mistresses, to be the handmaid of pleasure is the part of a man who has nothing great in his soul.

[U515]

Plutarch, *Stoic Self-Contradictions*, 26, p. 1046E: Now if [Chrysippus] held prudence to be a good productive of happiness, as Epíkouros did...

[U516]

Origen, *Against Celsus*, V.47, [p. 270 Hoesch.]: And so too the "courage" of Epíkouros is one sort of thing, who would undergo some pains in order to escape from a greater number; and a different thing for the philosopher of the Stoa, who would choose all virtue for its own sake.

[U517]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.120: {The Epicurean school teaches that} courage is not a natural gift but arises from circumstances.

[U518]

Origen, *Against Celsus*, V.47, [p. 270 Hoesch.]: ... but righteousness is shown to be one thing according to the view of Epíkouros, and another according to the Stoics (who deny the threefold division of the soul), and yet a different thing according to the followers of Plato, who hold that righteousness is the proper business of the parts of the soul.

Saint Augustine, *Sermon* 348.3, t. V [p. 1343- Venice edition, 1719]:

[U519]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, VI.2 [p. 441 Stählin]: And again, if Aristophanes writes:

"You will have a secure life, being just
and without anxiety nor fear
you will live well"

{Aristophanes, uncertain fragment 19, in *Mein.*, *Greek Comics*, 2 p. 1181}

... Epíkouros says "The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind."

[U520]

Plutarch, *Virtue and Vice*, 3, p. 101B: Where, then, is the pleasure in vice, if in no part of it is to be found freedom from care and grief or contentment or tranquility or calm? For a well-balanced and healthy condition of the body gives room for engendering the pleasures of the flesh; but in the soul lasting joy and gladness cannot possibly be engendered, unless it provided itself first with cheerfulness, fearlessness, and courageousness as a basis to rest upon, or as a calm tranquility that no billows disturb; otherwise, even though some hope or delectation lure us with a smile, anxiety suddenly breaks forth, like a hidden rock appearing in fair weather and the soul is overwhelmed and confounded.

[U521]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.120: The school holds that not all sins are equal.

Horace, *Satires*, I.3.96 (criticizing the Stoics):

People who rate all offences as equally wicked are brought up
Short when they face reality: private and public opinions
Find it abhorrent and hardly useful for the general welfare –
Usefulness, one may say, is the mother of justice and fairness.

[U522]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 28.9: It is time I left off – not before I have paid the usual duty though! "A consciousness of wrongdoing is the first step to salvation." This remark of Epíkouros' is to me a very good one. For a person who is not aware that he is doing anything wrong has no desire to be put right. You have to catch yourself doing it before you can reform.

Cf. Horace, *Epistles*, I.1.41:

Virtue begins with avoidance of vice,
And the first rule of wisdom
Is to abstain from one's folly.

§ 4.10 On Human Society

[U523]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.42: [Epíkouros maintains that] pleasure is the greatest good; there is no human society – each one takes thought for himself. {Cf. U581}

Cf. Cicero, *Letters to Atticus*, VII.2.4: ...Carneades {spoke} with more wisdom than our philosophers Lucius and Patron, who in sticking to selfish hedonism and denying altruism, and saying that man must be virtuous for fear of the consequences of vice and not because virtue is an end in itself, fail to see that they are describing a manner not of goodness but of craftiness.

Arrian, *Discourses on Epictetus*, 2.20.6: So too Epíkouros, when he wishes to abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what does he say? "Don't be deceived, men, or misled or mistaken: there is no natural fellowship of rational beings with each other. Believe me: those who say otherwise are deceiving you and reasoning falsely."

Ibid., 2.20.20: So with Epíkouros: he cut off everything that characterizes a man, the head of a household, a citizen, and a friend, but he did not succeed in cutting off the desires of human beings; for that he could not do.

[U524]

Horace, *Satires*, I.3.98:

Usefulness, one may say, is the mother of justice and fairness.

Plutarch, *Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept?* 4, p. 1129B: But consider one who in natural philosophy extols God and justice and providence, in ethics: law and society and participation in public affairs, and in political life the upright and not the utilitarian act, what need has he to live unknown?

[U525]

Arrian, *Discourses on Epictetus*, I.23.1: [done above] Even Epíkouros understands that we are by nature social beings, but having once set our good in the husk which we wear, he cannot go on and say anything inconsistent with this. For, he next insists emphatically upon the principle that we ought neither to admire nor to accept anything that is detached from the nature of the good; and he is right in so doing. But how, then can we still be social beings, if affection for our own children is not a natural sentiment? Why do you dissuade the wise man from bring up children? Why are you afraid that sorrow will come to him on their account? ... 5: Nay, he knows, that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it or to care for it. For the same reason Epíkouros says that a man of sense does not engage in politics either... 7: Yet, despite the fact that he knows this, he still has the audacity to say, "Let us not bring up children."

Ibid., IV.11.1: Some people raise doubts whether the social instinct is a necessary element in the nature of man.

Ibid., 3.7.19: In the name God, I ask you, can you imagine an Epicurean State? One man says, "I do not marry." "Neither do I" says another, "for people ought not to marry." No, nor have children; no, nor perform the duties of a citizen. What will happen then? Where are the citizens to come from? Who will educate them? ... Yes, and what will they teach them?

[U526]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, 2.23, p. 181.25: Democritus repudiates marriage and the procreation of children, on account of the many annoyances arising thereby, and the detraction from more necessary things. Epíkouros agrees, as do those who place good in pleasure, and in the absence of trouble and pain.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.5: One who hates women has enumerated for him [by Epíkouros] the benefits of celibacy, and childlessness is proclaimed to one who has bad children.

[U527]

Plutarch, *On Affection for Offspring*, 2, p. 495A: Are we, then, to believe that Nature has implanted these emotions in these creatures because she is solicitous for the offspring of hens and dogs and bears, and not, rather, because she is striving to make us ashamed and to wound us, when we reflect that these instances are examples to those of us who would follow the lead of Nature, but to those who are callous, as rebukes for their insensibility, by citing which they disparage human nature as being the only kind that has no disinterested affection and that does not know how to love without prospect of gain? In our theaters, indeed, people applaud the verse of the poet who said, "What man will love his follow-man for pay?" {Uncertain comic author, t. V p. 122 Mein.} And yet, according to Epíkouros, it is for pay that a father loves his son, a mother her child, and children their parents.

[U528]

Plutarch, *Against Kólôtēs*, 27, p. 1123A: Do you people not dismiss the instinctive love of parents for their offspring – a fact accepted by all?

Cicero, *Letters to Atticus*, VII.2.4: I am glad you take delight in your baby daughter, and have satisfied yourself that a desire for children is natural. For if it is not, there can be no natural tie between people; remove that tie and social life is destroyed. "Heaven bless the consequence" says Carneades, but with more with more wisdom than our philosophers Lucius and Patron...

[U529]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.5: For one who is irreverent toward his parents there is [from Epíkouros] the idea that there is no bond in nature.

[U530]

Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, 43.139: "Laws are made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent them from inflicting wrong but to secure them from suffering it."

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 27: "The written laws are laid down for the sake of temperate men, not to keep them from doing wrong but from being wronged."

[U531]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 97.15: Let us disagree with Epíkouros on one point, when he declares that there is no natural justice, and that crime should be avoided because one cannot escape the fear which results therefrom; let us agree with him on the other – that bad deeds are lashed by the whip of conscience, and that conscience is tortured to the greatest degree because unending anxiety drives and whips it on, and it cannot rely upon the guarantors of its own peace of mind. For this, Epíkouros, is the very proof that we are by nature reluctant to commit crime, because even in circumstances of safety there is no one who does not feel fear.

Horace, Satires, I.3.113:

Nature, however, can not differentiate just things from unjust,
As she distinguishes things to be shunned from the things to be sought for.

[U532]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 6, p. 1090C: That their general prospects are poor even for a life without mental anguish you may also judge in the light of the remarks they address to others. Criminals and transgressors of the laws, says Epíkouros, pass their entire lives in misery and apprehension, since even though they may succeed in escaping detection, they can have no assurance of doing so. Consequently, fear of the next moment weighs heavy on them and precludes any delight or confidence in their present situation.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 97.13: Hence I hold Epíkouros' saying to be most apt: "That the guilty may happen to remain hidden is possible" or, if you think that the meaning can be made more clear in this way: "The reason that there is no advantage for wrong-doers to remain hidden is that (even though they got lucky) they have not the assurance of remaining so."

Cf. Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.5: It is not impossible to feel assurance of being undetected in wrong-doing, if indeed it be necessary to avoid detection by men: it is not necessary, however, on every occasion even to seek to avoid detection, where a man has power to overmaster those who have discovered him. So the disbelief in providence is a ready way to wrong-doing. For a very worthy person indeed is he, who after holding out pleasure to us as a good, and granting us security from the gods, still thinks to provide a plan to prevent wrong-doing. He acts like a physician who, having neglected to give help while the sick man was yet alive, attempts after death to devise certain contrivances for curing the dead man.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.11: A man acts foolishly {according to Epictetus' derisive portrayal of Epicureanism}, if, when he is a Judge and able to take the property of other men, he keeps his hands off it. But, if you please, let us consider this point only, that the theft be done secretly, safely, without anybody's knowledge. For even Epíkouros himself does not declare the act of theft evil – only getting caught. Only because it is impossible for one to be certain that he will not be detected, does he say, "Do not steal."

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1152:

Hence, the fear of punishment spoils the {ill-gotten} prizes.

Violence and wrong catch people in their own nets

and those who start such things are most often entangled.

It is not easy to pass a peaceful life

if you act in a way that disturbs the general peace.

Although you elude the gods and the human race

you still must wonder whether your secret will be kept forever.

[U533]

Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 2, VII.21 col. XXVIII: The chief of all goods, even if there weren't any other, is that by which he who possesses it advances toward virtue.

[U534]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 25, p. 1104B: Epíkouros supposes that fear of punishment is the only motive to which we can properly appeal in deterring from crime.

[U535]

Origen, *Against Celsus*, VII.63, [p. 385 Hoesch.]: For example, the philosophers who follow Zénōn of Citium abstain from committing adultery, the followers of Epíkouros do so too, as well as others again who do so on no philosophical principles; but observe what different reasons determine the conduct of these different classes. The first consider the interests of society, and hold it to be forbidden by nature that a man who is a reasonable being should corrupt a woman whom the laws have already given to another, and should thus break up the household of another man. The Epicureans do not reason in this way; but if they abstain from adultery, it is because, regarding pleasure as the chief end of man, they perceive that one who gives himself up to adultery, encounters for the sake of this one pleasure a multitude of obstacles to pleasure, such as imprisonment, exile, and death itself. They often, indeed, run considerable risk at the outset, while watching for the departure from the house of the master and those in his interest. So that, supposing it possible for a man to commit adultery, and escape the knowledge of the husband, of his servants, and of others whose esteem he would forfeit, then the Epicurean would yield to the commission of the crime for the sake of pleasure.

Theophilus of Antioch, *To Autolytus*, 3.6, p. 120B: And Epíkouros himself, too, as well as teaching atheism, teaches along with it incest with mothers and sisters, and this in transgression of the laws which forbid it; *Ibid.*, p 120C: Why, then, do Epíkouros and the Stoics teach incest and sodomy, with which doctrines they have filled libraries, so that from boyhood this lawless intercourse is learned?

Cf. St. Justin Martyr, *Apology*, 2.12 p. 50E: And imitating Jupiter and the other gods in sodomy and shameless intercourse with woman, might we not bring as our apology the writings of Epíkouros and the poets?

§ 4.11 On Security Among Men

[U536]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.117: There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt. These the wise man overcomes by reason.

[U537]

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115u (Maxims of Epíkouros): It is not possible for he who incites fear upon others to lack fear within himself.

[U538]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.26.84: Hatred and envy will be easy to avoid – Epíkouros gives rules for doing so.

[U539]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, I.20.65 (Torquatus to Cicero): On the subject of friendship... Epíkouros' pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct.

Cf., *Ibid.*, 2.25.80 (Cicero to Torquatus): The system you uphold... undermines the very foundations of friendship, however much Epíkouros may, as he does, praise friendship up to the heavens.

Ibid., 2.25.80 (Cicero to Torquatus): It does you not good to repeat Epíkouros' admirable remarks in praise of friendship – I am not asking what Epíkouros actually says, but what he can say consistently while holding the theory he professes.

[U540]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.120: {The Epicurean school teaches that} friendship is prompted by our needs. One of the friends, however, must make the first advances (just as one has to cast seed into the earth), but it is maintained by a partnership in the enjoyment of life's pleasures.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.42: Epíkouros says... there is no one who loves another but for his own sake.

[U541]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.26.82 (Cicero to Torquatus): Let us return to what you said about friendship. In one of your remarks I seemed to recognize a saying of Epíkouros himself – that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated for the reason that without it we cannot live secure and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live pleasantly.

Cf., Ibid., 2.26.84 (Cicero to Torquatus): "Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility." {The Epicureans says} "Friends are protection."

[U542]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 19.10: Epíkouros says "you should be more concerned about inspecting whom you eat and drink with, than what you eat and drink. For feeding without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf." This privilege will not be yours unless you withdraw from the world. Otherwise, you will have as guests only those whom your slave-secretary sorts out from the throng of callers. It is, however, a mistake to select your friend in the reception-hall or to test him at the dinner-table.

[U543]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.11: {Diocles} further says that Epíkouros did not think it right that their {the Epicureans'} property should be held in common, as required by the doctrine of Pythagoras regarding the goods of friends; such a practice in his opinion implied mistrust, and without confidence there is no friendship.

Cicero, Letters to Friends, VII.12: {February, 53 B.C.} My dear friend Pansa {Caius Vibius Pansa} has informed me that you {Caius Trebatius Testa} have become an Epicurean ... What will be your legal ruling on Communi Dividundo {dividing what is held in common}, when nothing can be held in common among those whose one standard of conduct is their own pleasure?

[U544]

Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power, 3, p. 778E: And yet, Epíkouros, who places happiness in the deepest tranquility, as in a sheltered and landlocked harbor, says that it is not only nobler, but also pleasanter, to confer than to receive benefits.

[U545]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment. 55: ... and they present for frank criticism what concerns themselves in the presence of the students, to be put before Epíkouros and for the sake of correction. Nevertheless, if it is pleasing to someone, let it be said: "Why is it that the purifier of everyone {i.e., Epíkouros} for the sake of correction of the errors arising from foolishness, would not present even one ..." {sc., perhaps, "...of his errors as an example"}

[U546]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 8, p. 1111B: Epíkouros chooses friends for the pleasure he gets, but says that he assumes the greatest pains on their behalf.

[U547]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment. 45 (part): And the overall and most important thing is, we shall obey Epíkouros, according to whom we have chose to live, as even....

§ 4.12 On Honor & Glory

[U548]

Plutarch, On How to Study Poetry, 14, p. 37A: "It is not great sums of money nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor offices of authority which produce happiness and blessedness, but rather freedom from pain and calmness and a disposition of the soul that sets its limitations in accordance with nature."

[U549]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 18, p. 1100A: Epíkouros admitted that some pleasures come from fame.

[U550]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.12.28: Put the same question to Epíkouros: he will say that a moderate degree of pain is worse evil than the deepest disgrace, for no evil is involved in disgrace alone, unless it should be attended by painful circumstances. What pain then does Epíkouros feel when he actually affirms that pain is the greatest evil? And yet I cannot look to find any worse disgrace than such a sentiment in the mouth of a philosopher.

Cicero, *Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso*, 27.65: Pain is an evil, according to your view. Reputation, infamy, disgrace, degradation – these are mere words, mere trifles.

[U551]

Plutarch, *Is "Live Unknown" a Wise Precept?* 3-4, p. 1128F-: "Live unknown."

Flavius Claudius Julianus (Julian the Emperor), *Letter to Themistius the Philosopher*, [p. 471 Pet.; 330.15 Hertlein]: Do you think that such a man, upon hearing these arguments ... would he not ... approve the wisdom of the son of Neoklês, who bid us to "live unknown?" Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epíkouros you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epíkouros was mistaken in that view of his, {but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration.}

Ibid., [p. 478 Pet.; 335.19 Hertlein]: To admire the Epicureans' lack of engagement in political life, and their gardens...

Themistius, *Discourses*, XXVI, [p. 390.21 Dind.; 324.2 Penella]: In theory, we expel Epíkouros, son of Neoklês, and exclude him from our list [of philosophers] because he approved of the injunction "live unnoticed" and was responsible for the doctrine that human beings are not sociable and civilized by nature; but in reality we approve of his opinion...

Cf. Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, VIII.28 p. 368: All through his life, [Apollonius] is said often to have exclaimed: "Live unobserved, and if that cannot be, slip unobserved from life."

Horace, *Epistles*, I.18.102:

Is serenity found amid honors and neat little profits
Or does it wait on the untraveled road and the hidden byway?

Ibid., I.17.10:

Nor is a life badly spent, which from birth until death goes unnoticed.

Ovid, *Tristia*, 3.4.25: Believe me, he who keeps himself well-hidden has lived well.

Seneca, *Thyestes*, 393-403:

Let me be filled with sweet repose
In humble station fixed.
Let me enjoy untroubled ease, and
To my fellow citizens, unknown.
Let my life's stream flow in silence,
So when my days have passed noiselessly away,
Lowly may I die and full of years.
Death lies heavily on he,
Who is too well known by all,
And dies to himself unknown.

[U552]

Plutarch, *Life of Pyrrhus*, 20.3: They {Epíkouros and his school} would have nothing to do with civil government on the ground that it was injurious and the ruin of happiness.

Saint Augustine, *Against the Academicians*, 3.16.35 t. I [p. 290F Venice Edition, 1719]: {Rhetorically addressing Cicero} If we are to live according to what is plausible to another, then you shouldn't have governed the Roman Republic, since it seemed to Epíkouros that one ought not do this.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B: ... the people who shout "No manly boxers are we" or orators, or champions of the commonwealth, or magistrates; "We ever hold the table dear instead." {Homer, Odyssey, VIII 246-248} and "every agreeable stirring of the flesh that is transmitted upward to give some pleasure and delight to the mind."

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1127:

It is indeed much better to obey in peace
Than to desire to hold the world in fee and to rule kingdoms.

The Comic Sotion of Alexandria, by way of Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 336F: "Ethics, embassies, military tactics – fine pretenses that sound hollow, like dreams."

Cf. Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. (2) VII.176:

[U553]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.3: The teaching of Epíkouros ... speaks according to the natural bent of each individual. ... He prohibits the cowardly from an advance to public life, the lazy from exercise, the timid from engaging in military service.

[U554]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 31, p. 1125C: ... who write in these very words: "We must proceed to tell how a person will best uphold the purpose of his nature and how of his own free will he is not to present himself for public office at all."

[U555]

Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 2 p. 465F (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 29.79): For this reason not even Epíkouros believes that men who are eager for honor and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfill their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire.

[U556]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 31, p. 1125C: But who are the men that nullify these things, overthrowing the state and utterly abolishing the laws? Is it not those who withdraw themselves and their disciples from participation in the state? Is it not those who say that the crown of an untroubled spirit is a prize beyond all comparison with success in some great command? Is it not those who say that to be king is a fault and a mistake?

[U557]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.6: He who is eager for fame and power is instructed [by Epíkouros] to cultivate kings and royal acquaintances; he who cannot bear annoyance to shun the palace.

[U558]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 34, p. 1127D: Epíkouros and Mētródōros ... speak spitefully of the earliest and wisest lawgivers.

Ibid., 21, p. 1119C: For this is what Typhon {a mythological monster} signifies, and your master has implanted plenty of him in you with his war against the gods and godlike men.

The Comic Sotion of Alexandria, by way of Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 336F: "You will only have what you eat and drink. All the rest is dust – Pericles, Codrus, Cimon"

[U559]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 15, p. 1097C: But even if one wished, one could not pass over the man's absurd inconsistency: He treads underfoot and belittles the actions of Themistocles and Miltiades, and yet writes this to his friends about himself... "{=U183}"

[U560]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 33, p. 1127A: They mention statesmen only to deride them and belittle their fame, for instance Epaminondas, who they say had but one good thing about him, and even that 'mikkon' {Boeotian dialect for 'micron' = 'small'; i.e., the one good thing about him, his abstention from unnecessary pleasures, was an example of the Boeotian insensibility} for this is their expression, and dubbing the man himself 'iron guts' and asking what possessed him to go walking across the Peloponnese and not sit at home with a nice felt cap on his head {his campaign took place in winter}, wholly concerned – we must suppose – with the care and feeding of his belly.

5. On the Sage

§ 5.1 On the Studies of the Sage

[U561]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: It is not possible for one Sage to be wiser than another.

[U562]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: He will formulate beliefs and not be a pure skeptic.

[U563]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.119: He will leave written words behind him.

[U564]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: He will found a school.

[U565]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.118: The Sage will not give rhetorical speeches.

[U566]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.119: He will not compose panegyric {a formal public speech delivered in high praise of someone or something}.

[U567]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: He will earn money, if he should be in poverty, but only for his wisdom.

[U568]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: {...the Sage will be able to converse correctly about music and poetry} without however actually writing poems himself.

[U569]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: Only the Sage will be able to converse correctly about music and poetry.

[U570]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.120: He will be fond of the country.

[U571]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.5: For one fleeing the crowd, solitude is praised [by Epíkouros].

§ 5.2 On Duties

[U572]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.120: {The Sage, according to Epíkouros,} will mind his property and plan for the future.

[U573]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.120: He will pay only as much regard to his reputation as needed to be not looked down upon.

[U574]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.118: The Epicureans believe the Sage should not fall in love; ... according to them, love does not come by divine inspiration – so Diogenes says in his twelfth book.

Chrysippus, by way of Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, LXIII.31:

[U575]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: The Sage will set up votive images.

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.119: He is willing to take a suit to court.

[U577]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.121: He will pay court to a king if need be.

[U578]

Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 2, VII.15 col. XIX

§ 5.3 The Attitude of the Sage

[U579]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 4, p. 1089A: Whether the other set {i.e., the Epicureans, in contrast with the Cyrenaics} who hold that the superiority of the Sage lies above all in this: vividly remembering and keeping intact in himself the sights and feelings and movements associated with pleasure – are thus recommending a practice unworthy of the name of wisdom by allowing the slops of pleasure to remain in the soul of the Sage as in the house of a spendthrift, let us not say.

[U580]

Cicero, *In defense of Publius Sestius*, 10.23: He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. ... He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. But those who said that men should aim at an honorable position, should consult the public interest, should think of duty throughout life not of self-interest, should face danger for their country, receive wounds, welcome death – these he called visionaries and madmen.

[U581]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.39: For when [Epíkouros] holds that a Sage does all things for his own sake, he considers his own advantage in everything he does. *Ibid.*, 17.4: [Epíkouros] counsels the Sage to bestow nothing on any man, for all things that are his own concerns make him wise.

[U582]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, IV.22, [p. 228.7 Sylb.]: Even Epíkouros says that a man who he esteemed wise "would not do wrong to anyone for the sake of gain; for he could not persuade himself that he would escape detection." So then, if he knew he would not be detected, he would, accordingly, do evil.

[U583]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.118: In regards to women, he will obey legal restrictions, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epíkouros' ethical doctrines.

[U584]

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.120: He will guard himself against chance.

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.20.49: Epíkouros says ... that fortune has no power over the Sage.

[U585]

Seneca, *On the Integrity of the Sage (to Serenus)*, 16.1: Even if Epíkouros, who most of all indulged the flesh, is up in arms against injury, how can such an attitude on our part seem incredible or to be beyond the bounds of human nature? He says that injuries are tolerable for the Sage; we {Stoics} say that injuries do not exist for him.

[U586]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.36.103: Will obscurity, insignificance, or unpopularity prevent the Sage from being happy? ... 104: It must be understood that popular acclaim is neither to be coveted for its own sake, nor is obscurity to be sorely feared. "I came to Athens" said Democritus, "and no one knew me." What dignified resoluteness for a man to glorify having no glory! As flute-players and harpists follow their own tastes – not the tastes of the multitude – in regulating the rhythm of music, should not the wise man, gifted as he is with a far higher art, seek out what is truest, rather than the pleasure of the populace? Can anything be more foolish than to suppose that those, whom individually one despises as illiterate mechanics, are worth anything collectively? The wise man will in fact despise our worthless ambitions and reject the distinctions bestowed by the people even if they come unsought. ... 105: What anguish they escape who have no dealings whatever with the people! For what is more delightful than leisure devoted to literature? That literature I mean which gives us the knowledge of the infinite greatness of nature, and I, in this actual world of ours, of the sky, the lands, and the seas. 106: Now when honors are despised, and money also despised, what is there left to be dreaded? Exile, I suppose, which is reckoned among the greatest evils. ... 108: In facing all mishaps, the easiest is the method of those who refer the aims they follow in life to the standard of pleasure, and this means that they can live happily wherever this is provided; Teucer's saying can be fitted to every condition: "One's county is wherever one's happy."

[U587]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.117: {susceptibility to emotion} will be no hindrance to exercising his wisdom {the wisdom of the Sage}.

[U588]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: Whether or not he is well off will be a matter of indifference to him.

[U589]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.118: He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed.

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 81.11: "Do you maintain then that only the wise man knows how to return a favor?" ... In order not to bring any odium upon myself, let me tell you that Epíkouros says the same thing. At any rate, Mētródōros remarks that only the wise man knows how to return a favor.

[U590]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: For the sake of a friend, on such occasion, he is prepared to die.

[U591]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.119: Some he will try to dissuade {from marriage}.

[U592]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: He will be grateful to anyone when he is corrected.

[U593]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.120: He will be more delighted than others at festivals.

[U594]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.118: Nor will he punish his servants; rather, he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character.

[U595]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.121: He will be like himself even while asleep.

[U596]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.117: He will be more susceptible to emotion than other men.

[U597]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.119: The Sage will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his *Epilecta*.

Diogēnēs Laértios 10.118: When tortured, he will give vent to cries and groans.

[U599]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.38.110: Emotions of the soul, anxieties and distresses are alleviated by forgetfulness when the thoughts of the soul are diverted to pleasure. Not without reason therefore, Epíkouros ventured to say that the Sage always has more of good than evil because he always has pleasures; and from this he thinks there follows the conclusion we are in search of: that the Sage is always happy. 111: "Even if he is to go without the sense of sight, or of hearing?" Even then – for he doesn't love such things for themselves. For to begin with, what pleasures, pray tell, does the blindness you dread so much have to go without? Seeing that some even argue that all the other pleasures reside in the actual sensations, while the perceptions of sight do not go along with any delight felt in the eyes, in the same way as the perceptions of taste, smell, touch, hearing are confided to the actual organ of sensation – nothing of the sort takes place with the eyes. It is the soul which receives the objects we see. Now the soul may have delight in many different ways, even without the use of sight; for I am speaking of an educated and instructed man with whom life is thought; and the thought of the wise man scarcely ever calls in the support of the eyes to aid his researches. For if night does not put a stop to happy life, why should a day that resembles night stop it? ... 39.114: Democritus lost his sight – he could not, to be sure, distinguish black from white; but all the same he could distinguish good from bad, just from unjust, honorable from disgraceful, expedient from inexpedient, great from small, and it allowed him to live happily without seeing changes of color; it was not possible to do so without true ideas. And this man believed that the sight of the eyes was an obstacle to the piercing vision of the soul and, while others often failed to see what lay at their feet, he ranged freely into the infinite without finding any boundary that brought him to a halt. 40, 116: Is there any evil really in deafness? ... all of us ... are assuredly deaf in so many foreign languages which we do not understand. "But the deaf do not hear the voice of a good singer." No, nor the screech of a saw either, when it is being sharpened, nor the grunting of a pig when its throat is being cut, nor the thunder of the roaring sea when they want to sleep. And if, perhaps, music has charms for them, they should first reflect that many wise men lived happily before music was invented, secondly, that far greater pleasure can be derived from reading than hearing verse. Next, as a little while ago we diverted the blind to the pleasure of hearing, so we may divert the deaf to the pleasure of sight; for the man who can converse with himself will not need the conversation of another.

[U600]

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 3, p. 1088B: By attaching the pleasurable life to painlessness they preclude us from dwelling longer on the point, since they admit themselves that pleasure of the flesh is a slight or rather an infinitesimal thing – that is, if this is not mere empty and pretentious talk ... Epíkouros asserts that in illness the Sage often actually laughs at the paroxysms of the disease.

Ibid., 5, p. 1090A: My judgment is that if they would take a tone more in keeping with their own bitter experience {of terrible diseases} and not incur in addition the odium of ranting, by courting applause with a bold display of hollow words, they ought either to refrain from taking the position that the "stable condition of the flesh" {cf. U424 & U68} is the source of all delight, or from asserting that persons in the throes of an excruciating disease feel delight and treat the affliction with insolent contempt.

[U601]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.7.17: As for Epíkouros, however, he speaks in a way that makes him seem laughable to my mind. For in one passage he asserts that if the wise man be burnt, if he be tortured – you are waiting perhaps for him to say, "he will submit, will endure, will not yield." High praise, by Hercules! – and worthy of the great god Hercules whose name I invoked. But this is not enough for Epíkouros – that hard stern spirit. If the wise man finds himself inside Phalaris' bull {description}, he will say "How sweet; how indifferent I am to this!" ... And yet those philosophers {the Stoics} who deny that pain is an evil do not generally go so far as to say that it is sweet to be tortured; they say that it is unpleasant, difficult, horrible, contrary to nature, and yet that it is not an evil. Epíkouros, who says that pain is the only evil and the worst of all evils, thinks that the Sage will call it sweet. For my part I do not require you to describe pain in the same words as Epíkouros, that devotee, as you know, of pleasure. Let him, if he likes, say the same inside the bull of Phalaris as he would have said, had he been in his own bed; I do not consider wisdom so wonderfully powerful against pain.

Ibid., V.10.31: Epikouros too, note well, insists that the Sage always happy. He is caught by the grandeur of the thought; but he would never say so if he paid attention to his own words – for what is less consistent than for the man who says that pain is either the highest or the only evil, to suppose also that the Sage, at the moment he is tortured by pain, will say "How sweet this is!"

Ibid., V.26.75: For my part, I should say, let the Peripatetics also and the Old Academy make an end some time or other of their stuttering and have the courage to say openly and loudly that happy life will reach down even into the bull of Phalaris.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.27.88 (Cicero to Torquatus): {Epikouros} thinks nothing of pain; for tells us that if he were being burnt to death, he would claim, "how delightful this is!"

Ibid., V.28.85: {it is doubtful} whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris.

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 18.42: Well, these same philosophers who define evil as pain and good as pleasure assert that the wise man, even were he to be shut up in the bull of Phalaris and roasted above a fire, would assert that he was happy and felt perfect calm of mind. What they meant as that the power of virtue is so great that the good man can never be otherwise than happy.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66.18: {I might say} "Epikouros even maintains that the wise man, though he is being burned in the bull of Phalaris, will cry out 'This is pleasant, and concerns me not at all.'" Why need you wonder, if I maintain that he who reclines at a banquet and the victim who stoutly withstands torture possess equal goods, when Epikouros maintains a thing that is harder to believe, namely, that it is pleasant to be roasted in this way?

Ibid., 67.15: "If I am tortured, but bear it bravely, all is well; if I die, but die bravely, it is also well." Listen to Epikouros – he will tell you that it is actually pleasant. I myself shall never pronounce an unmanly word to an act so honorable and austere.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.27.5: Epikouros was much more strong in saying "The Sage is always happy, and even enclosed in the bull of Phalaris, he will utter this pronouncement 'It is pleasant and I care nothing.'" Who would not mock him, especially because a voluptuary placed upon himself the character of a strong man, and beyond measure at that!

Ibid., 3.17.42: [Epikouros says] death should not be feared by a strong man, nor any pain, because even if he is tortured, if he burns, he may say that he cares not at all about it.

Ibid., 3.17.5: [=U401]

[U602]

Aelian, Various Histories, IV.13 (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVII.30): Epikouros said that he was ready to rival Zeus for happiness, as long as he had a barley cake and some water.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.21 [p. 178.41 Sylb.]: Epikouros, in placing happiness in not being hungry, or thirsty, or cold, uttered that godlike word, saying impiously that he would thereby vie even with Father Jove; teaching, as it were, that the life of pigs devouring rubbish and not of rational philosophers, was supremely happy.

[Cf. Theodoretus, Remedies for the Errors of the Greeks, XI [p. 154.2 Sylb.; p. 420 Gaisf.]]

Flavius Claudius Julianus (Julian the Emperor), Orations, VI, "To the Uneducated Cynics" [p. 366 Pet.]: Then does he {Diogenes of Sinope} not seem to you of no importance, this man who was "cityless, homeless, a man without a country, owning not an obol, not a drachma, not a single slave" nay, not even a loaf of bread – while Epikouros says that if he have bread enough and to spare he is not inferior to the gods on the score of happiness.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.27.88: Isn't pleasure more desirable the longer it lasts? On what ground then does Epikouros speak of a deity (for so he always does) as happy and immortal? Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epikouros. Each of them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure. Wherein then is he inferior to a god, except that a god lives forever?

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 25.4: Let us return to the law of nature; for then riches are laid up for us. The things which we actually need are free for all, or else cheap; nature craves only bread and water. No one is poor according to this standard; when a man has limited his desires within these bounds, he can challenge the happiness of Jove himself, as Epíkouros says.

[U603]

Cicero, De Finibus, V.31.93: The very people who measure all things by pleasure and pain – do they not cry aloud that the Sage always has more things that he likes than that he dislikes? Thus when so much importance is assigned to virtue by those who confess that they would not raise a hand for the sake of virtue if it did not produce pleasure, what are we to do?

[U604]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.26.73: Is Epíkouros, who merely puts on the mask of a philosopher and has bestowed the title on himself, to be allowed to say ... that there is no circumstance in which the Sage, even if burnt, racked, cut into pieces, cannot cry out: "I count it all as nothing" – particularly as Epíkouros restricts evil to pain and good to pleasure, makes a mockery of our notions of virtuous and depraved and says we are preoccupied with words and uttering sounds empty of meaning, and that nothing interests us except the bodily sensation of either rough or smooth. Shall we allow this man to be forgetful of himself and be disdainful of fortune at the moment when all that he holds good and evil is at fortune's disposal? 75: ...he maintains that the Sage is always happy.

Ibid., 3.20.49: He says that there is not time when the wise man is not happy.

Ibid., V.10.31: [@ U601]

[U605]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1098B: But, it is objected, they shout that "they have had a pleasant life" "revel in it" and "hymn the praises" of their own "way of living." {c.f., U181 & U600}

[U606]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, l.158

[U607]

Apollonius Dyskolus, The Adverb, [p. 566.3 Bekk.]

Vatican Sayings

Sententiae Vaticanae

Gnomologium Vaticanum Epicureum

Ἐπικούρου Γνωμολογία

Ἐπικούρου Προσφώνησεις

SV 4. Perception of Pain

Πᾶσα ἀλγηδὼν εὐκαταφρόνητος: ἢ γὰρ σύντονον ἔχουσα τὸ πονοῦν σύντομον ἔχει τὸν χρόνον – ἢ δὲ χρονίζουσα περὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀβληχρὸν ἔχει τὸν πόνον.

* All pain is **completely easy to regard**: because the experience of **flaring pain** has a **sparing duration** – but the long enduring in **the body** has a **mild pain**.

[Bailey] All bodily suffering is negligible; for that which causes acute pain has short duration, and that which endures long in the flesh causes but mild pain.

Every pain is easy to disregard; for that which is intense is of brief duration, and those bodily pains that last long are mild.

SV 7. Detection & Concealment

Ἄδικοῦντα λαθεῖν μὲν δύσκολον – πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον

although **it is difficult for the Unjust to escape notice** – **it is impossible to gain confidence** concerning the deception

[Seneca, Epistles 9.13] Potest **nocenti** contingere **ut lateat** – **latendi** Fides non potest

It can happen **for the guilty that they may hide** – but **Trust in concealment** cannot exist

[add U532]

This is a summary of Principle Doctrine 35 "It is not possible that he who secretly does something (among those things agreed with each other for not harming and not being harmed) to believe that he will evade [notice] – even if he evades thousands of times up to now – for until his death it is unclear if he will evade notice."

SV 9. No Need to Live in Need

Κακὸν ἀνάγκη – ἀλλ' οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ζῆν μετὰ ἀνάγκης.

* Natural need is **harmful** – but there is **no** natural need to live **with natural need**.

[Bailey] Necessity is **an evil** – but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.

SV 10. Eternal Contemplation

Μέμνησο ὅτι, θνητός ὢν τῇ φύσει καὶ λαβὼν χρόνον ὠρισμένον, ἀνέβης τοῖς περὶ φύσεως διαλογισμοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ κατεῖδες "τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα."

* Remember that, being **mortal by nature** and having received **finite time**, you ascended **to the considerations** concerning nature **to infinity and eternity**, and you have seen "**the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before.**"

[Bailey] Remember that you are of mortal nature and have a limited time to live and have devoted yourself to discussions on nature for all time and eternity, and have seen "things that are now and are to come and have been."

Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, 5.138

Μητροδώρου τε καίτοι Ἐπικουρείου γενομένου, ἐνθέως ταῦτά γε εἰρηκότος: "Μέμνησο, Μενέστρατε, διότι θνητὸς φύς καὶ λαβὼν βίον ὠρισμένον, ἀναβάς τῇ ψυχῇ ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων, κατείδες καὶ 'τὰ τ' ἔσσόμενα, πρό τ' ἔοντα.'"

Although Metrodorus became an Epicurean, he said these things piously: "Menestratus, remember that, having been born mortal and having received a finite life, and having ascended with your soul up until the eternity and the infinity of circumstances, you have even seen 'the things that will exist, and the things existing before.'"

SV 11. Behavioral Extremes

Τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων: τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾶ – τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾶ.

* With most people: the one being quiet is numb – but the one being active is frantic.

Most men are insensible when they rest, and mad when they act.

[Bailey] For most men, rest is stagnation and activity is madness.

SV 14. No Second Life

Γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ – δις δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι: δεῖ δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ, οὐκ ὦν τῆς αὔριον κύριος, ἀναβάλλη τὸ χαῖρον! ὁ δὲ βίος μελλησμῶ παραπόλλυται – καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνήσκει.

* We have been born once – twice it is not possible to be born: it is necessary to no longer exist for eternity. But you, not being master of tomorrow, you delay joy! Life is lost by this delay – and each one of us, while occupied, dies.

[Bailey] We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not [master] of tomorrow, postpone your happiness: life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 27, 1104E

Ἴη καὶ προεπισφάπτουσιν οἱ ταυτὶ λέγοντες "Ἄπαξ ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν – δις δ' οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι, δεῖ δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτ' εἶναι." καὶ γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ὡς μικρὸν μᾶλλον δὲ μηδ' ὀτιοῦν πρὸς τὰ σύμπαν ἀτιμάσαντες ἀναπόλαυστον προῖενται, καὶ ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ πράξεως οἷον ἐξαθυμοῦντες καὶ καταφρονοῦντες ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἐφημέρων καὶ ἀβεβαίων.

About which also those who say these things predict in advance: "once we humans have been born – twice it is not possible to be born, it is necessary to no longer exist for eternity." Indeed by discounting the present moment as a minute fraction, or rather as nothing at all, in comparison with all time, men let it pass fruitlessly. They think poorly of virtue and manly action, as if being disheartened and despising themselves as ephemeral and uncertain.

Stobaeus, Florilegium 16.28

Ἐπικούρου "Γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ – δις οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι. δεῖ δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μκέτ' εἶναι. σὺ δὲ, τῆς αὔριον οὐκ ὦν κύριος, ἀναβάλλη τὸν καιρόν! ὁ δὲ πάντων βίος μελλησμῶ παραπόλλυται – καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνήσκει."

Of Epíkouros "We have been born **once – twice** it is not possible to be born: it is necessary to **no longer** exist **for eternity**. But you, not being master of tomorrow, you delay **joy**! Life of all is lost **by this delay** – and **because of it** each of us, while occupied, dies."

Horatius, Carmina 1.11

**Tū – nē quaesierīs – scīre nēfās! quem míhi, quem tibi
fīnem Dī dēderint, Λευκοβοή. Nec Babylōniōs
temptáris númerōs. ut mélius (quídquid érit) páti,
seu plúrīs Híemēs seu tribuit Iúppiter últimam,
(quae nunc oppósitīs dēbilitat pūmicibus máre
Tyrrhénūm). Sápiās: vína líquēs et spátio brévi
spem lóngam résecēs! dum lóquimur, fúgerit invida
aētās: cárpe díem quam mínimū crédula pósterō.**

* You – do not seek – it is not to be found! **What** to me, **what** to you the Gods will give **as an end**, Leuconoë. Nor should you tamper with **Babylonian numbers**. How much better (whatever will be) to endure, whether Jupiter grants **more winters** or the **last**, (which now **with opposing pumice** weakens the **Tyrrhenian sea**). Be wise: you should filter **the wine** and **in short time** you should cut back **long hope**! While we speak, **envious** age will have fled: harvest the day **which expects the least in tomorrow**.

Ask not ('tis forbidden knowledge), what our destined term of years, Mine and yours; nor scan the tables of your Babylonish seers. Better far to bear the future, my Leuconoe, like the past, Whether Jove has many winters yet to give, or this our last; This, that makes the Tyrrhene billows spend their strength against the shore. Strain your wine and prove your wisdom; life is short; should hope be more? In the moment of our talking, envious time has ebb'd away. Seize the present; trust tomorrow e'en as little as you may.

Leuconoë, don't ask, we never know, what fate the gods grant us, whether your fate or mine, don't waste your time on Babylonian, futile, calculations. How much better to suffer what happens, whether Jupiter gives us more winters or this is the last one, one debilitating the Tyrrhenian Sea on opposing cliffs. Be wise, and mix the wine, since time is short: limit that far-reaching hope. The envious moment is flying now, now, while we're speaking: Seize the day, place in the hours that come as little faith as you can.

SV 15. Appreciating Others

Ἡθῆ ὡςπερ τὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἴδια τιμῶμεν – ἂν τε χρηστὰ ἔχωμεν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλώμεθα, ἂν τε μή: οὕτω χρή καὶ τὰ τῶν πέλας, ἂν ἐπιεικεῖς ᾖσιν.

* [Our] **dispositions** we appreciate as **things particular to ourselves** – whether we possess **good ones**, and we are admired **by people**, or not: thus it is necessary also [to appreciate] **the** [dispositions] **of those nearby**, if they are tolerable.

We place a high value on our characters as if they were our own possessions whether or not we are virtuous and praised by other men. So, too, we must regard the characters of those around us if they are our friends.

[Bailey] We value our characters as something peculiar to ourselves, whether they are good and we are esteemed by men or not, so ought we value the characters of others, if they are well-disposed to us.

Horatius, Saturae 1.3.29-37

**Trācúndior est paúlō, minus aptus acūtīs
nāribu^s hōr^{um} hómīnum: rīdērī póssit eō quod
rustícīus tónsō, toga dēfluit et mále lāxus
in péde cálceus haeret – at est bónus, ut mélior vir
nōn álius quisquam – at tibi^a mícus – at ingéni^{um} íngēns
incúltō látet hoc sub córpore. dēnique tē ípsū
cóncute, nūmq^a tibi vitiōr^{um} inséverit ólim**

nātúr^a aut *étiam* consuetúđō *mála*; námque
negléctīs *uréndā flīx innáscitur ágrīs*.

[he is] More quick-tempered by a little, less suited to the critical observations*^[lit. sharp noses] of these men: he might be laughed at because with a rougher haircut, the toga slips and the badly loose shoe clings on his foot – but he is good, as a better man there is no other – but he is a friend to you – but and a great genius lies hidden under this unrefined body. Finally, shake yourself and see whether nature or even bad habit has never instilled vices in you; for in neglected fields, the fern that must be burned grows.

[A certain person] is a little too hasty in his temper; not well calculated for the sharp-witted sneers of these men: he may be made a jest of because his gown hangs awkwardly, he [at the same time] being trimmed in a very rustic manner, and his wide shoe hardly sticks to his foot. But he is so good, that no man can be better; but he is your friend: but an immense genius is concealed under this unpolished person of his. Finally, sift yourself thoroughly, whether nature has originally sown the seeds of any vice in you, or even an ill habit [has done it]. For the fern, fit [only] to be burned, overruns the neglected fields.

SV 16. Harmful Temptation

Οὐδεις, βλέπων τὸ κακὸν, αἰρεῖται αὐτό – ἀλλὰ δελεασθεὶς ὡς ἀγαθῷ πρὸς τὸ μείζον αὐτοῦ κακὸν, ἐθηρεύθη.

* No one, seeing what is harmful, chooses it – but is lured as if by a benefit towards his greater harm, and is caught.

[Bailey] No one when he sees evil deliberately chooses it, but is enticed by it as being good in comparison with a greater evil, and so pursues it.

No one who sees what is bad chooses it, but being lured [by it] as being good compared to what is even worse that it he is caught in the snare.

SV 17. Anchored with Age

Οὐ νέος μακαριστὸς ἀλλὰ γέρων βεβιωκῶς καλῶς: ὁ γὰρ νέος, ἀκμῇ, πολὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, ἑτεροφρονῶν πλάζεται· ὁ δὲ γέρων, καθάπερ ἐν λιμένι τῷ γήρα καθώρμικεν, τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατακλείσας χάριτι.

* [It is] not the young man who is blessed but the old who has lived well: for the young, in his prime, is greatly influenced by fortune, being shaped by having different thoughts. But the old, as if moored in the harbor with old age, has locked away the formerly uncertain goods in security with gratitude.

We should not view the young man as happy, but rather the old man whose life has been fortunate. The young man at the height of his powers is often befuddled by chance and driven from his course; but the old man has dropped anchor in old age as in a harbor, since he secures in sure and thankful memory goods for which he was once scarcely confident of.

[Bailey] It is not the young man who should be thought happy, but the old man who has lived a good life. For the young man at the height of his powers is unstable, and is carried this way and that by fortune, like a headlong stream. But the old man has come to anchor in old age, as though in port, and the good things for which before he hardly hoped he has brought into safe harbourage in his grateful recollections.

SV 18. Separation Effect

Ἀφαιρουμένης προσόψεως – καὶ ὁμιλίας – καὶ συναναστροφῆς: ἐκλύεται τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος.

* With sight removed – and interaction – and cohabitation: erotic feeling is relaxed.

If sight, association, and intercourse are removed, the passion of love is ended.

[Bailey] Remove sight, association, and contact, and the passion of love is at an end.

SV 19. Regenerating Gratitude

Τοῦ γεγονότος ἀμνήμων ἀγαθοῦ – γέρων τήμερον γεγένηται.

* When he is forgetful of **the good that has happened** – **on this day** he becomes **an old man**.

He has become an old man on the day on which he forgot his past blessings.

[Bailey] Forgetting the good that has been, he has become old this very day.

SV 21. (Persuade/Obey Nature)

Οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον: πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες τὰς τε φυσικὰς, ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι – τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.

One should not fight **nature** but instead should persuade: we will persuade **by completely fulfilling the necessary desires which are natural**, if they do not harm – but by **harshly** discarding **the harmful ones**.

[Bailey] We must not violate nature but obey her; and we shall obey her if we fulfil the necessary desires and also the physical, if they bring no harm to us, but sternly reject the harmful.

SV 23. Advantages of Friendship

Πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρετὴ· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.

Every friendship in itself is to be desired; but the foundation of friendship is from its advantages.

[Inwood] Every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits.

[Bailey] All friendship is desirable in itself, though it starts from the need of help.

SV 24. Reception of Dreams

Ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θείαν οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν – ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπρωσιν εἰδώλων.

Dreams have not obtained **a divine nature** nor **prophetic power** – but happen **by the pressure of images**.

Dreams have neither a divine nature nor a prophetic power, but they are the result of images that impact on us.

[Bailey] Dreams have no divine character nor any prophetic force, but they originate from the influx of images.

SV 25. Natural Abundance

Ἡ πενία μετρομένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὀριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.

Poverty, if measured by the natural end, is great wealth; but wealth, if not limited, is great poverty.

[Bailey] Poverty, when measured by the natural purpose of life, is great wealth, but unlimited wealth is great poverty.

Δεῖ διαλαβεῖν ὅτι καὶ ὁ πολὺς λόγος καὶ ὁ βραχὺς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνει.

One must presume that long and short arguments contribute to the same end.

[Bailey] You must understand that whether the discourse be long or short it tends to the same end.

SV 27. Pleasure in Learning

Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων μόλις τελιωθεῖσιν ὁ καρπὸς ἔρχεται, ἐπὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ τερπνόν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ μάθησιν ἀπόλαυσις, ἀλλὰ ἅμα μάθησις καὶ ἀπόλαυσις.

The benefits of other activities come only to those who have already become, with great difficulty, complete masters of such pursuits, but in the study of philosophy pleasure accompanies growing knowledge; for pleasure does not follow learning; rather, learning and pleasure advance side by side.

In the case of other occupations the fruit (of one's labors) comes upon completion of a task while (in the case) of philosophy pleasure is concurrent with knowledge because enjoyment does not come after learning but at the same time (with) learning.

In other activities, the rewards come only when people have become, with great difficulty, complete [masters of the activity]; but in philosophy the pleasure accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous.

[Bailey] In all other occupations the fruit comes painfully after completion, but, in philosophy, pleasure goes hand in hand with knowledge; for enjoyment does not follow comprehension, but comprehension and enjoyment are simultaneous.

SV 28. Friendship Moderation

Οὔτε τοὺς προχείρους εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε τοὺς ὀκνηροὺς δοκιμαστέον· δεῖ δὲ καὶ παρακινδυνεῦσαι χάριν φίλιας.

Those who are overly eager to make friends are not to be approved; nor yet should you approve those who avoid friendship, for risks must be run for its sake.

[Bailey] We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship's sake we must even run risks.

SV 29. Honesty Over Popularity

Παρρησία γὰρ ἔγωγε χρώμενος φυσιολογῶν χρησιμωδεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἢ βουλοίμην, κἂν μηδεὶς μέλλη συνήσειν, ἢ συγκατατιθέμενος ταῖς δόξαις παρποῦσθαι τὸν πυκνὸν παραπίπτοντα παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον.

To speak frankly as I study nature I would prefer to speak that which is of advantage to all men in oracles even though it be understood by none, rather than to conform to popular opinion and thus gain the constant praise that comes from the many.

[Bailey] In investigating nature I would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob.

[Yarujakis] For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many.

SV 30. Life's Mortal Drink

Ἐτοιμάζονται τινες διὰ βίου τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον, οὐ συνορῶντες ὡς πᾶσιν ἡμῖν θανάσιμον ἐγκέχυται τὸ τῆς γενέσεως φάρμακον.

Some men spend their whole life furnishing for themselves the things proper to life without realizing that at our birth each of us was poured a mortal brew to drink.

Some men, throughout their lives, spend their time gathering together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.

[Bailey] Some men throughout their lives gather together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.

Attributed to Metrodorus.

SV 31. Defenseless Against Death

Πρὸς μὲν τᾶλλα δυνατὸν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι, χάριν δὲ θανάτου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οἰκοῦμεν.

It is possible to provide security against other things, but as far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls.

[Bailey] Against all else it is possible to provide security, but as against death all of us mortals alike dwell in an unfortified city.

SV 32. Benefit of Veneration

Ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ σεβασμὸς ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί.

The honor paid to a wise man is itself a great good for those who honor him.

[Bailey] The veneration of the wise man is a great blessing to those who venerate him.

SV 33. Basic Needs Met

Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξειν κἂν <τῆς> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιο.

The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, thirsty, or cold; for he who is free of these and is confident of remain so might vie even with Zeus for happiness.

[Bailey] The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst, and cold. For if a man possess this safety, and hope to possess it, he might rival even Zeus in happiness.

SV 34. Assurance Over Assistance

Οὐχ οὕτως χρεῖαν ἔχομεν τῆς χρείας <τῆς> παρὰ τῶν φίλων ὡς τῆς πίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς χρείας.

We do not so much need the assistance of our friends as we do the confidence of their assistance in need.

[Bailey] It is not so much our friends' help that helps us, as the confidence of their help.

SV 35. Gratitude Over Desire

Οὐ δεῖ λυμαινέσθαι τὰ παρόντα τῶν ἀπόντων ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα τῶν εὐκταίων ἦν.

Don't spoil what you have by desiring what you don't have; but remember that what you now have was once among the things only hoped for.

[DeWitt] We must not spoil the enjoyment of the blessings we have by pining for those we have not, but rather reflect that these too are among the things desirable.

[St. Andre] Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.

[Bailey] We should not spoil what we have by desiring what we do not have, but remember that what we have too was the gift of fortune.

SV 36. A Model Life

Ὁ Ἐπικούρου βίος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων συγκρινόμενος ἔνεκεν ἡμερότητος καὶ αὐταρκείας μῦθος ἂν νομισθεῖη.

* life of Epikouros, compared with those of others, because of his calmness and independence, might be considered a myth.

[Bailey] Epikouros' life when compared to that of other men with respect to gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend.

SV 37. Natural Vulnerability

Ἀσθενής ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ κακόν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἡδοναῖς μὲν γὰρ σῶζεται, ἀλγηδόσι δὲ διαλύεται.

When confronted by evil, nature is weak, but not when faced with good; for pleasures make it secure but pains ruin it.

[Bailey] Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

SV 38. Appreciating Life

Μικρὸς παντάπασιν ᾧ πολλαὶ αἰτίαι εὐλογοὶ εἰς ἐξαγωγήν βίου.

* insignificant entirely [is he] for whom [there are] many causes reasonable for life's departure.

He is of very small account for whom there are many good reasons for ending his life.

[Bailey] He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life.

SV 39. Balanced Support

Οὔθ' ὁ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος – οὔθ' ὁ μηδέποτε συνάπτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ καπηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν – ὁ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν.

* Neither the one who always asks for what is needed is a friend – nor the one who never engages: for the one trades repayment with favor – but the other removes confidence for the future.

Neither he who is always seeking material aid from his friends nor he who never considers such aid is a true friend; for one engages in petty trade, taking a favor instead of gratitude, and the other deprives himself of hope for the future.

[Bailey] He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barter kindly feeling for a practical return, and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.

The use of καπηλεύει (peddles) implies a mercenary or self-serving attitude, suggesting that such a person is not a true friend, but rather someone who offers favor with the expectation of receiving a reward or benefit in return.

SV 40. Irony of Determinism

Ὁ λέγων πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχει τῷ λέγοντι μὴ πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό φησι κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι.

He who asserts that everything happens by necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that everything happens by necessity; by his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity.

[Bailey] The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity.

SV 41. Balanced Living

Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι – καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.

* One must **at the same time** laugh and philosophize and manage the household and engage **in other personal responsibilities** – and **in no way** give up **the words that come from correct philosophy**.

At one and the same time we must philosophize, laugh, and manage our household and other business – while never ceasing to proclaim the words of true philosophy.

[Bailey] We must laugh and philosophize at the same time, and do our household duties, and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy.

SV 42. Pleasure is the Removal of Pain

Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως «τοῦ κακοῦ».

* The same time is both **the genesis** of the greatest good and **the release** of evil.

[DeWitt] The same span of time embraces both the beginning and the end of the greatest good.

[Bailey] The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment.

SV 43. The Shame of Greed

Φιλαργυρεῖν ἄδικα μὲν ἀσεβές – δίκαια δὲ αἰσχρόν: ἀπρεπές γὰρ ῥυπαρῶς φεΐδεσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου.

* To love money **unjustly** is **impious** – and **justly** is **disgraceful**: for it is **improper** to be **filthily** frugal even **with justice**.

[Bailey] The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly, shameful; for it is unseemly to be merely parsimonious even with justice on one's side.

SV 44. Self-Sufficiency

Ὁ σοφὸς, εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα συγκριθεὶς, μᾶλλον ἐπίσταται μεταδιδόναι ἢ μεταλαμβάνειν· τηλικούτον αὐταρκείας εὔρε θησαυρόν.

* The wise man, **in regards to the necessary things**, knows more **to give** than **to receive** – he found **so great** a treasure of self-sufficiency

The wise man who has become accustomed to necessities knows better how to share with others than how to take from them, so great a treasure of self-sufficiency has he found.

[Bailey] The wise man, when he has accommodated himself to straits, knows better how to give than to receive: so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency which he has discovered.

SV 45. Quiet Confidence

Οὐ κομποῦς οὐδέ φωνῆς ἐργαστικούς οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδεῖαν ἐνδεικνυμένους φυσιολογία παρασκευάζει, ἀλλὰ σοβαροὺς καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα φρονοῦντας.

The study of nature does not create men who are fond of boasting and chattering or who show off the culture that impresses the many, but rather men who are strong and self-sufficient, and who take pride in their own personal qualities not in those that depend on external circumstances.

[Bailey] The study of nature does not make men productive of boasting or bragging, nor apt to display that culture which is the object of rivalry with the many, but high-spirited and self-sufficient, taking pride in the good things of their own minds and not of their circumstances.

SV 46. Banish Detrimental Habits

Τὰς φαύλας συνηθείας ὥσπερ ἄνδρας πονηροὺς πολὺν χρόνον μέγα βλάψαντας τελειῶς ἐκδιώκομεν.

Let us completely rid ourselves of our bad habits as if they were evil men who have done us long and grievous harm.

Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits, as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm.

[Bailey] Our bad habits, like evil men who have long done us great harm, let us utterly drive from us.

SV 47. Defiance of Fortune

Προκατείλημμαί σε, ᾧ τύχη, καὶ πᾶσαν σὴν παρεῖσδυσιν ἐνέφραξα, καὶ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε ἀλλῇ οὐδεμίᾳ περιστάσει δώσομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδότους· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡμᾶς τὸ χρεῶν ἐξάγη, μέγα προπτύσαντες τῷ ζῆν καὶ τοῖς αὐτῷ κενῶς περιπλαττομένοις – ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς [εὔ] ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

[Yarjajakis] I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud a glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

[Bailey] I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

Attributed to Metrodorus.

[Bailey] ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς [εὔ] ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

[Bailey] ...we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

We shall depart from life with a beautiful song shouting out that it has been lived well for us.

The word "παιῶνος" (paionos) is the genitive form of "παιών" (paion), which means "paean" or "song." A paean is a song or chant of triumph, praise, or thanksgiving, often associated with celebrations and victories in ancient Greek culture.

[Vat.gr.1950] ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ πλείονος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς εὔ ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

[Vat.gr.1950] we shall depart from life with more beauty, proclaiming that we have lived well.

CHORUS: You triumph then, brave champion; thine is the wine-skin!

CHORUS: Aye! we will sing of thee, thee and thy sacred wine-skin, and we all, as we follow thee, will repeat in thine honour, "Triumph, Triumph!"

SV 48. Improving Life's Journey

**Πειρᾶσθαι τὴν ὑστέραν τῆς προτέρας κρείττω ποιεῖν, ἕως ἂν ἐν ὁδῷ ὤμεν·
ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐπὶ πέρας ἔλθωμεν, ὁμαλῶς εὐφραίνεσθαι.**

While we are on the road, we must try to make what is before us better than what is past; when we come to the road's end, we feel a smooth contentment.

[Bailey] We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content.

SV 51. Managing Passion

Πυνθάνομαί σου τὴν κατὰ σάρκα κίνησιν ἀφθονώτερον διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἔντευξιν. Σὺ δὲ ὅταν μῆτε τοὺς νόμους καταλύης μῆτε τὰ καλῶς ἔθη κείμενα κινήσῃς μῆτε τῶν πλησίον τινὰ λυπήσῃς μῆτε τὴν σάρκα καταξείνης μῆτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καταναλίσκῃς, χρῶ ὡς βούλει τῇ σεαυτοῦ προαιρέσει. Ἀμήχανον μέντοι γε τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἐνί γέ τινα τούτων συνέχεσθαι· ἀφροδίσια γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὤνησεν· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ μὴ ἔβλαψεν.

I understand from you that your natural disposition is too much inclined toward sexual passion. Follow your inclination as you will, provided only that you neither violate the laws, disturb well-established customs, harm any one of your neighbors, injure your own body, nor waste your possessions. That you be not checked by one or more of these provisos is impossible; for a man never gets any good from sexual passion, and he is fortunate if he does not receive harm.

[Bailey] You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws, or good customs, and do not distress any of your neighbours, or do harm to your body, or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please. Yet it is impossible not to come up against one or other of these barriers, for the pleasures of love never profited a man and he is lucky if they do him no harm.

SV 52. The Joy of Friendship

Ἡ φιλία περιχορεύει τὴν οἰκουμένην κηρύττουσα δὴ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν.

Friendship dances around the world bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.

[Bailey] Friendship goes dancing round the world proclaiming to us all to awake to the praises of a happy life.

SV 53. The Futility of Envy

Οὐδενὶ φθονητέον· ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἄξιοι φθόνου, πονηροὶ δὲ ὅσω ἂν μᾶλλον εὐτυχῶσι, τοσοῦτ' ἄλλοι αὐτοῖς λυμαίνονται.

We must envy no one; for the good do not deserve envy and as for the bad, the more they prosper, the more they ruin it for themselves.

[Bailey] We must envy no one: for the good do not deserve envy, and the bad, the more they prosper, the more they injure themselves.

SV 54. Authentic Pursuit of Wisdom

Οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλοσοφεῖν· οὐ γὰρ προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν.

It is not the pretense but the real pursuit of philosophy that is needed; for we do not need the semblance of health but rather true health.

[Bailey] We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality: for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health.

SV 55. Gratitude for the Unalterable Past

Θεραπευτέον τὰς συμφορὰς τῆ τῶν ἀπολλυμένων χάριτι καὶ τῷ γινώσκειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπρακτον ποιῆσαι τὸ γεγονός.

We should find solace for misfortune in the happy memory of what has been and in the knowledge that what has been cannot be undone.

[Bailey] We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been, and by the recognition that it is impossible make undone what has been done.

SV 56. Loyalty & Shared Pain

Ἄλγεϊ μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος ἢ στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τεθνήσκει· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται τὸν φίλον ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς δι' ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται.

The wise man feels no more pain when being tortured himself than when his friend tortured, and will die for him; for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.

[Bailey] The wise man is not more pained when being tortured [himself, than when seeing] his friend [tortured]: [but if his friend does him wrong], his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.

SV 58. Political & Academic Conformity

Ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσμοτηρίου.

We must free ourselves from the prison of public education and politics.

[Bailey] We must release ourselves from the prison of affairs and politics.

SV 59. Misconception of Insatiability

Ἄπληστον οὐ γαστήρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, ἀλλ' ἡ δόξα ψευδῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ «τῆς» γαστρὸς ἀορίστου πληρώματος.

What cannot be satisfied is not a man's stomach, as most men think, but rather the false opinion that the stomach requires unlimited filling.

[Bailey] It is not the stomach that is insatiable, as is generally said, but the false opinion that the stomach needs an unlimited amount to fill it.

SV 60. Life's Brief Journey

Πᾶς ὥσπερ ἄρτι γεγονὼς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπέρχεται.

[Bailey] Every man passes out of life as though he had just been born.

SV 61. Beautiful Harmony

Καλλίστη καὶ ἡ τῶν πλησίων ὄψις τῆς πρώτης συγγενήσεως ὁμονοούσης ἢ καὶ πολλὴν εἰς τοῦτο ποιουμένης σπουδῆν.

Most beautiful is the sight of those close to us, when our original contact makes us of one mind or produces a great incitement to this end.

[Bailey] Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is great incitement to this end.

Εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δέον ὄργαι γίνονται τοῖς γεννήσασι πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα, μάταιον δὴπουθέν ἐστι τὸ ἀντιτείνειν καὶ μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι συγγνώμης τυχεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ δέον, ἀλλὰ ἀλογώτερον, γελοῖον πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἔκκλησιν «ἐκκαλεῖν» τὴν ἀλογίαν θυμῷ κατέχοντα, καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν μεταθεῖναι κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους εὐγνωμονοῦντα.

If the anger of parents against their children is justified, it is quite pointless for the children to resist it and to fail to ask forgiveness. If the anger is not justified but is unreasonable, it is folly for an irrational child to appeal to someone deaf to appeals and not to try to turn it aside in other directions by a display of good will.

[Bailey] Now if parents are justly angry with their children, it is certainly useless to fight against it, and not to ask for pardon; but if their anger is unjust and irrational, it is quite ridiculous to add fuel to their irrational passion by nursing one's own indignation, and not to attempt to turn aside their wrath in other ways by gentleness.

SV 63. Balance

Ἔστι καὶ ἐν λεπτότητι καθαριότης, ἧς ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιστος παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχει τῷ δι' ἀοριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι.

There is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance.

[Bailey] Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is in like case with him who errs through excess.

SV 64. Prioritize Self-Improvement

ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἔπαινον αὐτόματον, ἡμᾶς δὲ γενέσθαι περὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἰατρείαν

It is necessary that the Praise from others follows automatically, but that [primarily] We should become [focused] on our own healing

ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
αὐτόματος <i>(η, ον)</i>	automatically	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΣ <i>self</i>
γενέσθαι	to become	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>beget</i>
ἡ ἰατρεία αἱ ἰατρεῖαι	healing	ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ <i>curing</i>

SV 65. Self-Reliance

μάταιόν ἐστι παρὰ θεῶν αἰτεῖσθαι ἅ τις ἑαυτῷ χορηγήσαι ἰκανός ἐστι

it is pointless Begging from the gods for what One is sufficiently [able] to obtain for himself

μάταιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	pointless	ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ <i>folly</i>
αἰτέειν	to beg	ΑΙΤΕΙΝ <i>requesting</i>
αἰτεῖσθαι	to beg [for oneself]	
χορηγεῖν	to supply	ΧΟΡΗΓΕΙΝ <i>providing</i>
χορηγήσαι	to have supplied	
ἰκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ΪΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>

Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες.

We show our feeling for our friends' suffering, not with laments, but with thoughtful concern.

[Bailey] Let us show our feeling for our lost friends, not by lamentation, but by meditation.

SV 67. Natural Abundance

Ἐλεύθερος βίος οὐ δύναται κτήσασθαι χρήματα πολλά διὰ τὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα «μὴ» ῥάδιον εἶναι χωρὶς θητείας ὄχλων ἢ δυναστῶν, ἀλλὰ συνεχεῖ δαψιλεία πάντα κέκτηται· ἂν δέ που καὶ τύχη χρημάτων πολλῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ῥαδίως ἂν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίον εὖνοιαν διαμετρήσαι.

A free life cannot acquire much wealth because it is not an easy issue without the service of crowds or rulers, but it possesses everything with continuous abundance; and if by chance it acquires much wealth, it can easily distribute it for the goodwill of neighbors.

[Bailey] A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unflinching abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbors.

SV 68. Insatiability's Trap

Οὐδὲν ἱκανὸν ᾧ ὀλίγον τὸ ἱκανόν.

Nothing is enough to someone for whom what is enough is little.

Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems too little.

[Bailey] Nothing is sufficient from him to whom what is sufficient seems little.

SV 69. Ingratitude's Trap

Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχάριστον λίχνον ἐποίησε τὸ ζῶον εἰς ἄπειρον τῶν ἐν διαίτη ποικιλμάτων.

The thankless nature of the soul makes the creature endlessly greedy for variations in its lifestyle.

[Bailey] The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties of dainty food.

SV 70. Live As Though You Are Seen

Μηδὲν σοι ἐν βίῳπραχθεῖ ὁ φόβον παρέξει σοι εἰ γνωσθήσεται τῷ πλησίον.

Do nothing in your life that will cause you to fear if it is discovered by your neighbor.

[Bailey] Let nothing be done in your life which will cause you fear if it becomes known to your neighbour.

SV 71. Interrogate Your Desires

πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας Προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο: Τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ Τὸ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ Τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;

It is necessary to apply **this question** to every desire: What will be produced **for me** if This, which is pursued **according to desire** is fulfilled? and What if it is not fulfilled?

ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ <i>toward spirit</i>
προσακτεῖν προσακτέειν	to apply	ΠΡΟΣΑΚΤΕΙΝ <i>applying towards</i>
τὸ ἐπερώτημα τὰ ἐπερώτηματα	question	ΕΠΕΡΩΤΗΜΑ <i>asking toward</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
ἐπιζητεῖν	to pursue	ΕΠΙΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seek after</i>
τὸ ἐπιζητούμενον τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα	that which is pursued	

SV 73. Learning from Pain

Καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τινὰς ἀλγηδόνας περὶ σῶμα λυσιτελεῖ πρὸς φυλακὴν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν.

That we have suffered certain bodily pains aids us in preventing others like them.

[Bailey] The occurrence of certain bodily pains assists us in guarding against others like them.

SV 74. Learning from Defeat

Ἐν φιλολόγῳ συζητήσει πλεῖον ἤνυσεν ὁ ἡττηθεὶς καθ' ὃ προσέμαθεν.

In a philosophical dispute, he gains most who is defeated, since he learns the most.

[Bailey] In a philosophical discussion he who is worsted gains more in proportion as he learns more.

SV 75. Gratitude for Past Fortune

Εἰς τὰ παρωχηκότα ἀγαθὰ ἀχάριστος φωνὴ ἢ λέγουσα· τέλος ὄρα μακροῦ βίου.

The saying, "look to the end of a long life," shows small thanks for past good fortune.

[Bailey] Ungrateful towards the blessings of the past is the saying, 'Wait till the end of a long life.'

SV 76. Individual Benefit

Τοιοῦτος εἶ γηράσκων ὅποιον ἐγὼ παραινῶ, καὶ διέγνωκας ὅποιόν ἐστι τὸ ἑαυτῷ φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ οἷον τὸ τῇ Ἑλλάδι· συγχαίρω σοι.

As you grow old you are such as I urge you to be, and you have recognized the difference between studying philosophy for yourself and studying it for Greece. I rejoice with you.

[Bailey] You are, in your old age, just such as I urge you to be, and you have seen the difference between studying philosophy for oneself and proclaiming it to Greece at large; I rejoice with you.

SV 77. Independence

Τῆς αὐταρκείας καρπὸς μέγιστος ἐλευθερία.

Freedom is the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency.

[Bailey] The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.

SV 78. Noble Priorities

Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίνεταί, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.

The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one.

The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal.

[Bailey] The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these, the one is a mortal good, the other immortal.

SV 79. Be a Peaceful Presence

Ὁ ἀτάραχος ἐαυτῷ – καὶ ἐτέρῳ ἀόχλητος

He who is untroubled *within himself* – is also *undisturbing to another*

ἡ ταραχή αἱ ταραχαί	trouble	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ <i>trouble</i>
ἀτάραχος	untroubled	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>without trouble</i>
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	untroubledness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ <i>without trouble</i>
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	disturbance	ΟΧΛΟΣ <i>crowd of people</i>
ἀόχλητος <i>(ον)</i>	undisturbing	ΑΟΧΛΗΤΟΣ <i>without a crowd of people</i>

SV 80. Guard Against Desires

νέῳ, σωτηρίας Μοῖρα τῆς ἡλικίας τήρησις καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν πάντα μολυνόντων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς οἰστρώδεις

to a young man, a Part of salvation is the preservation of youth and guarding from all defiling things according to the desires that are raging

[Bailey] The first measure of security is to watch over one's youth, and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

SV 81. Futility of Wealth & Praise

Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾶ χαρὰν οὔτε Πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος – οὔθ' ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς Τιμὴ καὶ Περίβλεψις – οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας.

* Neither the greatest wealth – nor honor among the public and admiration – nor any other thing of those among the undefined causes reduces the disturbance of the soul or produces significant joy.

[Bailey] The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended, nor true joy created, either by the possession of the greatest wealth, or by honour and respect in the eyes of the mob, or by anything else that is associated with, or caused by, unlimited desire.

Incorrect Perspective

P.Oxy 2.215, col. 1, lines 1-11

...γίν[ε]σ[θ]αι ὅταν καθ[ή]κ[η] [τ]ὸ τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἔλεγον, [οἰ]κεῖον, μηδ' ὅταν γε [ν]ῆ Δία οὕτω λέγεται πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ["δ]έδο[ι]κα τοὺς θεοὺς πάν[τας οὐ]ς σέ[βο]μαι [κ]αὶ τοῦ[τοι]ς βο[ύ]λ[ο]μαι πάντα κα[τ]αθύειν καὶ τούτοις [ἀν]ατιθέναί.

...Γίνεσθαι ὅταν καθήκη τὸ **τῆς φύσεως**, ὡς ἔλεγον, οἰκεῖον – μηδ' ὅταν γε, νῆ **δία**, οὕτω λέγεται πάλιν **ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων** "**δέδοικα τοὺς θεοὺς πάντα οὐς σέβομαι καὶ τούτοις βούλομαι πάντα καταθύειν καὶ τούτοις ἀνατιθέναί.**"

[col. 1, lines 1-11] ...to happen whenever what aligns **with nature**, as I mentioned, is suitable – nor whenever, by god, it is spoken like this again **by the common people** "I fear **all the gods whom** I revere and **to them** I wish to sacrifice **all things** and to dedicate **to them**."

[Chilton] {It is no proof of piety to observe the customary religious obligations — though the offering of sacrifices} on suitable occasions may be, as I have said, in keeping with nature — nor is it, by Zeus, when someone or other goes about repeating, "I fear all the gods, and honour them, and want to spend all my money in making sacrifices and consecrating offerings to them."

[Grenfell] Nor, indeed, even when this further statement is made by the ordinary man, "I fear all the gods and worship them, and to them I wish to make every sacrifice and offering."

Infirm Basis

col. 1, lines 11-16

χαριέστε[ρο]ς μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ [ὁ τ]οιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιω[τῶ]ν ἐστίν, ὅμως δὲ οὐ[δὲ] ταύτη πω τὸ βέβαιον [εὐ]σεβείας ὑπάρχει.

Χαριέστερος μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν ἐστίν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτη πω τὸ βέβαιον εὐσεβείας ὑπάρχει.

[col. 1, lines 11-16] Indeed, **possibly** such a person **at times** is **more refined than other laymen**, but still not **in this way at all** does the firmness **of piety** exist.

[Chilton] Such a man is perhaps more praiseworthy than other individuals, but still it is not thus that a solid foundation for piety is laid.

[Grenfell] It may perhaps imply more taste on his part than the average, nevertheless by this formula he has not yet reached the trustworthy principle of religion.

Fear of the gods is an infirm basis for piety

Correct Perspective

col. 1, lines 11-16

σὺ [δ', ὦ] ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώ[τα]τον μὲν τι νόμιζε τὸ [διε]ληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ [παν]άριστον ἐν τοῖς οὐ[σί] [δια]γοηθῆναι δυνάμεθα], κα[ὶ θ]αύμαζε ταύτην [τῆ]ν δ[ι]άληψιν καὶ σέβου [ἀδ]ε[ί]α τοῦτο, ἔπειτα...

Σὺ δ', ὦ ἄνθρωπε, **μακαριώτατον** μὲν **τι** νόμιζε τὸ διεληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ **πανάριστον** **ἐν τοῖς οὐσί** **διανοηθῆναι** δυνάμεθα, καὶ **θαύμαζε** ταύτην τὴν **διάληψιν** καὶ **σέβου ἀδεία** τοῦτο, ἔπειτα...

[col. 1, lines 11-16] And you, Sir, should consider **it something most blessed to have rightly grasped what is best of all among what exists** that we are able to conceive [for ourselves] – and you should marvel at **this understanding** and you should revere it **with freedom from fear**.

[Chilton] You, my friend, must know that the most blessed gift is to have a clear perception of things; that is absolutely the best thing that we can conceive of here below. Admire this clear apprehension of the spirit, revere this divine gift.

[Grenfell] But do you, sir, consider that the most blessed state lies in the formation of a just conception concerning the best thing that we can possibly imagine to exist; and reverence and worship this idea.

Reason for our Reverence

col. 1, lines 27-35

...σέ[βεσ]θα[ι νο]ῶσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον [μῆ] ὀλ[ιγ]ωρῶν τηλικού[του] σεμνώματος κατὰ [τῆ]ν θ[ε]ωρίαν πρὸς τὴν [σε] [αυ]τοῦ εὐ[δαιμ]ονίαν. κ[αὶ] [νῆ] Δία περὶ ταύ[την] τῆ[ν] ἐν[τε]ῦθε[ν]...

...σέβεσθαι νοῶσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον μὴ ὀλιγωρῶν τηλικούτου σεμνώματος κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν πρὸς τὴν σεαυτοῦ εὐδαιμονίαν. καὶ, νῆ δία, περὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐντεῦθεν...

[col. 1, lines 27-35] ...they intend to worship, but only that you are not neglectful of **such great reverence according to the study** for your own happiness. And, by god, concerning **this which** from here...

[Chilton] [After that you should not honour the gods because you think thus to gain their favour], as people will think when they see you performing acts of piety, but only because, in comparison with your own happiness, you see how the condition of the gods [is infinitely more august, according to our doctrine]

Honoring Yourself

col. 2, lines 1-8

{[πε]υτικὸν} καὶ κεχα[ρισ]μένον, ἐὰν εὐκαιρῆ, τιμ[ᾶ]ν αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν σεαυτοῦ ταῖς συγγενέσιν κατὰ σάρκα ἡδοναῖς, αἶ ποτ' ἂν καθήκωσιν, ἀλλὰ ποτε καὶ τῆ τῶν νόμων συμπεριφορᾶ χρωμένου σοῦ.

...Καὶ κεχαρισμένον. ἐὰν εὐκαιρῆ: τιμᾶν αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν σεαυτοῦ ταῖς συγγενέσιν κατὰ σάρκα ἡδοναῖς, αἶ ποτ' ἂν καθήκωσιν – ἀλλὰ ποτε καὶ τῆ τῶν νόμων συμπεριφορᾶ χρωμένου σοῦ.

[col. 2, lines 1-8] ...and was grateful. If there is an opportunity: honor **this very study of yourself with the innate pleasures of the flesh**, whenever they may be appropriate – but also whenever **by you acting in accordance with the laws**.

[Chilton] [And certainly, by Zeus, {when you practice} this doctrine — the doctrine most worthy of belief, {as your reason should tell you — it is of course open to you to offer sacrifices to the gods. By doing so you perform] an act which gives confidence] and is a pleasure to see, if it is done at the proper time, because you honour your own doctrine by enjoying those pleasures of the senses which befit such occasions and besides you conform in some sense to religious traditions.

Fearlessness

col. 2, lines 8-16

Δέος δὲ μὴ πρόσα[γε] ἐνταῦθα μηδ' ὑπόληψιν χαριτωνίας θεοῖς, ὅτι ταῦτα πράττεις. τί γάρ, ὧ πρὸς Διός, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, δ[έ]δοικας; πότερα ἀδικεῖ[ν] ἐκείνους νομίζων; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς ἔλλατῶν.

Δέος δὲ μὴ πρόσαγε ἐνταῦθα μηδ' ὑπόληψιν χαριτωνίας θεοῖς ὅτι ταῦτα πράττεις. τί γάρ, ὦ πρὸς διός (τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον) δέδοικας; πότερα ἀδικεῖν ἐκείνους νομίζων; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς ἐλλατῶν!

[col. 2, lines 8-16] Do not introduce **fear here** nor the **assumption of grace from the gods** because you do **these things**. For why "oh for god"(as it is said) were you afraid? Perhaps you think **they act unjustly**? Therefore, it is clear that how you are belittling [them]!

[Chilton] Only be careful that you do not permit any admixture of fear of the gods or of the supposition that in acting as you do you are winning the favour of the gods. For indeed, in the name of Zeus (as men affect to say) what have you to fear in this matter? Do you believe that the gods can do you harm? Is not that, on any showing, to belittle them?

[Grenfell] But let there be no question of fear in this, nor any assumption that your action will buy the favour of the gods. For why, 'by Zeus,' to use the vulgar phrase, do you fear them? Is it because you think that you do them an injury? Is it not plain in that case that you are making them inferior? Are you not then regarding the divine power as something mean, if it is inferior to you?

Fearing the divine denigrates the divine.

Comparison

col. 2, lines 16-24

πῶς οὐ[ν] οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμ[ό]νιον δοξάζε[ι]ς, εἴπερ ἐ[λατ]το[ῦ]ται πρὸς σέ; ἢ καὶ χ[ά]ριν ἀδ[ική]ματο[ς] ὑπέιλ[η]φας ἐὰ[ν] τοιαῦτα πράττη[ς] πρα[ῦ]νεῖν θεόν; ἢ τὸν τα[ῦ]τα λογιζόμενον ἐνίσι[ς] ἀνή[σειν] βλά[β]ας πρὸς ἀνθρώ[πους];

Πῶς οὖν οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμόνιον δοξάζεις, εἴπερ ἐλαττοῦται πρὸς σέ; ἢ καὶ χάριν ἀδ[ική]ματος ὑπέιληφας ἐὰν τοιαῦτα πράττης, πραῦνεῖν θεόν; ἢ τὸν ταῦτα λογιζόμενον ἐνίσι[ς] ἀνήσειν βλάβας πρὸς ἀνθρώπους;

[col. 2, lines 16-24] How then do you not consider **the divine as something lowly**, if indeed it is belittled **in relation to you**? Or have you assumed that, **because of** [your wrongdoing], if you do **such things**, you appease **a god**? Or [have you assumed] that **the one considering these things** sometimes **will forgive harms** towards men?

[Chilton] How then will you not regard the Divinity as a miserable creature if it appears inferior in comparison to yourself? Or will you rather be of the opinion that by sacrificing [thousands of oxen] you can appease God if you have committed some evil deed? Can you think that he will take account of the sacrifice and, like a man, remit at some time or another a part of the penalty?

Fear

col. 2, lines 25-27

κ[α]ὶ γὰρ οἶ[ον]ται δεῖν αὐτῶν δεδοικέναι [καὶ] τιμᾶν τινάς ἵνα κατεχόμενοι τῶ...

Καὶ γὰρ οἶονται δεῖν αὐτῶν δεδοικέναι καὶ τιμᾶν τινάς ἵνα κατεχόμενοι τῶ...

[col. 2, lines 25-27] And indeed, they think it necessary to have been fearful **of them** and to honor **certain ones** in order that they are held...

[Chilton] No doubt men tell each other that they should fear the gods and honour them with sacrifices so that, restrained by the tribute they receive, the gods will not attack them

Fear's gamble

μη ἐπιθ[ῶν]ται αὐτοῖ[ς· ὡς] εἴτ' ὀρθῶς τ[οῦ]το οἰομέ[νων] καθόλου μη βλαβήσεσθ[αι] [εἴ]τ' οὐκ ὀρθ[ῶς] τὸ δυνα[μικὸν θε]ῶν τιμώντων

...Μὴ ἐπιθῶνται αὐτοῖς: ὡς εἴτ' ὀρθῶς τοῦτο οἰομένων, καθόλου μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι – εἴτ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς, τὸ δυναμικὸν θεῶν τιμώντων...

[col. 2, lines 28-32] ...Do not rely **on them**: whether thinking **this** rightly, not to be harmed **at all** – or not rightly, by honoring **the power of the gods**...

[Chilton] as a result they think that if their surmise is correct they will altogether escape injury and if it is not, all will be well because they pay homage to the power of the gods.

Fearful Expectations

col. 3, lines 2-4

καίηται. τὸ γὰρ καταθῦσαι βλάβην ἔφερεν ἂν [εἴ τις] προσεδόκα τὸ ἐπιτίμιον.]

...καίηται. τὸ γὰρ καταθῦσαι βλάβην ἔφερεν, ἂν εἴ τις προσεδόκα τὸ ἐπιτίμιον.

[col. 3, lines 2-4] ...would be set on fire. For sacrificing would have brought **harm**, if [someone] expected **the penalty**.

[Chilton] [But if these close relations between gods and men were really to exist it would be a great misfortune, for the effect would make itself felt even beyond the grave after the funeral ceremonies, as soon as a man] was cremated. For then men would suffer injury even beneath the earth and [everyone] would have to expect punishment.

A fearful mindset invites problems.

Expectations of Providence

col. 3, lines 5-10

καὶ χωρὶς τούτω[ν οἱ παραι]τούμενοι, μὴ παρ[ορῶντο, τὰ] σημεῖα τῆς χάριτ[ος καὶ νομ]ίζοντες αὐτοὺς ῥα[δίως πρὸς] ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς [ἄλλους] ἀφικέσθαι καὶ...

καὶ χωρὶς τούτων, οἱ παραιτούμενοι μὴ παρῶντο τὰ σημεῖα τῆς χάριτος, καὶ νομίζοντες αὐτοὺς ῥαδίως πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ἀφικέσθαι καὶ...

[col. 3, lines 5-10] ...and **apart from these**, those who pray **so that they would not pass by the signs of grace** and thinking that **they easily arrive** for themselves and for others...

[Chilton] Moreover, I need not describe how men would have to beg for signs of favour from the gods in their fear of being neglected by them (for they would think to induce the gods in this way to communicate with them more readily and come down into their temples).

Many people incorrectly expect direct help from the gods.

Acting out of Fear

col. 3, lines 11-16

...ὅσους δῆποτε τρόπ[ους πάν]τες πρὸς τὸ τῆς βλά[βης ὑπό]πτευμα καὶ τὴν τιμωρίας] προφυλακὴν ἐγγ[υῶνται, λογισ]τέον, πρὸς

...ὅσους δῆποτε τρόπους πάντες πρὸς τὸ τῆς βλάβης ὑπόπτευμα καὶ τὴν τιμωρίας προφυλακὴν ἐγγυῶνται. λογιστέον πρὸς...

[col. 3, lines 11-16] ...as many as at any time all the methods for the suspicion of harm and the prevention of punishment are guaranteed – then they give pledges. It must be calculated towards...

[Chilton] any more than I can tell of the diversity and number of the methods they would employ because of their fear of harm and so as to guard against punishment. For to speak the truth *⟨all this seems a pure illusion of these people when compared with the doctrine of those who think that a life of happiness exists for us in this world and do not admit that the dead live again – a marvel not less unlikely than those which Plato imagined⟩*.

Many people pray to avoid harm and not be punished.

Biographical Index

Themísta

Θεμίστα "Order-keeper"

Wife of Leonteús. Epíkouros wrote her letters and dedicated at dedicated least one book (Neoklês) to her. She was well known for being praised by Epíkouros for her character and wisdom. She and Leonteús named their son Epíkouros.

Leóntion

Λεόντιον "*Little Lion*"

Wife of Mētródōros. Wrote a book against Theóphrastos. Theorus the painter produced a well-known picture of her called "Leóntion In Compilation."

TESTIMONIA

CERTORUM LIBRORUM VESTIGIA

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INCERTAE SEDIS FRAGMENTA OPINIONUMQUE TESTIMONIA

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...[με]τὰ πολλῆς πεπ[ο]ιθήσεως ἄλλους νοουθετήσομεν – καὶ νῦν καὶ διαπρέψαντες οἱ καθηγητῶν ὅτως ἀπότομαι γενηθέντες. Καὶ τὸ συνεχὸν καὶ κυριώτατον – Ἐπικούρωι καθ' ὃν ζῆν ἡρήμεθα, πειθαρχήσομεν...

With great confidence we will instruct others – both presently and [later] as distinguished leaders who have thus become strict. And the continuous and most important thing – to Epíkouros, according to whom we have chosen to live, we will be obedient."

summa vero Vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est – in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant; hanc ἰσονομίαν appellat Epicurus id est aequabilem tributionem. ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse immortalium non minorem, et si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere.

the greatest Power of infinity is indeed most worthy of great and diligent contemplation – in which it is necessary to understand that nature is such that all things correspond as equals to all things. This Epicurus calls "isonomía," that is, equal distribution. Therefore, from this it follows that, if the multitude of mortals is so great, the number of immortals must not be smaller, and if those that destroy are innumerable, those that preserve must also be infinite.

Sandbox

Subject	ctrl U
Subject modifier	ctrl alt U
Object	ctrl shift D
Object modifier	ctrl alt D
Oblique	ctrl shift /
Oblique modifier	ctrl alt /
Prepositional/absolute	ctrl shift \
Prepositional modifier	ctrl alt \

*** = **

&&& = *

working/extras

x	VVV	x

⇒→

Reliquiarum Quaesitor